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Abstract 
In broad terms, this work aims to gain a greater understanding of the particular 
features introduced in the regulatory set-up by competitive issues and vertically 
related markets. Specifically, we explore their impact on the profitability of the 
market and the p~ssibility for the incumbent to maintain monopoly profits under 
different regulatory regimes. There was a time when utilities industries and in 
particular telecoms each seemed to be a natural monopoly. Most governments liked 
it that way because they owned the monopoly and siphoned off some of the profits. 
Nowadays, competition is spreading in most utilities market and it becomes 
imperative to assess its impact on the tariffs and in general on social welfare. 
We deal with a second degree price discrimination model allowing the players 
-namely, an incumbent, who has a natural monopoly on the network, and a rival- to 
make use of non-linear pricing in intermediate and final goods. In this framework the 
entrant's choice of the customer types is endogenised in a sequential multistage 
game, where the incumbent, who is undoubtedly the most powerful player, acts as a 
first mover. We also show that cream skimming, contrary to the general wisdom, can 
be welfare enhancing. Particular attention is devoted to the access pricing problem 
which is becoming the key issue to the regulators, examining the relevance of simple 
pricing rules, such as the Baumol-Willig rule. Despite the presence of a growing 
literature in these areas, other models fail to incorporate the use of non-linear access 
pricing. Since price discrimination is common in practice this omission can lead to 
misleading results. Our analysis shows that the regulator should not allow 
competition for the low-demand consumers' types or by a less efficient entrant and 
should impose the adoption of socially optimal non-linear access tariffs. Therefore 
the general conclusion is that competition will not obviate the need of regulation. 
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Chapter 0 
INTRODUCTION 
In countries, such as the UK, where previously held assumptions about the 
extent of network industries are being challenged, experiments have been made in 
introducing a degree of vertical separation. Particularly in telecommunication 
industries Oftel has been recently reviewing access pricing and, more generally, the 
whole terms of interconnection (see, for instance, Oftel 1993 and 1995). Also the 
European Commission has tried to open up the utilities market, through the 
intervention of industry related Directorates (e.g. the ones for Telecommunications, 
Energy and Transport) and the Competition Directorate. For example, think about 
the actual situation where Mercury (and others) compete with British Telecom to 
supply telephone calls, but exchange and local loop facilities are, in general, still 
owned by British Telecom. By introducing competition at one vertical level alone it 
is hoped to engineer a reduction in the need of regulation, allowing competition to 
do some of the work. However, can competition (at a "vertical level alone) be really 
considered as a substitute to regulation? This is one of the central issues we address 
in this thesis. Although there is an extensive literature on topics such as access 
pricing regulation and vertical issues, many such interesting questions remain still to 
be analysed. 
The mechanisms derived by these studies establish regulatory policies for a 
finn already awarded a franchise monopoly. This is the basic optimal regulation 
approach, as notably developed by Laffont and Tirole (1993), and it represents our 
starting point. To simplify matters, we ignore asymmetries of information between 
the regulator and the regulated firm, taking advantage of the similarities with the 
case of a public finn, which directly maximises social welfare. In fact, in the 
standard literature the amount of information regulators have is too much compared 
to the real situation, and the moral hazard issue is usually drastically simplified or 
entirely ignored. This perspective is not restrictive since regulation may be also 
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considered as a two stage process, involving first the selection of a franchise 
monopolist from a set of potential suppliers and then the implementation of the 
regulatory contract, when the production stage takes place. Moreover, we introduce 
competition in the second stage of our game. 
Specifically, we model the interactions between regulation and competition in 
a second degree price discrimination setting, where non-linear pricing is allowed for 
both in intermediate and final goods' markets. Non-linear tariffs are a means whose 
aim is to discriminate amongst consumers with different tastes when the regulator 
and the firm cannot directly observe consumers' tastes. This device ameliorates, at 
least to some extent, the problem caused by the asymmetry of information. In the 
canonical price discrimination model a monopolist (the principal) has incomplete 
information about the agent's types, namely the consumers' willingness to pay for 
his goods. He has to design a tariff schedule that determines the price to be paid as a 
function of the quantity purchased. We extend the canonical framework to the case 
of competition and to vertically related markets. 
Our interest in these extensions derives from the consideration of some crucial 
policy issues. An issue that arose in November 1990, \vhen the main duopoly review 
began in the UK, was how to open up the telecommunication industries to 
competition. In this case attention focuses on the terms on which rivals -Mercury and 
others- should gain access to British Telecom's local networks and the wider issue of 
British Telecom's vertical structure. 
There are several relevant policy options that need to be analysed in a vertical 
setting, the most important of which are related to vertical structure and conduct. 
Regarding the first issue a network industry can be vertically integrated or separated 
(a policy of vertical separation involves divestiture if the incumbent starts off as a 
vertically integrated firm). Therefore, we also consider vertically separated structures 
in which the network is owned by an upstream monopolist, examining the 
circumstances under which the upstream monopolist (if allowed to price 
discriminate) is able to extract all the dO\\l1stream industry's profits. 
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Oui general aim is to gain a greater understanding of the particular features 
introduced in the regulatory (and procurement) set-up by vertical issues (more 
specifically different linkages between the upstream and downstream sector) and 
their impact on the profitability of the market and the possibility for the incumbent to 
maintain monopoly profits. In what follows the structure of the thesis is sketched. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the state of the art of the economic 
literature on regulation and related issues in procurement. Specifically, vv·e consider 
in detail the relevance of agency problems in the basic optimal regulatory setting. 
We then sketch the ways in which competition and regulation interact within 
different scenarios. Namely, regarding regulation we take into account regulatory 
constraints on final goods, such as price caps, and on intermediate goods. Finally, 
competition within the market is distinguished from competition for natural 
monopoly. 
In chapter 2 we introduce our approach to model non-linear pricing and 
competition. Following a positive approach we first examine the private incentives 
of the economic players (basically an incumbent and a potential entrant) in the 
absence of regulatory constraints in horizontal and vertical settings (where the rival 
enters at the downstream level). Following the incumbent's point of view we analyse 
the conditions under \\'hich the incumbent can maintain monopoly profits while entry 
occurs at one vertical level. In doing this we also analyse whether it is in his interest 
to oblige the (eventual) competitor by the use of an appropriate access charge to be 
efficient. The case of cream skimming competition by a more efficient rival is 
analysed in detail, as well as its "desirability" from a productive and allocative point 
of view. Specifically, cream skimming competition is endogenised and it is shown to 
be welfare enhancing under a wide range of circumstances, in contrast with the 
normal wisdom. In fact, cream skimming is usually thought of as an inefficient form 
of competition, or it is assumed to be one of the major causes of the unsustainability 
of natural monopoly. 
In Chapter 3 socially optimal regulation is introduced, so that the analysis is 
4 
more normative. Information and incentive issues complicate the intervention of 
regulators. However, the amount of private information on the regulatory side built 
into the standard models is too limited compared with problems actual regulators 
face. Our approach is to leave aside problems of moral hazard and adverse selection 
on the regulatory side to make the problem more manageable and to reveal its 
fundamental structure. These assumptions, which lead us to analyse the full 
information benchmark, are quite usual in the case of a public firm (which directly 
maximises social welfare) as well as in the large part of the debate on access pricing. 
Despite the extensive literature, models usually fail to incorporate the use of non-
linear pricing. Since price discrimination is common in practice, this omission can 
lead to misleading results. Welfare considerations are drawn for different 
specifications of the social welfare function, incorporating also distributional 
considerations and distortionary taxation. We also discuss the optimality of simple 
access pricing rules, such as the Baumol-Willig rule in the original setting and in our 
vertical game. Finally, we look further at the design of other welfare enhancing 
mechanism implicit in a vertical merger. 
In chapter 4 we introduce vertically separated markets. For a long time 
regulatory reforms have gone in the direction of divestitures and deregulated 
structures. Yet the theoretical and applied literature on this intriguing area is very 
little. We first expand the model set out in Chapter 2 to see under which 
circumstances we can get the same outcomes as under vertical integration where the 
regulatory stage involves divestiture. We then model vertical separation in an 
alternative framework that portrays access price discrimination by an upstream 
monopoly towards downstream producers of different types (that is, level of 
efficiency). We complicate the model further by introducing second degree price 
discrimination also in the final demand market. As should be expected, there are no 
clear cut results in terms of the optimal pricing strategy to be applied in the 
intermediate and final demand markets. We discover a variety of different 
combinations of cases that can arise depending on the specification of the functional 
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fonn of downstream producers' costs and final customers' demand. The general 
lesson to be drawn is that distortion can arise not only in the tariff schedule offered 
to final customers, but also in the customers' allocations between the downstream 
producers. Nevertheless, a modified monopoly result applies also in this framework, 
with quite relevant exceptions. Finally, we conclude by summarising the main results 
. achieved in this thesis, pinpointing directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1 
AN OVERVIE\V OF THE NE\V ECONOl\tICS OF 
REGULATION AND PROCUREl\fENT 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of new developments in the 
field of regulation and related issues in procurement. The topics we are going to 
focus on are mainly concerned with competitive issues that have been subject of 
several recent controversies in the UK and in the USA related to the policies to apply 
in utility industries. Referring in particular to telecommunication industries, in the 
UK Oftel has been recently reviewing access pricing and, more generally, the whole 
terms of interconnection and experiments have been made in introducing a degree of 
vertical separation. Also the European Commission has being involved in dealing 
"vith such issues through the intervention of industry related Directorates and the 
Competition Directorate. 
From a regulatory point of view we can rely on the results of an extensive 
literature on the standard regulatory set-up and more specifically on access pricing. 
An incredible number of variants of the standard analysis, early formulated in the 
80s by Loeb and Magat (1979), Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole 
(1986), has been proposed by the "new economics of regulation and procurement". 
In particular, several extensions of the basic approach introduced by LafTont and 
Tirole (1986) have been collected in a very impressive volume.· An alternative, 
more positive, approach to regulation has been developed in the UK by Littlechild 
(1983), Bradley and Price (1988), Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Waterson (1988, 
1992, 1994). New developments on access pricing -starting from the contributions of 
Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983)- introduced the so called Baumol-Willig rule, 
1 Laffont and Tirole's book (1993) develops a synthetic approach to regulation and 
procurement and provides a very detailed analysis of the most recent advances in this 
field A particular emphasis, however, is put on regulation of natural monopolies. 
More attention to topics such as product market competition is devoted by 
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994). 
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recently reconsidered in potential applications (for instance in the case of New 
Zealand) by Baumol and Sidak (1994), Cave (1994), Armstrong and Doyle (1994), 
Armstrong and Vickers (1995) and Economides and White (1995). 
Previous approaches to regulation -which ignored agency problems due to the 
presence of moral hazard and adverse ~election- were partially unsatisfactory, since 
they provided only a very stylised description of actual regulatory processes 
(considered as exogenous mechanisms) and they didn't pay enough attention to the 
opportunity for strategic behaviour on the part of both the regulator and the regulated 
firm. Specifically, the early regulatory literature focused on how traditional 
regulatory constraints induce profit maximising enterprises to misallocate resources, 
contrary to the central regulatory goal of replicating competitive conditions. The 
Averch and Johnson (1962) model, for instance, investigates the behaviour of a 
profit maximising monopolist operating under a rate of return on investment 
constraint (this system being adopted in the USA). The UK system of regulation, 
knovm as price cap, is based upon the notion that transfers are not feasible, so that 
the regulator must rely on prices to perform his objectives. 
In reality both price caps and rate of return regulation may be seen as two 
polar cases of incentive contracts. Specifically, let us consider the basic trade off 
between providing incentives for efficiency and minimising the rent enjoyed by the 
regulated firm, because of asymmetric information. In this context price caps can be 
seen as high powered contracts (since they provide the best incentives for cost 
reductions), whilst rate of return constraints represent low powered schemes (but 
they are ideal for rent extraction). Having noted this, the following questions arise: 
a) do these regulatory mechanisms converge toward socially optimal pricing with a 
limited delay and social cost?; b) are the regulator's positive objectives and 
constraints different from the usual normative ones (e.g. optimal pricing) and has 
the regulator the power to implement them against the interest of the regulated firm? 
Let us consider such questions in a static environment, where capacity is given 
and cost and demand conditions are stable. Basically, what the literature finds out is 
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that rate of return regulation is likely to encourage inefficient productive choices 
and waste. Price regulation, instead, may lead to efficiency in the short run and 
eventually converge to socially optimal pricing, as shown by Vogelsang and 
Finsinger (1979). But the adjustment process may take many periods; in fact, the 
finn may have a weak incentive to reduce costs on the way to the optimum.2 
Another criticism moved by Sappington (1980) is the possibility for the finn to 
engage in strategic behaviour, manipulating the information on the cost and being 
intentionally inefficient. 
Real word is much more complex and static models do not consider the 
evolution of the environment and the relation between the regulator and the firm. 
This leads us to modify question b) in order to deal with this type of problem. One 
specific problem arises \\lith respect to the achievement of an optimal capacity path 
and socially efficient productive choices when the regulator can engage in strategic 
behaviour with respect to sunk investment. In a dynamic framework the previous 
conclusion may be reverted. While the cost plus characteristic of rate of return 
regulation makes its performance poor with respect to short run efficiency it makes 
it desirable in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour and to support an optimal 
investment path, as recently argued by Gilbert and Newbery (1994). 
Notice how the mechanisms derived follovv'ing a regulatory perspective 
establish regulatory policies for a firm already awarded a monopoly franchise. This 
is the kind of modelling approach we are going to develop in our thesis, using 
Laffont and Tirole's analysis as an interesting and relevant starting point.3 In fact, 
2 Using more demanding mechanisms, such as Sappington and Sibley (1988), the 
convergence to Ramsey pricing occurs in a period. 
3 However, the regulatory process may also be considered as a two stage process, 
involving first the selection of a franchise monopolist from a set of potential 
suppliers and then the implementation of a regulatory policy, which occurs once the 
information on the firms' performance is known and the production stage takes 
place. This is the procurement approach. We believe that the auction theory 
developed for procurement can be extended to the regulation framework, so that the 
same modelling structure can be used both for procurement and regulation, 
fol1owing the lines ofLaffont and Tirole (1993). 
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the normative framework developed by Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1990a, 1990b, 
1993, 1994a, 1994b) has provided an important new paradigm for the analysis of 
optimal regulation under asymmetric information. Therefore, it becomes imperative 
to be clear about exactly what their framework does and does not do. 
Focusing on asymmetric information issues the standard distinction is betvveen 
the presence of moral ha=ard and adverse selection (some authors prefer to speak in 
terms of hidden action and hidden information). 4 In this chapter we first discuss the 
modelling implications of introducing adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
standard optimal regulation set-up, showing how, in practice, Laffont and Tirole's 
(1986) original approach does not involve any serious moral hazard issue. In reality, 
all Laffont and Tirole's regulatory analysis can be treated within a pure adverse 
selection model, with no loss of insight. This is true for their basic model, as for 
many of the extensions contained in Laffont and Tirole (1993) and (1994a). In that 
sense it is not a particular advance on Baron and Myerson (1982) that deals with the 
case of cost unobservability.5 Specifically, the two formulations lead to similar 
qualitative results, despite the presence of several differences, even in the definition 
of the regulator's objective. For clarity of exposition, in standard first best analysis 
[Loeb and Magat (1979)] the regulator's objective, i.e. the social welfare function, is 
defined as the unweighted sum of consumers' and producer's net surplus, abstracting 
from distributional considerations and costs associated with monetary transfers. 
Baron and Myerson (1982) introduce the first extension, in a simple but "ad hoc" 
way, by putting more weight on consumers' surplus, whereas Laffont and Tirole 
(1986) follow the latter option, introducing the so called cost of public funds, a 
parameter that affects both terms of the welfare function and can be justified in the 
4 The firm is typically better informed then the regulator about the cost and demand 
conditions in the industry. This gives rise to problems of hidden information (or 
adverse selection). The problem ~fhidden action (or moral hazard) in the regulatory 
context depends on the unobservability of the firm's cost reducing effort and the 
consequent risk of managerial slackness. 
5 The techniques employed by these model are the ones developed by Mirrlees 
(1971). 
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ambit of a general equilibrium model. Furthermore, they also introduce in the 
managerial utility function (which has the same weight as profits and consumers' 
surplus) a moral hazard or efTort parameter (distinguished from the adverse 
selection, which has a merely technical nature). However, the introduction of this 
new problem does not cause any trouble, as both the regulator and the firm's 
manager are risk neutral. 
We then focus on cream skimming and optimal bypass, discussing the structure 
of the approach chosen by Laffont and Tirole (1990b) to model regulation and 
competition in a second degree price discrimination setting. Differently from Laffont 
and Tirole, who concentrate their analysis on socially optimal regulation under 
incomplete information, we present a simplified cream skimming game adopting 
their approach to competition, but leaving aside the adverse selection problem 
(between the regulator and the firm) and also regulation. In this setting we will 
derive all the main economic results, showing that in reality what matters is the 
consumer surplus offered to high demand customers (which corresponds to the 
relative competitors' efficiency) is exogenous. In practice, we have different regimes 
simply because competitors have a perfectly elastic offer curve, which modifies high 
demand consumers'partecipation constraint and not because of the presence of 
asymmetric information or the optimal regulatory structure imposed on the model. 
A more detailed analysis shows that a crucial feature of LafTont and Tirole's 
. 
model lies in the terms of the connection between competitors and high demand 
consumers. Specifically, as will be shown in chapter 2 (section 2.4.3), we can 
endogenise cream skimming competition by combining Laffont and Tirole (1990a, 
1994a) and (1990b), with no recourse to any ad hoc assumptions. In fact, in a vertical 
framework with non-linear access pricing cream skimming becomes naturally the 
only type of competition allowed by the incumbent. By considering the situation 
where the incumbent is a monopolist and the entrant comes in at only one vertical 
level (a common event in network industries) we provide a rationale for entry 
concentrating on high-demand consumers. 
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Having clarified LafTont and Tirole's paradigm, we then mainly focus on the 
interactions between competition and regulation, abstracting from many interesting 
variants and extensions of the regulatory analysis. At first sight regulation may be 
regarded as the antithesis of competition; for instance one may argue that regulation 
simply diverts resources, which have more important alternative uses and produces 
undesirable side effects (such as the phenomenon of regulatory capture).6 This may 
be true in a number of circumstances; however, there are several cases in which 
regulation has a positive role in preserving and extending the competitive process. In 
particular, regulation proved to be necessary in order to promote competition, as the 
market left to itself would not achieve this objective. The role of regulation becomes 
even more crucial in determining the terms of the interconnections between the 
regulated firm and competitors. 
The modelling set-up in which we want to analyse the interactions between 
regulation and competition in the next chapters is a second degree price 
discrimination model -where non-linear pricing is allowed- and markets are 
vertically linked. Non-linear pricing allows to discriminate amongst consumers 
under asymmetric information on consumers' tastes. This self selecting device 
ameliorates to some extent the problem caused by the presence of asymmetric 
information. A similar strategy can be also used when there is asymmetric 
information between the regulator and the firm about industry conditions (i.e. the 
firm's cost or effort levels). A regulatory scheme should discriminate between firms 
with different level of efficiency. However, because firms with different costs must 
be offered the same contract, the firm's monopoly of information entails that the 
most efficient firms '''ill enjoy rents. Therefore, if the profit of the regulated finn has 
a lower weight than the consumers' surplus (adopting the social welfare function of 
Baron and Myerson) or we introduce the cost of public funds there will be a trade-off 
between allocative efficiency and minimising informational rents, which reduces 
6 For a discussion on the regulatory capture phenomenon see Laffont and Tirole 
(1991} . 
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overall welfare. As a result of this, it is optimal to set price above marginal cost. 
A particular interest in vertically related markets derives from the 
consideration of some crucial policy issues. A relevant issue that arose at the 
beginning of the Duopoly Review in 1990 in the UK telecommunication industries 
was how to open up the industry to competition. The existence of economies of scale 
provided a possible case for limiting competition, whereas some competition (at 
least between networks) is likely to be beneficial in order to induce a greater 
efficiency level. In this case attention should focus on the terms on which rivals -
Mercury (MeL) and others- should gain access to British Telecom's local networks 
and the wider issue of British Telecom's vertical structure. Another important 
question to analyse is whether this trade-off should be solved by the market forces or 
by regulation (for instance, by licensing just one or few additional competitors). 
Hence, when regulated firms operate in a competitive environment a fundamental 
issue is the determination of the access pricing, i.e. the pricing of an intermediate 
good that allows rivals to survive with the regulated firm in the final output market. 
This is not a merely theoretical question, as in many utility industries the feasibility 
of access constitutes a "conditio sine qua non" entry is blockaded. 
From time to time the regulatory authorities have considered questions about 
structure (for instance, mergers and vertical integration, and the possibility of 
divestiture) and conduct (i.e. possible predatory behaviour). Therefore, the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of competition will be greatly influenced by 
regulation, and in particular by the terms of interconnection to BT's network. In 
particular, the Office of Telecommunication (OFTEL) commenced operations in mid 
1984, a few months before the privatisation of BT. In the "Duopoly Review" it 
decided that a particular potential existed for competition at a local level, the 
benefits of competition being considered to outweigh the losses of economies of 
scale. At the start of competition BT was contributing to some of the costs of its 
local network through the prices for long distance calls. MeL was allowed to 
interconnect with BT's network without making an equivalent contribution to BT's 
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local costs. This advantage helped MCL to offset its disadvantage from its lack of 
economies of scale in pricing its long distance calls. Furthermore, BT was practically 
constrained to charge uniform tariffs. This meant that MCL could concentrate its 
effort on the densest telephone traffic, with a limited ability ofBT to respond. 
In Autumn 1993 Oftel published the determination of interconnection charges 
between BT and MCL and indicated how to deal with the Access Deficit 
Contribution (ADC) waivers. The ADC system aims to compensate BT for the 
deficit it incurs (compared with fully allocated costs) in the provision of access. 
However, access is meaningless by itself and its utility must be measured in relation 
to the expectation of its use, identifying the costs imposed by losing customers or 
sharing them with competitors. The main purpose of ADC is therefore to discourage 
inefficient entry. Major changes occurred in the market itself. Since mid 1993 
competition developed in all market segments.7 There has also been a series of price 
reduction by BT and the settlement of new prices for new or existing mobile 
services. The interesting feature of these development is that they entail competition 
between technologies with different cost structures. The intuition would suggest that 
customers will segment themselves according to the cost structures of the operators, 
which would also be reflected in their tariffs. For instance, a wire based technology 
characterised by substantial access costs and low usage costs seems to attract high 
users, whilst wireless technologies with low access costs but high usage charges 
would favour low users.8 
Reasoning about competition poliCies requires better theoretical considerations 
on how different kinds of competition work in different circumstances. In particular, 
in order to enhance social welfare, we will pay attention to the conditions wider 
which competition can be welfare reducing and therefore undesirable. Mankiw and 
7 Subscribers to telephony provided by cable television operators .have developed 
and radio-based technologies penetrated into the local loops providing both fixed 
services such as Ionica and mobile services as Mercury One to One and Euro Digital. 
8 This intuition seems to be supported by the theoretical model that we introduce in 
the next chapter; in particular endogenising the choices of the customers' type for the 
competitor we get similar conclusions. See in particular section 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. 
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Whinston (1986) pointed out that part of the profits of entry comes not from the 
generation of additional consumers' surplus, but from the opportunity to steal profits 
from one's competitors. There is no welfare gain attached to the latter. Schwartz 
(1989) also pointed out a second source of inefficiency, when entry reallocates 
output from a low marginal cost incumbent to a high marginal cost entrant. Brennan 
(1991) showed how the similar reasoning applies to a special but common situation 
in which a regulated firm faces competition from firms offering differentiated 
products. To understand his reasoning consider the following example first iIi an 
unregulated setting. Suppose we have an incumbent who initially serves two types of 
customers, earning zero profits (as the revenues simply cover his costs). Assume now 
that competitive entry occurs in one of the markets driving the pricedovvn to the 
entrant's marginal cost. The incumbent no longer finds it profitable to stay in, 
causing a welfare loss in the other market. Under these circumstances, entry will 
reduce social welfare if the consumers' gain from the market in which entry occurred 
is less than the consumers' loss in the other market. 
Let us now deal with multiproduct regulated markets. If the entrant's cost of 
serving the market exceeds the incremental cost to the regulated firm, entry is 
inefficient and is induced only by the price structure. This entry induced inefficiency 
is quite well known. However, as Brennan points out there may be welfare losses 
abstracting from welfare benefits associated "ith distribution, or favouring certain 
types of customers. Welfare losses in regulated markets ~an simply derive from the 
requirement that only the regulated firm's customers are expected to contribute to 
fixed costs. Hence, entry in regulated markets shrinks the set of markets from which 
cost recovery can be generated. 
Competition may be used in order to reduce asymmetric information since it 
provides valuable information about the firm's performance. In fact, more precise 
information about the technology of the regulated firm can be collected through the 
comparison with other firms, by creating between them "yardstick competition". 
Even the mere threat of entry can be used as a sort of endogenous regulatory 
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mechanism. In fact, the presence of an uncontrolled competitive fringe has a relevant 
influence both within the range of regUlation, or outside it (leading to the shutdown 
of the regulated firm), as shown by Caillaud (1990). 
Apart from product market competition, also competition through auctioning 
must be considered. In fact, from an allocative point of view procurement represents 
a major component of the public budget in many countries, so that its cost 
effectiveness is extremely relevant. The dominance of monopolistic practices and of 
arrangements with a single producer may lead to costly rents and overpricing. The 
role of regulation in this frame\vork is to prevent the regulated firm from setting its 
price too far above cost and to encourage sufficient cost reducing activity. In a static 
context the introduction of competition can be used in order to improve such a 
situation and to realise savings through price reduction. In any case, as has been 
shown by Laffont and Tirole, among others, competition cannot perfectly substitute 
regulation; the best that can be done is just to auction a regulatory incentive contract 
able to achieve the second best level of effort.9 Furthermore, the selection of the 
producer (through competition) is just the first step in the organisation of a natural 
monopoly. It should be followed by the aspects related to the production stage (such 
as the determination of the production level and of the firm's rent). In this enlarged 
regulatory context, apart from the further stages of the monitoring and enforcement 
of the contract, in which potential or yardstick competition may playa role (at least 
mimicking the audit process) reducing informational asymmetries, for long term 
activities (such as utility industries) a complete contract with commitment is quite 
inconceivable. This opens the problem of under-investment in specific assets, 
because the added value, generated by the investment, may be expropriated during 
the subsequent bargaining processes. Competition may be helpful also in a dynamic 
context, by providing incentives for investment or innovation. However, even if in 
this case important factors may limit the efficacy of competition, giving the 
9 The auction theory developed for procurement can be readily extended to the 
regulation framework, so that the same model can be used both for procurement and 
regulation. 
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incumbent a big advantage (as investments in R&D), any possibility to somehow 
weaken the monopolist's position should not be neglected 
The struc~e of this chapter is as follows. First of all, we discuss the modelling 
implications of introducing asymmetric infonnation between the regulator and the 
firm in the standard optimal regulation set-up, showing how Laffont and Tirole's 
approach can be dealt within a pure adverse selection model ",ith no loss of 
economic insight (section 1.2). In section 1.3 we present a simplified cream 
skimming game adopting Laffont and Tirole's (1990b) approach to competition but 
leaving aside the adverse selection problem (between the regulator and the finn) and 
regulation. In this setting we derive all the five different regimes, showing how in 
reality what matters in tenns of outcomes is the consumers' surplus offered to high 
demand customers, which corresponds to the relative competitors' efficiency. 
Differently from Laffont and Tirole (1990b) we keep the marginal cost of the 
incumbent fixed, allowing the marginal cost of the entrant (and her efficiency) to 
vary. We believe this framework to be more realistic, since from a policy point of 
view the crucial question is whether or not to allow bypass, depending for instance 
on the relative efficiency of the competitor. 
Section 1.4 examines the more positive approach to regulation proposed in the 
UK, following the price cap literature. Since the main question we address in this 
thesis has to do with the direct interactions between regulation and competition, 
price cap regulation will be introduced in the analysis, in order to explore its effects 
on competition. We then give some hints on important extensions relative to 
vertically related markets allowing competition to appear at one vertical level 
alone, rather than only "horizontally". 
Our focus will then shift to the possible benefits deriving from the introduction 
of competition between firms, distinguish product market competition, that is 
competition in the market, analysed in section 1.5, from competition for natural 
monopoly, described in section 1.6. A final section (1.7) provide a sketch of the 
issues that we are going to tackle in the next chapters. 
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1.2 The relevance of agency problems in the regulatory framework 
In this section we first provide a clear demonstration of the point that there is 
nothing of substance gained by including moral hazard in the form they introduce it 
within Laffont and Tirole's framework. The model may be collapsed to the pure 
adverse selection case. Our point in doing this is to clarify the literature on their 
mode1.10 We do not claim that any introduction of moral hazard would leave results 
unchanged. In what follows we proceed to the proof of the absence of moral hazard 
in Laffont and Tirole's framework: first within the basic (1986) monopoly model 
with fixed output (Q=l) in the full information case, then under asymmetric 
information (in the two type case) and finally extending this result to a general 
framework with variable output. 
1.2.1 The basic monopoly model in the full information case 
Let us consider the basic (1986) model redefining the average costs only as a 
function of a pure adverse selection parameter (i.e. the technological parameter p): 
v = c+\jI( e) = c+\jIW-c) 
where the original cost function is C = c = p - e, as in Laffont and Tirole, where c is 
the marginal (average cost) and e is the effort level (that ,is, the moral hazard 
parameter). Notice how v represents what Laffont and Tirole define as "the total cost 
of the project as perceived by the taxpayer" (1993, p. 56). Ignoring the moral hazard 
problem the disutility of effort \jI(e) can be treated as an additional production cost. 
We do not even need to speak in terms of the manager's utility function, since we are 
only concerned with the definition of the incumbent's profit function. The latter can 
be expressed as the difference between transfers (tr) and costs (v): 
II = tr - v = tr - c - \JIW-c) 
10 See for instance, among others, Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994): "this 
model [Laffont and Tirole (1986)] contains elements of both hidden information and 
hidden action and the regulator is not able to deduce whether observing a low 
realization of c is due to good luck ... or high effort", p. 33-4 and Baron (1989) "In 
the Laffont and Tirole model in which cost is observable, the regulator has the same 
incentive, but the regulator also faces a moral hazard problem", p. 1387. 
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It is then immediate to verify that the induced social welfare function, once we 
denote by S the consumers' gross surplus and by A the shadow cost of public funds, 
is exactly the same as Laffont and Tirole's social welfare function: 
w = S - (I+A)tr +Il = S - (I+A)v - AIl= S - (I+A)[c+\jI(J3-c)]- AIl 
Therefore, in the absence of noise and with the specification of the cost 
function as C = j3-e Laffont and Tirole (1986)'s model is a pure adverse selection 
model, as the original one due to Baron and Myerson (1982). The only real 
difference has to do 'With the observability of c. Here, the newly defined cost v 
(inclusive of managerial disutility) is no longer observable. 
1.2.2 The extension to the case of asymmetric information 
Let us extend the reasoning to the presence of asymmetric information on two 
types of firms: an efficient (j3=j3L' C=CL) and an inefficient one (13= j3u. C=CH)' The 
efficient type's incentive compatibility condition can be written as: 
IlL ~ trH - CH - \jI(j3L-CB) = IlB + ~(j3H-CH) 
where the differential rent of the efficient type (relative to the inefficient type), i.e. 
~(j3B-CH) = \jI(J3H-CU) - \jI(I3U-CH-~I3), where ~j3 = j3H-j3L, is an increasing and convex 
function of the inefficient type effort (I3H-cH)' Since rents are costly, the previous 
constraint, as well as the inefficient type's individual rationality constraint, that is: 
nH = tr H - CH - \jI(j3H-CH) = 0 
are binding, so that: TIL = ~(j3H-CH). trH = CH+\jI(I3H-CH) and trL = CL+\jI(J3L-CL)+~(j3H-CH)' 
Once we substitute these constraints into the expected social welfare function (where 
v is the probability the firm being efficient) we get as in Laffont and Tirole's: 
W = v {S(j3L) -(1+A)[CL+\jI(j3L-CL)] -AIld+(I-v){S(j3H) -(l+A)[cH+\jI(j3H-cH)] -ATIn} = 
V{S(j3L) -(I+A)[cL+\jI(j3L-cL)]- A~(j3H-CII)} + (l-v){S(j3H) -(I+A)[cH+\jI(j3,rCH)]} 
Therefore, the same conclusion as before can be derived: that is, in the absence 
of noise and with the specification of the cost function as C = j3-e Laffont and Tirole 
(1986)'s model is ~ pure adverse selection model. 
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1.2.3 The extension to variable output 
Let us now consider the extension of the basic procurement model in a setting 
with variable quantity. In practice, ignoring fixed costs and remembering that in 
LafTont and Tirole C = (p-e)Q=cQ we may rewrite the total average cost function as 
v = C+\jJ(e)/Q = c+\jJ(p-c)/Q and hence the monopolist's cost function as: 
C = vQ = cQ+\jJ(p - c) 
The incumbent's profits n are simply given by the difference between 
transfers (tr) and costs: 
TI=tr-vQ 
In the monopoly case the welfare function is just the original one present in 
Laffont and Tirole who are dealing with a private regulated firm: 
W = S( Q) - (1 + J.. )tr + TI 
In this new setting with variable quantity following the previous procedure we 
can rewrite the binding efficient type's incentive compatibility condition as: 
nL = trH - CH - \jJ(PL-CH) = TIH + ~(PH-CH) 
But since the inefficient type's individual rationality constraint is binding nH = 
trH -CH -\jJ(PH-CH) = 0 the transfers from the public budget can be written as: trH = CH 
+ 'V<PH-CH) and trL = CH + \jJ(PL-CL) + ~(PH-CH). Hence, only the efficient firm enjoys a 
rent given by nL = ~(PH-CH). 
Substituting these constraints in the objective function the latter becomes 
exactly the same as Laffont and Tirole's social welfare function: 
Hence, to sum up introducing the moral hazard issue (through the effort 
variable e) in the presence of a risk neutral firm keeps us in the ambit of a pure 
adverse selection model whenever we make use of Laffont and Tirole's deterministic 
or stochastic cost function. The crucial point is that the managerial disutility \jI 
becomes ex post observable, once the adverse selection parameter P is observed. It is 
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also worth noticing how linear schemes are robust in that they are optimal regardless 
of the distribution of accounting and forecast errors. Hence, even Laffont and 
Tirole's specification of the cost function as C = (3-e+& gives rise a pure adverse 
selection model. In any case, the presence of moral hazard with cost unobservability 
would not had changed matters, as long as the manager is risk neutral, as shown by 
Baron (1989).11 
1.2.4 A simplified model 
The problem can be further simplified, as we will show for simplicity's sake in 
the monopoly case, if we assume that a public firm directly maximises welfare. In 
fact, in this case we can deal within a full information setting where the level of (3, 
the adverse selection parameter, is known by the regulator who now coincides with a 
benevolent public manager. In this simplified setting we may more easily deal with 
the most interesting problems of the entry of a competitor in horizontal and vertical 
settings and of non-linear access pricing regulation. The basic structure of the model 
presented below will be kept in the following chapters where we examine these 
problems, allowing for competition. 
If one analyses in depth the accounting convention present in Laffont and 
Tirole (in practice, the fact that transfer and costs are paid by the public sector, 
which directly receives all revenues from sales, a convention that we will continue to 
adopt) it is natural to think of a public firms whose deficit is automatically part of 
the public budget. Hence, one may wonder what happens if, differently from Laffont 
and Tirole, we are dealing with a public firm. It seems natural, in this case, following 
part of the literature, to suppose that the manager directly maximises social welfare 
11 Baron (1989) shows that the introduction of moral hazard into a generalised 
version of Baron and Myerson's model would not change matters. uThe choice of 
effort in a managerial model in which there is no ex post observables is thus efficient 
... and the price is distorted from marginal cost only as a result of the marginal 
information ... That is, there is no moral hazard problem when there is no ex post 
observable and the manager is risk neutral" Baron (1989), p. 1379. For an analYSIS of 
the implications of the introduction of different types of errors see Baron and 
Besanko (1987). 
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with respect to the tariff system {T H, 'ln, T Lt 'lL} .12 In fact, the question regarding 
who controls the public manager is similar to the one who regulates the regulator. 
The authority may impose a different welfare function than the public manager's one 
getting a better outcome (especially in the context of simultaneous games). 
Following this line of reasoning we show below that in this case, in which 
there are simply payment-transfers to the public flnn's manager, who only cares 
about social welfare, the model just collapses into what LafTont and Tirole often call 
the full information benchmark. In chapter 3 where we follow a normative (rather 
than positive) approach, analysing socially optimal regulation, we will then only 
consider the case of a public firm even if the results still hold for a private regulated 
firm under full information. 
In fact, assuming that the regulator and manager's utility functions coincide we 
do not have any problem of asymmetric information and the entire model simplifies, 
if for simplicity's sake, one also keeps on assuming that competitor's cost and 
demand functions are kno\W, given that the manager belongs to the same industry. 
However, we still have a principal-agent problem between the flrm and the 
customers. 
In practice, the manager's objective function is no longer given by his private 
satisfaction {the difference between transfers and costs: ll= tr - vQ = tr - C - \jJ(J3-
c)}, but coincides with W the social welfare function (used by LafTont and Tirole 
who are dealing with a private regulated finn) in which the manager's private 
satisfaction II has the same weight as the consumers' surplus. Denoting by SeQ) the 
consumers' gross surplus, the social welfare function is exactly the same as LafTont 
and Tirole's function: W = SeQ) - (1 +A)[c+\jJ(I3-c)]- All. 
It is simple but instructive to show how the very same results as Laffont and 
Tirole may be obtained under the standard and optimal regulatory setting in this 
model, limiting ourselves, for simplicity's sake to the monopoly case, under the 
12 See De Fraja and Del Bono (1990), Vogelsang (1990), Pint (1991) and De Fraja 
(1993) for useful references. 
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following simplified hypotheses. 
On the consumers' side we have two types of customers present in the same 
number N: high and low-demand customers (t = H, L), as in Laffont and Tirole 
(1990b). For the same quantity, the surplus function of the high-demand consumer 
can be expressed as a multiple of the low-demand one. In particular, UH = eu('IH) and 
uL = u( ~), where the taste parameter 9> 1 is the factor of proportionality. 
On the industry's side the incumbent makes use offully non-linear tariff. 
Tt = T(qt)· 
where Tt is the amount paid to the firm by the customer of type t. 
In the absence of entry the incumbent acts as a monopolist and is characterised 
by the following cost and revenue functions: 
C(Q) = v Q 
R(Q) = [TL + TH] N 
where v is the new defined marginal cost function, which includes the social costs 
due to the disutility of managerial effort, and Q = N( 'lL + qH) denotes the total output. 
As before, due to the costs of public funds the consumers' surplus may be 
\vritten as S(Q)+AR(Q), but differently from Laffont and Tirole \ve have a public 
fIrm that maximises social welfare with respect to the tariff system {TH, %, T L. 'IL}: 
maxW*= S+AR(Q)-(l+A)vQ = 
N[eu( ~)+u( 'IL)]+ AN(T H+ T L)-( 1 + A)[ cN( cm+'IL)+\jJ«(3-c)] 
subject to: 
[IRd T L = u( 'IL) 
[ICH] TH = e UC'hl) - (9 - 1) u('hJ 
With full information (that is, when v, i.e. the level of (3. the adverse selection 
parameter, is known by the regulator) W can be maximised with respect to qH and'lL: 
max W· = N[eu('h1)+u('IL)]+AN[(2-e) u('IL)+eu(<m)]-(1+A)[cN('h1+'IL)+\jJ(J3-c)] 
Making use of the optimality conditions for the consumers [Pt = etu'(qt)] from 
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the previous first order condition \\~th respect to c we can write the following 
condition of optimal effort: 
\V'{P-c) = Q Optimal effort condition 
This last condition [that can be also rewritten as ((3-c) = e*] can be clearly 
interpreted as the Laffont and Tirole's "optimal effort condition", which equates the 
marginal disutility of the public managers' effort and the marginal cost saving [that 
is, the generalisation of the condition \jJ' (P-c) = 1 to a model in which the output is 
variable]. Thus, the introduction of moral hazard (represented by the variable effort) 
with full information doesn't change the result obtained in the absence of vertical 
issues: in fact we have some distortion at the bottom, since the value of the high 
type's marginal price is: PI! = 9 u'{Cb"i) = c/[l +1..(2-9)/(1 +9)], being costly to get public 
revenue from taxes. Furthermore, the previous condition [c i.] holds for a regulated 
private firm (not just for a public one maximising social welfare) in the absence of 
adverse selection. In the fol1owing section we also get rid of adverse selection 
showing that the same outcomes of the cream skimming model can be derived in a 
simplified setting. 
1.3 :Modelling cream skimming competition a la Laffont-Tirole: a graphical 
approach 
"Cream skimming" labels the special case in which competition focuses on the 
most profitable part of the demand market served by a regulated firm that is engaged 
in price discrimination. In the case in which competitors are successful, we are in the 
presence of the so called bypass regimes: high-demand consumers purchase from the 
entrant bypassing the regulated monopoly, which is left with the less lucrative part of 
the market ("skimmed milk"). 
The existence of a bypass regime with no capacity constraint (for a high level 
of the incumbent's intrinsic marginal cost) introduces discontinuities in the control 
of the regulated firm, given the reduction in production, because the firm serves only 
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low~demand customers.13 However, even the mere threat of this potential 
competition interferes with the pricing policy of the monopolist (in the context of 
second or third degree price discrimination). In particular, with second degree price 
discrimination the possibility of bypass complicates the incentive compatibility 
problems. The monopoly may consequently call for a restrictive policy toward this 
aggressive competition that serves the Iow~cost and high-return part of the market. 
Laffont and Tirole (1990b) examine this case under the following hypotheses: 
(i) individual consumption of two customer types ('IL. 'hi). respectively low and high. 
demand consumers (indexed by t= Land H and whose proportion are aL and aH) can 
be monitored so that the use of fully non-linear tariff Tt = T(Ch) is feasible for the 
established firm; 
(ii) the surplus function of high-demand consumers is a fixed multiple of the surplus 
function of low-demand consumers (here we have put 9L=1 just to simplify 
notation); 
UH = e u(ChJ 
uL = U(qL) 
(iii) the regulated firm's cost function is linear in total output Q = c( aL ClJ. + aH 'b-I): 
C(Q) = (p-e)Q = c(aL <lL + a H ChJ 
where p represents the adverse selection parameter (i.e. the intrinsic marginal cost) 
and e the moral hazard parameter. The managerial utility function is given by the 
difference between transfers tr and the disutility of effort \jI(e); that is, Urn=tr-\jI(e); 
(iv) competitors' bypass technology allows a positive net surplus only to high-
demand customers and it is always optimal for the incumbent to serve low-demand 
consumers (no shutdown hypothesis); 
13 Furthermore, as Laffont and Tirole argue, in general, the presence of asymmetric 
information between the regulator and the firm, rising the actual cost, increases the 
probability of bypass in comparison with the optimal complete information level. 
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(v) the policy choices of the regulator maximise the expected social welfare, defined 
as in their basic (1986) model; that is, introducing the social cost of public funds, a 
parameter that affects both the consumers' surplus, profits and the managerial utility: 
W= S+}.R-(1+A)[c+\V(e)]- AUm• S denotes the consumers' surplus and R the revenue 
function of the incumbent. We will get the standard Loeb Magat (1979) welfare 
function for A equal to zero. For A close to infinity the case of an unregulated 
monopoly can be derived. 
The Laffont and Tirole model can be stated as: 
maxW= 
[IRd 
[IRR] 
[rCd 
[I~] 
[Urn] 
aLu('lL)+a~u(qH)+A(aLTL+cxHTH) - (I+A)[c(cxLCIt +cxIfb-l)+\V(e)] - AUm 
subject to: 
u(CIt) ~ TL 
e u(crn) - TH~ SH 
u(CIt) - TL ~ u(crn) - TH 
e u(crn) - TH ~ Su('lL) - Tt 
Urn = tr - \V( e) ~ 0 
No particular comments are needed for the individual rationality [IRd and 
incentive compatibility [ICd [I~]constraints since they are the standard ones ([Urn] 
is just the managerial individual rationality constraint). The modified participation 
constraint [IRRl instead tells that a H consumer will not buy from the incumbent, 
unless he is allowed to enjoy a rent greater or equal to the exogenous surplus offered 
by the entrant SH. In the absence of bypass, we may have a sequence of five regimes 
that maximises the expected social welfare, as the intrinsic cost of the regulated finn 
-that is identified with a technological parameter ~ (which represents also the 
adverse selection parameter)- increases; that is, his level of efficiency becomes lower 
and lower. 
Regime 1 is the usual one with no distortion at the top (i.e. the marginal price 
for high-demand customers is set equal to the marginal cost) where only the low-
demand customers' individual rationality constraint and the high-demand customers' 
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incentive compatibility constraint are binding. Only a very efficient firm will offer to 
the H type a very high net surplus (greater than the one offered by the bypass 
technology). Low-demand consumers will be constrained to obtain the optimal 
separating equilibrium. With a less efficient firm (in regime 2) high-demand 
customers must be given incentives not to bypass; so their individual rationality 
constraint becomes binding. Therefore, the distortion at the bottom will be gradually 
reduced as consumption of the H type remains constant. Subsequently, in regime 3, 
both marginal prices are equal to marginal costs because the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the H type is no longer binding. Later, with a further increase in 
marginal costs, in regime 4, the high-demand customers need more incentives and 
the L type should be prevented from buying his bundle. In this way, the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the L type becomes binding and the distortion at the top 
should be gradually increased. Thus, the H type consumption remains constant, till it 
is possible to extract all surplus from low-demand consumers. With very high 
intrinsic costs, in regime S, the bundle offered to high-demand customers becomes so 
attractive that low-demand customers must be prevented from consuming it. In this 
last regime, clearly, low-demand customers enjoy a positive net surplus, since their 
individual rationality constraint is no longer binding. 
It can be demonstrated that in regimes 4 and 5 it becomes optimal to charge 
marginal prices below marginal cost to high-demand consumers. This form of 
predatory behaviour is put in practice in order to avoid bypass and to prevent 10w-
demand customers from buying the high-demand bundle. 14 Naturally, not all these 
regimes need exist. IS 
14 Because the managerial disutility and rent are just a function of the realised 
marginal cost (through effort and government transfers), it is possible to maximise 
welfare separately with respect to the non-linear schedule of the two types of 
customers. Hence, the regimes that we are going to examine exist even in absence of 
the adverse selection and moral hazard problem at the firm level. We will discuss 
this issue in the following section. 
15 For instance, when the firm is constrained to charge a two-part tariff, the number 
of regimes is reduced, since there are no incentive compatibility constraints to be 
satisfied. However, even in this case it is still possible for price to fall below 
marginal cost In fact, if only the individual rationality constramt for high-demand 
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Finally, the passage to the bypass regime introduces a discontinuity in the 
incumbent's high type consumers' demand that disappears. The regulated finn serves 
only low-demand customers, taking an their surplus. This introduces discontinuities 
in effort and in the marginal cost of the regulated firm. In fact, with a low supply 
there is less interest in efficiency issues, and more incentive to reduce costs and rents 
of low cost type firms. In what follows, we will derive all these regimes graphically 
in a stylised version of the model, with no asymmetric information both in the 
unregulated case and under different types of "optimal" regulation. Notice how the 
entrant wiJ] simply serve the high type \vhenever she can bypass the incumbent. 
1.3.1 A graphical representation of the cream skimming paradigm 
In fig. 1.1 the indifference curves (or individual rationality constraint, IR) for 
each type (passing through the origin) are represented in the (q, T) space, where q 
and T, as usual, denotes respectively the quantities and the tariffs of the regulated 
monopolist addressed to each type. The curve IR;f does not pass through the origin 
simply because he enjoys a positive surplus given by the competitors. 
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IR 
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Fig. 1.1 
q 
The optimal non-linear tariffs and bundles (qt, TV ('lJ~, T:i) (under asymmetric 
information) are derived in fig. 1.1 above assuming: a) the social welfare function is 
the unweighted sum of consumers' surplus and profit -that is, in the absence of 
consumers is binding, the firm is obliged to reduce the fixed fee in order to keep this 
type of customers. 
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public fund costs (i.e. when A. is equal to zero); b) the relevant binding incentive 
compatibility constraint of type H passes through (qt, It). Notice how in fig. 1.1 
below an increase in the value of f3 implies the anti clockwise rotation around the 
origin of the variable cost of the incumbent (namely, a decrease in his level of 
efficiency). Moreover. also the lines tangent to IRL and ICH (parallel to the variable 
cost curve) will be subject to the same rotation. 
As the intrinsic marginal cost P of the regulated finn increases we can have 
different non-bypass regimes as shown in the following figures, which are drawn for 
simplicity's sake, following Maskin and Riley (1984), in the (q, 1t) space for different 
welfare specifications, where 1t is the per customer profit. Not all Laffont and 
Iirole's five regimes need to exist; moreover, as we will see, the existence of some 
regimes depends crucially on the social welfare function adopted by the regulator. 
In fig. 1.2 below, following the Maskin and Riley convention, the indifference 
curves (the locus of points for which the utility functions u(Ch., ad and u(cm, 9H) are 
constant) represent also the profits that the regulated firm can extract from each 
customer. 
1t 
q* L q* H 
Fig. 1.2 
IR' H 
q 
In the absence of additional public fund costs ().. = 0), the socially optimal non-
linear tariffs -under asymmetric information- are the bundles (qt, 1tl) (qJ!j, 1t:i) of the 
separating equilibrium for which the unweighted social welfare is maximised under 
the incentive compatibility constraint of type H, related to bundle (qt, 1tf), and the 
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participation constraint of the low type. 
On the other hand, with 'A. > 0, welfare increases if the L type consumes less 
than the efficient bundle; that is, there is no distortion at the top, but some distortion 
at the bottom, as represented in the fig 1.3 below. A similar reasoning holds for the 
unregulated monopolist (a case that occurs as 'A. tends to infinity), which reduces to a 
greater extent the low customers' bundle. Thus the relevant incentive compatibility 
constraints of type H pass through (qE, 7tE). In both cases ('A. = 0, A > 0) there is no 
distortion at the top (i.e. marginal price is set equal to marginal cost for high-
demand customers, so that they consume the efficient bundle). 
7t 
q'i. q* H 
Fig. 1.3 
IR' H 
q 
Low demand customers are constrained to consume less (with contract L 0, with 
qE < %) to increase the public profits (from the high type with contract HO, where 7tH 
> 1t~) which have a greater weight 1+'A.. No problem of competition arises when the 
regulated finn is very efficient and the H type's participation constraint IRi! IS 
between IRH and ICH (or IC~ when 'A. = 0). 
In regime 2 (which exists only for A > 0 or for an unregulated monopolist) the 
individual rationality constraint lRi1 is below 1Cl'r and becomes binding, even if it is 
higher than IC~. 
As represented in fig. 1.4 below, the relevant incentive compatibility constraint 
lei! of type H (which is no longer Iqn coincides with IRi! and the distortion at the 
bottom is gradually reduced as consumption qi. increases till it reaches qt. 
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Then, in regime 3, no incentive compatibility constraint is binding and the firm 
can directly extract the entire rent (apart from the net surplus guaranteed by the 
bypass technology from the H type) with non-linear pricing, exactly as in a first 
degree price discrimination setting, as fig. 1.5 below shows. 
1t 
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1t* L 
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Fig. 1.5 
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Subsequently, in regime 4 the indifference curve IRL cross IRil on the right of 
its maximum profit point, as sho\W in fig. 1.6 below. 
1t Fig. 1.6 
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The L type incentive compatibility constraint I~ is binding; L is prevented 
from buying the H's bundle but enjoys no net surplus while there is some distortion 
at the top. Notice how this regime exists only for A > 0 or for the unregulated case in 
the absence of entry. 
Finally, with high marginal costs, in regime 5, represented in fig. 1.7 below, 
while the incentive compatibility constraint I~ is binding the L type participation 
constraint IRr. is no longer binding. Thus, low-demand customers enjoy a positive net 
surplus. As in regimes 4 marginal prices are below marginal costs for high-demand 
consumers, to avoid bypass and dissuade L customers from buying the H bundle. 
7t 
q* L 
Fig. 1.7 
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It should be noticed how for').. equal to zero -namely, regulating a la Loeb and 
Magat- the points H* and H"" do coincide and we have no distortion in all the 
possible regimes, apart from the bypass one (that is, regime 1, 3 and 5). Our 
conclusion is that there are just three non distortionary regimes when social welfare 
is the unweighted sum of consumers' surplus and profits a la Loeb and Magat (1979). 
We need to introduce the distortion due to the shadow cost of public funds in order 
to derive the five regimes as described in Laffont and Tirole (l990b) with optimal 
regulation. 
Only in this respect the cream skimming paradigm proved not to be so robust. 
No major changes will instead take place vvithout regulation. Thus, paradmo'caUy, 
this paradigm proves to be so robust that the very same distortion arises as in an 
unregulated monopoly, the only difference being that the distortion is not always a 
negative factor. In regime 1 and 2 monopoly tariffs are far from optimal, the 
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marginal price of the L type being higher than the optimal one. 
Let us now examine in more depth the consequences of cream skimming 
competition upon consumers. First of all, notice how the same sequence of regimes 
can be derived as competitors become more efficient (and the net surplus of the H 
type increases), taking as given the monopolist's marginal cost, as we will do in the 
LT game. Laffont and Tirole claim that (if bypass cannot be controlled by the 
regulator) the presence of efficient potential competitors may be indirectly 
advantageous to low-demand customers. Their argument is that, when very efficient 
competitors are prevented to operate, there is less (or no) distortion at the bottom and 
in some case even a positive net surplus can be allowed to the L type. However, we 
must take into account the fact that Laffont and Tirole's model is restricted to the 
analysis of two types of consumers. It is therefore not surprising that the low-demand 
type is 110t hurt by the presence of bypass. 16 
In any case, in Laffont and Tirole's model it can be sho"t'TI that: 
(a) supply to both types increases as the competitor becomes more efficient, and 
(b) the difference between the two type surpluses is greater when the incentive 
compatibility is upward binding. Hence, even if there is less or no distortion at the 
bottom, the differential surplus of high demand customer increases as the surplus left 
to high demand customers does, and, if public revenues are not to be reduced, low-
demand customers will generally be hurt.!7 
Let us now briefly look at whether the rent of the regulated firm is always 
reduced by competition. In this type of model, the production function resulting from 
16 If we just allow for more than two types it becomes evident that some 
intermediate ones can be hurt by the desertion of some others (through a surplus 
reduction). Another case in which low-demand consumers are worse off arises when 
the finn is subject to a budget constraint, since they must bear the losses in revenues 
associated with the bypass. 
17 Denoting by S the surplus functions (which differ from a factor of proportionality 
e) and by T the tariff charged for the two types, from the incentive compatibiljty 
constraint for the high-demand customers (binding in regime i) eS( ctl-I)-Tk - elSe qI)-
ll]=Q we obtain the difference between the two surpluses eS(ql-I)-Tk - {S(ql)-Tu=(e-
l)S(qt), whereas fFom.the up~ar4 binding ingentive compatibility S('ll-I)-l1- [S(qL)-
11.1=0 we get esc qI-I)-Tk - [S( 'llJ-ll]=(e-l )S( 'lli)· 
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optimal regulation shows increasing returns to scale, even if the intrinsic cost 
function is linear in total output, because the regulator is more interested in reducing 
total costs as output grows. Laffont and Tirole calculate the new values of the rents 
left to the incumbent in the case in which the regulator can prohibit bypass. They 
show how rents could be: (1) lower for mediocre regulated firms (the explanation is 
that, as the bypass region is reduced, the interest in efficiency is increased, as are the 
rents of lower cost firms), (2) higher for the most efficient ones (since it is no longer 
required to increase output to contrast bypass in regimes 2-5 and the interest in 
efficiency is reduced, as are the rents oflower cost firms). 
We may repeat their reasoning, taking as given the monopolist's marginal cost, 
and introducing two types of competitors: one efficient (that leads to a bypass 
regime) and the other inefficient. With a ban on bypass, it is likely that in the first 
case rents are reduced in the bypass regime and hence in regime 1, whereas in the 
second case nothing happens (as regime 1 is the only regime and bypass is not 
allowed). When bypass cannot be banned, clearly in the presence of efficient 
competitors the rent-reduction effect certainly predominates for mediocre regulated 
firms. Instead, \\~th inefficient competitors the rent surely increases for all values of 
marginal cost if there is more than one region. Therefore, we may conclude that in 
any case it is always desirable to have efficient competitors because the more 
perverse effects may happen when bypass is not optimal; that is, in the presence of 
inefficient competitors. I8 
1.3.2 The LT game 
In what follows we present the LT game in which we adopt the same approach 
to competition as Laffont and Tirole (1990b), leaving aside asymmetric information 
and "optimal" regulation. In other words, in this section we will also get rid of 
18 In the simplest case of third degree price discrimination Laffont and Tirole show 
how cream skimming may also interfere with redistributional concerns. However, 
even if this type of competition interferes with optimal regulation, it should be borne 
in mind that, by assumption, Laffont and Tirole exclude the presence of any positive 
effects of competition (such as the reduction of information asymmetries). 
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adverse selection. In this framework the incumbent faces an entrant who is perfectly 
competitive and is unable to enter the low demand customers' market. If one is not 
yet convinced that the richness of possible regimes does not depend on the presence 
of asymmetric information or, more generally, that it does not crucially hinge on the 
optimal regulatory structure imposed in the model our present analysis shows that 
this is the case. In fact, in the L T game we have different regimes only because 
competitors have a perfectly elastic offer curve and modify high demand consumers' 
incentive compatibility constraint (by offering them a given net surplus SH)' 
The game's structure is as follows. In the first stage of the LT game the entrant 
chooses the tariff for which she is committed to serve any customer. In the second 
stage the incumbent chooses his strategy, but for him it is always optimal to serve 
low-demand consumers (due to the "no shut-down" hypothesis). The analytical 
derivation of all the regimes is given in Appendix 1. Here after sketching the 
analytical problem we just provide a simplified graphical exposition. 
The LT problem 
max aL TL +aH TH - c(aL 'lL + aH 'h-I) subject to: 
[IRd u('h..) ~ TL 
[IR'Hl e u('h-I) - TH ~ SH 
[lCd u( qL) - T L ~ u( ern) - T H 
[ICH] e u('h-I) - TH~ e u('h.) - TL 
All the five regimes already described in our analysis of Laffont and Tirole's 
cream skimming model and the correspondingly pricing rules (PH, PL, PH and PiJ are 
represented graphically in the case of linear marginal utility u'( q) = I-q. 
Regime 1 is the usual one with no distortion at the top (i.e. marginal price for 
high-demand customers is set equal to marginal cost). It is obtained with a very 
efficient firm able to offer to the H type a very high net surplus (greater than the one 
offered by the bypass technology). Low demand customers will be constrained to 
obtain the optimal separating equilibrium. 
p 
A 
c 
p' F~------~~----~~-- L 
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Fig. 1.8 
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In fig. 1.8 above the linear marginal utility functions u'(q) and 9u'(q) are shown 
as well as the optimal discriminatory marginal prices PH=OG=c and PL =OF>c. The 
quantities allocated per unit of customer are obtained in correspondence of the 
intersection between the curves representing the marginal utility and marginal price 
for each type. The tariffs T L and T H give a measure of the gross revenue per unit of 
customer. TL is simply given by the area COqLE, while to obtain TH the area Hqi-qI-P 
should be added. Net revenues per customer are obtained subtracting the marginal 
cost c: graphically CGIE and HID measure the respective net revenue obtained from 
a customer of type L and H. The H type enjoys a net surplus (8-1)TL (the area 
ACEH) in order to satisfy his incentive compatibility constraint. 
With a less efficient firm (in regime 2) high-demand customers must be given 
incentives not to bypass; so, their individual rationality constraint becomes binding. 
This implies that the distortion at the bottom can be gradually reduced as 
consumption of the H type remains constant. Graphically, while the H type marginal 
price stays the same (PH =OG=c) the L type optimal discriminatory marginal price 
varies between PI. and c. The L bundle the related tariff T L are increased. Instead, in 
correspondence of qH the tariff THis reduced as the related net surplus (8-1)T L 
(necessary to satisfy the H type's modified participation constraint). 
Subsequently, in regime 3, both marginal prices are equal to marginal costs (PH 
= Pi:) because the incentive compatibility constraint of the H type is no longer 
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binding. Now, in correspondence of qH the H customer pays a lower tariff and his net 
surplus varies between the area ACML and ACND. The H type consumption remains 
constant, till the surplus given by competitors reaches ACNI? 
Later, with a further increase in marginal costs, in regime 4, the high-demand 
customers need more incentives and the L type should be prevented to buy his 
bundle. In this way, the incentive compatibility constraint of the L type becomes 
binding and the distortion at the top should be gradually increased. 
Finally, while the L type marginal price Pi: =c and the related tariff T L stays the 
same the H type optimal discriminatory marginal price varies between PH and PH 
below c. The quantity 'h-r increases as the surplus T H till the level ACRQ is reached 
in correspondence of qH. Then in regime 5 the Hand L types' consumption remains 
constant at the levels qJ~ and qL and it is no longer possible to extract all the surplus 
form low-demand customers who will subsequently enjoy a net surplus. It can be 
demonstrated that in regimes 4 and 5 it becomes optimal to charge marginal prices 
below marginal cost to high-demand consumers. This form of predatory behaviour is 
put in practice in order to avoid bypass and to prevent low-demand customers from 
buying the high-demand bundle. 
With very high marginal costs, in regime 5, the bundle offered to high-demand 
. 
customers becomes so attractive that low-demand customers must be prevented from 
consuming it. In this last regime, clearly, low-demand customers enjoy a positive net 
surplus, since their individual rationality constraint is no longer binding. Finally, in 
the bypass regime high-demand consumers' demand disappears and the firm serves 
only low-demand customers, taking all their surplus, without any distortion. 
To demonstrate the existence of the five regimes we need also to show that 
regime 5 is more profitable than the bypass regime. This requires just that the 
average price for the H type is greater than the average cost (at the end of regime 4), 
or to verify the inequality u( qL)/qL >c. In practice. we require: 
u(qL)/qL= (1+c/[l+(ClH/ClL)(9-1)/9])/2 > c 
which is clearly verified for 9 sufficiently close to 1. 
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In reality. for a competitor there are no obvious good reasons to increase the 
surplus of high-demand customers (apart from the theoretical case of perfect 
competition). Furthermore, in a more general model, the type of customer should be 
selected endogenously. on the basis of the profit maximisation and not assuming a 
priori that one type will never be served for technical reasons. The strength of this 
model seems to lie in its weakness: that is, assuming competitors with unlimited 
capacity and restricting competition for the H type all the problems connected to the 
entry and pricing decision on the competitor's side do not arise. Furthermore, many 
complications in the welfare maximisation problem are eliminated as only the H type 
can be served by perfectly competitive entrants who do not enjoy any profit. 
These ad hoc hypotheses lead to the most striking feature of this type of game: 
that is, the regulated firm (which is implicitly assumed to be a dominant firm, in any 
case big enough to fmd it convenient to serve all customers of type L) seems really to 
play the role of the "entrant" for the H type. In fact. apart from the first regime, in 
which he responds to the tariff fixed by the competitors, in all the other regimes he 
behaves exactly as a "surplus taker competitor". 
In chapter 2 we follow a complete different approach to competition, showing 
how, when the incumbent remains the monopolist of an intermediate good, which is 
consumed both internally and by any potential competitors, cream skimming turns 
out to be the only strategy of competition allowed by the incumbent (cf. section 2.5). 
Therefore, in this context cream skimming does not derive from ad hoc hypotheses, 
but is simply due to the vertical structure of the market. 
To develop this regulatory research topic, in chapter 2 we will start from the 
original model proposed by Laffont and Tirole (1990a) and (1994) tackling the 
problem of entry as a crucial one. In fact, regarding competitive issues their model 
turns out to be quite restrictive, as it simply bypasses the most interesting problems 
related to strategic competition. As in the basic model (abstracting from vertical 
issues) competitors are assumed to have an unlimited capacity, and they don't really 
take any type of economic decisions. Furthermore, the perfectly competitive entrants 
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are only allowed to charge linear pricing schedules and also the regulated firm and 
the authority make use of a linear access pricing policy. Hence, it may be interesting 
to introduce the possibility of price discrimination. Since this pricing strategy is a 
more general one, always superior to the linear pricing strategy, it is not clear why a 
firm (and in particular the incumbent) should reject it a priori. 
Our approach will focus on competition and price discrimination. In the 
following section we \\-i11 summarise the main insights provided by the literature on 
price cap regulation, following a positive approach to regulation. 
1.4 Interactions between price regulation and competition 
1.4.1 Alternative approaches 
The optimal regulatory models mentioned in the previous sections should be 
regarded just as sources of insights rather than solutions to any actual regulatory 
problem. For instance, the amount of private information built into the models seems 
too limited compared with the problems actual regulators face. There is no reason 
why the regulator should be merely uncertain about the level of the cost function and 
not about its shape, or the demand condition of the industry. 
Lewis and Sappington (1989) introduced asymmetric information on the 
demand side, assuming that the firm has better knowledge of demand than the 
regulator. They derive in this setting the optimal regulatory policy in two scenarios, 
namely when marginal production costs increase or decrease with output. In the first 
case price decisions can be delegated to the fmn. which can be induced costlessly to 
set efficient prices (enjoying no rent from its superior knowledge). This result 
contrasts sharply with the one established for asymmetric information on the cost 
side, among the others by Laffont and Tirole (1986), where the regulator induces 
prices above marginal cost in order to limit the firm's informational rent. In the case 
in which marginal costs decrease with output, instead, no delegation takes place and 
the optimal policy involves the setting of a single price invariant to demand. This 
optimal price turns out to be greater than marginal costs for small demand realisation 
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and below marginal costs otherwise. Informational rents are enjoyed by the firm only 
for intermediate demand levels (rather than in extreme cases as it occurs in the case 
, 
of cost uncertainty). 
Biglaiser and Ma (1995) introduce competition (in the form of a Stackelberg 
follower) in a model very close to Lewis and Sappington (1988) in the informational 
structure, characterising the optimal policy in the case of constant marginal 
production costs. They isolate a trade off between the efficient distribution of 
consumers across firms and the excess profit, a trade off present even under 
complete information. The conclusion is that the presence of competitors implies 
some relevant constraints on regulation, so that the pricing decision can no longer be 
delegated to the finn. Optimal policies under asymmetric information can be 
pooling, constant or separating, depending on the distribution of the private 
information. 
Another shortcoming of the normative approach is that it focuses on the 
theoretical case of "optimal" (i.e. social welfare maximising) regulation and 
examines only very special situations: we are referring in particular, as should be 
clear from the previous section, to the modelling of competition. In practice, Ramsey 
pricing is seldom implementable, because of the huge amount of infonnation . 
required both on the demand and the cost side (for a derivation of the Ramsey 
formula see section 1.5.3). The alternative approach that we are going to examine in 
this section is a more pragmatic one, whose purpose is to an~lyse the properties of 
regulatory schemes used in practice. Since this approach leaves the question of why 
transfers are ruled out unexplained, it can be criticised as "ad hoc". However, it is a 
useful complement to approaches that assume that regulators have the pO\ver to 
make such transfers, contrary to what is observed in reality. If transfers are not 
feasible the regulator must rely on prices to perform his objectives. Laffont and 
Tirole (1994b) recognise the very demanding requirements of the Ramsey approach 
and seem to reach a compromise with price regulation, proposing the "global price 
cap", which we are going to analyse in the final subsection (1.4.3) on access pricing. 
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The positive regulatory literature has first focused on how traditional 
regulatory constraints induce profit maximising enterprises to misallocate resources, 
contrary to the central regulatory goal of replicating competitive conditions. The 
Averch and Johnson model, for instance, investigates the behaviour of a profit 
maximising monopolist operating under a rate of return on investment constraint. A 
key assumption is that the allowed rate of return exceeds the actual cost of capital. 
The so called A..J effect is basically an over-investment result, as it implies that the 
ratio of capital to labour is too high to minimise costs in producing any observed 
level of output. 
A shift from profit to price level regulation affects a shift of risks and benefits 
between the firm and its customers. In pure theory profit level regulation assigns to 
consumers the risks of cost increases and the benefits of cost reductions, while price 
level regulation reassigns both to the finns. By breaking the equation between the 
finn's actual internal costs and allowed revenues, price regulation regenerates the 
range of managerial incentives for profit maximisation (subject to the constraint of 
maximum price levels). However, price levels erroneously set too low \\;11 
encourage output contraction and eventual withdrawal from the market, whereas 
price levels just enough to maintain the firm's viability \\ill discourage new 
investments. The conclusion is that price caps methods are more likely to encourage 
innovation under certain circumstances, because the firm can keep the benefits (at 
least for a limited period of time); but this may also occur under rate of return 
regulation (henceforth ROR) whenever a regulatory lag is present. A comparative 
assessment of these two methods of regulation and an interesting discussion is 
contained in Waterson (1992). 
Essentially the same conditions for efficient regulation are required for cost.of 
service regulation and price caps. Without truthful revelation and commitment by the 
regulator neither will be efficient. Claims for the superior efficiency of price cap 
regulation over ROR stem from the notion that ROR to the extent that it is a cost 
driven system, does not provide an incentive to minimise costs. However, the 
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decoupling of price and cost under price caps is by no means guaranteed. As 
proposed in telecommunications there is a problem about setting the initial level of 
the price caps and the adjustment formula over time. 
Waterson (1992) examines in detail the theoretical and practical implications 
of the use of these two methods in the US and UK. Following the evaluation of 
Littlechild (1983) for the telecommunication industry in the UK one might conclude 
that if protection against monopoly is not important there would be no need for 
regulation. In sum, regulation would apply only if the industry is particularly 
relevant, or there are substantial barriers to entry. The more recent assessment of 
Beesley and Littlechild (1989) provides several argument in favour of price cap 
regulation over ROR. The advantages of price caps are due to its greater flexibility 
and simplicity but also to the fact of being less vulnerable to the A-J effect. 
Let us now consider very briefly the originality of the framework adopted by 
Waterson (1992). First of all, he analyses some of the distortions introduced in the 
application of price cap. An output distortion effect is due to the fact that generally 
the price cap applies as a constraint on average price over a range of products. A sort 
of A-J effect can arise with price caps, if they include certain cost passthrough 
elements. Moreover, in practice as the price cap formula can be revised over time, 
there are usually regulatory lags in ROR. Therefore, also non pricing issues need to 
be reexamined. Finally, a desirable criterion emphasised in this paper is the openness 
of decision taking which not only is useful in order to ameliorate the problem of 
asymmetric information but also provides the opportunity for concerned people 
affected by the actions of the regulated fum to put their cases. 
A quite general framework to deal with these questions is provided by 
Waterson (1994), who examines alternative regulatory tools to be used in practice, 
comparing price cap regulation with ROR and the approach proposed by Braeutigarn 
(1993). Price cap regulation has been initially proposed in order to ensure consumers 
to be better off, providing at the same time to the regulated firm the incentive to 
engage in cost reductions and quality and service enhancement. In reality, many 
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variants have been proposed and not all of them ensure these desirable properties. 
Moreover, the very real problem has to do with the promotion of competition in all 
aspects of the network utilities. For instance, over time there is allocative 
inefficiency where costs fall more rapidly than the price formula reduces prices. 
ROR could solve this problem; sometimes regulators use rate of return earned in 
order to assess what revisions to the price cap formula are required. 
Another alternative framework would be relying upon the existing institutions 
such as the Office of Fair Trading and Monopolies and Mergers Commissions, which 
cover competition issues in a broader context; i.e. in the overa]] economy. A serious 
problem that we would have to face is that the anti competitive practices are too 
slow. A system that seems more appropriate to solve medium term problems has 
been proposed by Braeutigam. According to Braeutigam's procedure there is a 
constraint between the maximum profit made by the firm overall and the price 
allowed in the regulated sector. In particular, only if prices fall increases in profits 
are permitted. This approach allows to overcome some of the difficulties connected 
with ROR and price cap regulation. In particular, it would no longer be possible for a 
firm to subsidise unregulated competitive activities from regulated, or to avoid the 
consequences of the revisions of a stringent price cap. The only real problem with 
this procedure is that it implicitly assumes that the regulator can observe demand 
shifts and that it is not clear at all how it can deal with innovation and quality issues. 
Waterson argues strongly for the need of regulation in order to promote 
competition, even after the privatisation and/or liberalisation of public utilities. In 
fact, competition is not guaranteed in a framework in which there is still a monopoly 
at a stage of supply. A regulator is needed to oversee access, charging, maintenance 
of competition, promotion of consumer interests, network benefits etc. Clearly there 
would be always present a tradeoff between the losses of economies of scale 
(associated with the network nature of public utilities industry) and the promotion of 
competition. 
43 
1.4.2 Price discrimination and competition 
Let us now examine how the pricing structure (especially when is subject to 
regulation) influences social welfare, in a direct way, or indirectly, by modifying the 
nature of the competition faced by a multiproduct incumbent. In the pure monopoly 
case (without regulation) it is well known that price discrimination has an ambiguous 
welfare effect, which can be positive only when there is an increase in total output 
(the negative consequence of price discrimination is that it induces marginal utilities 
to differ; we will refer to this phenomenon as the inequality effect). 19 
In what follows we will show how the introduction of price regulation (in 
particular an average revenue constraint) can induce the incumbent to set price 
below marginal cost, with unintended negative effects on potential competition. 
Furthennore, the incumbent's response to entry is likely to be even more aggressive 
when price discrimination is allowed. We can then conclude that the presence of this 
kind of predatory behaviour provides a strong case against freedom to price 
discriminate. 
The analysis of a regulated discriminating monopolist of Armstrong and 
Vickers (1991) and Ann strong, Cowan and Vickers (1995) represents the first step to 
follow in order to examine the direct interactions between competition and price 
regulation. Thus, it pays to give a sketch of the main results, some of which can be 
directly applied in the presence of a given scale of entry and no redistributional 
concerns, as shown by Armstrong and Vickers (1993). In the case of third degree 
price discrimination Armstrong and Vickers (1991) show how freedom to price 
discriminate, subject to average revenue constraint, reduces consumers' surplus, but 
has an ambiguous net welfare effect (as in the unregulated case). The net welfare 
effect is negative if total output does not increase enough or the price cap is close to 
marginal cost. Furthennore, in this latter case the firm is induced to charge price 
below marginal cost whenever sufficiently different elasticities of demand are 
19 Excellent surveys on the literature on price discrimination are Phlips (1983), 
Tirole (1988) and Varian (1989). 
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present. Similar results are found with non-linear pricing, a form of second degree 
price discriminalion.20 In this framework Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1995) 
show how the results achieved by the literature on pure monopoly (such as the 
optimality of offering quantity discounts) still hold. 
Average price regulation, being equivalent to minimum output regulation, 
induces the discriminating monopolist to produce a higher output and in most 
circumstances improves welfare in comparison with the unregulated case, as sho\\TI 
by Katz (1983). But, because of the increase in the level of output, the highest types 
face a marginal price lower than marginal cost (a result due to a very high elasticity 
of the demand function). Thus, the negative inequality effect is likely to be stronger 
(than in the unregulated case) and only under particular circumstances it can be 
offset by a rise in the total output. In any case, the possibility to engage in non-linear 
pricing unambiguously reduces consumers' surplus. In fact if the average revenue 
constraint is binding the "average" consumer has no benefit, as he can purchase at 
the uniform price the same quantity (thus, only higher types may be better off). 
Finally, the use of optional tariffs (that leave open to the consumer the 
possibility to purchase at the uniform price) is Pareto improving, as demonstrated by 
Willig (1978). However, this result holds only if the firm faces no competition and 
we are not dealing with an intermediate good. The firm is worse off in this regime 
compared with average price regulation; however, it is still better off, and so are the 
consumers, in comparison with the uniform tariffs case.21 
Let us now consider the effects of price discrimination upon competition. For 
simplicity's sake, suppose that the regulated incumbent operates in two markets, one 
of which is potentially open to competition. If the prices are required to be equal and 
are restricted from above by the upper bound given by the regulated price cap, the 
20 For a technical exposition of non-linear pricing see Maskin and Riley (1984) and 
Wilson (1993). 
21 In the case in which the firm does not offer optional tariff it is obliged to offer all 
consumers a lower tariff, being not allowed to offset a higher tariff for low users 
with a lower tariff for high consumers. 
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firm has no incentive to engage in pricing predatory behaviour, since whenever it 
reduces the price in the competitive market it automatically does so in the other 
market, losing profits. The incumbent's response to entry is likely to be more 
aggressive if price discrimination is allowed. As potential competitors take this 
circumstance into account, price discrimination has a relevant effect on the entry's 
occurrence and on its level. Once we consider the residual demand (instead of the 
total demand) in the competitive market we can directly apply the previous results 
introducing an exogenous scale of entry and putting the same weight on consumers' 
surplus and profit. Hence, the welfare consequences of price discrimination are, once 
again, ambiguous: while the incumbent benefits from the possibility to reduce price 
in the competitive market and to increase it in the captive one, both the competitors 
and the consumers are worse off. 
This situation is analysed by Annstrong and Vickers (1993) allowing also for 
endogenous degree of competition. The structure of the game is as follows: in the 
first stage the government decides whether or not to allow price discrimination; the 
second stage involves the rivals in the decision of whether, and on what scale, to 
enter the market and the final stage consists in the determination of the pricing rule 
followed by the incumbent (with the same price in both markets when price 
discrimination is banned). The optimal pricing rule chosen by the incumbent turns 
out to be strictly decreasing with respect to the scale of entry (a result due to the 
enhanced elasticity of the residual demand curve). It follows that when fixing the 
scale of entry, the price in the competitive market is lower allowing for price 
discrimination (while the opposite is true in the captive market). 
The authors' analysis starts from a situation in which regulation is absent. 
Prohibiting price discrimination encourages entry, since it restrains the incentive of 
the incumbent to reduce his price in the competitive market, so that entry occurs in 
some ranges where it would have not in the presence of price discrimination. This 
result does not necessarily hold when the scale of entry is endogenised (in fact, price 
discrimination may promotes entry). In any case, the price in the competitive market 
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is (weakly) reduced as a conseguence of price discrimination. 
Even allowing for average revenue regulation, welfare effects still remain 
ambiguous. Price discrimination hurts consumers in the captive market (as higher 
prices are charged by the incumbent), while it favours the ones in the competitive 
market. However, regulation makes entry less deSirable, by constraining price 
directly. In particular, the larger the scale of entry. the lower is the price in the 
competitive market, because higher prices can be charged in the captive market. 
Thus, pricing below marginal costs may become profitable, under certain conditions. 
Price cap regulation eliminates this anti competitive behaviour. 
The deSirability of allowing for more competition (given the incumbent's 
optimal response) is another important question, whose answer remains ambiguous. 
In the unregulated context the benefits of customers in the competitive market may 
offset the incumbent's profit losses (due to a sort of business stealing effect) if the 
entrant's supply function is sufficiently elastic or if she is the most efficient 
producer. This latter case may still hold in the presence of regulation, even if entry 
becomes less desirable, because prices are already directly constrained 
While in Laffont and Tirole (1990b) with second degree price discrimination 
the incumbent's predatory behaviour arises in order to avoid the potential danger of 
cream skimming by inefficient competitors, in Armstrong and Vickers (1993) even 
more efficient competitors may be thwarted, due to the presence of average price 
regulation. In fact, this anti competitive strategy chosen by the incumbent would not 
be optimal without regulation or with separate price caps. This latter type of 
regulation on the price structure has also the same advantageous features as optional 
pricing regulation. Some interesting issues related to regulation of the price structure 
(rather than the price level) are discussed by Ireland (1992) who shows that a welfare 
gain can be achieved in the presence of a restriction of the relative prices a 
monopolist can charge for a range of products in a model with linear demands and 
constant variable costs. His contribution can be also interpreted in terms of price 
discrimination, referring to Ireland (1991). In particular, the policy implication 
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would be that bans to price discrimination can be welfare enhancing, a conlusion in 
line with the results of Armstrong and Vickers. Sappington and Sibley (1992) 
consider in a dynamic context the incentives for the firm to engage in strategic non-
linear pricing under price cap regulation (arising because of the intertemporal 
linkage introduced in calculating the average revenue) and propose some 
implementations (in practice leading to lower levels for the price cap) able to 
eliminate such incentives. 
At this point it is worth examining further complications which arise in 
vertically related markets, focusing on regulation of the terms of access in network 
industries. 
1.4.3 Access pricing regulation 
When regulated finns operate in a competitive environment an important issue 
is the determination of the access pricing, i.e. the pricing of an intermediate good 
that allows rivals to survive with the regulated firm in the final output market. This is 
not a merely theoretical question, as in many utility industries the feasibility of 
access constitutes a "conditio sine qua non" entry is blockaded. A complete 
treatment of this problem includes the possibility of divestiture of the integrated finn 
by the regulator. The regulator can in fact break up the integrated firm in order to 
avoid favourable treatment of internal consumers, and at the same time reduce a line 
of business, to prevent the supplier of the input from reintegrating once again with 
the competitive sector. In this case, it is essential to perform a cost-benefit analysis 
to ensure that the eventual coordination failure (and expropriation of specific 
investment) does not overcome the benefits due to greater opportunities of regulation 
and a reduction of the discriminatory policy towards previous competitors. 
Ignoring this possibility and incentive issues, Laffont and Tirole's approach 
allows us to compute the pricing rules, using the standard Ramsey principles, 
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interpreting the intennediate and the final output as substitutes.22 In this framework 
it is easy to extend the standard analysis to examine predatory behaviour by the 
regulated firm, through high access pricing. 
The regulator can perfectly check the presence of this sort of predatory 
behaviour only if the regulated firm and its competitors have the same technical 
requirement for the intennediate good, i.e. there is no need to create new· 
infrastructure or facilities to connect the competitors with the existing network. 
When the regulated finn cannot falsely claim a higher access price, without being 
hurt in the final goods market, the input price exceeds the marginal cost of providing 
access even at the full information benchmark. Furthermore, with asymmetric 
information, it is optimal to increase access price, due to the incentive correction 
associated with the network activity. However, the same is true for the price of the 
final good produced by the regulated firm. 
In the network expansion case, instead, less access is given than under the full 
information benchmark, a result (too little competition) that seems to clash with the 
one obtained in the analysis of the optimal bypass (excessive competition), discussed 
in section 1.3. However, the difference in these results is easily explained: here, the 
rise in the cost of the intermediate good (due to incentive issues) hurts competitors, 
whereas, in the bypass problem, it is directly transferred to the consumers, through 
higher prices in the final output, which in tum favours competitors. 
Laffont and Tirole (1994a) extend the previous analysis considering limitations 
on regulatory instruments, showing how the separation of the regulatory functions 
from the taxation's ones creates difficulties in the presence of bypass. The 
determination of the access price involves a trade off between limiting inefficient 
bypass and contributing to budget balance. Therefore, it is clear that if the regulator 
is unable to tax in order to raise funds to cover the firm's fixed costs then only a 
22 This interpretation can be justified given that the fringe makes no profit (so that 
the shadow social cost attached to their profit is irrelevant). The access price is not 
only greater than the marginal cost, but also of the one provided by the application of 
the Ramsey rule. 
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rough balance between these two conflicting objectives may be reached. They also 
examine the optimality of the efficiency component pricing rule. henceforth labeled 
as the Baumol-Willig rule. According to this rule, charges should be set equal to the 
marginal cost of access plus a term which reflects the opportunity cost of entry. 
Armstrong and Vickers (1995) define the concept of opportunity cost of entry under 
different assumptions about supply conditions, bypass and possibility of substitution 
in a model in which both prices and output are exogenously given -following the 
approach of Armstrong and Doyle (1994) and abstracting from information and 
incentive problems. They conclude that opportunity costs are often lower than those 
implied by the application of a simple price margin rule. 
LatTont and Tirole (1994b) show how Ramsey pricing can be obtained by 
imposing a global price cap -global -i.e. a cap including access as a fmal good- on 
the incumbent, with weights exogenously determined and proportional to the goods' 
forecasted quantities. They criticise the use of a partial price cap together with the 
efficient component pricing rule, since it provides a form of subsidy to non 
competitive segments (in the sense that access charge are considered too high). 
A more detailed discussion of optimal access pricing regulation is provided in 
chapter 3. In particular, we will explore within our framework: (a) the necessity that 
entry may be allowed only if an amount, which reflects the opportunity cost of entry 
incurred by the public incumbent, is paid. (b) the idea to exploit the merger's 
efficiency enhancing properties, or more precisely the more general idea of 
"internalisation" (of which the merger represents a specific application). As will be 
shmvn, the first point \\ill prove quite relevant with all the welfare function 
specifications and with some welfare functions a strictly more efficient competitor 
(able to pay an amount greater than the opportunity cost of entry) may be required. 
In the following sections we reconsider the scope for promoting competition, 
distinguishing competition in the product market from bidding/or the market. 
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1.S Interactions between competition in the market and regulation 
1.5.1 The use of yardstick competition as a regulatory means 
Competition, providing information about the firm's performance, may play an 
important role in reducing asymmetric information, as well as other types of 
regulatory failures. As the literature on optimal regulation under asymmetric 
information has shown, the regulated firm enjoys rents from private information 
about its technology. In other words, the firm can be seen as an informational 
monopoly opposed to a natural monopoly (arising for instance due to the presence of 
increasing returns to scale). An obvious way of collecting more precise information 
about the technology of the regulated firm is through the comparison with other 
firms. This is the concept that is at the basis of the formulation of so called 
"yardstick competition". 
We will first consider yardstick competition as a regulatory system: as shown 
by Shleifer (1985) the regulator can force firms serving different markets to 
effectively compete in cost reduction.23 The structure of the game is as follows: the 
regulator proposes his pricing rule; firms then invest in cost reduction and the 
regulator observes their cost level and relative effort to achieve such reductions. The 
regulator, by setting the price and the lump sum transfer respectively equal to the 
average marginal cost and the average effort level of all the other fmns. can reach 
the first best solution. These average values are used as yardsticks against which 
each firm's performance is compared, so that each firm is assigned its own "shadow 
firm". 
The promotion of competition through regulation offers in this way the 
opportunity of combining inlemal and allocative efficiency. The first version of the 
model makes the unrealistic hypothesis that firms operate in identical environments 
and in the absence of uncertainty. However, the model can be extended to 
accommodate the presence of heterogeneity, if the regulator correctly observes the 
13 If the regulator can credibly threaten to make inefficient firm incur losses, 
yardstick competition can lead to the first best solution. 
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diversity, through a statistical inference. 
Shleifer's conclusions, generalised in the ambit of incentive theory, lead to a 
very strong result: under the hypotheses of risk neutrality, no bankruptcy problems 
and (appropriately) correlated information extracting the firm's rent is costless, so 
that fixed price contracts are optimal. For a rigorous proof of this result, the classical 
reference is Cremer and McLean (1985). Specifically, Cremer and McLean impose 
appropriate rank conditions on the conditional distribution functions, which 
determine a particular stochastic structure. In this context, the first best solution can 
be obtained as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. More intuitively, any level of 
correlation of types between firms leads to a situation where de facto all information 
becomes common knowledge. 
One possible way to escape from this extreme result is to assume the presence 
of two kinds of shocks, an aggregate and an idiosyncratic one (whose sum constitutes 
the technological parameter of each firm). In this framework it is the aggregate 
shock that can be treated as the common knowledge's factor. and can therefore be 
elicited costlessly by the regulator. as in Auriol and Laffont (1992). Lockwood 
(1995) points out that this mechanism which leads to a first best solution may cause 
the violation of the consumers' participation constraint (in particular when the 
correlation is low), due to the presence of transfers from consumers to the firm in 
some particular states of the world 
Even in this new context (in the presence of two kinds of shocks), the relative 
performance of the agents plays a useful role. since it can provide a better indicator 
of their individual efforts, while controlling for the effect of common aggregate 
shocks. Holmstrom's (1982) sufficient statistic condition implies that relative 
performance evaluation has a value whenever the agents face common uncertainties, 
so that the performance of one agent provides information about another agent's state 
of uncertainty. This is because relative performance evaluation provides insurance 
against random events that affect in a similar way the agents and are beyond their 
control. 
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The optimal incentive scheme with many agents, as derived in Mookberjee 
(1984), consists in the general case of a combination of schemes based on 
individualised and relative performance indicators. Naturally, in the presence of 
merely idiosyncratic shocks the regulator finds it optimal to regulate individually, 
while in the opposite case, in which only aggregate shocks are present, the first best 
solution can be achieved through a fixed-price contract based on relative 
performance comparisons. 
Many of the insights in the literature of tournaments, such as Green and Stokey 
(1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), are just an application of Holmstrom's 
result. Potential collusion between firms can in theory constitute a relevant limitation 
to the use of yardstick competition. In particular, rank-orde~ tournaments may suffer 
from this problem and may be unusable in some situations. 
There are several possible extensions of the analysis. For instance, we can deal 
with organisational design issues, discussed by Auriol and LatTont (1992), Dana 
(1993) and Dana and Spier (1994). Auriol and LatTont (1992) examine the optimal 
industry structure, isolating some relevant etTects -apart from the yardstick effect 
already considered in detail above- which may favour a duopoly structure compared 
with a monopoly: 
1) the sampling effect, that is the achievement of a higher probability of small 
marginal costs, particularly valuable when the technologies are very risky; 
2) the complementary effect, arising from a larger product space associated with the 
imperfect substitutability; 
3) the information effect, which favours the duopoly structure only under particular 
circumstances. Specifically, it introduces an additional cost which favour duopoly 
if it grows in a linear way with production (if the market structure is chosen ex 
post, otherwise it must grow faster than production in order to favour duopoly). 
The disadvantage of the duopoly structure is that it involves duplication of 
fixed costs. 
Notice how if firms are identical the sampling effect has no value. Auriol and 
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Laffont (1992) model practically collapses to Shleifer's (1985) one. In fact, 
whenever the Cremer and McLean condition is fulfilled the regulator can capture all 
the information rents. On the other side side if firms' characteristics are 
stochastically independent monopoly is favoured under incomplete information, 
since the sampling effect is weakened. 
Dana and Spier (1994) explore the optimal mechanism for auctioning 
production rights in a setting in which the market structure is endogenous. They 
conclude that duopoly is implemented less often under incomplete information (than 
under complete information). This is basically because incomplete information 
introduces a bias toward less competition, since the private information about the 
production rights is likely to be correlated with the benefits to increase the 
competitive structure of the market. 
We must also be aware of the possibility of breaking up an integrated firm in 
order to enhance the advantages brought by the introduction of yardstick competition 
(if such advantages are not offset by the duplication of fixed costs). Furthermore, the 
multi-task issue introduces further distortions. We believe that an important 
development can be made folIo\\'ing the lines of HolmstrOm and Milgrom (1991) by 
introducing multidimensional efforts in the basic model of yardstick competition. 
Finally, in a dynamic context matters become more complicated With the 
introduction of the ratchet effect -a kind of implicit incentive, which implies the 
dampening ofa firm's incentive to reduce costs, because of the anticipation of future 
price reductions- yardstick competition can be undesirable. Meyer and Vickers 
(1995) discuss this question, showing the relevance of the information structure of 
the model. Specifically, in a two periods set-up, an increase in the weight on the first 
period performance in forming expectation makes yardstick competition hannful. 
The intuition is that the larger is the agent's bargaining power in the second period 
the stronger becomes the ratchet effect. 
We have already discussed the msurance effect brought by comparative 
performance information, which allows explicit incentives to be provided at lower 
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costs (in term of risk). In a simple dynamic model where no explicit incentives can 
be addressed (the agent being risk neutral) the crucial variable to look is the 
correlation between firms' types relative to the correlation of transitory shocks 
affecting the firms' performance. Depending on the size of this variable, yardstick 
competition can either increase or decrease social welfare. In particular, the ratchet 
effect becomes less relevant if the correlation between firms' types is greater than 
the one relative to the shocks, so that the insurance effect outweighs it. In a more 
complex set up in which both implicit and explicit incentives can be designed Meyer 
and Vicker (1995) show that if risk aversion is not too important and the 
intertemporal linkage is not too strong yardstick competition, or more generally 
comparative performance information, is welfare enhancing. 
1.5.2 The effect o/product market competition on regulation 
Apart from yardstick competition, product market competition interacts with 
regulation in many other ways. In particular, neglecting distortions in the pricing rule 
of the regulated firm, a positive question examined at the end of this section, we can 
first consider competitors as a price-taker fringe, assuming, for instance, the 
existence of small costs and/or delays in entry. 
Under conditions of cost unobservability [following the approach pioneered by 
Baron and Myerson (1982)] Caillaud (1990) emphasises the gains that can be 
achieved through the threat of entry, used as an endogenous regulatory mechanism. 
The presence of this uncontrolled competitive fringe has a relevant influence either 
within the range of regulation, leading to the reduction in the rents of the regulated 
firm, or outside this range, .. vith the shutdown of the regulated firm (if the fringe is 
more efficient than the regulated firm). In particular, it is the correlation between the 
unit cost of the regulated finn and the fringe that can be used to save on costly 
transfers, through the entry's threat. But, even in the case of stochastic 
independence, the ex post price which prevails will be lower than the implicit price 
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chosen by the regulator.14 Hence, not only do consumers benefit, but also the 
regulator, as he can reduce the amount of transfers. 25 Biglaiser and Ma's (1995) in a 
similar perspective, i.e. introducing uncertainty on the demand (rather than on the 
cost of the regulated finn), model the entrant as a Stackelberg follower (instead ofa 
competitive fringe). 
Although there are several analogies with the models presented by Anton and 
Yao (1987) and Demski et at. (1987), analysed in section 1.6.2, this approach is very 
different from the second sourcing lit~rature. In fact, the regulator cannot contract 
with the fringe and cannot exercise any power of control on it. Nevertheless, the 
presence of a competitive fringe, that represents the role of market forces, is welfare 
improving. Therefore, it could be argued that not only has competition direct effects, 
that interact with the incentive of the firm [as already shown in the previous 
subsection], but also it may limit the consequences of some regulatory failures, such 
as asymmetric infonnation, as well as problems of regulatory capture and credibility. 
Let us finally tackle the distortions in the pricing rule arising from the 
introduction of competition. Assuming cost observability and incentive-pricing 
dichotomy,26 we will follow Laffont and Tirole (1990a) in the derivation of the 
modified Ramsey elasticity formulas in the presence of competition (in the fonn of a 
competitive fringe). The well known Ramsey elasticity formula derived from welfare 
maximisation, [where social welfare is defined as is the Laffont and Tirole's (1986) 
basic model, i.e. W = S - (1 +A)tr +Um] holding for each product is: 
L = (All +A) 11" 
where L = (p-c }/p is the Lerner index and" = -( qlp )dqldp is the elasticity of demand 
24 However, the price distortion of the regulated firm may increase or decrease with 
respect to the unregulated case. 
2S Lockwood (1995) examines the case in which transfers are ruled out. 
26 For a one dimensional cost reducing activity (e)~ the incentive-pricing dichotomy 
holds if and only if the cost function is separable C=C(H( c, e}, q); that is, changing 
the production output (q) does not affect the extent to which the firm can transform 
productivity increases into rents. 
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The interpretation of this fonnula is straightforward as the price mark up is 
inversely related to the elasticity of demand The correction term (All+A) measures 
the relative cost of transfer. Note also how the foundation of the shadow cost of 
public funds and taxation can be found in a general equilibrium analysis," in which 
regulation can be used as a substitute for a perfect taxation system (which does not 
exist in the real world). Two special cases can be easily derived when this factor 
does not appear: 
1) marginal cost pricing (p = c) by setting A equal to zero (that is, leaving aside 
distortionary taxation)~ 
2) monopoly pricing (L = 1/11) by letting A go to infinity (that is, assuming a very 
high shadow cost of public funds). 
In order to simplify matters and ignore incentive issues, in contrast to the 
previous model, perfect information about competitors and 110 correlation between 
technologies are assumed. The competitor is assumed to produce an imperfect 
substitute (n+ 1) of the incumbent's product (n), her cost function being common 
knowledge. 
We can distinguish t\'vO situations according to whether or not the fringe is 
regulated. In the presence of an unregulated fringe, the optimal price decision can be 
delegated to the regulated firm, who correctly reasons in terms of the net residual 
demand. The relevant net elasticity, is equal to the ordinary one in the case of 
simultaneous competition in prices: 
Ln=()Jl+A) lI11n 
It is instead lower for strategic complements (that is, for a positive value of the 
fringe's price reaction: Ef = (dpn+/dpn)/(Pn+l/Pn» 0) and demand substitutes (i.e. 
when the cross elasticity between nand n+ 1 is positive: 1111, n+t > 0) in the case of 
sequential competition, as is evident from the following equation: 
Ln = (All +A) [lI(11n -1111, n+t Ec)] 
The conclusions in the presence of regulated competition are completely 
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different, because of the presence of an externality associated with a change in the 
consumption of the fringe's good In particular, because of the general hypothesis 
that the shadow price of public funds is independent of firms' costs, the optimal 
pricing rule would be as if the two firms were merged. In this case the superelasticity 
formula of Boiteux will do the job: 
Lu=(All+A) 111;0 
where 1; n = 11110 [1+(Pn+1Qn+l/Pnqn) (11n+I, J11n)]/[l - (11~, n+l11n+I, J11n11n+I)] is the 
superelasticity of demand 
Finally, Laffont and Tirole (1990a) extend the analysis to the cases of a 
competitor '"ith 'market power' and subsidised competitors. The regulated firm in 
both cases attempts to manipUlate the demand for unregulated goods, raising its price 
above the Ramsey price in the first case, lowering it in the second. In fact, the 
presence of a competitor endowed with market power involves a sub-optimal level of 
production and enhances the consumption of the regulated finn's product if the goods 
are demand substitutes. So, under simultaneous competition (given the monopoly 
price) a higher price is optimal because it encourages demand for the monopolised 
product, raising its consumption. 
Lu = (All+A) 1I11n +(Pn+lQn+l)11n+I,n l (PnQn)(l+A) llnlln+l 
In the case of sequential competition two strategic effects are introduced: first, 
assuming strategic complementarity in prices, there is a further distortion in the 
pricing of the competitor's products (an effect that tends to reduce the Ramsey 
index, being captured by the term lln, n+l &) and an increase in the revenue of the 
regulated firm (effect that goes the other way round, provided the first effect does 
not lead to charge a price below marginal cost) brought by the term (1 - lln. n+l&/lln) as 
shown by the following formula: 
La = (All +A) 1/11n +[Pn+lCln+l/(lln -lln, n+I&)/(PnqJ(1 +A)llnll n+l]/(1 -lln, n+l Ellln) 
The case in which the competitors' pricing rule is distorted by subsidies is 
represented, for instance, by the absence of payments of social costs (due to 
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pollution or congestion costs generated by competitors). Given these premises, it is 
obvious that the reduction in the price by the regulated finn is aimed at the reduction 
in the negative externality generated by competitors. Assuming that the previous 
effect does not lead to a fall in price below marginal cost, under sequential 
competition there is an opposite effect (a price's rise) which is due not only to the 
usual strategic effect, but also it depends on the reduction in the demand of the 
subsidised good (a positive externality). 
So far, we have considered the interactions between product market 
competition and regulation. In the next section we \\111 look at competition for 
natural monopoly. 
1.6 Competition through auctioning and second sourcing 
Since procurement is (and will probably remain) a major component of the 
public budget in many countries, its cost effectiveness is of the greatest practical 
importance. The dominance of monopolistic practices and of arrangements with a 
single producer, due to various reasons, may lead to costly rents and overpricing. 
Consequently, at least in a sIalic context (section 1.6.1) it seems appealing to 
encourage the introduction of competition in order to improve such a situation and to 
realise savings through price reduction. In any case, as will be sho\\-n, competition 
cannot perfectly substitute regulation; the best that can be done is just to auction a 
regulatory incentive contract able to achieve the second best level of effort.27 The 
selection of the producer (through competition) is just the first step in the 
organisation of a natural monopoly. It should be folIowed by the aspects related to 
the production stage (such as the detennination of the production level and of the 
finn's rent). In this enlarged regulatory context, apart from the further stages of the 
monitoring and enforcement of the contract, in which potential or yardstick 
competition may play a role (at least mimicking the audit process) reducing 
17 The auction theory developed for procurement can be readily extended to the 
regulation framework, so that the same model can be used both for procurement and 
regulation. 
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infonnational asymmetries, for long tenn activities (such as utility industries) a 
complete contract with commitment is quite inconceivable. This opens the problem 
ofunderinvestment in specific assets, (considered in 1.6.3) because the added value, 
generated by the investment, may be expropriated during the subsequent bargaining 
processes.28 
However, we will show how competition may be partially helpful also in a 
dynamiC context, by providing incentives for investment or innovation (1.6.2). Even 
if in this ambit important factors may limit the efficacy of competition, giving the 
incumbent a big advantage (as investments in R&D), any possibility to somehow 
weaken the monopolist's positions should not be neglected. 
In any case competition can hardly solve effectively all these problems and our 
analysis will show that a continuous process of regulation is needed so that the 
auctioning of a regulatory contract remains a theoretical extreme case. 
1.6.1 Static competition and regulation 
Before any regulation stage, the most important part of the procurer's task is to 
identify the most efficient potential finn. Following Vickrey (1961), theory suggests 
that by awarding the right to be the sole producer with a second-price auction (or 
Vickrey's auction), the regulator selects the most efficient finn and reduces rent (to 
the difference between his and the second-highest bidder's valuation of the award), 
since the finns' dominant strategy is to reveal through bidding their true intrinsic 
cost. In particular, in first best \velfare analysis (when the social welfare function is 
defined by the expected value of consumers' surplus) a Bayesian regulator, setting 
the subsidy equal to consumers' surplus to induce marginal pricing [a rule proposed 
first by Loeb and Magat (1979)], eliminates all producer's rent with competitive 
bidding. However, as will be shown in what follows, this is true only with identical 
finns or with a great number of bidders. 
28 Incentives to invest may be created by reimbursing a high part of the finn's total 
cost at the investment stage or through the existence of a long term conUact or a 
credible substitute (i.e. developing a reputation for being fair). 
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The auctioning of a franchise is partly different, because the regulator can 
extract further rents from the winner (promoting more aggressive bidding) distorting 
prices and linking the contract rules to the winning bid Thus, the optimal scheme 
may be seen as a menu of franchise contracts, defining prices and net transfer 
payments in function of revealed intrinsic costs. 
Riordan and Sappington's (1987) analysis is built on the model of Baron and 
Myerson (1982) and allows for cost uncertainty at the time the monopoly franchise is 
auctioned (specifically, fixed costs are common knowledge, marginal ones are 
learned by the winning firm only after the auction and will be denoted by ci) but 
there is no "winners curse" (because of the independence of private technology 
signals t). Each (risk neutral) bidding firm knows a private technology signal, t, of 
the future value assumed by c (unknown to the regulator) independently drawn from 
the same unifonn distribution on [0, 1] and the associated conditional density 
function Fj(c It) with strictly positive support on [£. C]. Using the revelation 
principle, the regulator can restrict attention to mechanisms which induce truthful 
reports: whoever reports the highest t realisation is selected and pays a franchise fee. 
He incurs fixed costs and reports the realised parameter c. The regulator establishes 
the price and the producer receives both the sales revenues and the subsidy. 
In general, it is optimal to auction a menu of contract types to induce self-
selection and obtain the second best level of effort through production distortion, 
following a price-cost relationship which is independent of the number of bidders 
(n): 
where F} and F2 are the partial derivatives of the conditional distribution function 
with respect to its arguments (in particular F2 associates the prospect of low 
production cost with high realisation of the signal t).29 
29 The fulfilment of a regularity condition requires the adjusted marginal cost (the 
left hand side of the equation) to be a monotonically increasing (decreasing) function 
. in c(t). 
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In practice, the winner faces the same incentives (independent of n) and his 
rent is a nonincreasing function in c, as if there had been no bidding (the so called 
"separation property"). This can be explained by the fact that after the auction the 
winner must be prevented from overstating its realised production cost c. 
Competition benefits the regulator because the winner's rent is also a 
nonincreasing function in the number of bidders (n), as the franchise fee is a 
nondecreasing function ofn. In particular, the franchise fee is the sum of the winner's 
estimate of the second-highest bidder's valuation of the award (which is 
nondecreasing in n) and of the gains due to the fact that production and transfer are 
linked to the winning bid This latter factor (the production distortion that reduces 
the incentive to misrepresent t) increases the fee and represents an improvement on 
. the rule proposed by Loeb and Magat with a small number of firms and informative 
signals [i.e. F2(c I t) > 0]. If this is not the case, the regulator can extract without any 
distortion all the winner's profits as the fee is equal to the expected rents due to the 
transfer. As in the standard model of Baron and Myerson (1982), the fundamental 
trade-offis between reducing production distortion of a given firm type (P-C)Fl(C I 't) 
and raising rents (decreasing franchise fee) of the more efficient ones (l-t)F2(c I t).30 
From our perspective, it may be also instructive to examine the way in which 
LatTont and Tirole (1987), generalising their monopoly regulation model, formalise 
Demsetz's idea to auction the right to operate a natural monopoly industry. They 
show how, with a very large number of (risk neutral) bidding firms with private 
information about their intrinsic costs (independently drawn from the same 
distribution), the winner's intrinsic cost is close to the lowest one and we are near to 
implement a fixed price contract \\lith an optimal level of effort. Thus, as Laffont and 
Tirole. (1993) conclude: "competition asymptotically solves the moral hazard 
problem by solving the adverse-selection problem" (p. 318). 
30 From the price<ost relationship we see that the distortion is greater the higher is 
the likelihoQd to have a lower c [i.e. for higher values of the informative technology 
signal F2(c It) and of the range of higher bidders (I-t)] and the lower is the 
likelihoOd to b,ave exactly c [for higher values of the probability to distort 
production FI(c It)]. 
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Even in this case, competition may act more as a useful complement than as a 
perfect substitute of regulation. This can be shown if we stick to their model with a 
finite number of competing bids (without restricting to fixed-price contracts) and 
ignore the complexities of contract specification and transaction costs. In fact, in this 
simplified context, the optimal Bayesian auction is equivalent to asking firms how 
much they are willing to pay to be regulated as a monopolist (in a Vickrey auction 
with dominant strategy). "The auction selects the most efficient firm and awards the 
winner an incentive contract to induce a second best level of effort" (p. 322). The 
"separation property" tells us that with the optimal auction the winner faces the same 
incentives as if there had been no bidding. This result comes from the fact that in this 
model the incentive constraint is downward binding and hence the trade-off is 
between reducing distortion of a given type of firms and raising rents of the more 
efficient firms. This explains why in general it is still optimal to offer a menu of 
contracts to different types of finn and also why effort is below the optimal level and 
decreasing in the level of cost, just as in the monopoly regulation model. 
We are back to the optimal monopoly contract with a random upward 
truncation point, given by the intrinsic cost revealed by the second lowest bid. 
Competition in the auction amounts just to reducing the interval of the possible 
intrinsic costs. This limits the information rent because now the second lowest bid 
(and not the lowest type) has a zero rent. In this way asymplolical efficiency is 
ensured: more competition, reducing the interval, leads to select a more efficient 
finn and to decrease distortion in effort (as optimal regulation implies no distortion 
\\~th the most efficient type). Therefore, we move toward a fixed price contract. 
The previous models, however, emphasise the benefits of selecting the most 
efficient firm and do not consider the costs associated with the auction. At the limit, 
if transaction costs are very high it may be better to regulate just a single competitor. 
It would be interesting to see how much the results are modified when a fixed 
transaction cost must be incurred (before cost realisations are known) to obtain a 
private estimate of intrinsic cost and when the number of competing firm becomes 
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endogenous. The case of insufficient entry may prevail so that (in expected tenns) an 
additional entrant would bring a positive externality. 
1.6.2 Sequential competition (through second sourcing) and regulation 
It is important to go beyond the previous static model, since the most relevant 
advantages of competition are perhaps to be found in a dynamic context. Like the 
auctioning of regulated monopoly, the threat of competition, after this position has 
been awarded, can playa useful role in order to mitigate monopolistic problems. 
This introduces the issue of franchise renewal and of the usefulness of 
reprocuremenl through repeated auctions. In particular, this possibility may be used 
in order to exploit superior opportunities in future or to discipline the regulated firm 
by the threat of a break-out. Under asymmetric information the incumbent's 
advantage imposes the problem of the deviation from the bidding parity rule (which 
tells, very loosely, to replace the incumbent only \vith a firm characterised by lower 
intrinsic cost) to favour a second source. Therefore, we are in the presence of a basic 
trade-off between the entrant's production cost (allocative inefficiency) and the 
incumbent's rent extraction (saving in incentives or "control cost"). 
In the absence of investments, Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1987) show 
how it may be useful to make a regulated monopoly incumbent subject to the threat 
of break-out in favour of a second source. This makes it more costly for him to 
pretend to have higher intrinsic costs. In fact, producing at a cost that reflects a high 
intrinsic cost, the incumbent will face a higher probability of being replaced. Thus, ~ 
second source is not only valuable when the incumbent is inefficient. but also its 
threat may alleviate the incentive constraint and reduce the rent of efficient finns. 
In practice, as the second supplier may be used to monitor the incumbent's 
cost, Demski et a!. 's (1987) generalisation of Baron and Myerson's (1982) model 
allows a comparison between optimal auditing (intended as a means of verifying the 
incumbent's cost report) and entry policies, under the following hypotheses: 
(a) the regulator (who maximises social welfare, defined as in the standard model) is 
a Stackelberg leader, able to commit and to enforce only limited penalties (so that he 
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is endowed with a limited power); 
(b) the products are identical and the cost functions are, as usual, linear in total 
output vvith two possible realisations (high and low) of intrinsic costs, respectively 
denoted as cI and cE for incumbent and entrant, positively correlated, and with a 
marginal cost advantage for the incumbent; 
(c) it is common knowledge that, in order to learn their marginal costs, the 
incumbent and the entrant incur fixed costs that can be only partially recovered. 
Initially, the regulator offers an opportunity to produce to the incumbent firm asking 
it to sink a fixed cost and to report its marginal cost. Afterwards, on this basis the 
regulator decides whether to start production, to shut-down the incumbent, or to ask 
the entrant for a cost-projection before production (or shut-dO\\n) occurs. 
The second source (as well as the audit) is considered only if expected welfare 
gains are greater than expected incremental costs. But, as by construction, entry can 
always mimic audit, the presence of an alternative supplier may be more powerful in 
limiting the incumbent's rent. Given these assumptions, this implies that whenever it 
is not optimal to invite entry an audit should not been undertaken, but entry may be 
useful even when the re2Ulator never conducts an audit. 
In general, the optimal policy mix differs systematically between a second 
source and an audit. For instance, one can compare the prices in the two regimes 
finding that entry can increase as well as decrease price distortion. That happens 
because prices constitute just a set of instruments that may perform more than one 
role. In general, under any specific condition, the interplay among the various policy 
instruments will establish in which regime a single one will be higher. Hence, it is 
possible that the optimal probability of entry is greater (or lower) than the optimal 
probability of audit, as the first instrument, being the most effective, may be used 
more extensively (or less extensively to impose the desired level of discipline). 
In partiCUlar, it may be useful to increase the probability of replacing a high 
intrinsic cost firm to stop an efficient incumbent pretending to be an inefficient one. 
In practice, the stochastic dominance by the incumbent's intrinsic cost may call for 
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favouring the second source. In this case, the bidding parity (which implies break-out 
when intrinsic costs are equal) will not hold and the entrant may be intrinsically less 
efficient. In their example, the extra production costs more than offset the gains due 
the reduced "control cost" (given by the rent of the efficient incumbent), since the 
incumbent is re1uctant to false1y report high costs in order not to be shut-dO\\<n. 
A similar result may be expected to hold also in a dynamic model of price 
competition where the cost advantage for the incumbent is due to the fact that, being 
the developer, he may possess more accurate cost information and may have gained 
experience during the initial production stage. In such a two stage procurement 
process, the developer has a greater incentive to misrepresent cost, because for a low 
cost type it is useful to rise the second source bid (hiding efficiency to capture rents), 
while a high cost type finds it profitable to take full advantage of the initial 
production stage incentives and to lose the reprocurement auction (adopting the so 
called "take the money and run" strategy).31 Given this informational handicap, the 
second source takes into account the "winner's curse" and bids less aggressively, 
rising in this way the winning auction price. Furthermore, when the second source 
has won, price competition prob1ems occur in the form of additional cost, delay, or 
quality failure. 
Analysing a sequential model for the acquisition of a newly developed product, 
Anton and Yao (1987) consider how, under asymmetric information and perfect cost 
correlation, the experience curve [taken from Spence (1981)] may affect the 
incentive contract design that induces revelation when the regulator is committed to 
the use of a reprocurement auction with a second source (and not to exploit the 
revealed cost of the developer) in order to reduce the monopoly advantages with the 
new system.32 They focus on the sequential acquisition process (composed of an 
31 In a pooling equilibrium different developers' types submit the same report and, 
since the second source is uncertain about the production cost, we have an auction 
with asymmetric information and valuation ("winner's curse"). 
32 The experience advantage over a second source (which simply consists in lower 
production cost of additional units) clearly reduces the benefits of competitive 
bidding. The auction commitment limits the ability of the government to dictate the 
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initial production and reprocurement stage \\~th the new system or with the old 
technology) in order to simplify matters, avoiding problems of design preference and 
uncertainty about technological possibilities. Given the existence of a less efficient 
alternative system (an old technology that would never be used with full 
information), they show how the second source may be useful because: 
(1) it establishes the price when the auction is used for the reprocurement, and 
(2) it creates the possibility to cut-off the new system, taking as given the cost of the 
technology transfer. 
The optimal cost minimising policy should start with an initial production 
contract, which reveals the private cost information, eliminating the information 
handicap of the second source, and should use the cut-off rule for the new system at 
the reprocurement stage (a threat that is made credible by the presence of a second 
source). In this way the optimal contract trades off between allocative inefficiencies 
and savings on the cost of ex-ante incentives. The developer is prevented from 
reporting falsely high costs, because above the cut-off level there will be no auction 
and the residual production will be conducted using the alternative system, 
notwithstanding the higher costs. 
However, in this model the second source has a limited setting-price role, as 
the developer (who has a lower production cost) matches his bid and the learning 
process is fully automatic, with no place left for discretionary investments. 
1.6.3 Regulation, competition and the underinvestment issue 
Let us examine now a fully dynamic context where investments in 
infrastructure and in human capital produce benefits in favour of the incumbent and 
problems with break-out. Without commitment, in the context of repeated auctions, 
the major issue which emerges is that of underinvestment by the incumbent in long-
lived industry specific (non-transferable) assets, which will be lost in case of break-
out However, even if the investment is transferable, it may be difficult to measure it 
terms of reprocurement. using the cost information revealed by the developer during 
the initial production stage. 
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and to adequately compensate the incumbent for it. With a regulator able to commit, 
this would be the only case in which the incumbent underinvests, given the 
possibility of being replaced. 
An interesting case ofre-auclioning is examined by Rob (1986) who explicitly 
derives the R&D process (treating experimentation as sampling with perfect recall) 
and deals simultaneously with the choice of the most efficient developer and of the 
incentives needed to induce him to pursue a socially desirable R&D strategy. 
First, the firm's R&D strategy is derived from search theory: experimentation 
continues till the expected gain from searching once more becomes less than its 
relative cost. Thus, the optimal cut-off cost level denoted by z, turns out to be an 
increasing function of learning (or searching) cost (specific to the firm and 
represented by s) and a decreasing function of output auctioned by the government 
(y). Then, the possibility of realising savings with a "learning" buy procedure (that is, 
only a fraction of the project is competitively purchased after an R&D stage) is 
examined. It is clear that we have a trade-off between competitive price reduction 
(reauctioning) and production cost reduction; in fact, the smaller is y, the quantity 
the regulator is committed to buy from the developer, the less are the incentives to 
reduce production costs and invest in R&D. 
The analysis starts from the benchmark case in which even the most efficient 
firm can be undercut by competitors when it makes normal profits and it is assumed 
that the government and a developer initial1y make a fix-price agreement with 
technology disclosure. Under perfect competition profits are driven to zero, so that 
the price is equal to the most efficient cut-off cost level (~), even in the absence of 
interface problems (which means that there is no efficiency loss when switching to 
another producer). Therefore, costs are minimised only in the case in which the 
single contractor used for R&D is also the only producer. 
Instead, with a small number of bidders and a limited interface problem, Rob is 
able to show how entry by other suppliers, at a later stage of the project, may lead to 
a net welfare gain, notwithstanding the negative effects on the developer's incentives. 
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The results are only slightly modified when the quantity to be purchased is not 
predetermined but depends on the R&D performance. 
In any case, Rob does not examine really In depth the incumbent 
underinvestment problem and if bidding parity should not hold in the re-auctioning, 
two fundamental issues tackled by Laffont and Tirole (1988). 
More specifically, Laffont and Tirole consider the effect of a non-observable 
monetary investment, made in the first period by the incumbent, on the optimal 
contract and on the second period auction, under the following simplifying 
assumptions: 
(a) the incumbent and the entrant have intrinsic costs c and c' independently drawn 
from the same regular distribution F and it is always optimal to realise the project 
(no shut-down); 
(b) the regulator is able to commit and maximises welfare, i.e. the sum of expected 
utilities of consumers and firms (as usual, a shadow cost of public funds is present); 
(c) monetary investment d(i) (with d'>O, d">O) lowers the incumbent's cost by i and 
the entrant's cost by ki in the second period (where O<k<I); 
(d) the discount factor 0 (for second period utility) is identical for all agents. 
In period 1 the incumbent facing an incentive contract chooses effort e1 and 
investment d(i). In period 2, after reprocurement, the intrinsic cost of the regulated 
firm depends on first period investment (c-i for the incumbent, or c'-ki for the 
entrant). The regulator chooses a break-out rule c*(c) which allows the entry of a 
lower intrinsic cost finn [i.e. such that c' < c*(c)]. 
It is worthwhile to start from the complete information benchmark. For the 
regulator it is optimal to set a breakout rule c*(c) = c-(l-k)i (so that bidding parity 
holds in the second period auction) and to equalise marginal disutility and benefit of 
effort. Furthermore, the socially optimal investment i*, chosen by the regulator, 
imposes the equality between marginal cost and marginal social benefit {in 
analytical terms: d'(i*) =0 [(l-F(c-(1-k)i*)+kF(c-(l-k)i*)]} and fully intemalises the 
externality on the entrant cost [given by okF(c-(l-k)i)]. 
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With asymmetric infonnation (i.e. nonobservable investment), instead, it is not 
always possible to separate incentive problems from the break-out rule and the 
nature of the optimal deviation from bidding parity crucially depends on the type of 
investment. If the investment is general (k= 1) the regulated finn has a low incentive 
to invest, since it does not internalise part of the social benefit [namely the positive 
externality on entrant cost]. As a consequence of this "externality effect" the 
incumbent underinvests and should then be favoured to increase investment [i.e. 
c*(c) < c-(l-k)i]. Furthennore, the optimal incentive scheme in period 1 relative to 
period 2 is low-powered, in order to reduce investment cost in the first period and to 
favour the capture of its benefits in the second one, through greater rents. In this way, 
the underinvestment problem is mitigated. It may be solved, at least in theory, ifbig 
delayed penalties are allowed for and the incumbent's cost depends also on the 
entrant's realised cost after a break-out. Then, the incumbent would not deviate from 
the socially desired investment i*, as if it were observable. 
On the other hand, given the regulator'S commitment ability, if the investment 
is specific (k=O) the monopolist makes the socially optimal choice. In this case, since 
nothing should be internalised, the unobservability of non-transferable investment 
imposes no cost and the slope of incentive schedule is time invariant. Then, it is 
optimal to bias the break-out rule in favour of the entrant [c*( c) > c-i] taking into 
account the "rent differential effect" due to the investment advantage (that is, the 
incumbent obtains a greater rent at the bidding parity point). In fact, given the trade-
offbetween efficiency and rent, with bidding parity (i.e. equal intrinsic cost in period 
2) the entrant (being c' = c - i < c) needs lower effort distortion because the moral 
hazard rate is non-decreasing [F(c')/f(c') < F(c)/f(c)]. A similar result was already 
found by Demski et al. (1987) and Anton and Yao (1987). 
However, Laffont and Tirole do not allow for a choice of the transferable 
fraction of investment; in fact, k is only an exogenous variable. Alternatively, it 
would be of some interest to assume an increasing cost of hiding useful infonnation 
away from competitors, transfonning k into a discretionary variable. 
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In another similar and interesting extension of their basic model, Laffont and 
Tirole (1993) deal with learningby doing (in the absence of monetary investment) 
assuming that the incumbent's effort in the first period (e l ) reduces the incumbent's 
cost by the quantity (g + h) e1 and the entrant's cost only by the amount gel in the 
second period (so that g/(g+h) represents the ratio of transferable learning). With 
complete information the regulator imposes the equality of marginal private 
disutility of effort and its soCial benefit. In particular, the optimally social effort for 
the incumbent should internalise the transferable effect of learning by doing on the 
entrant [0 g F(c-he l )]. 
Under asymmetric information and unobservable fully transferable learning by 
doing (h=O) the incumbent is affected, as in the previous model, by the "externality 
effect" (he doesn't internalise the positive externality on entrant). Furthermore, we 
encounter a "learning by doing effect" (a reduction of the first period effort e l 
increases intrinsic cost and decreases rent in the second period) that calls for 
favouring the incumbent, reinforcing the previous effect. Hence, the incumbent is 
favoured [c*(c) being less than c] in order to increase the first period effort e l . In 
fact, in this way the rent lost in the second period, by hiding efficiency in the first 
period, becomes more costly. 
Like in the previous model, when learning is specific (g=O) the monopolist's 
rent obtained with bidding parity is higher. Due to this "rent differential effect" the 
break-out rule should favour the entrant [that is, c*(c) is greater than c-he\]. 
However, in this model the final result is ambiguous, given the presence of the 
opposite incentive, due to the "learning by doing effect". 
Let us examine now the optimal incentive scheme. When the shadow cost of 
public funds is near to one, the derivative of the marginal disutility of effort is 
constant, and g is big enough, the scheme should be high-powered in period 1 
relative to period 2 in order to increase the first period effort e l , while the opposite is 
true when learning by doing is non-transferable (g=O), in order to allow the regulator 
to reduce the first period rent. This result, in complete contrast with the conclusion 
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reached 'With the previous fl'lQ.netary investment model, depends entirely on the fact 
that the investment is now embodied in the first perioq.effort. In particular e1 should 
be incentivized to encourage internalisation when g has a big value, while in the 
absence of externality (g=O) a steeper incentive scheme in period 2 favours rent 
extraction, making it more costly to hide efficiency in the first period (reducing e1). 
Also in this model it could be interesting to introduce an increasing cost of hiding 
learning, transforming g into a discretionary variable. 
1.7 Conclusion 
From our overview it is easy to realise how topics such as competition (without 
regulation) natural monopoly regulation, have been analysed in great detail by the 
economic literature. As we have shovm the "new economics of regulation and 
procurement" has proposed an incredible number of variants and extensions of the 
standard analysis, early formulated in the 80s. 
However, it also emerges, especially from the last section, how, in most cases, 
the modelling of competition in the presence of price discrimination has not received 
a sufficient attention. We believe that is worthwhile to explore further the 
interactions between competition and regulation when non-linear pricing rules are 
allowed. This is the route that we are going to follow in the next chapter. A 
particular emphasis will be given to the telecommunication case and to vertical 
issues related to the regulation of the terms of access to the network. We believe that 
the answers to these questions has a particular relevance not only from a theoretical 
point of view but also from a practical perspective. Just in passing it is worth 
noticing how many of these issues have been (and are still) the object of several 
discussion both in the economic literature and in the political arena. 
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• The modelling approach (section 2.2) follows the lines ofVagliasindi (1994). 
It went through major revisions and it has been extended to vertically related 
markets. I have received helpful comments from James Mirrlees, John Vickers, 
and participants of the Industrial Economist Workshop held on 7 October 1994 
at the University of Warwick. 
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Chapter 2 
NON-LL~EAR PRICING AND CO~IPETITION IN 
VERTICALLY RELATED l\IARKETS 
2.1 Introduction 
As already noticed in the previous chapter, there is a fairly extensive literature 
on topics such as natural monopoly regulation, competition (without regulation), and 
the welfare effects of price discrimination (by a monopolist). However, the problem 
of the direct interactions betvveen regulation (including in the definition of regulation 
also the policies toward price discrimination) and competition is still largely 
unexplored, especially in the non-linear pricing framework. Moreover, in the more 
realistic case in which markets are vertically related, even distinguished economists 
such as Laffont and Tirole (1993) recognise the need of developing a "general theory 
of access pricing" (p. 266). A renewed interest in the access pricing problem, a 
problem first introduced by Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983) with the formalisation 
of the so called Baumol-Willig rule, followed the contributions of Baumol and Sidak 
(1994), Annstrong and Doyle (1994) Laffont and Tirole (1994b), Annstrong and 
Vickers (1995) and Economides and White (1995). However, there has been no 
attempt to deal with non-linear access pricing. 
An important question in this setting involves the determination of the range of 
circumstances in which access pricing can be used to bring about a welfare 
enhancing competitive solution to fmal goods supply, whilst a monopoly remains at 
one essential point in the chain of delivery, In fact, it is not always the case that the 
entry of a competitor (even if characterised by lower marginal costs) automatically 
increases social welfare in a general price discrimination setting. Notice how from a 
normative point of view it is relevant to determine the socially optimal access 
charge, that is the one (or the ones) that maximises social welfare. In chapter 3 we 
will specify different definition of social welfare, namely the unweighted and 
weighted sum of consumers' surplus and profit (with the introduction of 
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distributional considerations or the cost of public funds). We will focus on 
regulating access directly, a kind of regulation which has been subject of 
controversies especially in th~ case of telecommunications. 
Following a more positive approach in this chapter we want to examine the 
private incentives of the economic players (basically an incumbent and a potential 
entrant) in the absence of regulatory constraints in horizontal and vertical settings 
(where the rival enters the downstream level). In dealing with private incentives of 
both parties one interesting perspective to explore is to follow the incumbent's point 
of view in analysing the conditions under which he can maintain monopoly profits 
while entry occurs at one vertical level and act as if he were the only player. In doing 
this we want also to find out whether it is in his interest to oblige the (eventual) 
competitor to be efficient by the use of an appropriate access charge. 
We wiII see that we are basically dealing with a simplified game in which the 
regulator does not appear -specifically the preliminary stage involving regulation is 
removed. This kind of approach (in which first we leave aside regulation) can be 
justified on economic grounds, because one important regulator's task involves, first 
of all, to determine what behaviour he could expect from the economic agents had 
they operated with no constraints. Only in this way he can find out the types of 
market failures, and, if necessary, he can design appropriate non market mechanisms 
that can remove, or at least to ameliorate, such failures. 
Typical market failures, which occur in the network utilities, are usually 
related to the presence of natural monopoly, network externalities and the danger of 
potential cream-skimming competition, which is generally be thought as undesirable 
by itself. We analysed in detail what they effectively imply in the presence of 
vertically related markets and in which ways the regulator can intervene to improve 
social welfare. 
It seems quite natural to start the analysis from an initial setting in which there 
is a natural monopoly in the network and the incumbent is vertically integrated. The 
regulator can intervene by directly setting the terms of interconnection between the 
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incumbent and potential rivals, or more generally by imposing some constraints on 
finns' conduct. Various solution of the access pricing problem have been proposed 
in the UK with particular reference to telecommunications and gas industries. The 
regulator can more radically change the structure of the industry, for instance by 
adopting a divestiture approach. This seems to resemble the view taken by the US 
regulator in the telecommunication case. Problems brought by the presence of 
vertically separated structures will be examined in chapter 4. 
Making reference to the existing literature, even in the simple context of third 
degree price discrimination only the model of Armstrong and Vickers (1993), which 
represents the extension of Armstrong and Vickers (1991) to endogenous scale of 
entry, somehow offers a possible framework to deal with some of the questions 
related to the interactions between competition and regulation. However, as shown 
before (see section 1.4.2), even in this case, the complications of non-linear tariffs 
and vertically related markets are not treated by the authors. In the ambit of non-
linear pricing, there have been indeed very little attempts to tackle this kind of 
problems, which seem particularly relevant not only from a theoretical point of view, 
but also from a practical perspective. 
The only model which introduces second degree price discrimination in a 
regulatory setting; that is, Laffont and Tirole (1990b), has already been analysed in 
detail in section 1.3. Regarding competitive issues, however, this model is quite 
restrictive, since it ignores the most interesting problems of strategic competition. In 
fact, as in the original (1986) model competitors are assumed to have an unlimited 
capacity, and they don't really take any type of economic decisions (competitors do 
not even choose which type of customer is more profitable to serve, or the optimal 
pricing strategy to apply). Basically, this occurs because their technology is 
exogenously given and, due to their hypothesis of two part tariffs (where the fixed 
part is simply given by the fixed per capita cost of access) with perfect competition, 
it automatically detennines the surplus competitors offer to the most profitable 
customers. In practice, the problem of which type of customers will be served in 
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equilibrium is already settled in advance by the authors, by appropriately choosing a 
relatively high flXed per capita cost in order to avoid competition for the low 
customers (the skimmed milk). In fact, Laffont and Tirole (1990b) concentrate their 
analysis on a very specific case; that is, the complete market invasion by a perfectly 
competitive fringe using a two-part tariff; this explains why high-demand customers 
(referred henceforth as the H type) are always the cream. Furthermore, they only deal 
with the case of an optimally regulated incumbent in an asymmetric information 
setting, or we may argue, following their convention on transfers, the case of a public 
finn once we remove asymmetries of information between the regulator and the 
finn. 
However, in a more general situation, it is not clear at all that the H type 
should always be seen as the most profitable part of the market by any possible type 
of entrant. In other words, the entrant's choice of the type of customers to serve 
should in general depend also on the relative efficiency of the competitor and needs 
to be endogenised in a sequential multistage game. This more complicated setting is 
avoided by Laffont and Tirole (1990b) in assuming the existence of a competitive 
fringe with high fixed per capita costs that automatically eliminates any further 
possible stage in which strategic entry decisions take place. In reality we usually do 
not see a optimally regulated incumbent or a perfectly competitive fringe, and the 
typical initial situation entails a "big" incumbent who faces a "small" entrant not 
able to undertake a complete market invasion. 
If we want to follow the original Laffont and Tirole model we may focus on 
the special case in which competition is able to attack only one type, serving all the 
population (that is market L or market H) we may need to introduce ad hoc 
assumptions that prevent entry for one type. Clearly, in Laffont and Tirole's original 
model one cannot even conceive the problem of what is the most profitable part of 
the market for the entrant, because both markets are equally profitable for the 
competitors, given that their profits are always zero. The only structure examined is 
the one implied by a competitive fringe. What matters for the outcomes of their 
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model is only what the incumbent finds it more lucrative. Given the existence of a 
bypass regime, provided that their number is large enough, the H customers represent 
the most profitable part of the demand market served by the incumbent that is 
engaged in price discrimination. However, this does not imply that the profit per unit 
of customer obtained from the H type is higher than the one relative to the L type for 
any type of competitor which can enter the market. 
On the other hand, when the competitor does not behave as a purely 
competitive market things become more complicated, and in this case what is the 
most lucrative part of the market for the entrant and for the incumbent remain open 
questions. The answer to them depends crucially on the respective marginal costs, 
the game's structure, the strategy of competition chosen by the entrant, her cost and 
scale of entry. Here, what is more lucrative for the entrant will determine which type 
of customer she will choose to serve, if she is able to attack both part of the market. 
Thus, we will show how cream skimming is no longer necessarily the most 
profitable strategy for a potential entrant (see 2.4.2). We also explore the question 
regarding the desirability of cream skimming, shov~ing that this type of competition, 
contrary to the general point of view, is not necessarily more "harmful" than 
skimmed milk competition. 
Within this chapter we , .. ill not deal with regulation, since we just limit 
ourselves to set up the basis of the model and solve it in the unregulated case. In 
order to develop in the next chapter a regulatory research topic (which will be fully 
specified in chapter 3) we try to extend the model proposed by Laffont and Tirole 
(l990a, 1994) introducing non-linear pricing as in LafTont and Tirole (1990b) and 
tackling the problem of entry as a crucial one. In Laffont and Tirole (1990a), a more 
complicated model, where vertically related markets are introduced, the price 
competitors set is just equal to the sum of the marginal cost and the access price. 
Furthermore, both competitors and the regulated firm make use only of linear pricing 
also for the intermediate good. Hence, it may be interesting to introduce the 
possibility of price discrimination. Since this pricing strategy is a more general one, 
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always at least as good as the linear pricing strategy, it is not clear why it should be 
rejected a priori by the finns (and in particular the incumbent) and by the regulatory 
authority. That is, they are dealing with a regulation which is optimal only in a 
framework in which non-linear tariffs are prevented on an "a priori" ground, or due 
to an exogenous political constraint which has not been justified. 
We \\lill study a simpler model than the one proposed by Laffont and Tirole, in 
order to pay a particular attention to the entrant's behaviour and to the way of 
modelling it within a model in which non-linear pricing strategies are used by both 
the incumbent and the entrant. Specifically we decided not to introduce as)mmetric 
information on the reh'Ulatory side. As shown in chapter 1 (section 1.2) moral hazard 
if introduced in the standard way (a la Laffont and Tirole) does not bring substantial 
changes in the outcomes relative to a pure adverse selection model. We also leave 
aside adverse selection between the regulator and the firm; this assumption is quite 
usual in the case of a public firm which directly maximises social welfare. Moreover 
we can also ignore asymmetric information on the demand side, since in a model 
where the marginal cost of the incumbent is fixed things would not changed, as 
proved by Lewis and Sappington (1989). 
The only type of asymmetric information is on the consumers' side. 
Technically, we will deal \\lith a special class of games of incomplete infonnation. 
classified as games of mechanism design.33 In the canonical situation a monopolist 
(the principal) has incomplete information about the agent's types, namely the 
consumers' willingness to pay for his goods. He has to design a tariff schedule which 
determines the price to be paid as a function of the quantity purchased.34 We extend 
the canonical framework to the case of competition, the competitor being a small 
output constrained entrant, the idea being that competition should start somel"here. 
33 See for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
34 A similar problem is the regulation of a natural monopoly. Here the regulator has 
incomplete information of the cost (generally only of the cost level, rather than its 
structure). His task is to design an incentive scheme, which related the transfers 
received by the regulated finn to its cost or price, or both of them, depending on the 
type of regulation considered. 
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If we want to correctly specify the structure of this type of game we should 
follow a three step procedure. In the first step the principal designs the mechanism, 
the mechanism itself being a game in which the agents send costless messages. It 
should then be clear that the subsequent allocation between types (that is, the 
decision on the quantity purchased) depends on the realisation of these messages. In 
the second step the agents simultaneously accept or reject the mechanism. If the 
agent rejects the mechanism he gets a reservation utility. In the final step, in which 
only the agents who accepted the mechanism can participate, they play the game as 
specified by the mechanism itself. However, the revelation principle allows us to 
restrict attention to mechanisms that are accepted by the agents (bypassing stage 2) 
and in which the agents' types are truthfully revealed (so that there is no need to 
specify the third stage).3S 
A basic difference between our approach and the one proposed by Laffont and 
Tirole is that here the incumbent is the first mover with respect to pricing policies, 
i.e. the first player who chooses the tariff for which he is committed to serve the 
customers. We think that this resembles more closely the typical situation in utilities 
industries, where the incumbent is more powerful and enjoys the first mover 
advantage in many aspects. 
Given these premises, in the absence of vertical issues, our approach may also 
be interpreted as a transposition of Armstrong and Vickers (1993) to a second degree 
price discrimination model. However, the presence of non-linear pricing and of 
vertical relations remarkably modifies and complicates their basic model. For 
instance, we need to consider very carefully all incentive-compatibility problems 
(absent in the context of third degree price discrimination) and, as a direct 
consequence, the structure of the game itself must be modified. 
3S The perfection requirement involved here is simply that the agents have an 
incentive not to misreport their types, being not allowed to threaten to reject the 
mechanism. With this requirement the highest payoff of the principal can be 
obtained through a static game among the agent, so that mechanism design can be 
treated as a special case of static Bayesian game. 
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As the presence of non-linear pricing complicates the structure of the game, 
introducing incentive compatibility problems, when we consider vertical issues, we 
will slightly simplify the model proposed by Laffont and Tirole (1990a, 1994a), 
eliminating, for instance, the product differentiation issue, in order to derive clear-
cut results and to pay a particular attention to the problems related to the entrant's 
behaviour and non-linear pricing. We will study the simplest framework, i.e. the one 
in which both the incumbent and his competitors have the same technical 
requirements for the intermediate good; i.e. there is no need to create new 
infrastructure or facilities to connect the competitors with the existing network. We 
can refer to this situation as the "common network case", following the definition by 
Laffont and Tirole. 
Whilst in the basic model (ignoring vertical issues) we argued that cream 
skimming is not always the most profitable strategy for the entrant, except for very 
particular cases, this is no longer true for the common network case. In fact, when 
the incumbent remains the monopolist of an intennediate good which is consumed 
both internally and by any potential competitors cream skimming turns out to be the 
only strategy of competition allowed by the incumbent. We will see how, generally 
in the absence of regulation, the access charge determined by the incumbent may 
depend, apart from the type of network cost, on the entrant's production cost, the 
vertical game's structure, the strategy of competition chosen by the entrant and her 
scale of entry. 
We will also show how the entry of an equally efficient competitor in the 
market of the non monopolised good 1, represents a limiting case as the incumbent is 
indifferent about entry. In fact, setting the per customer access charge equal to the 
monopoly variable profits, he maintains the monopoly pricing strategy and the 
related profits, independently of the entry scale. It is optimal for the incumbent to 
allow entry, if, maintaining the previous monopoly pricing, he can set a per customer 
access charge equal to the variable profits of the entrant and if the latters are equal or 
greater than his own. This happens only with an equally or more efficient 
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competitor. Moreover, the incumbent finds it optimal to oblige the competitor to 
behave as a surplus taker (i.e. setting a new tariff which allows the same surplus 
determined by the incumbent for each type) and to allow only cream skimming 
competition. However, it would be preferable for the incumbent (and for the 
maximisation of social welfare) that the competitor sells all the produced good 1 to 
the incumbent (reaching only break-even profits), so that the latter is able to resell it 
to the consumers, applying the monopoly tariffs. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Before providing the details and better 
specifying the hypotheses \\ithin which we will move both in the absence and in the 
presence of vertically related markets, we will first discuss the variety of approaches 
available to model the entrant's behaviour (section 2.2). The following sections 
provide the solution of the game in the absence of regulation first of all ignoring 
vertical markets. They focus on the private incentives of the incumbent (section 2.3) 
and the entrant (section 2.4) in the absence of regulatory constraints. We then extend 
the previous model in order to deal with vertical markets, providing the solution of 
the game in the absence of regulation first for the case in which the entrant is as 
efficient as the incumbent, and then in section 2.5 for the general case. Section 2.6 
provides further refinements to the vertical game, endogenising the scale of entry 
(previously exogenously given) and considering more general cost functional forms 
for the entrant. A final section (2.7) summarises the main results of our analysis. 
2.2 Modelling approaches 
In our analysis we proceed step by step, disregarding at first the relevant issue 
of access pricing, limiting the analysis to an horizontal framework where only one 
final good is produced by the incumbent and the entrant. We then extend this 
framework by assuming that the incumbent has a natural monopoly on the network 
and introducing an intermediate good (access). 
Even in the absence of vertically related markets there are several possible 
schemes, and correspondingly several games, that can be used to model the 
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behaviour of the entrant and it is difficult (and also in part arbitrary) to choose 
between them, since many are quite plausible and seem to capture certain particular 
features of what happens in some public utilities industries. 
For instance, we may assume that in stage (1) the entrant chooses her scale of 
entry in tenns of output capacity (X) or in terms of the number of customers to be 
served (K). Furthennore, assuming that there are only two customers' types (as in 
Laffont and Tirole), the scale of entry can be fixed in each of the two markets (Xt , 
Kt , where t = L, H) to be served, or in global tenns (X, K), postponing the 
determination of the split between the two markets to a subsequent stage. In this 
way, even if we stick to the simplest possible framework (i.e. we assume a tariff 
taker cOinpetitor, that is a competitor that takes as given the optimal pricing strategy 
fixed by the incumbent), we can obtain at least four possible games, each of which 
deserves a different and detailed analysis on its own. The number of games increases 
once we take into account a surplus taker competitor, who designes a new tariff, 
which allows each consumer type the same surplus fixed by the incumbent. 
2.2.1 Our basic game and a possible alternative one 
In this subsection we introduce two main categories of modelling approaches, 
which may be interesting to analyse, whose structure is here summarised. 
Horizontal Game 
(1) the entrant decides the number of customers {Kt } to be served in each market; 
(2) the incumbent chooses his pricing rule {Tt• qt}, where Tt = T(qt) is a fully non-
linear tariff; 
(3) the entrant takes as given {Tt, qt} acting as a tariff-taker. 
In this first type of model the entrant commits herself to the number of 
customers to be served in each market before the incumbent chooses his pricing rule 
(naturally we are referring only to a fully non-linear tariff). We believe that this 
approach might be used for example as a starting model, useful to describe 
telecommunication industries (where the crucial variable of competition is the 
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number and the type of customers to be served) e.g. the case of "British Telecom" 
and "Mercury", especially if we focus on competition for large users. 
Capacity Game 
(1) the entrant determines her total output capacity X; 
(2) the incumbent chooses his pricing rule {Tt, qtl; 
(3) the entrant decides how to allocate her output between the customers' types {Xt }, 
taking as given the incumbent's tariff structure. 
In the second type of model, where the competitor decides her scale of entry in 
terms of output capacity, it makes much more sense to assume that she will allocate 
his output between the customers' types only after the incumbent has chosen his 
pricing rule.36 
In what follows, a detailed analysis is provided only for the first type of game, 
which seems the most interesting and simple. In this type of game the competitor 
seems relatively more powerful since she commits herself to serve a given number of 
customers of given types, without taking into account the tariffs chosen by the 
incumbent. In other words, the crucial variables for the entrant {KL, KH} are 
determined independently of the pricing policy chosen by the incumbent, so that 
there is less interaction between the two players. 
The second approach, instead, allows for strategic interactions between the hvo 
players. The presence of strategic interactions crucially depends on the structure of 
the game, and in particular on the fact that the entrant determines the split of his total 
capacity behveen the two customers' types (Xt), only after the incumbent has fixed 
his pricing strategy. Therefore the incumbent, in determining the tariffs to apply to 
each type of customer, takes into account not only the value of the scale of entry 
already fixed in the previous stage, but also its expected split between the two types. 
In practice in this case, as the entrant serves the market \vith the highest average 
36 This second approach has emerged in a discussion with John Vickers. This 
particular approach seems to capture some of the typical situations that may arise in 
some of the gas and electricity industries. 
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price, we may expect that the result crucially depends on the entry scale and the 
numerical dimension of the types. 
Focusing on the decision of the type of customer to be served by the entrant 
and making reference to our basic horizontal game, as we will see in what follows, 
the particular value assumed by the marginal cost of the incumbent turns out to be 
the crucial variable. Naturally, also the value assumed by the cost of entry affects the 
choice of the customers' type (since it matters in the preliminary decision taken by 
the competitor; that is, whether or not to enter the market). Instead, in the alternative 
capacity game the entrant chooses which type to serve only on the basis of the 
highest average tariff, which she is allowed to charge, given the tariff fixed by the 
incumbent. 
Despite the several differences between the two approaches, it is worth 
noticing how in both of them the incumbent, who is undoubtedly the most pO\verful 
player, is the first mover, i.e. the first to fix the tariffs, and consequently, the 
quantities allocated to each type of customers. This is what really differentiates these 
approaches from the one proposed by Laffont and Tirole (1990b), where, instead, in 
reality it is the entrant who determines the pricing policy. The incumbent play the 
role of a surplus taker competitor, as the analysis of section 1.3 has sho\\n. 
2.2.2 Modelling approach 10 non-linear access pricing 
If we want to model access pricing and vertical issues, the situation becomes 
even more complicated. For instance, we may assume that the interconnection costs 
are functions of output capacity or of the number of customers to be served or, more 
generally, that they are functions of both the variables. However, following this more 
general option, we have finally sorted out a modelling approach, which is built upon 
the basic horizontal game in the presence of vertical relationships. The structure of 
this multistage game is here summarised 
Vertical Game 
(0) the authority sets up the regulatory system and decides the policy toward price 
discrimination; 
84 
(1) the incumbent fixes the access pricing function F(KH, KL, Q.), where Kt denotes 
the number of customers served by the entrant in each market and QC represents 
the total output produced by the entrant; 
(2) the entrant decides her scale of entry in terms of the number of customers {Kt } 
to be served in each market; 
(3) the incumbent chooses his pricing rule {Tt, qt}, where Tt = T(qt) is a fully non-
linear tariff; 
(4) the entrant chooses the strategy of pricing competition in the final good market. 
Naturally, we may have different versions of this game, depending on the 
nature of the network cost function and the pricing strategy chosen by the entrant. On 
the whole, we believe that this approach might be quite appropriate to describe the 
case of telecommunication industries in the UK. 
2.2.3 The main assumptions of the proposed games 
Let us start introducing the following simplifying hypotheses within which we 
""ill initially move in our analysis of the horizontal and vertical games. We will 
consider only t\vo final goods markets. The total output in the final goods' sector can 
be decomposed in QO, the output of a monopolised good, and QI which is the one of 
a non-monopolised good, hereafter denoted also as good 1. In the horizontal game 
the total output is simply QI. 
On the consumers' side, for simplicity's sake, we restrict the analysis to two 
types of customers: high and low-demand customers (t = H, L). 
(i) each type is present in the same number (denoted by N); 
(ii) as in Laffont and Tirole, for simplicity's sake, we \\ill assume that the 
monopolised good is sold by the incumbent at the linear price po. We can in fact, for 
instance suppose that both the customers of type Land H receive the same utility 
v( qO) from consuming a unit of the monopolised good. 
For the non-monopolised good the gross surplus function of type t is assumed to be a 
function of the relative output per unit of customer (qt) and a taste parameter (9t) 
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which captures the willingness to pay for the bundle qt. 
To simplify notatio~ let 9r. =1 and consider the following simple functional form, 
such that for the same quantity, the high-demand utility becomes a fixed multiple of 
the low-demand's one, with e > 1: 
(2.1) uH = e U('1H) 
[2.2) UL = u( 'It) 
with u'( '1t»O and u"( qt)<O. In what follows we examine in more detail the quadratic 
utility function case [Ut = qt - q£/2] which has a nice geometrical interpretation. 
On the industry's side both the incumbent and the entrant are allowed to make 
use offully non-linear tariff. 
where Tt is the amount paid to the firm by the customer of type t. 
(iii) In the absence of entry the incumbent acts as a monopolist and is characterised 
by the following cost and revenue functions: 
C(Q)=c· Q 
R(Q, QO) = (T L + TI-l)N + 2N pOqO 
where c· is the incumbent's constant marginal cost, Q and QO respectively denote his 
total output for the non-monopolised and monopolised good. For simplicity's sake 
good 0 has only network costs. Naturally, in the horizontal game being QO equal to 
zero, the revenue function is simply R(Q). We are assuming that the incumbent's 
fixed costs are already sunk. 
(iv) the competitor has afued limited scale of entry in tenns of number of customers 
to be served: 
K=KL +KH<N 
Loosely speaking, she can't pre-empt either of the two markets. For simplicity's sake, 
we ,viII keep this assumption in all the stages of the game. We assume that she must 
pay an access charge F fixed by the incumbent (which can be considered as a cost of 
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entry) which may depend in general both on the scale of entry K and on her total 
output Qe: 
F(KL> KH, Q<) ~ 0 
Natural1y in the horizontal game F is equal to zero. 
Finally, she has a linear variable cost function: 
CVe=m Q< 
where m denotes the value of her marginal cost. Usually, to simplify matters we 
assume that the total cost function and the variable cost function do coincide, c· = 
eve. 
Notice how the competitor will enter the non monopolised good market if the usual 
participation constraint is satisfied: 
[PCe] ne(Qe) = Re - c· = KL(Ti. - mqi.) + KI-~reH -mql-l) - F(KL, KH, Q<) ~ 0 
We do not need to specify an incentive compatibility constraint, as we are dealing 
\"ith a single competitor with complete information. 
(v) the production cost of the two final goods depends on the network subcost 
function NC. In general the latter may depend on the number of customers to be 
served (2N) and on the total quantity of commodities which flO\vs through the 
network, QI = Q + Qe: 
NC(2N, QO, QI) = ./'·C(2N) + cOQo + CIQI 
To simplify matters, for some of the analysis, we will assume c l equal to zero. 
In the presence of entry the incumbent is characterised by the following cost and 
revenue [uncI ions: 
C(Q) = c· Q = c· (NL ~ + NH CJH) 
R(Q, QO) = NLTL + NH T H + 2N pOqO 
where Nt=N-Kt denote the residual number of customers of type t served by the 
incumbent, c· is the incumbent's constant marginal cost and Q = NL~ + NH'hi 
denotes the total output. Notice how we are assuming that the incumbent's fixed cost 
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depends on the total number of customers 2N. 
For clarity of exposition, here is sketched the overall structure of the game in 
the absence of vertical markets: 
(0) the authority sets up the regulatory system and decides the policy towards price 
discrimination; 
(1) the entrant decides the number of customers {Kt } to be served in each market; 
(2) the incumbent chooses his pricing rule {Tt• qt}, where Tt is a fully non-linear 
tariff; 
(3) the entrant chooses the strategy of competition. 
In the next sections we will solve the game, first in the absence of vertical 
issues and also making some simplifying assumption regarding the strategy of 
competition (stage 3), that \",i11 be later relaxed. Specifically assuming that the 
entrant is a tariff taker (i.e. she makes use of the same pricing rule of the incumbent) 
we can directly move to the second stage, determining the optimal pricing strategy of 
the incumbent. In the vertical case, we will solve the game, starting from the simple 
case of an equally efficient competitor (i.e. m=c*). 
2.3 The incumbent's problem 
2.3.1 The basic problem in the absence o/vertical issues 
We can directly tackle the incumbent's problem allowing for fixed levels of 
entry, by considering the decision of the incumbent in residual terms. Let Nt=N-Kt 
denote the residual number of customers of type t served by the incumbent. The 
solution of the problem in the absence of entry can be directly determined by 
imposing NL =NH=N. We are now dealing with stage 2, in order to tackle the 
incumbent's optimisation problem. 
In the absence of entry (i.e. when Ql = Q) the incumbent acts as a monopolist; 
that is, he maximises his profit function n(Q) with respect to the tariff system {T L' 
'IL, T H and ~} subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility 
constraints: 
88 
max n(Q) E R(Q) - c*Q subject to: 
[IRd u('lL) - TL ~ 0 
[IRH] 9 u(cm) - TH ~ 0 
[ICd u('lL) - TL ~ U(qH) - TH 
[ICH] 9 u('h~) - TH ~ 9 u('lL) - TL 
and Q=NL'IL +NH'hi 
The first two constraints [IRd and [IRH] represent the participation constraints 
for the two types of customers, when we assume a reservation price equal to zero, 
whereas [rCd and [ICH] specify the incentive compatibility constraints. In particular, 
the upward binding incentive constraint [ICd prevents the low-demand type from 
consuming the high-demand bundle ('hI), while the downward binding incentive 
constraint [ICH] prevents the high-demand consumer from mimicking the low-
demand customer. 
In this model as in Laffont and Tirole we assume that the incumbent serves 
both types of customers. We can simply say that this derives from an universal 
service obligation, but we \\~ll see how for him it is profitable to serve both types for 
a certain range of values of his marginal cost c and the taste parameter 9. If both 
types are served by the incumbent it is easy to demonstrate that only [IRd and [ICIl] 
are binding: 
[IRd T L = u( 'lL) 
[I CB] T H = 9 u( 'In) - (9 - 1) u( 'lL) 
These expressions can be interpreted as follows: no surplus is allowed to the L 
type, whereas the H type enjoys a positive net surplus [given by (9 - 1) u(CIrJ)' 
In order to show that the only binding constraint are [IRd and [ICB] we will 
proceed as follows. First of all, we \vi11 prove that [IRH] will be automatically 
satisfied, once the previous constraints are binding. From [ICH] we know that: 
9 u('h-l) ~ Tn + 9 u(qd - TL 
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Making use of [IRd, which tells us that T L is less or equal to u( ~), keeping in 
mind that 9 is greater than unity, we can rewrite the previous inequality as: 
9 u('lH) ~ TH + (9 - I) u(~) ~ TH 
This is exactly what we want to prove; i.e. [IRH] is fulfilled. The intuition 
behind this result is that the H type can always mimic the L type, at a lower cost, 
since his willingness to pay for the same bundle is higher (9) I). 
The last step of the procedure involve sho\\'ing that [led is satisfied ex post by 
the solutions of our model. We are going to verify this at the end of the optimisation 
problem, solved below, applying a two stage procedure. 
Since the incumbent's cost function depends only on the total level of output Q 
(and not separately on qH and qL), we can split up the maximisation problem in two 
stages. The first stage involves the determination of the optimal revenue function for 
all levels of the total output. The solution of this stage gives the optimal relationship 
between the shares of output allocated by the incumbent for each customer of type L 
and H, whereas only in the final stage we are able to determine the optimal level of 
output by solving the profit maximisation problem. 
The two stages maximisation problem becomes: 
STAGE A: 
max R(Q) = 
[IRd 
[ICH] 
and 
Determination of the optimal R(Q) for all Q 
TL NL + TH NHsubject to: 
TL = u(~) 
TH = e U(qH) - (9 - 1) u(~) 
Q = NL qL + NH 'h~ 
The previous problem can be solved only Vtith respect to qL and 'hI' once we 
substitute the two binding constraints [IRd and [ICH] into the objective function: 
maxR(Q)= [NL - N1i 9 - 1)] u(~) + NH 9 u('lH) subject to: 
Q=NL~ +NHqH 
We can then write down the Lagrangean function, which is: 
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L = R(Q) - J.l [Q - (NL 'h. + NH 'h-l)] 
The first order conditions are given by: 
[NL - N~9 - 1)] u'(ch) - J.l NL = 0 
Nn [9 U'(qH) - J.l] = 0 
Substituting the value of the Lagrangean multiplier J.l=9u'(4I) into the first 
order condition with respect to 'h. we get the optimal relationship between 'h. and 'hI: 
(2.3) 
The optimal relationship between the two marginal pnces is very easily 
obtained from [2.3), making use of the optimality conditions which hold for the 
consumers, i.e. Pt = 9t u'(qt): 
[2.4) PH = [1 - (9 - 1) NHlNd PI.. 
STAGE B: Determination of the optimal level of output Q 
max TI(Qi) == R(Q) - c* Q 
Since we already know, from the solution of the previous stage, the optimal 
revenue function, we can get the solution of the profit maximisation simply by 
imposing the equality between marginal revenue and marginal cost [i.e. dRldQ=c*]. 
Substituting in [2.4) the value of the marginal revenue [dRJdQ=PH=9u'('hI)]' we 
immediately get the expression for the two marginal prices: 
[2.5] 
(2.6] 
PI. = u'('h.) = c* / [1 - (9 - 1) NHlNd > c'" 
PH = 9 U'('hl) = c* 
Equations [2.5] and (2.6) show how the low-demand marginal price PI.. is 
always greater than PII. Since the inverse demand function is a decreasing function of 
the price, the sign of the inequality in terms of quantities is clearly reversed, so that 
the quantity consumed per unit of customer 'h-I is always greater than'lL. Hence, we 
can easily verify that in equilibrium [rCd is satisfied: 
TlI - T L = e [U(qH)- U(ChJ] ~ U(qH) - U(ClL) 
This concludes our proof that the only binding constraints are [IRrJ and [ICH]. 
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Let us now explore the admissible values of the model standardising, for 
simplicity's sake, the utility function [i.e. u'(CJr.)=1 for CJr. =0]. To be sure that the 
incumbent will find it profitable to serve both markets when non-linear pricing is 
allowed we require PI. to be less than unity; that is, making use of [2.5]: 
PI. =c* / [1 - (9 -l)NliNd < 1 
which reduces to: 
c* < 1 - (9 - l)NHINL 
We must also check that this condition will hold when the ratio NlfNL reaches 
its maximum (that is, for the skimmed milk case which occurs when KH=O, the ratio 
NUINL being a decreasing function of KH)' Corresponding to KH equal to zero NHINL 
is equal to lI( I-s), where s = KIN denotes the proportional scale of entry: 
c* < 1 - (9 - 1)/(1 - s) = C *(9, s) 
This means that the incumbent must be efficient enough; i.e. his marginal cost 
has an upper bound which is a function of 9 and s, denoted by c *(9, s). This value 
must be positive (hence, economicaI1y meaningful): 
c*(9,s)= 1-(9-1)/(I-s»0 
,vhich is equivalent to say: 
9 <2-s 
c· Fig. 2.1 
A 
o a 
In the space (9, c) C *(9,0) = 2 - 9 is just a ~~ight, li..ne which passes through 
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the points A = (1, 1) and B = (2, 0). Graphically, the admissible values of c* and e 
are confined to the region inside the triangle ABC [where C = (1,0)], as shown in fig. 
2.1 above. This hinges on the fact that c *(9, s) is a decreasing function of s~ i.e. 
when s decreases the function c *(9, s) simply rotates clockwise around the point A. 
Let us pause now to interpret the results of the optimisation problem. It directly 
follows from [2.6) that the marginal price applied to the H type equals the marginal 
cost, so that there is no distortion at the top. The conclusion is that the standard 
result on price discrimination for pure monopoly can be directly applied allowing for 
exogenous scale of entry (KL and KH), once we take into account only residual 
customers (NH and NL). 
This shows how pervasive is this result, which holds in several different 
frameworks. Mirrlees (1971) was the first to derive it in the ambit of optimal 
taxation, Mussa and Rosen (1979) and Spence (1980) confirm its validity 
respectively for a multi-quality and a multi-product monopolist who price 
discriminates. This result deserves a brief digression for its importance, in order to 
better specify its meaning and relevance. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions in order to have "no distortion at the 
top" in a very stylised principal agent setting (where a monopolist is serving a 
population of customers but is unable to distinguish each type) are: 
1) the existence of a "top customer". This condition will generally imply an upper 
bound on the value of the taste parameter. Here for simplicity's sake we consider 
only the two types case, that is we assume that the taste parameter takes only two 
values. 
2) the relevant incentive compatibility constraint [ICH] being binding, while the other 
[ICd being ex post satisfied by the solution, in the case of two types. 
The intuition behind this result is easily explained The monopolist would like 
to extract the high demand surplus~ however, doing this he faces the threat of 
personal arbitrage by high demand customers. In fact each high demand customer 
can consume the low demand bundle if the latter generates more surplus (compared 
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with his own bundle). The reduction of the quantity offered to the low demand 
consumers is needed in order to relax the arbitrage constraint. In fact, due to a 
technical sorting condition high demand customers suffer more from a reduction of 
the quantity than low demand customers do.37 Very loosely, the monopolist, by 
reducing the quantity of low demand customers will reduce the "temptation" of high 
demand customers to exercise arbitrage (that is, to mimic low demand customers). 
In what follows we are going to explore some interesting properties which can 
be derived from the previous analysis. Specifically, we focus on the determination of 
the optimal reply, in terms of tariff and bundle allocation, of the incumbent relative 
to the scale of entry of and the desirability to apply quantity discount in the presence 
of competition. 
The optima/tariffs of the incumbent as afunction of the scale of entry 
It is interesting to analyse how the incumbent's tariffs and quantities vary with 
respect to the residual number of customers served by the incumbent (we will make 
reference to the ratio NHlNd in the horizontal game. In particular, we will show that: 
(a) qL is a decreasing function of the ratio NHINL ; 
(b) 'lJ-l is independent of the ratio NHINL; 
(e) TL = u(~) is a decreasing function of the ratio NHINL; 
(d) TH = 8 u(~) - (8 - 1) u(~) is an increasing function of the ratio NHINL. 
Since it is straightforward to prove these results in what follow we just sketch 
the main arguments. 
Result (a): From [2.5] the value of PI. is clearly an increasing function of the ratio 
NHINL, since this term appears in the denominator with a negative 
coefficient (by assumption 8> 1). But ~ is a decreasing function of PL 
(this follows directly from the fact that the utility function is concave), so 
that it must b~ a decreasing function of the ratio NHINL. 
37 In the literature on incentives this condition is known as the "single crossing 
condition" or the "Spence-Mirrlees condition". 
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Result (b): From (2.6] the value of PH is independent of the ratio NHINL and the same 
is true of 'lI-I~ It is worth noticing that this result crucially hinges on the 
fact that we are assuming constant marginal cost for the incumbent. 
Result (c): This result isjust a corollary of (a), since we know that TL = u(CIt), where 
u is an increasing function of CIt. 
Result (d): This result follows from (b) and (c). Since TH = S u('h-I)-(S-l)u(CIt), using 
(b) the first term is independent of the ratio NHINL, whereas from (c) the 
latter term turns out to be an increasing function of CIt. 
These result are very relevant if we want to analyse which kind of competition 
the incumbent would prefer to face: namely competition for the high or low type. We 
are going to make use of these properties later, after solving the entrant's problem 
(see section 2.4.3, where we explore the desirability of cream skimming in terms of 
productive and allocative efficiency). 
The quantity discount result 
Finally, we might want to check whether it is optimal for the incumbent to 
offer quantity discounts (i.e. in analytical term we need to verify that TdCIt is 
greater than T H/'h-I). A proof of this result is provided below for simplicity's sake in 
the quadratic utility functions case. 
Let us then verify that TdCIt is greater TJ'hI for quadratic utility functions. To 
simplify the comparison between T L/CIt and T H/'hI let us decompose the latter as the 
weighted average between T dCIt and T i(]a where T i(]a = (T H - T t> / ('lI-I - CIt): 
TIl/ChI = {CIt/%} TdCIt + {('hI - CIt)/%} [TH - Ttl / (% - CIt) 
This means that in order to prove that T dCIt> T H/'lI-I we can limit ourselves to 
show that TdCIt>Ta!qa' For quadratic utility functions TdCIt is simply the average 
between 1 and u'( CItTPt, as it can be easily verified: 
Similarly T a/qa is the average between l'J-I=C* and Su'( CIt)=8Pt: 
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T a/CIa = (T If" T L)/( 'lirqrJ = 9[( 'b-r'lL)-1I2( 'lir'lL)( 'li1+'lL)]/( CJir 'lL) 
= 9 [(l-qH) + (1-'lL)]/2 = (PH+9PrY2 
Substituting the value of PH from [2.5) into the previous equations: 
Td'lL = {l+c*/[I-(9-I)NHlNd}/2 = {l-(9-1)(NHINL)+C*}/2[1-(9-I)NHlNd 
Ta/qa = {c*+9c*/[1-(9-1)NHlNd}/2=c*[(9+ 1)-(9-1)NHlNd/2[1-(9-I)NulNd 
We are now able to derive the condition which makes Td'lL>Tiqa being 
fulfilled: 
[1- (9 - l)NIlINL + c*] > c*[C9 + I) - (9 - I)NHlNd 
Subtracting 2c* from both sides: 
Notice how the left hand side is always positive, that is [1- (9 - I)NJIINL - c*l > 
0, since the marginal price PL and the marginal cost c* are less than unity, both 
inequalities being required in order to ensure that the incumbent start off by serving 
both types of customers (see fig. 2.1). Let then examine the sign of the right hand 
side of the equation. For NH>NL (that is, in the case of skimmed milk competition) 
the right hand side is negative; so that the required condition is always fulfilled. For 
NH<NL, that is in the cream skimming case, although the right hand side is now 
positive, the condition still holds. It is easy to check that if we reduce by the amount 
of z the ratio NHINL the left hand side is increased by a factor given by z(9 - 1), while 
the right hand side rises only by z c*(9 - I) (where c* is less than unity). 
This completes the proof that the incumbent finds it optimal to apply quantity 
discount in the presence of competition. In the next subsection we extend the game 
to vertically related market where the incumbent has a natural monopoly on the 
network. 
. 2.3.2 Extension to the vertical case 
Following the same procedure applied before, we first tackle the incumbent's 
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optimisation problem. However, we first solve the game in the absence of entry (i.e. 
when N = NL = NH). In this case the incumbent acts as a monopolist; that is, he 
maximises his profit function TICQ, QO, QI) -now inclusive of the revenue and costs 
of the monopolised good and network costs NC- with respect to the tariff system 
{T L' ClL, T H and ern} subject to the following constraints: 
[Problem 1] max TI(Q, QO, QI) == R(Qo, QI) - NC(2N, QO, QI) - C(Q) 
[M1v1E] 
[IRd 
v'(qO) - po S 0 
uCClL) - TL ~ 0 
[IRH] e u(qH) - TH ~ 0 
[I Cd u( 'lL) - T L ~ u( 'hi) - T H 
[ICH] e U('hf) - TH ~ e u('h.) - TL 
subject to: 
The first constraint [MME] simply implies the monopolised market 
equilibrium on the consumers' side, imposing the price of the monopolised good to 
be less or equal to the marginal utility enjoyed by its consumption. As previously 
said, both customers of type L and H receive the same utility from consuming a unit 
of the monopolised good. The two following constraints [IRd [IRH] are the usual 
participation constraints (""ith reservation prices equal to zero) for the two types of 
customers, whereas [ICd and [ICH] represent the incentive compatibility constraints. 
As in the basic model, the upward binding incentive constraint [ICd prevents the 
low-demand type from consuming the high-demand bundle (qH), while the 
downward binding incentive constraint [ICH] prevents the high-demand consumer 
from mimicking the low-demand customer. As we have shown before the upward 
binding constraint [ICd and the participation constraint [IRH] are automatically 
satisfied by the solution of the problem when [IRd and [ICH] are binding (the same 
proof being provided above holds in this case). In practice, no surplus is allowed to 
the L type, whereas the H type enjoys a positive net surplus [given by (8-1) u(ClL)]. 
Notice how in the vertical game, apart from the additional constraint derived 
for the consumers in the intermediate demand market, the same constraints referred 
to the consumers' in the final demand market in the horizontal game are binding. 
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Once we substitute all the functional fonns of the revenue and cost functions, 
as previously defined, [Problem 1] becomes: 
[Problem 21 max TI(Qi) == 2NpOqO + N (T L + T H) - NC(2N) - C*Qi 
[MME] 
[IRd 
pO = v'(qO) 
TL = u(~) 
subject to: 
This problem, hereafter called (Problem 21, can be easily solved only with 
respect to qO, ~ and 'lJ~, once we substitute the three binding constraints into the 
objective function: 
max TI(Qi) == 2NqOv'( qO)+ N(2-e)u( ~)+ Neu( 'hI) - NC(2N) - cO(2NqO) - Nc*( qL +~) 
Making use of the optimality conditions which hold for the consumers for the 
non monopolised good, i.e. Pt = et u'(qt) we can write the first order conditions as: 
[qO] CO = v'( qO)+ v"( qO) qO 
[~] PH = e U'(qH) = c* 
[~] PL = u'(~) = c* / (2-e) 
The first equation simply states the equality between the marginal cost and the 
marginal revenue for the monopolised good. The following ones imply that there is 
no distortion at the top and some distortion at the bottom. 
A comparison with the first order condition in the horizontal game (naturally 
for NliNL equal to unity, since we are dealing with a monopolist) shows how the 
incumbent finds it optimal to fix in the final demand market the same tariffs as in the 
horizontal game. 
In particular, from the two latter first order conditions we obtain the optimal 
relationship between the two marginal prices PL and PH: 
[2.10] PH = (2 - e) PL 
and between ~ and ~: 
[2.11] e u'(~) = (2 - e) u'(~) 
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What is more surprising, as will be shown later in section 2.5, is that the 
optimal relationship between the marginal prices [2.11] still hold in the presence of 
competition. That is, differently from the vertical game the incumbent can act as a 
monopolist, fixing his tariffs independently of the scale of entry. However, before 
tackling the entrant's problem let us provide a graphical representation of the 
incumbent's problem. 
2.3.3 A graphical exposition 
In order to· clarify the exposition of the model, it may be of some interest to 
give a representation of our game in the monopoly case of quadratic utility junction 
u( q)=q - (q)2/2. In fig. 2.2 the linear marginal utility functions u'( q) and Su'( q) are 
shown, as well as the optimal discriminatory marginal prices PH=OG=c*, PL=OF>c*. 
p Fig. 2.2 
A 
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It is ilmnediate to derive graphically the quantities allocated per unit of 
customer (which are obtained in correspondence of the intersection between the 
curves representing the marginal utility and marginal price for each type) and to 
verify that 'h~ is greater than 'lr.. (since q is a decreasing function of p, the sign of the 
inequality is clearly reversed). The tariffs T Land T H give a measure of the gross 
revenue per unit of customer. The tariff T L can be measured by the integral from 0 to 
~ of the area which lies below the L type marginal utility function u'(~). 
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In the linear case T L is simply given by the area COCILE. To obtain the tariff T H, 
since 'hI is greater than 'h., the integral from 'h. to qH of the area which lies below the 
H type marginal utility function should be added. In the linear case this additional 
tariff is represented by the area H'h.qHN. If we want to derive the net revenues per 
customer it suffices to subtract the marginal cost c*; graphically CGIE and CGIE + 
HIN measure the respective net revenue obtained from a customer of type Land H. It 
is also worth noting how, in order to respect the incentive compatibility constraint of 
the H type a net surplus which amounts to (9 - 1) TL (the area ACEH) must be given 
to each customer of type H. 
Notice how the representation of our vertical game in the case of monopoly 
when c1 is equal to zero does not differ from the previous pictures. Therefore, no 
further explanations are required. 
For the horizontal game we can make more detailed consideration, since we 
have already solved the game in the presence of entry, showing that the optimal 
prices and quantities allocated per unit of customer do not depend in any way on the 
scale of entry in the vertical game.38 
p Fig. 2.3 
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We know that in the horizontal game the value of 'hI remains the same as long 
38 This would be no longer true when the incumbent can fix charges to give access to 
his network, since in this case we will see how he can act strategically in a way of 
appropriating all the entrant's profits (by using an appropriate access charge) 
enjoying monopoly profits independently of the scale of entry. 
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as the marginal cost is constant Instead, we have different values of'lL whenever the 
values of NL and NH vary. In fig. 2.3 above for a given value of K, the two extreme 
values assumed by the low-demand per customer bundle 'h. are shown. From result 
(a) we know that 'h.is a decreasing function of the ratio N1IN'L' Since the total scale 
of entry is fixed (that is, we are allowing KH to vary), then. the ratio NH/'NL is clearly 
a decreasing function of the scale of entry for the high type KH [since Nw'NL is equal 
to (N-KH)/(N-K+KH)]. Therefore. 'h. is an increasing function ofKH. 
If for each variable x. we denote by ~ and x: respectively the value assumed 
for KH = K and KH = O. it immediately follows that q L is strictly greater than ~. This 
implies that the incumbent can enjoy monopoly profits for the residual number of 
customers' served in the horizontal game. In the next section we solve the 
maximisation problem for the entrant. 
2.4 The entrant's problem 
2A.l Strategies of competition 
The previous results derived for the incumbent's optimal pricing strategy are 
useful to solve the entry game. that is the decision of the competitor to determine her 
scale of entry in tenns of number of customers. In this section we are now going to 
solve stage 1 of the horizontal game. tackling the question of how the competitor's 
profits vary with the decision to serve the two types of customers in a given 
proportion. 
However. before doing that. let us discuss in more detail the strategy of 
competition available to the entrant in stage 3. So far we assumed that the competitor 
acts as a tariff-taker; i.e. that she takes as given the tariff Tt detennined by the 
incumbent However, in principle there are several strategies of competition that the 
entrant can use; for instance, a surplus-taker competitor can propose a new tariff Tt 
that allows to type t the same surplus fixed by the incumbent This kind of strategy is 
superior to the previous one and in Appendix 2 we are going to show that this is 
indeed the optimal pricing strategy for the entrant. Intuitively, it should be clear how 
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the tariff-taking strategy is just a special case of the surplus taking behaviour. This 
consideration justifies our focus on the simple price taking behaviour on simplicity 
grounds. The point is that a priori we find out an incredible number of variants of the 
basic model. That is the reason why we limit ourselves to analyse in detail some of 
them, suggesting how the reasoning developed could be extended or modified in 
order to deal with more complicated cases following the geometric intuition. 
For both these strategies of competition it is important to endogenise the scale 
of entry and determine which of the two types the entrant will choose to serve. In 
general, as will be sho\\n, this will crucial1y depend on the level of the entrant's 
marginal costs m, or we may say, on the efficiency level of the competitor. 
In what follows, first of all, we\vill provide a sketch of the entrant's problem 
in general terms, just in order to specify the crucial variables relevant in the choice 
of the customer's type to be served at the margin. Loosely, from the solution of the 
optimisation problem for the entrant we are able to determine two critical values 
assumed by the marginal cost as a function of the scale of entry. Outside the interval 
determined by these values, two comer solutions appear; an inetpcient competitor 
will always find it more profitable to serve only low-demand customers, whereas a 
relatively efficient competitor will cream skim (Le. she will serve only the H type). 
The reason that drives this result is very simple: serving one customer of type 
H involves a trade-off between the benefits enjoyed because of the increase in the 
quantity sold and the costs due to the decrease in the average tariff (we are referring 
to the quantity discount result). It is then clear how a relatively efficient competitor 
is willing to accept the reduction in the average tariff, in order to enjoy a higher 
profit in absolute terms. For intermediate values of m the entrant will serve both 
types, being indifferent between one type and the other at the margin. This first result 
holds for the case in which there are relevant infra-marginal effects. 
It is interesting to notice how only, ignoring infra-marginal effects, a 
competitor as efficient as the incumbent will always go for the H type. In a more 
general context (that is, allowing for infra-marginal effects) an entrant with the same 
102 
marginal cost of the incumbent may increase ,his profit by substituting a customer of 
type H with a customer of type L (see Appendix 3). Basically, a decrease in the 
number of the H type served by the entrant allows a reduction in the net surplus to 
leave to the remaining high-demand customers. In fact, the gains achieved in this 
way might be greater than the losses due to the forgone net additional revenue (due 
to the decision of no longer serving a customer of type H). 
2.-1.2 Endogenising the choice of the customers' opes 
We are now solving the first stage of the horizontal game. The competitor 
decides whether or not to enter the market and in the first case she determines the 
number of customers to be served in each market. Since we are still keeping the 
assumption that the entrant has a fixed scale of entry (i.e. K=KH+KL is given) there is 
only one variable left to his control, say KIl. Naturally, the value of KL will be 
automatically determined as a residual KL =K-KH' 
The optimisation problem for the entrant can be stated as: 
where T Hand T L represent the incumbent's optimal tariffs, whose value will be 
determined in stage 2 (as described in section 2.3 above) and we considering the case 
in which the cost of entry depends on the scale of entry for both types of customers. 
Let us give a brief account of all the terms that enter into the marginal 
profitability per unit of customer: 
dITe/dKH= (Tlrm'hl)-(TL-m'k)+KI~(TI1m'lH)/dKH+(K-KH)d(TL-m'k)/dKl-l- (fel-l-feL) 
1) T = (TI1m'h-I)-(TL-m'k) represents the difference benveen the two net revenues 
enjoyed by serving a customer of type H and a customer of type L. 
2) n = KH d(TI1m'hl)/dKH + (K-KH) d(TL-m'lL)/dKH represents the total net gain (or 
loss) on the infra-marginal customers of type Hand L arising because of the 
variation in the incumbent's tariffs and quantities (as a response to the change in 
the value ofKH chosen by the entrant). 
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3) fe = (feH - feL) represents the effect brought by a different marginal cost of entry 
for the two types of customer, where: feH = dF/dKH and feL = dF/d(K - KH). 
In Appendix 3 we will consider in more detail the problem. In what follows we 
focus on a particular case. 
The choice of an additional customer (type L or H) when the scale of entry is small 
The simplest framework to examine is the one in which it is optimal for the 
entrant to go only for one type and her decision concerns just the choice of the 
additional customer to be served (i.e. the entrant is free to choose between serving a 
customer of type H or L). 
We initially abstract from the preliminary decision whether or not to enter the 
market, postponing some considerations on the influence of the cost of entry on the 
choice of the type of customer to be served at the end of this section. Ignoring infra-
marginal gains (or losses) on the residual number of customers (i.e. 0=0) and 
assuming that the cost of entry depends only the total number of customers (fe=O) 
the crucial variable for the entrant is clearly the net revenue per customer (using the 
previous notation T). Infra-marginal effects can be surely ignored if we are dealing 
with infinitesimal changes in the value of the number of customers served by the 
entrant, i.e. when the percentage scale of entry (KJN) is small enough. A formal 
justification is provided in Appendix 3. 
We will start from a tariff-taker competitor. The criterion which will guide her 
decision is simply the achievement of the highest profit per unit of customer at the 
margin. 
The optimisation problem for the entrant can be stated as: 
max TIe == KH (T H - mCffi) + (K - KH) (T L - m'lL) - F(K) 
The marginal profitability per unit of customer is given by: 
where THis a decreasing function of KH, whereas both T Land 'lL are increasing 
functions of KH and 'lH is a constant (see section 2.3). The competitor obtains from 
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each type the same net revenue per unit of customer if and only if dTIe/dKH = 0; that 
is, whenever: 
m = (TH - Tt ) / (CUr <IL) 
Keeping the same notation as before, for each variable x let ~ and x represent 
respectively the value assumed for KH= K and KH=O. That is, the first value is 
associated to cream skimming the other to skimmed milk competition. 
Given these premises, it is straightforward to conclude that an interior solution 
(O<KH<K) arises whenever m assumes values within the interval detennined by m 
and m, whereas for all values outside this interval two comer solutions appear, as 
sketched below. 
The entrant's choice of customers 
1) for m < m the entrant ""ill go only for the H type, since dTIc/dKH >0; 
2) for m > m the entrant will serve only the L type, since dTIe/dKH<O; 
3) for m ~ m ~ m the entrant will be indifferent between serving one type or the 
other (as for all these values of m the equilibrium value of KH will be set such that 
dTIc/dKH =0). 
In Appendix 3 we \"ill prove that m is a decreasing function of the scale of 
entry in the high-demand market KH; therefore, we have that m is less than m. In 
economic terms this means that the level of efficiency required for the entrant in 
order to engage in cream skimming competition is strictly higher (the level of the 
marginal cost being strictly lower) than the one required to engagein skimmed milk 
competition. It can also be proved that m is always greater than the H type's 
marginal price Pr-l' which is simply equal to c·, the incumbent's marginal cost (see 
Appendix 3). 
It is then immediate to deduce that in the case of a competitor as efficient as 
the incumbent case 1) will always occur (since m>c*). The same conclusion holds 
also for a surplus taker competitor (since in this case she can do no better than a 
tariff taker). As will be shown, the best that a surplus taker can do is to set marginal 
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price equal to marginal cost. It is worth noticing that for the cream skimming case to 
occur the entrant does not need to be more efficient than the incumbent, as in the L T 
game or in the Laffont and Tirole approach. 
Let us finally consider how the level of the cost of entry that are sunk in the 
preliminary decision of entry affects the choice of the type of customer to be served. 
First of all, the competitor will enter the market only if she gets a positive profit. By 
imposing TIe = 0 we can determine the limiting value of the marginal cost (hereafter 
denoted by me) for which entry is profitable: 
me = [KH TH + (K - KH) TL - F(K)] / [KH'll! - (K - KH)qrJ 
Depending on the value assumed by the fixed cost F me varies, so we can 
classify two cases: 
I) for sufficiently high level of F me will be less than m, so that the entrant will 
serve only the H type. Laffont and Tirole (1990b) limit the analysis to this case. 
II) For sufficiently low level ofF me will be greater than m, so that the entrant will . 
serve only the L type. 
Let us conclude this section related to the entrant's problem by providing a 
graphical representation. 
2.4.3 A graphical representation 
It is useful to continue to represent the case of quadratic utility functions, in 
order to have a clear-cut picture of the possible situations. 
The limiting levels m (m )in the linear case are just given by the average 
between 9 ~ (9PL) and PH (= c)~ that is: 
m= (9Qr.+c)/2 
m = (9PL + c)/2 
Graphically, as shown in fig. 2.5 below, this occurs because the areas of two 
triangles STY and YDW (HVZ and ZDX) between 9 u'( q) and the horizontal line m 
(or m) [and the two boundaries CIL (or flL) and 'lHl must be equal. 
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Let us now extend the analysis to a surplus-taker entrant. The same reasoning 
can be applied and the same cases hold. The real difference hinges on the fact that a 
surplus taker competitor sets for each type the marginal price equal to her marginal 
cost [p=8u'( qf~)=U'( Gl)=m], so that the two limiting values of m are greater than the 
ones relative to a tariff-taker. In any case the surplus of high-demand customers is 
the same, no matter who they buys from. Another important fact to notice is that the 
entrant does not create any incentive compatibility problems to the incumbent 
(differently from Laffont and Tirole), because the L type consumer will always get a 
quantity qi from the entrant which is less than the one offered by the incumbent ('lL). 
Instead of providing a detailed analysis of this case we will limit to represent the 
three possible situations for quadratic utility functions. 
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To picture the cream skimming case (fig. 2.6 above) we should first of all find 
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a price me (graprucally a horizontal line) for wruch the consumer's surplus of the H 
type [the area AFY = Ou(qfI) - % me] is equalised to the sum of the surplus of the L 
type [the area CFZ = Ou(qf) - elf. me] and the surplus allowed by the incumbent to the 
H customer [the area ACHE = (O-l)Td. This occurs in correspondence of the 
equality of the areas of the two shaded triangles (ZEL and LVH). 
The second case in which only the L type is served is shown in fig. 2.7 below. 
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As is geometrically intuitive from the previous figures, for all values of the 
scale of entry K we have: 
It goes without saying that the competitor will be indifferent about serving one 
type or the other for intermediate values ofm (that is, for me:s; m :s; me). 
At this point we can finally compare the two strategies of entry. It is important 
to notice how the surplus-taker behaviour is a more effective strategy for the entrant 
which allows her to appropriate a greater profit per customer. As has been shown, we 
have me> m and mc > m for any value of K. Furthennore, for any value of the 
entry scale K and of the marginal cost m, the entrant is able to get a greater profit if 
she acts as a surplus-taker. The explanation of this is that, since a surplus-taker 
entrant tends to compete more for high-demand customers, she will allow them to 
get a greater net consumer surplus for any given value of K. Hence, this strategy 
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improves the sum of the net consumers' surplus; that is, their welfare. 
In the next subsection we will focus on the cream skimming case, in order to 
explore its implication in terms of productive and allocative efficiency and to 
compare to the case of skimmed milk competition. 
2.-1.-1 The cream skimming and skimmed milk cases 
It seems relevant at this point to compare the results derived in this section 
with the one of Laffont and Tirole (1990b). A comparison with the cream skimming 
paradigm carried out within an unregulated framework is perfectly legitimate, since 
our analysis have proved that no major changes of the outcomes of Laffont and 
Tirole (1990b) will take place without regulation (cf. section 1.3.2). In fact, 
paradoxically, this paradigm proves to be so robust that the very same distortion 
arises as in an unregulated monopoly. Only regarding regulation the cream skimming 
paradigm seems not to be so robust. In fact, we have sho'wn how when social welfare 
is defined as the unweighted sum of consumers' surplus and profits (a particular case 
which occurs in Laffont and Tirole's framework when the shadow cost of public 
funds is equal to zero) there can be at most a sequence of only three regimes \vith no 
distortion (instead of the original sequence of five regimes). Therefore, in order to 
derive all the sequence of the five regimes present in Laffont and Tirole (1990b) with 
optimal regulation we need to introduce the distortion due to the shadow cost of 
public funds in the social welfare function, or to impose a binding budget constraint. 
Our point in doing a comparison with Laffont and Tirole's cream skimming 
model is not merely theoreticaL Whether natural monopolies should be protected 
from cream skimming entry is a question that has been raised by the recent 
theoretical and applied literature. In the previous section we developed an alternative 
modelling of competitive issues, which allows us to compare the welfare 
implications of different strategy of competition -namely, competition for the low 
and high type- and to derive some policy implications. Here we want to find out 
whether cream skimming competition is necessarily more harmful than skimmed 
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milk competition, from an efficiency point of view. 
In order to carry out a comparison with the cream skimming model of Laffont 
and Tirole, let us briefly recap what happens in terms of productive and allocative 
efficiency when bypass from a cream skimming competitive fringe takes place. We 
clearly satisfy productive efficiency being the entrant more efficient than the 
incumbent, we do also get allocative efficiency having no distortion at the bottom 
(the price for low-demand customers being equal to the marginal cost). Furthermore 
bypass is also optimal from the point of view of the regulator, as shown in section 
1.3. However, we must also ackno\vledge that the profit of the incumbent are clearly 
reduced, as he is left with the less lucrative part of the market. Moreover, high-
demand customers will enjoy a rugher surplus, compared with the one they would 
enjoy if they had been served by the incumbent and low-demand customers are given 
a positive surplus, lower than the one they would have got in regime 5, where their 
incentive compatibility constraint was binding. 
It is also quite interesting to consider the case in which the bypass technology 
is appropriate only for the low type (the skimmed milk), that is the exactly the 
opposite case of cream skimming, following the Laffont and Tirole approach. Under 
the hypothesis of perfect competition what we may call the "skimmed milk" case 
implies that the surplus left to the H type is lower than the one given only by the 
regulated firm. This case may occur when we have low or zero fixed costs (in our 
notation for a low value of the parameter feL) and high marginal costs (i.e. a relative 
high value of m). What happens is that the L type will enjoy a positive surplus, 
causing a reduction in the tariffs of the regulated firm. 
We will not get any change of regimes, since this time the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the low type leL is not affected, whereas its individual 
rationality constraint IRi. will not pass through the origin, allov.ing him to enjoy a 
positive surplus (offered by the competitors). Hence, under different specifications of 
the social welfare function (as well as in the unregulated case) regime 1 remains the 
only regime, apart from bypass (for a very high value offeH). 
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In fact, if we apply the same procedure as in the cream skimming case, carried 
out in section 1.3.1 increasing the marginal cost 13 of the regulated firm, the surplus 
the incumbent must leave to the L customer is given (and as a consequence also the 
additional net surplus of the H type). Henceafter, the superscripts * and 0 refer to the 
optimal bundles derived assuming respectively the social welfare function as the 
unweighted sum of consumers' surplus and profits (i.e. for I.. equal to zero) and as a 
weighted sum in the presence of public funds costs (i.e. when I.. is greater than zero). 
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In fig. 2.8 above the only non-bypass regime is illustrated in the space (q, T). It 
is immediate to derive the graphical representation in the space (q, 1t), as shO\\n in 
fig. 2.9 below. 
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As P increases, the bundle (CIL, 'lH) corresponding to the separating equilibrium 
is reduced. till the firm fmds it no longer profitable to serve the L type and to allow 
an additional surplus to the H type, leaving way to bypass. Even if there is no change 
of regime, in this only possible regime social welfare is reduced by the threat of 
skimmed milk competition, since the profit of the regulated firm decreases 
(compared with the monopoly case). Low-demand customers enjoy a positive 
surplus, so that they are better off than in the standard monopoly case (in which they 
would enjoy no surplus, their rational individual constraint being binding). The 
transfer of surplus from the regulated producer (or public budget) to customers 
reduces social welfare, if transfers are costly (for instance, if we acknowledge the 
presence of a shadow cost of public funds, i.e. we assume that A is greater than zero). 
It is worth noticing how, even in the bypass case, following considerations of 
productive efficiency, social welfare is reduced compared with the cream skimming 
case, because the marginal cost of the entrant is higher (compared with the 
incumbent's one). Let see the consequences of these types of competition on 
consumers' surplus. Low-demand customers would be better off in the presence of 
skimmed milk competition, but at the expenses of allocative efficiency (since there 
would be a distortion in the tariff for the low type). On the other hand. high-demand 
customers would rather prefer cream skimming, as in this case they enjoy a greater 
surplus offered by competitors. Therefore, from an allocative and productive 
efficiency point of view cream skimming would be better than skimmed milk 
competition. 
Laffont and Tirole's analysis clearly does not endogenise the competitor's 
choice of customers' types, since rivals are able to serve the ,vhole population of one 
type, pre-empting only one market (that is, market L in the case of skimmed milk 
competition). Moreover, competitive issues are not really tackled. as we were still 
assuming perfect competition with two part tariffs. The crucial differences of our 
alternative approach, with Laffont and Tirole (1990b), which are basically an related 
to the modelling of competition, are summarised below: 
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(i) the entrant is "small" and cannot totally pre-empt either of the two market. 
Instead, in Laffont and Tirole (1990b), the incumbent risks losing all the H 
market~ 
(ii) the entrant is not perfectly competitive, since she can enjoy a positive profit; 
(iii) the entrant maximises her profit acting a surplus taker (that is offering to each 
type a surplus equal to the one determined by the incumbent, and not an 
exogenous one, technologically given in perfect competition); 
(iv) the choice of which type of customers is endogenised so that we do not have to 
assume exogenously what is the cream. This differentiates the present model 
from the original one where only high-demand customers are served by the 
entrant, since the L type would get a negative surplus; 
(v) entry may take place even if the competitor is less efficient than the incumbent 
(vi) the incumbent is the first mover, that is the first player who determines the 
optimal pricing strategy. 
In what follows we allow the entrant to compete for both types and to make 
use of fully non-linear pricing. Notice that we replace the perfect competitive fringe 
with a single entrant with limited capacity. As already derived in section 2.4, 
focusing on the decision of the type of customer to be served, when the competitor 
does not behave as a perfect competitor things become more complicated, and in this 
case what is the most profitable part of the market for the entrant and for the 
incumbent remains an open question. We have in fact shown how either cream 
skimming or skimmed milk competition can occur depending on the relative 
efficiency of the entrant. 
Let us first of all describe the two main cases of competition for the high and 
low type. We first consider the cream skimming case. We have seen that this kind of 
competition can take place only when the entrant's marginal cost m is lower than a 
given threshold (m). We have shovm that the incumbent in the presence of entry can 
enjoy monopoly profits for the residual number of customers served: that is, NH 
customers of high type and NL customers of low type. Notice how in the absence of 
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infra-marginal effects the incumbent loses the most profitable part of his customers. 
He would rather prefer to face the same scale of entry in the low-demand market. 
However, we should keep in mind that in the presence of optimal regulation this 
consideration does not matter, as the profits of the public firm are appropriated by 
the regulator. Examining issues related to productive efficiency we can conclude that 
clearly cream skimming competition is good in terms of productive efficiency, as 
long as the entrant is at least as efficient as the incumbent. Cream skimming is also 
beneficial for low-demand consumers. In fact regarding allocative efficiency 
considerations, we have seen that the marginal price of low-demand customers 
decreases in the presence of cream skimming. This derives from the fact that the 
marginal price PL is an decreasing function of the scale of entry in the high demand 
market KH -a direct consequence of result c) examined in section 2.3. There is no 
distortion at the top, so that the marginal price for high-demand customer is equal to 
the marginal cost.(as in the standard monopoly case). 
Let us now focus on the skimmed milk case. We have seen that this case occurs 
when the entrant is less efficient than the incumbent (and his marginal cost m is 
greater than a given threshold m). Similarly to the cream skimming case, the 
incumbent can enjoy monopoly profits for the residual number of customers served, 
but this time is better off since he loses customers which gives him a lower variable 
profits. 
Skimmed milk competition is clearly bad both for productive efficiency -since 
the competitor is surely less efficient than the incumbent- and allocative efficiency 
hurting low-demand customers, since the marginal price of low-demand customers 
rises as a consequence of entry. This derives from the fact that the price PL is an 
increasing function of the scale of entry in the low demand market. 
Therefore, even in this enlarged framework the same conclusion as before 
holds; namely cream skimming is not very likely to be less harmful than competition 
for low-demand consumers, even in the absence of regulation, at least as long as it 
allows the entry of more efficient rivals. An additional reason that makes us prefer 
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cream skimming (compared to skimmed milk competition) is that the marginal price 
of low-demand customers will decrease, bringing a welfare increase of consumers' 
surplus. 
Let us sum up the most relevant conclusions. In this subsection we first 
analysed competition for the skimmed milk carried out by a perfectly competitive 
fringe, a case which is the opposite of cream skimming. When bypass takes place, 
social welfare is reduced, because the marginal cost of the entrant are higher 
(compared to the incumbent's one) and both from a productive and allocative point 
of view cream skimming would be preferable. Later, when we removed the 
hypotheses of perfectly competitive entrant serving only the H type also in this 
context emerges that cream skimming is not necessarily the most "harmful" type of 
competition. This time in the case of skimmed milk competition a reduction in 
allocative efficiency \\ill surely take place, whereas in the opposite case of cream 
skimming allocative efficiency would be satisfied This is due to the fact that in this 
the marginal price in the low-demand market is an increasing function of the scale of 
entry in the high demand market. 
These results contrast on the standard idea of cream skimming, always being 
considered an undesirable regime by itself or one of the major causes of the 
unsustainability of regulated monopolies. In particular, cream skimming may involve 
a lower reduction of social welfare compared to the one implied by competition for 
the skimmed milk. In our model cream skimming is welfare enhancing, at least from 
the point of view of allocative efficiency. Moreover, society can benefit from the 
entry of a more efficient player who serve the high demand market, and the 
incumbent can keep his monopoly tariff for the residual number of customer served. 
We must of course acknowledge many other drawbacks (ignored in our 
analysis for simplicity's sake) against restrictions to entry (i.e. the provision of 
insufficient incentives for the incumbent to be efficient). In fact, in the absence of 
other types of regulation the incumbent may be tempted to overprice his products or 
to engage in predatory behaviour. These caveats lead us to be against justified 
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restrictions on competitive entry based only on the claim that cream skimming would 
be undesirable and inefficient by itself, without providing any evidence for the 
specific case analysed. In the next section we will provide introduce competition in 
the vertical game, and examine which strategies of competition will survive in this 
enlarged framework. 
2.5 The solution of the vertical game 
2.5.1 The case of an equally effiCient compel ilor 
Let us postpone the solution of the vertical game in general terms, focusing, 
first on the case of an equally efficient competitor (i.e. m is equal to c*). We solve 
the game in the absence of regulation, that is ignoring stage (0). In particular, we 
tackle the question on how the incumbent's profits vary, depending on the 
competitor's entry decision. In this case, if the competitor acts as a tariff taker [i.e. 
she takes as given the tariffs Tt determined by the incumbent in stage (3)] she will 
maximise her gross profits (abstracting from the access charges). that is, as will be 
shO\'tn later, a surplus taker competitor and a tariff taker competitor will end up 
proposing the same tariffs. Hence, for simplicity's sake we will consider only the 
case of a tariff taker competitor and demonstrate the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 
When an equally efficient competitor enters the market of good I it is optimal 
for the incumbent to set the per customer access charge equal to the monopoly 
variable profits; that is, TIl - c*qJl and to maintain the previous monopoly pricing 
strategy, independently of the scale of entry K. In other words, the incumbent is 
indifferent between facing a duopoly or a monopoly in the market of good I. 
In what follows we will provide just a sketch of the proof of Proposition 1, as 
what matters at this stage is to develop the crucial reasoning relevant in the solution 
of the game. 
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Since in the absence of regulation the incumbent can fix at his discretion the 
level of the access charge, his profit can never be reduced in the presence of entry (as 
he can always deter entry by setting a vel)' high access price). Furthennore, as the 
incumbent knows the competitor's marginal cost he can extract all the entrant's 
profits, simply by setting the per customer access charge equal to the entrant's per 
capita gross profits; that is, 'PH - c*qH. Notice how we are considering a simplified 
framework (i.e. in the absence of infra-marginal effects, or alternatively assuming a 
small scate of entl)') the entrant will cream skim, since her variable profits in this 
case are strictly greater than the ones she had serving low-demand customers. A 
lower access charge would not be levied, since in this case the incumbent would be 
worse off, getting lower profits. Therefore, assuming the presence of a tariff taker 
competitor, stage (3) is automatically solved, given the incumbent's choice ofTH. 
In particular, if the per customer access charge is set equal to the gross profits 
of a tariff taker competitor, the incumbent will expropriate all the entrant's profits. 
In this case, we can write the access pricing condition [AP] as: 
[AP] F(KH) I KH = TH - c*~ 
In order to deal with stage (3) we may write down the incumbent's 
maximisation problem, in presence of entl)', subject to the access pricing condition: 
[problem 3] max II(Qi) == 
2NpOqo+NLTL+NHTH+F(KH) - NC(2N, QO + Q) _ cO(2NqO) 
- C*(NL~+N~i) 
po = v'(qO) 
TL =u(~) 
TH=eu(~)-(e-l)u(~) 
F(KH) = KH (TH - c*~) 
subject to: 
It is easy to show how substituting the constraint [AP] the problem becomes 
exactly the same as the one examined in the monopoly case. This allows us to solve 
stage (3) as we get the values of qO, ~ and ~. Given the [AP] condition, clearly the 
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entrant is indifferent about entry for PH=c*=m, only if she serves the H type; 
otherwise, she will always incur in losses. Thus, we can assume that she enters and 
goes for the H type. 
The proposed solution is not necessarily the unique solution of the game; 
however, this is the only economicalIy relevant solution, since it allows the 
incumbent to get the same results as if he were the only player. Notice how, in 
practice, the incumbent has a sort of control on the scale of entry, since by setting the 
appropriate access charge to the entrant (extracting all her profits) he can oblige the 
entrant to take the action he wanted to; that is in trus case to go only for the rugh-
demand type (setting K= KH). The previous reasoning isolates the relevant points that 
will allow us to solve the general game. 
It is immediate to derive graphically the quantities allocated per unit of 
customer (obtained in correspondence of the intersection between the curves 
representing the marginal utility and marginal price for each type) exactly as we did 
in section 2.3.3 (cf. fig. 2.2) and to verify that 'h-I is greater than CIL. 
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The tariffs TL and TH (i.e. the gross revenue per unit of customer) are given by 
the integral from 0 to 'h. and from 0 to 'h-l of the area which lies below the L type and 
the H type marginal utility function u t ( 'h..) and e ut ( ~). In the linear case T L and T H 
are respectively given by COCILE and HCIL~D. The net revenues per customers' type 
are derived by subtracting the variable costs and are given by CGIE and CGIE + 
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HID. The H type enjoys a positive net surplus which amounts to (9 - 1) TL (the area 
ACEH). 
Let us first consider a competitor with the same marginal cost of the incumbent 
(m=c*). If the non-linear monopoly tariffs T Land T H are maintained unchanged by 
the incumbent, the best the entrant can do, for any scale of entry, is to go for the H 
type and to get a gross profit per customer given by CGIE + HID (always greater than 
CGIE). Hence, if the competitor enters she will certainly decide to do cream 
skimming, setting PH=rn=c*. 
Furthermore, she will enter only if her implicit participation constraint is 
satisfied; that is, the per customer access charge she must pay to the incumbent is 
lower than her gross profits per unit of customer (CGIE + HID). 
To complete the argument, \\le just need to show that the optimal pricing for 
the incumbent is indeed to choose the monopoly tariffs T Land T H for any scale of 
entry. This seems obvious if we realise that, given an equally efficient competitor, 
the incumbent who expropriates all her gross profit is exactly in the same position as 
a monopolist. 
In fact, if he increases ~ by a marginal amount he will gain PL-c* (that is, 
segment EI) from his N low type customers, but he will lose (8-1) PI.. (that is, 
segment HE) from his NH high type customers, and similarly from the K =KH per 
customer access charge paid by the entrant. Hence, in practice his net marginal 
losses are N(e-I) PL, as if entry had not occurred. Basically, we have an internal 
optimum when marginal losses equate marginal gains; that is, N(e-l) PL=N (Pr.. -c*) 
which gives PL =c*/(2-e), that is independently of the scale of entry. Thus, the 
monopoly pricing T Land T H, derived analytically in the section 2.3.2, still represents 
the optimal pricing strategy for the incumbent for any scale of entry, which is exactly 
what we needed to show. As before, in practice, the incumbent has a sort of control 
of the scale of entry, since by extracting all her profits by means of the access charge 
he can oblige the entrant to set K = KH. 
Notice in fact how the crucial variable is the total population served by the two 
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player, composed by N customers of type L entirely served by the incumbent and N 
customers of type H served by both players (2N=N+ NH + KH). This explains why the 
pricing schedule and the bundle allocated per each customer type do not depend on 
the scale of entry, in contrast with the horizontal game, as noticed in section 2.3.2. 
So far we have examined just the case of the entry of an equally efficient 
competitor. Let us now generalise the model. 
2.5.2 The general solution 
Let us tackle the general game introducing a surplus taker competitor, for 
simplicity's sake but without any loss of generality, in order to show the general 
solution and how the incumbent's profit will vary, depending on the competitor's 
type. To achieve this aim we can simply add in the previous fig. 2.8 a line parallel to 
PII in correspondence of m (which is less or equal to c*). This line intersects the 
vertical lines (q=O, CJL) and the marginal utility function e u'(q) of the H type 
respectively in L, M and N, as shown in fig. 2.11 below. 
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With a more efficient competitor (with m less than c*) the incumbent can 
increase the per customer access charge asking the entrant exactly her gross profits 
per unit of customer (CLME+HMN). This is in fact, on the basis of the previous 
reasoning, the new optimal per customer access charge, for any scale of entry (given 
the monopoly price PI.rc*>m). In fact, as before, the competitor will enter only for 
non negative profits and will decide to do cream skimming, setting PH=m<c*. 
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As before, the incumbent will maintain his optimal non-linear tariffs T Land T H 
for any scale of entry, because the first order condition relative to Chi does not depend 
on the value of NH and the additional KH per customer profit (GLND) is fixed and 
does not affect the optimal level of 'h.. This happens because, given PH the additional 
access profit (GLND) remains untouched for any given level ofPL greater than PH' so 
that the incumbent remains in the position of a monopolist, with an additional profit 
which depends only on the scale of entry K= KH• A higher access charge would not 
be levied, since in that case entry would not occur and the incumbent would just get 
his monopoly profits, losing any additional access profits. On the other hand a lower 
access charge would not be levied either. In fact, if the incumbent increases 'h. by a 
marginal amount he will gain PL-c* (that is, segment EJ) from his N low type 
customers, but he \\ill lose (9-1) PL (that is, segment HE) from his NH high type 
customers, and similarly from the K=KH per customer access charge paid by the 
entrant. Hence, as before, his marginal losses are N(9-1 )PL, as if entry had not 
occurred and the monopoly tariffs T Land T H still represents the optimal pricing 
strategy for the incumbent for any scale of entry, which is exactly what we needed to 
show. 
To complete the reasoning, we just need to consider the case of a less efficient 
competitor and of a positive network marginal subcost associated \\ith the delivery 
of good 1 (that is, considering the case in which cl is greater than zero). 
Entry is not optimal for a less efficient competitor. In fact, if we assume c* 
less than m, clearly the per customer access charge the entrant can afford to pay is 
less than the gross profits the incumbent can obtain by making use of the monopoly 
tariffs T L and T H for any scale of entry. It is obvious that knowing this outcome, the 
incumbent will set the per customer access charge greater than the competitor's 
gross profits, so that no entry would occur. 
A positive level of c1 creates no major problems. In fact, with a single 
competitor we can just limit to analyse two part tariffs, setting: 
F(KH, Q<) = c1 KH qH + H(KH) 
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where H(KH) plays the same role of F(KH) in the previous analysis. In practice, the 
presence of an additional variable access cost just shifts the previous marginal costs 
curves upward from c* to cl+c* for the incumbent and from m to m+cl for the 
entrant. However, once this has been taken into account, we can apply the previous 
reasoning simply by setting PH=c*+cl and ml=m+cl. No other changes affect fig. 
2.10 and 2.1l.39 
The previous results referred to the entrant's and the incwnbent's pricing 
strategies are useful to solve the general game and to prove the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2 
In the general model, without regulation, there is no competition for the L type 
in the market of good J (the non monopolised commodil)). It is optimal for the 
incumbent to allow the entry of a cream skimming competitor, only if she is at least 
as effiCient as the incumbent (c* ~ m), and to set a per customer access charge equal 
to the monopoly variable profits; that is, 'PFrc*qll (jor cl=O). In this way he can 
maintain the previous monopoly pricing independently of the scale of entry K «N). 
WIzen a more effiCient competitor enters the market the incumbent prefers to have a 
duopoly rather than a monopoly in the market of good 1. He also finds it optimal to 
oblige the competitor to behave as a surplus taker. However, it would even be 
preferable for the incumbent (and for the maximisation of social welfare) that the 
competitor sells all the produced good 1 to the incumbent (without any losses) at the 
marginal cost, so that the latter is able to resell it to the consumers at the monopoly 
tariffs· 
39 It might be interesting, before concluding the graphical analysis to notice how the 
fact that a more efficient competitor sets a marginal price less than PH implies a 
surplus loss for the monopolist and the collectivity. In fact, if the marginal units q~ -
'hI were sold as infra-marginal units to other H customers, or to L customers, they 
would produce (in this linear case) a surplus which is exactly the double of the 
previous one. In practice, very loosely instead of having a triangle we would have a 
rectangle; more precisely Pareto optimality implies equal marginal rates of 
substitution). 
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Let us sketch of the proof of Proposition 2. Since we know that the incumbent 
fixes the access charge in order to maximise his profits, on the basis of the previous 
\ 
analysis we can ignore the presence of a less efficient competitor. In fact, allowing 
entry the incumbent will always get a lower per customer gross profit. Namely by 
asking the entrant a per customer access charge equal to her variable per customer 
profit he would be worse off, incurring in losses with respect to the monopoly 
profits, being Tt -c*qt > Ti-mqi (for c*<m). On the other hand, for a more efficient 
competitor, the per customer gross profit advantage [that is, (Ti-mqi}-(Tcc*qt)] 
assumes the highest value if we have cream skimming competition. In practice, (TiI-
mqi{)-(T1rc*'1H) is greater than (ll-mqiJ-(TL-c*qd for c* greater than m. 
Consequently, it is clear that, as the entrant has a fixed scale of entry, we can set K= 
KJ{ (i.e. KH is now given being no longer a control variable). The competitor's 
optimisation problem can therefore be stated as: 
[Problem 4] max TI(Qe) == KH (reH - mqj{) - F(KH) subject to: 
[ICH] TH = 9 u(qj{) - (9 - 1) T L 
where T L is the incumbent's optimal tariff determined in stage (3). 
Solving the previous problem, we get the following first order conditions: 
[qH] PH = 9 u'(qj{) = m 
Knowing m, the incumbent will set the per customer access charge equal to the 
entrant's per capita gross profits~ that is TkmqjI. Furthermore, as the incumbent 
expropriates all the entrant's profits, it will be in his interest to oblige the competitor 
(by appropriately setting the access charge tariff) to behave as a surplus taker. From 
the previous reasoning we can write the access pricing condition [AP] as: 
which is needed in order to solve the incumbent's maximisation problem. 
[problem 5] max TI(Qi) == 
2NpOqo+NLTL +NH TH+F(KH)-NC(2N)-2NcOqO-c*(NL~ +N1flH) 
subject to: 
[MME] 
[IRd 
[ICH] 
[AP] 
pO = v'(qO) 
TL = u('lL) 
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T H = 9 u( em) - (9 - 1) u( 'lL) 
F(KH) = KH [9 u(qH) - (9 -1) u('lL) - m qH] 
Solving [Pro·blem 5] with respect to qO, 'lL and 'hi we obtain the very same first 
order conditions of the monopoly case and in particular: PL = c· I (2-9) = PH I (2-9). 
This can easily be checked by substituting the four binding constraints into the 
objective function. Thus, solving the incumbent's problems we get the optimal 
values of qO, qL and qH. Given the previous result, the competitor is indifferent to 
enter or not, knowing that the best outcome is to break even, serving the H type. 
Thus, we can assume that she enters and cream skim the market. On the other hand, 
the incumbent cannot do better than to oblige the competitor to maximise her gross 
profits (behaving as a surplus taker) setting the per customer access charge equal to 
the entrant's per capita gross profits. 
2.6 Further refinements of the model 
One may feel that the previous model has two major drawbacks. On one side, 
the scale of entry is exogenously given and the entry decision is limited to a binary 
choice. On the other side, the cost function of the entrant may seem "ad hoc", as in 
practice she has a fixed marginal cost m, till she serves a number of customers less 
than K and an infinite marginal cost from there onwards. 
Finally, it may seem undesirable that the purchasing solution (that is, the one in 
which the incumbent buys all the output of the entrant to resell it to the customers) 
should be preferable to allowing entry and direct selling of the competitor. Hence, 
further refinements are appropriate to satisfy any potential reader. 
In what follows we will examine first separately and then jointly these two 
problems. In particular, we will show how it is possible to refine the previous model 
in order to have a single optimal scale of entry chosen by the potential competitor at 
stage (2) of our game, without any substantial change in our assumptions. 
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At the same time we feel that this will in reality just complicate the model, 
without enriching it with further essential economic content. In practice, as the 
optimal purchasing solution depends only on the indivisibility of the number of 
customers' problem it will always appear in one way or another. Even if it is not 
possible in the real world to buy say a third of an egg, economists still continue to 
assume fully divisible goods, for simplicity's sake and they keep on believing that 
taking into account this indivisibility problem would not sensibly change the 
understanding of the basic economic problems. 
Clearly, the first drawback -that is, an exogenous given scale of entry- is more 
apparent than real. In fact, we can easily demonstrate the following proposition. 
Proposition 3 
If we leave unchanged all the other assumptions and allow the potential 
competitor to choose any finite number of customers as his scale of entry -that is, 
OSk::K «N)- in stage (2) the solution of the game will not change. 
Entry is still not optimal for a less efficient competitor. In fact for any possible 
scale of entry (given c*<m) the per customer access charge that allows entry is less 
than the gross profits the incumbent can obtain from the monopolist tariffs T Land 
TH. Thus, the per customer access charge will be greater than the competitor's gross 
profits and consequently entry would not take place. 
On the other hand, for a more efficient competitor the entrant has a per 
customer gross profit advantage, which is given, and reaches its maximum value if 
she serves the H type. Hence, for the incumbent it is optimal not only to have cream 
skimming, but also to oblige an efficient competitor to maximise the scale of entry, 
setting k equal to K. This can be done decreasing (by a small amount E, very close to 
zero) the per customer access charge associated with the maximum scale of entry. 
Hence, as before we end up with kH = k = K. 
Let us now tackle the two drawbacks jointly. It can be shown that if we 
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consider an increasing marginal cost for the competitor and allow her to choose any 
finite number of customers as her scale of entry -that is, 0 ~ k ~ K- at stage (2) of the 
game, we may have a unique solution of the game, but the purchasing solution due to 
the indivisibility of the number of customers will not disappear. 
Let us change the initial assumption (iv) considering the specific case of a 
competitor that is more efficient than the incumbent only if she keep himself 
relatively small; that is, she doesn't pre-empt either of the two types' markets for 
good 1. 
(iv)' the competitor can choose any scale of entry O::;;~K in tenns of number of 
customers: 
k=KL + KH<N 
She must pay an access charge F fixed by the incumbent dependent both on the scate 
of entry K and on the total output Qe: 
F(KL' KH, Qe) ~ 0 
Finally, she has an increasing production cost function: 
where m(k) represents a continuously differentiable marginal cost function (with 
respect to the scale of entry) that satisfies the following properties: 
1) it is increasing with the scale of entry; 
2) its initial value is lower than the incumbent's marginal cost; 
3) it intersects the incumbent's marginal cost when the scale of entry is less than the 
number of customer of any type; 
The competitor will enter the non monopolised good market if the usual 
participation constraint is satisfied: 
[IRe] ne(Qe) = KL(ll- mqt) + K~rH - mqH) - F(KL' KH, Qr) ~ 0 
With assumption (iv)' we have thus removed the two drawbacks and we can 
now state the following proposition. 
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Proposition 4 
Under assumptions (i), (ii), (Ni), (iv)' and (v) allowing any finite discrete 
number of customers as scale of entry there is only cream skimming competition in 
the market of good I (the non monopolised commodity). It is optimal for the 
incumbent to allow entry, to set a per customer access charge equal to the monopoly 
variable profits and to maintain the previous monopoly pricing. The incumbent also 
finds it optima/to oblige the competitor to behave as a surplus taker. However, it 
would be preferable for the incumbent (and for the maximisation of social welfare) 
that the competitor sells all the produced good I to the incumbent (reaching only 
break-even profits), so Ihat the latter is able to resell it to the consumers, applying 
the monopoly tariffs. 
Entry is optimal only when the competitor is more efficient -that is, for low 
marginal costs m(k) less than c*- being possible for the incumbent to set the per 
customer access charge greater than the gross profits he had obtained from the 
monopolist tariffs TL and TH. Thus, for any possible scale of entry, it is also in the 
incumbent's interest that the entrant has the greatest per customer gross profits 
advantage and this implies cream skimming competition and surplus taking 
behaviour. 
Thus, the incumbent in order to maximise his profits subject to the entrant's 
participation constraint will ask her to pay exactly his gross profit and to set K in 
such a way to maximise her gross profits K [rI1m(K)qj~] minus the net surplus K[TI1 
c*'lH] that he would have extracted from the K customers in the absence of 
competition. Consequently we may set K=KH and state the competitor's optimisation 
problem as: 
max TIe(Q)= K (rH - m(K)qj~) - [H+K (T H - c*~] subject to: 
Til = 9 u(qil) - (9 - 1) u(qiJ = 9 u('lH) - u('lL) = 9 U(qH) - TL 
where TH and TL are the incumbent's optimal tariffs and 'h-I and ~ the related 
quantities obtained by the solution of stage (3). Assuming that K is a continuous 
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variable we get the fonowing first order conditions: 
[qH] PH = e u'(qj~) = m 
[KH] 'PH - mCK) qjl - T - c'" em = Km'(K) qil 
In particular from the last condition that states the equality bet\veen the 
incumbent's marginal losses and gains connected to a change in the number of 
customers served we can derive the optimal scale of entry K* for the entrant given 
the access charge F(K *)=H+ K(T H-C"''lJ-l) paid to the incumbent; that is, the number of 
customers the incumbent finds it optimal that the entrant should serve. In reality for 
K as a discrete variable we should require that the marginal gains connected to an 
unitary change of K starting from the optimal one K* be greater than the marginal 
losses. 
Just in order to clarify the exposition let us provide a graphical representation 
of the problem, limiting ourselves to the case of linear marginal utility functions. 
The incumbent is clearly interested in maximising only his own profits, not the 
entrant's ones. If the entrant decides not to serve an additional high-demand 
customer the incumbent doesn't lose all the area HMN which represents Iii 
m(K*)qH' but only the area bet\veen PH and m that is, IMDN equal to Tkm(K*)qi~ -
T I1c*~'l> as it can be easily seen from fig. 2.10. 
The optimal internal solution for the entrant in the case in which the variable k 
could assume all continuous values would be reached when the losses due to the fact 
that he is no longer serving an additional H type customer equal the gains derived by 
the decrease in the marginal cost m(K) upon the K residual customers; that is, 
K*m'(K*)qj-I' In practice, m'(K*) represents just the reduction in the entrant's 
marginal cost due to the decrease in one unit of customer m(K*)-m(K*-l), and is 
simply multiplied for the quantity sold; that is, (K*- 1) qi-I = QC. To represent this 
graphically we can simply add to fig. 2.10 another horizontal line m(K*- 1). The area 
between the two lines m(K*)c and m(K"'-l) represents just the losses due to the fact 
that an H type cus~omer is no longer served. 
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In any case, if (as it should be) the access charge F is equal to the entrant's 
gross profits K*[rH'"m(K*)qH] the access pricing condition (needed in order to solve 
the incumbent's maximisation problem) is practically the same as [AP] used in 
[Problem 4], once we set K and m respectively equal to K* and m(K*): 
[AP]' F(K*) = K*[TH - m gH] = K*[9 u(qil)-(9-1) u(qi) - m(K*) qil] 
Thus, the incumbent, solving the maximisation problem [Problem 4] will 
obtain the very same monopoly first order conditions with respect to qO, 'lL and 'h1' as 
derived in the previous analysis. As before, the competitor will enter in stage 2 
knowing she will break even by serving the H type only. Thus, we can assume that 
she will enter and do cream skimming. In stage (1) of the game the incumbent, as 
already argued, cannot do better than to oblige the competitor to maximise her gross 
profits (behaving as a surplus taker) by setting the access charge tariff equal to the 
entrant's gross profits K*[Til - m(K*) qi1]. As in the previous analysis, the fact that 
the competitor's marginal price PH is less than the incumbent's one Pi-I implies a 
surplus loss -which amounts to the integral ofK*[9u'(q)-u'(crn)] for q that goes from 
'h-I to qjr for the incumbent and the society. If the marginal units K"'(qi-I - 'h1) were 
purchased by the incumbent at their marginal cost m(K *) and then sold as infra-
marginal units to the high-demand customers (or even to the low-demand ones) there 
would be no longer any surplus loss. We believe that no further comments are 
needed, as these refinements add more complications than fundamental economic 
contents. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The main conclusions that we can derive from this chapter is how pervasive is 
the standard result on price discrimination for pure monopoly (with no distortion at 
the top) in the absence of price regulation. We have shown how it can be directly 
applied in the presence of competition within different frameworks. In a very stylised 
model (which ignores vertically related markets) the incumbent can keep his 
monopoly profits and apply the relative tariffs in residual terms (in our model taking 
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into account only residual customers). Extending the game to vertically related 
markets, the incumbent can entirely enjoy monopoly profits, as if he were the only 
player allowing the entry of an equally efficient competitor. In the presence of a 
more efficient rival he can enjoy an additional profit, so that he would be better off 
by allowing entry, rather than deterring it. There is a very c1ear intuition beyond this 
result. That is, the use of non-linear access charges allows the incumbent to control 
entry, in the sense of obliging the competitor to cream skim the market (for 
productive efficiency reason). Cream skimming turns out to be the only strategy of 
competition allowed by the incumbent. 
In particular, when an equally efficient competitor may enter the market of the 
non monopolised good 1, it is optimal for the incumbent to set the per customer 
access charge equal to the monopoly variable profits and to maintain the previous 
monopoly pricing strategy, independently of the scale of entry. In other words, for 
the incumbent it is indifferent to face a duopoly or a monopoly situation in the 
market of good 1. 
Moreover, allowing any finite discrete number of customers as scale of entry, 
there is only cream skimming competition in the market of the non monopolised 
commodity. It is optimal for the incumbent to allow entry, to set a per customer 
access charge equal to the monopoly variable profits and to maintain the previous 
monopoly pricing strategy. The incumbent also finds it optimal to oblige the 
competitor to behave as a surplus taker. However, it would be preferable for the 
incumbent (and for the maximisation of social welfare) that the competitor sells all 
the produced good 1 to the incumbent (reaching only break-even profits), so that the 
latter is able to reseII it to the consumers, applying the monopoly tariffs. 
It is worth noticing how, in this general framework, cream skimming arises 
naturally because of the vertical structure of the model and therefore does not 
depend on ad hoc hypotheses regarding the entrant, as in Laffont and Tirole (1990b). 
We have also shown how in many aspect it is wrong to consider this kind of 
competition as the most harmful, both in horizontally and vertically related markets. 
130 
This chapter, however, was just meant to provide a framework, starting from 
which we could analyse the problem of the direct interactions between regulation 
(including the policies toward price discrimination) and competition. We have spent 
quite a lot of time in modelling competition and non-linear pricing, since a priori 
there was no obvious way of approaching the problem of entry and in particular the 
strategies of competition. 
We have departed from the standard approach (that is, modelling competition 
as simple bypass), using a more satisfactory way of dealing with the problem of 
competition in a second degree price discrimination model. In the next chapter 
socially optimal regulation will be introduced in the analysis, so that we can then 
derive some policy implications, following a more normative approach. 
Chapter 3 
SOCIALLY OPTL'lAL REGULATIO~: NO~-LIXEAR PRICING, 
COMPETITIO~ AND ACCESS PRICING· 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Preliminary welfare implications in the horizontal game 
3.2. J Preliminary remarks on regulation 
3.2.2 Social optimality with Loeb and Alagat 's welfare function 
3.2.3 The welfare consequence of the cost of public funds in the hori=ontal game 
3.2.4 Optima/non-linear pricing when the regulator cares of consumers' 
surplus 
3.2.5 Final remarks on regulatory issues in the hori=ontal game 
3.3 Access pricing regulation and the optimality of the Baumol-\Villig rule 
3.3.1 The optimality of the Baumol-Willigpricing rule in the originalframework 
3.3.2 The optimality of the Baumol-Willigpricing rule in the cream skimming 
model 
3.3.3 The optimality of the Baumol-Willig rule in a Loeb and Alagat's setting 
3.3.-1 Optimal access pricing regulation and the cost of public funds' 
approach 
3.3.5 Optimal access charges and pricing when the regulator cares about 
consumers' surplus 
3.3.6 Some considerations on the Bau11101-Willig rule and the OFTEL rule 
3.4 Final remarks 
• Vagliasindi and Waterson (1995b) summarised and partly developed the analysis 
of section 3.3. This paper has been presented at the Annual Conference of Game 
Theory and Applications (3-4 March 1995, Siena, Italy) and at the 22nd EARIE 
Conference (3-6 September 1995, Sophia Antipolis, France). I am grateful to 
Jonathan Cave, Gianni de Fraja, Morten Hviid, Norman Ireland, John Vickers and 
participants to the above conferences for helpful comments. 
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Chapter 3 
SOCIALLY OPTIMAL REGULATION: NON-LINEAR PRICING, 
CO~IPETITION AND ACCESS PRICING 
3.1 Introduction. 
Using the results of the previous chapter, where we analysed the private 
incentives of the incumbent and the entrant in the absence of regulatory constraints, 
we are now able to explore the direct interactions between regulation and 
competition. Following a normative perspective we are going to determine the 
socially optimal access pricing rules, that is the ones that maximise social welfare. 
We will focus on regulating access directly, a kind of regulation recently subject of 
several controversies in the UK and other countries, especially in the case of 
telecommunications. 
The access pricing problem has been lately object of a debate in the economic 
literature and in the political arena. The optimality of the application of a simple 
rule, such as the Baumol-Willig rule (recently applied to telecommunications in New 
Zealand) has been re-discussed, among others, by Baumol and Sidak (1994), 
Armstrong and Doyle (1994) Laffont and Tirole (1994b), Armstrong and Vickers 
(1995) and Economides and White (1995). 
Naturally, the first question that should be addressed before discussing the 
design of socially optimal tariffs (and related issues) is whether government 
intervention is needed at all (i.e. if competition would solve the whole matter). 
Traditional economic views assume that competition is a desirable regime in itself 
and that it is always feasible. In this world there would be no space for regulators and 
public finns. The predilection for competition as a process automatically generating 
efficiency arises from the two well knovm fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics. Theoretical models of perfect competition have several attributes 
(among others, the fact that the market is composed by a large population of passive 
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price takers firms) that make them non applicable to questions of economic 
regulation of public utilities (naturally apart from the treatment of externalities and 
environmental issues). Regulation instead generally addresses phenomena such as 
monopoly and market power, phenomena that clash with the hypothesis of an infinite 
number of small firms with no market power. This explains our particular care in 
modelling the strategies of competition (cf. section 2.4) and the decision to replace 
the assumption of a perfectly competitive fringe with a single entrant. Moreover, 
economic efficiency requires prices equal to marginal costs. However, even in a first 
best setting (in the absence of any redistributional issues) we will show how, only on 
efficiency grounds, the public firm should not set marginal access pricing equal to 
his marginal cost if doing so he allowed the entry of a less efficient competitor. 
Clearly, the. aims and objectives of regulation are several and can be partly 
contradictory. They include not only allocative and productive efficiency, but also 
the promotion of competition and the respect of universal service obligations (or 
more generally of a criterion of fairness). Moreover, information and incentives 
issues complicate the intervention of regulators. However, the amount of private 
information on the regulatory side built into the standard models seems too limited 
by comparison with the problems actual regulators face. There is no reason why the 
regulator should be merely uncertain about the level of the cost function, as in 
Laffont and Tirole (1994) and Vickers (1995), and not about its shape, or the demand 
condition of the industry. Furthermore, as Vickers (1995) says "It would be nice to 
examine a model in which the regulator was uncertain about both upstream and 
downstream cost levels" (p. 4), but till now no model assumes that the entrants' costs 
are private information. Also the usual way in which moral hazard has been 
introduced is not fully satisfactory (as seen in section 1.2). Consequently, we decide 
to leave aside problems of moral hazard and adverse selection on the regulatory side 
to make the problem more manageable and to reveal its fundamental structure. These 
assumptions are quite usual in the case of a public firm which directly maximises 
social welfare, as well as in the large part of the debate on access pricing and vertical 
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Issues. In chapter 1 (section 1.2.4) we have also shown'that the accounting 
convention of Laffont and Tirole, which we will continue to follow, perfectly fits a 
public firm. 
We consider instead only asymmetric information between the firm and its 
consumers, focusing on second degree price discrimination. In fact, despite the 
extensive literature on this field theoretical models fail to incorporate the use of non-
linear pricing. Since price discrimination by regulated firms is common in practice 
this omission can lead to misleading results, as our analysis will show. Specifically, 
arguments against the use of regulation might not be justified and simple pricing 
rules might no longer be socially optimal when the incumbent is allowed to use price 
discrimination. 
Therefore in what follows, we will exclusively deal with socially optimal non-
linear pricing regulation of the incumbent under full information, taking into account 
three different social welfare specifications which may represent the objective of the 
regulator. Dealing directly with a public finn the regulator's maximisation problem 
coincides with the incumbent's one. 
Even within this simplified framework and postulating at first the absence of 
vertical relationships -examining the horizontal game (proposed in section 2.2.1)-
regulation is needed. Our analysis will in fact show that socially optimal non-linear 
tariffs do not coincide with the ones private firms would choose, even in the 
presence of competition. Regulation is needed to deter the entry of a less efficient 
competitor and to ban competition for low-demand customers. Specifically, it is 
always welfare improving to create an eventual budget deficit of the inefficient 
competitor with negative lump sum transfers, ensuring that she will not be able to 
enter even the high type market. 
It is then relevant to examine the impact of cream skimming competition by a 
more efficient entrant on social welfare. We have already shown in chapter 2 
(section 2.4.3) that, starting from a private monopoly, cream skimming is likely to be 
less hannful than skimmed milk competition. Specifically, in a private setting cream 
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skimming is socially desirable both from the productive and allocative perspectives. 
Basically, this occurs because profit maximising firms, giving no weight to 
consumers' surplus, tend to distort prices by a greater amount than it would be 
socially optimal. Here, starting from a public monopoly (or equivalently, a private 
regulated firm), the only benefits cream skimming can bring are related to the 
productive side. In fact, it will be shown that a public firm maximising social welfare 
(defined a la Loeb Magat or a la Baron Myerson) would indeed create no distortion 
both at the top and at the bottom. Consequently, cream skimming competition would 
not bring any improvement in allocative efficiency. It may instead cause a departure 
from socially optimal tariffs introducing the cost of public funds (a la Laffont and 
Tirole). This last problem can be solved through specific forms of intervention such 
as the institution of entry taxes or the regulation of the entrant. In both of these 
scenarios the public monopoly tariffs would be kept, so that cream skimming may be 
used by the regulator in order to enhance social welfare, through its positive impact 
on productive efficiency. 
Also within the vertical game (introduced in section 2.2.2) it is relevant to 
detennine the socially optimal tariffs for final and intermediate markets, and the way 
they can be eventually implemented An important question we address introducing 
vertically related markets is indeed the determination of the range of circumstances 
in which access pricing can be used to bring about a welfare enhancing competitive 
solution to final goods supply, whilst a monopoly remains at one essential point in 
the chain of delivery. In fact, it is not always the case that the entry of a competitor 
(even if more efficient than the incumbent) automatically increases welfare in a 
general price discrimination setting. Moreover, ,ve will also briefly discuss various 
other fonns of interventions \"hich may enhanc.e social welfare, such as the 
institution of an entry tax or the regulation of the entrant. 
The previous considerations remi~d us the original Baumol's subtle pricing 
regulation issues of 1983, where he looked for efficiency improvements in vertically 
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related markets, showing that paradoxically a collusive result may be preferable to a 
Cournot-like competitive one. Baumol proposes a rule that attains some of the 
efficiency improvements implicit in a potential vertical merger. According to this 
rule, charges should be set equal to the marginal cost of access plus a term which 
reflects the opportunity cost of entry. The validity of this rule will be examined in 
detail in his original framework:, as well as in the cream skimming model proposed 
in chapter 2, where we also introduce non-linear access charges. 
Specifically, two issues which we are interested to explore in both games are: 
(a) the necessity that entry may be allowed only if an amount, that reflects the 
opportunity cost of entry incurred by the public incumbent, is paid, (b) the idea to 
exploit the merger's efficiency enhancing properties, or more precisely the more 
general idea of "intemalisation" (of which the vertical merger represents just a 
specific application). The first point will prove quite relevant with all the welfare 
function specifications and with some welfare functions a strictly more efficient 
competitor (able to pay an amount greater than the opportunity cost of entry) would 
be required. Only with an entry tax or a regulated entrant, the entry of an equally 
efficient competitor will always be optimal. 
The critiques which has been recently moved to the Baumol-Willig rule are 
quite specific and crucially derive from the relaxation of some of the basic 
assumptions made in the original framework. In this regard our approach is different, 
since we move in a setting which is quite close to the spirit of Baumol's model. 
Specifically, we will assume that the public firm is not operated inefficiently, both 
the vertically integrated incumbent and the rival produce homogeneous final goods, 
there are fixed coefficients in production and there is no possibility of bypassing the 
access provider. Baumol himself pointed out the need for corrections .in this simple 
rule, once we move away from these assumptions. As we won't deal with these 
issues, let us just provide a brief account of the most relevant extensions of the 
Baumol-Willig rule, which we will discuss in section 3.3. 
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Both Cave (1994) and Annstrong and Doyle (1994) consider a correction of 
the parity rule related to the introduction of differentiated products. This relatively 
straightforward generalisation is in substance implicit in the definition of the 
components of the Baumol-Willig rule, if correctly specified Annstrong and Vickers 
(1995) introduce alternatively substitution possibilities, variable proportion 
coefficients and bypass in a framework in which the entrant is characterised by a 
finite elasticity of supply (rather than an infinite one). They analyse the relevant 
assessment of opportunity costs in this setting, showing the need to reduce this 
component of the Baumol-Willig rule. As in Annstrong and Doyle (1994)'s model in 
practice prices and quantities are exogenously given. Moreover, there seems to be an 
artificial asymmetry between the entrant and the incumbent; in particular the 
elasticity of supply of the incumbent (in contrast to the one of the entrant) does not 
appear in any point of the analysis. Economides and White (1995) pointed out that it 
can be socially beneficial to allow the entry of an inefficient rival in the presence of 
complementary components. Specifically, even the entry of an inefficient competitor 
may bring about a reduction in the price of the complementary component. 
Finally, let us consider a general criticism of the Baumol-Willig rule, which 
would apply to any other access pricing rule. Basically it abstracts from the 
environment in which access is provided, and, consequently it doesn't consider 
altogether the regulation of final products' prices. Baumol and Sidak (1994) 
recommend to impose a price ceiling -based on the stand-alone cost- and a price 
floor in order to prevent predation on entrants. Laffont and Tirole (1994b) show how 
Ramsey pricing can be obtained by imposing a global price cap -including access as 
a final good- on the incumbent, with weights exogenously determined and 
proportional to the goods' forecasted quantities. They criticise the use of a partial 
price cap together with the efficient component pricing rule, since it provides a form 
of subsidy to non competitive segments (in the sense that access charge are 
considered too high). 
Finally, notice how the majority of these contributions, like ours, abstracted 
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from infonnation and incentive questions, with the only exception of Laffont and 
Tirole (1994a) where, however, thanks to the dichotomy property pricing and 
incentives issues are separated. Moreover, as noticed before, these papers entirely 
fail to consider the use of non-linear access charges. The aim of our approach is 
instead to offer a comprehensive analysis of socially optimal access pricing within a 
second degree price discrimination setting. 
In the cream skimming model we will show that the Baumol-Willig rule allows 
entry of an equally efficient competitor, who faces no fixed costs, apart from the 
access charge, and it represents the minimum charge to apply to avoid inefficient 
entry. Starting from a private equilibrium, welfare is enhanced applying the Baumol-
Willig rule when the retail average price and the access charge are decreased with all 
the welfare function specifications. 
In a Loeb and Magal's setting, where distributional considerations are left 
aside (and social welfare is simply the unweighted sum of profits and consumers' 
surplus), we will see how "parity" unit access charges are socially optimal, 
differently from what implicitly assumed by Baumol and explicitly by Armstrong 
and Doyle (1994). Hence, under socially optimal non-linear pricing, the presence of 
lump sum transfers may be compatible with the Baumol-Willig rule. 
In this framework Pareto efficiency will be achieved (when the entrant behaves 
as a surplus taker, maximising her own profits) since the rule would not allow entry 
by an inefficient competitor and the marginal prices equate the marginal costs. 
However, in reality, considering the welfare function as the unweighted sum of the 
consumers' and the producer's surplus it does not matter if the incumbent would 
instead set an higher access charge and expropriate (partially or totally) the more 
efficient competitor's profits. 
When the public (or private regulated) firm's profits are given an additional 
weight A. being costly to get public revenue from taxes, following the definition of 
social welfare of Laffont and Tirole, the Baumol-Willig rule will not always 
represent the socially optimal access pricing rule. In fact in this case it is socially 
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optimal to totally expropriate the most efficient competitor's profits, by setting a 
higher access charge than the one it would derive from the application of the parity 
rule. More precisely, the per customer profits of the incumbent, having a weight 
greater than unity, are strictly preferred to the ones made by an efficient competitor, 
even ifhe pays corporate taxes on them (being the tax rate normaIly less than unity). 
Similarly to the previous case, following the Baron and Myerson's approach, it 
will be always socially optimal that the incumbent expropriates all the entrant's 
profits, as the incumbent's profits are now given a lower weight (in the welfare 
function). But, like in the ultra-liberal case, now there will be no distortion at the 
bottom; hence, Pareto efficiency will be achieved ''lith marginal prices equal to 
marginal costs. In these two cases the application of the Baumol-Willig rule alone 
will lead to sub-optimal results because, differently from what implicitly assumed by 
Baumol in his framework, the merged monopolist's optimal pricing criteria are 110t 
socially optimal in these two contexts. 
To swn up, following uniquely an efficiency point of view, the Baumol-WiI1ig 
rule remains a useful benchmark for all institutional settings characterised by the 
different functional specifications of social welfare mentioned before. However, as 
we will show, the welfare enhancing role played by competition should complement 
rather than replace regulation. Specifically, in vertically related markets, allowing 
cream skimming competition, \ve have only an improvement in productive 
efficiency, as the incumbent fully takes advantage of the greater efficiency of the 
competitor, through the use of non-linear access charges. But competition by itself 
v~ill not reduce the high monopoly pricing distortion in the market for final goods 
and the public (or regulated) firm \\ill continue to behave as he were the only player, 
independently of the scale of entry. 
Therefore, it will be evident that the Baumol-Willig rule, built upon the 
vertical merger's efficiency properties, does not provide general socially optimal 
pricing policies, differently from the more general "intemalisation criterion" which 
should instead be considered more carefuI1y. 
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Just in passing, notice how the regulator can intervene more radically changing 
the structure of the industry, for instance by imposing a divestiture between the 
upstream and the downstream sector. This is exactly the case of AT&T in the USA 
in the telecommunication case. Also in the UK this approach has been adopted in the 
electricity which has been separated into three vertical levels; business separation is 
also taking place in gas. Oftel has recently reviewed the whole framework of 
interconnection to British Telecom's network and accounting separation of network 
activities has been achieved. Problems and distortions brought by the presence of 
vertically separated structures will be postponed to the next chapter. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Before tackling vertically related 
markets, we derive some preliminary welfare considerations in the horizontal game 
(partly introduced in chapter 2) in order to analyse the optimal behaviour of a 
regulated or of a public incumbent finn in the absence of vertical issues (section 
3.2). In section 3.3 we analyse the socially optimality of the Baumol-Willig rule in 
the original Baumol's setting and in our vertical game. A final section (3.4) 
summarises the main results achieved by our analysis. 
3.2 Preliminary welfare implications in the horizontal game 
Before tackling vertically related markets and non-linear access pncmg 
regulation, let us derive some preliminary welfare considerations in the horizontal 
game. The aim of this section is to briefly analyse the optimal behaviour of a 
regulated or of a public incumbent finn in the absence of vertical issues. In 
particular, we will exclusively deal with socially optimal non-linear pricing 
regulation of the incumbent under full infonnation, taking into consideration three 
different social welfare specifications which may represent the objective functions of 
the public incumbent finn. 
A general implication that will emerge is that competition should complement 
rather than replace regulation. Recent ultra-liberal views assume that competition is 
a desirable regime in itself, and that it represents always a feasible solution. The 
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general idea of competition as a process automatically generating efficiency has been 
justified on the basis of the two well known fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics. However, even in this first best setting, competition cannot be considered 
as an end in itself, but just only possible means in the hand of the public policy 
maker (whose general objective is to reach the so called "Pareto efficiency" and 
"interpersonal equity"). 
Moreover when efficiency consideration entirely dominates the scene, not only 
should the public firm set marginal pricing equal to his marginal cost, but also deter 
the entry of a less efficient competitor. In other words, it is always welfare improving 
to create an eventual budget deficits of the inefficient competitor with negative lump 
sum transfers, ensuring that she will not be able to enter even the low-demand 
market. 
3.2.1 Preliminary remarks on regulation 
In the previous analysis we have already noticed how competition by an 
inefficient rival is welfare reducing; this consideration emerges clearly in the 
horizontal model without access pricing (introduced in section 2.2.1 and re-
examined in section 2.3.1 and 2.4). In fact, even when both the incumbent and the 
entrant maximise profits, the total consumers' surplus is reduced because some 
consumers will face the competitor's higher costs and also because, as she will serve 
the L type, price distortion will be increased by the incumbent in order to maximise 
his profits. 
To show this, here we will first refer to efficiency problems in a first best 
setting, considering what it may be called an ultra-liberal welfare function. That is, . 
we simply define welfare as the unweighted sum of consumers' and producer's 
surplus a ]a Loeb and Magal (1979) adopting quasi linear utility functions. In this 
way, we go beyond the basic utilitarist (or benthamite) welfare function, because we 
directly assume equal marginal utility of income for any consumers, eliminating at 
its root any scope for redistribution. 
Even under full information on the cost and effort of firms, other types of 
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concerns, apart from productive and allocative efficiency considerations, should be 
taken into account. For instance, second best considerations may emerge if we 
impose a binding break even budget constraint when public subsidies are not 
avai~able. In the previous reasoning we have completely neglected the fundamental 
problems determined by the fact that taxes normally change the behaviour of 
economic agents, creating unavoidable distortions (due to the presence of suboptimal 
efficiency). This issue may be roughly considered introducing the cost of public 
funds, as notably done by LafJont and Tirole (1986). Moreover, adopting the 
approach of Baron and Afyerson (1982), specific redistribution concerns emerge as 
the policy maker puts a higher weight on consumers' surplus, differently from the 
previous welfare functions. 
In the analysis of the horizontal game we first referred to the negative 
consequences in terms of productive and/or allocalive efficiency which arise in 
correspondence of: (1) the entry of an inefficient competitor -that takes place 
whenever the entrant's marginal costs are higher than the incumbent's ones, (2) 
skimmed milk competition, even if undertaken by an equally or more efficient 
competitor. 
The negative impact on consumers' surplus directly follows from the analysis 
of the optimal relationship between the two marginal prices (and utilities) derived in 
the horizontal game: 
In fact, in these cases the negative effect on social welfare is not only due to 
the fact that probably the competitor faces higher costs, but also specifically to the 
increase in the marginal price PL. In this way, the consumers' surplus is reduced, 
because the quantity sold to the L type decreases and the price distortion is increased 
by the incumbent in order to maximise his profits. 
Consequently, it is clear that only cream skimming competition by more 
efficient entrants should be favoured, because it can be welfare enhancing, since: (1) 
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it implies that some of the high customers are served by the competitor at lower 
costs, (2) it brings a reduction in the tariffs applied to the low type of customers. In 
fact, cream skimming competition decreases the marginal price distortion 
automatically, since the relative weight of low types increases, reducing the 
distortionary factor (N1I''NL). Notice how it is in the incumbent's O\\TI interest (in 
order to maximise his profits) to decrease the L type's marginal price Pi and it is not 
a consequence of regulatory constraints. 
However, entry in the skimmed milk market may be welfare enhancing in 
particular cases in which competition is regulated and the rival's efficiency is 
sufficiently close to the incumbent's one. There may be in fact a trade-off between 
allocative and productive efficiency. Consider the case of a less efficient competitor 
(characterised by a value of her marginal cost intermediate between the incumbent's 
marginal cost and his optimal tariff for the low type, that is, c*<m< Pi) obliged to 
serve only the low type, because of, say, a ban on cream skimming. Acting optimally 
as a surplus taker, the rival \\ill set her tariff Pi. below the one fixed by the 
incumbent PL. In this way the incumbent, if his tariffs are not regulated, in order not 
to lose high-demand customers (who find it convenient to mimic low-demands and 
buy the bundle offered by the rival), must reduce the low customers' price distortion. 
In a different framework, with linear access prices (and with a standard intermediate 
demand curve) Economides and White (1995) show that competition by a less 
efficient rival could yield net social gains. As in our case, the improvement in terms 
of allocative efficiency may outweigh the losses in productive efficiency. 
Apart from these particular cases, in what follows we \vill show how, in the 
absence of access pricing issues, regulation should not allow competition for the 
low-demand customers or by inefficient entrants. This result holds for all different 
social welfare specifications, as summarised in the table (p. 276). 
3.2.2 Social optimality with Loeb and Magal 's welfare function 
In what follows, as a first approximation, following Loeb and Magat (1979) \ve 
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consider a social welfare function simply given by the unweighted sum of 
consumers' surplus U(Q\ Qt) and profits n -tr + ITO (specifically, the profit of the 
incumbent are net of transfers tr), disregarding any eventual distributional and excess 
burden issues. 
[L1\f.l ) W = U(Qi, Qt) + (ITi _ tr + ITt) = S(Qi, Qt) - (Ci + tr + 0) = 
= NHeU(Cb~) + NLu('lL) + KHeu(qi-I)+KLu(qt) _C(Qi) - tr - Ct(Qt) 
where as usual the two superscripts i and e refer respectively to the incumbent and 
the entrant. 
Applying LatTont and Tirole's accounting notation, social welfare can be 
expressed as the sum of consumers' surplus less the total cost of the project 
(including the transfers from the authority to the public firm). In fact, remembering 
that the consumers' net surplus is equal to the consumers' gross surplus minus firms' 
revenues, that is, U(Qi, Qt) = S(Qi, Qt) - R(Qi) - R(Qt), we see how in the formula the 
revenues drop out. The consumers' gross surplus function is specified as: 
[Ll\I.2) 
where Nt = N - Kt represent the incumbent's residual customer of type t (Kt is in fact 
the scale of entry in market t, in terms of number of customers). 
Let us now consider the behaviour of a social welfare maximising public 
incumbent firm in this setting. A public monopolist would automatically equate the 
low type marginal price PI.. and his marginal cost. This can be easily demonstrated in 
analytical terms, solving the public firm's social welfare maximisation problem with 
respect to good I, the non-monopolised final product. In the monopoly case (NH = 
NL = N), neglecting fixed costs, the social welfare maximisation problem can be 
written as: 
max W = N[eu(Cb~) + u(qJ] -c*N[CbI + 'IL] 
u('lL) - TL ~ 0 
e u(~)- TH~ 0 
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[ICd u(qrJ - TL ~ U(crn) - TH 
[ICH] 9 u(crn) - TH ~ 9 u('lL) - TL 
Assuming that the public firm can keep positive profits, appropriating 
customers' surplus (to keep our analysis as close as possible to Loeb and Magat, who 
deal with a privately regulated firm), as in the standard model the upward binding 
constraint [led and the participation constraint [IRH] are automatically satisfied by 
the solution of the problem when [IRd and [I~] are binding. Hence, no surplus is 
allowed to the L type, whereas the H type should always enjoy a positive net surplus 
[given by (9 - l)u(qrJ]. 
The welfare maximisation problem can be easily solved \vith respect to 'h. and 
'h-r' once we substitute the two binding constraints [IRd and [lCI-Jl into the objective 
function. Making use of consumers' optimality conditions, i.e. pt=9tu'( 'It) from the 
first order conditions we can see that an equality between the hvo marginal price 
must hold: 
['hi] 
[qi'J 
PH = 9 u'(qll) = c* 
Pi: = u'(qrJ = c* 
No distortion at the top 
No distortion at the bottom 
Hence, the public firm finds it optimal to equate marginal prices to marginal 
,. 
costs. Note how this result would also hold if customers of type Hand L served by 
the public firm were present in a different number. It is also important to notice that, 
since lump sum transfers are allowed, this condition does not necessarily imply that 
the L type customers enjoy no surplus at all (as assumed instead just for simplicity's 
sake). On the other hand, since the usual do\\nward incentive compatibility 
constraint [ICH] is binding any positive surplus given to customers of type L must 
also be given to high type customers. 
Let us now tackle competitive issues, considering as before a public firm. In 
the presence of a tariff taker rival, it is easy to show that social welfare a la Loeb and 
Magat reaches the maximum in the case of cream skimming competition undertaken 
by a more efficient rival. In fact, social welfare derived in the presence of entry [i.e. 
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NHeu(crn) + NLu('lL) - c*(NH'lH + NL'lL)] + [KHeU(q1) + KLu(qj) - m(KHClH + KLqjJ]: 
(1) decreases if the entrant is less efficient (m>c*), (2) stays the same if the entrant is 
equally efficient (m=c*) and (3) increases only if the entrant is more efficient 
(m<c*). 
Social welfare is reduced if an inefficient competitor (m > c*) enters the 
market. In fact, if entry takes place, social welfare per unit of customers decreases 
from the level ret u(qt) - c* qt] to ret u(qi) - m qil for the K customers served by the 
rival. With an efficient competitor (m < c*) the maximum additional gain for society 
per unit of customers, that is ret u( q\) - m q\] -ret u( qt) - c* qt], will be achieved 
,vith cream skimming competition (i.e. for t = H).40 
Hence, if the regulator does not impose any ban on competition for low-
demand customers or by inefficient entrants, the public finn himself must make 
these socially undesirable forms of entry unprofitable for the entrant. This can be 
done only if he distorts his tariffs; specifically if the L type's tariff is reduced by an 
amount SL. so that the entrant would not break even, being the maximum variable 
profits earned by a surplus taker competitor serving the low type K[u(qj) - SL -mqL] 
negative. However, since customers of type L enjoy a surplus SL also customers of 
type H must be given the same additional positive surplus ~ in order to satisfy their 
binding incentive compatibility constraint [ICH]. In the case in which the public firm 
does not break even by adopting these lower tariffs for both types of customers, he 
must be given adequate lump sum transfers. 
Alternatively, the public authority may directly impose an entry tax equal to 
the foregone variable profits of the public firm (if KH customers of type H and KL 
customers of type L were taken a,vay by the competitor). This payment amounts to 
(KH 1t~+ KL 1tt), where 1ti = Tt-c*qt represents the variable profit enjoyed by the 
public firm per unit of customer of type t. In this way, a less efficient competitor 
40 Notice how this reasoning applies perfectly to a private finn maximising profits 
the only difference being the presence of additional benefits, arising from the 
reduction of distortion on the low consumers associated \\lith cream skimming, as 
already seen in section 2.4.3. 
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(m>c*) is prevented from entering the market and a more efficient competitor 
(m<c*) will find it optimal to enter, and cream skim the market. In fact, taking the 
point of view of the entrant, a more efficient competitor (m<c*) wiJl maximise her 
variable profits KHJ'CH + KLTi. - m(KH'lH+ KLqD = KH9u(qH) - KJ9-1)u(qD + KLu(qi.) 
-m(KHqH+ KLqiJ only when she cream skims the market. She will also find it optimal 
to behave as a surplus taker, setting marginal price equal to her marginal cost. 
In order to clarify the reasoning, let us represent graphjcally the case of the 
entry of a more efficient rival. As represented in fig. 3.1 the public firm's tariffs are 
set equal to the marginal cost c* for both types of customer: T L is the area CO'llI and 
to obtain the tariffT H we must add the area EqLqjJD. 
p Fig. 3.1 
A 
C 
G 
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Since the non-linear tariffs TL and TH are maintained unchanged by the public 
finn, independently of the scale of entry, the best a tariff taker entrant can do is to go 
for the H type and to get a gross profit per customer given by CFBI + EBLD (always 
greater than CFBI, namely the gross profit she would get serving the L type). It can 
also be shovm that the optimal pricing strategy for the entrant is reached when she 
behaves as a surplus taker, that is she leaves to the rugh type the same surplus of the 
incumbent (the area ACIE, the minimum net surplus necessary in order to respect 
the incentive compatibility constraint). Doing this she maximises her profits by 
setti.ng the marginal price equal to the marginal cost pi=m<c*. A lower marginal 
price would cause her losses, while a higher one will make her forego some profits 
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(as in the tariff taker case). Also a surplus taker competitor finds it optimal to go for 
the H type and to get a gross profit per customer given by CFBI + EBH (always 
greater than CFM, namely the gross profit she would get serving the L type). It is self 
evident that the gross profit per unit of customer of type H enjoyed by a surplus taker 
competitor is greater than the one of a tariff taker by an amount given by the area 
DLH. Hence, if the competitor is more efficient she will enter and cream skim, 
behaving as a surplus taker (i.e. setting PH=m<c*). 
This type of entry is socially optimal since social welfare per unit of customers 
8U(qH) • c* qH is less than 8u(qif) • m qi1- As the previous variable profits per H 
customer are given by the shadow area of the two triangles CGI and EID the 
additional area GFHD whose height is c*·m must be added (with an additional gain 
of DLH). In particular, we will have a socially optimal setting when the competitor 
pays an entry tax (KH 1t:i+ KL 1tt) equal to the two shadow triangles in fig. 3.1 and the 
public firm exactly breaks even (ITi = 0) with his tariffs (TH and T d that equate 
marginal prices and marginal costs. 
Let us extend the previous analysis to the case in which the incumbent and the 
entrant incurs also fixed costs. Introducing fixed costs for the incumbent won't 
change the previous results. However, when the incumbent's fixed cost is relatively 
low (or null, as in our case) the L type customers may enjoy a strictly positive 
surplus, differently from what assumed above. Anyway, from an allocative point of 
view matters won't change, as the firm's profit and the consumers' surplus are given 
the same weight. On the other hand, when the incumbent's fixed cost is quite high 
the incumbent might need a lump sum transfer~ a transfer which should always be 
less than the net surplus of high customers (ACIE) times the number of high-demand 
customers. 
Instead, in the case of the entrant the presence of high fixed costs may penalise 
her, not allow to enter the market. Also from the social welfare perspective her entry 
may not be optimal, even if her efficiency was high enough to make entry profitable 
from her private point of vie\v. Specifically, even if the entrant's marginal cost are 
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lower than the incumbent's one, entry would not be welfare enhancing if the fixed 
cost is greater than the additional total variable profit (that is, the area GFHD times 
the number of high demand customers served). 
Finally, let see how socially optimal tariffs can be obtained if we deal with a 
private firm which maximises profit. Specifically, in Loeb and Magat's setting 
(allowing for lump sum transfers) once inefficient entry is prevented, price 
regulation of the incumbent (here a private regulated firm) with a single cap on the 
average price of the L type may allow to reach even the first best. In fact, Pareto 
efficiency can be achieved setting the average price for low-demand customers in a 
way such that the marginal price PI.. is equal to the incumbent's marginal cost. 
In the specific case of linear marginal utility functions, the required price cap 
for low-demand customers should be equal to the average between u'(O) and c*, as 
this will lead to set the marginal price equal to c*. Under this constraint, the 
incumbent finds it optimal, in order to maximise his profits, not to create any 
distortion at the bottom, \vhile keeping no distortion at the top. Hence, customers of 
type L will be offered a bundle such that the marginal price equals the marginal cost 
(that is, PI.. =c*). Eventually, apart from the price cap, also positive lump sum 
transfers to the incumbent would be needed if the firm will not break even. 
3.2.3 The welfare consequence of the cost of public funds in the hori=ontal game 
It is possible to consider efficiency issues more in depth, introducing the cost 
of public funds and considering the managerial effort e and its disutility \jJ( e), 
following Laffont and Tirole. Within their approach, however, only efficiency issues 
are considered (as welfare remains the unweighted sum of consumers' and 
producer's surplus in the ambit of quasi linear utility functions) and transfers to the 
public firms and revenues will be given a weight equal to (1+)..) and greater than 
unity. The moral hazard issue, introduced only in the form of managerial effort with 
risk neutral agents, has not a great relevance in a full information setting, and, 
furthermore, it does not imply any substantial change even in the ambit of their 
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adverse selection model, as proved in section 1.2. Consequently, we will carry on the 
analysis disregarding the issue of moral hazard, represented by the effort e and its 
disutility 'V ( e). 
Following LafTont and Tirole's assumptions within our public firm's setting, 
the collectivity will pay costs and transfers and get the revenues, which as a direct 
consequence, will be given a weight equal to (1+1..) greater than unity. Taking into 
account distributional and excess burden issues (deriving from distortionary 
taxation) we consider a social welfare function given by the unweigbted sum of 
consumers' surplus U(Qi, Qe) and profits (specifically, the profit of the incumbent are 
net of transfers tr, n - tr + ne). 
[LT.1] W), = U(Qi, Qe)+(1+A.)(n-tr)+ne = S(Qi, Qe)+A.R(Qi}{l + A.)(C+tr)-ce 
= NJI +A.)9u(ClH) + [NL(l +A.)-A.NH(9-1 )]u('lt) -(1 + A.)c * (NL'lt +N~H) 
- (1 +A.)tr +KH9u(qj-l) + KLU(qi.) - Ce(Qe) 
Applying Laffont and Tirole's accounting notation, social welfare can be 
expressed as the sum of consumers' surplus less the total cost of the project 
(including the transfers from the authority to the public firm) times the shadow cost 
of public funds (1+1..). In fact, since the consumers' net surplus is equal to the 
consumers' gross surplus minus finns' revenues, that is, U(Qi, Qe) = S(Q\ QC) _ R(Qi) 
- R(Qe), we see how in the formula the revenues of the entrant drop out. 
Hence, in the monopoly case. the consumers' net surplus may be written as 
SeQ) = U(Q)+A.R(Q). The public firm will maximise the social welfare function 
W(Q) = S(Q)+A.R(Q)-(1+A.)(c*Q+tr) with respect to the tariff system {TH• 'lH, TL• 'IL} 
subject to the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility constraints: 
[LT.2] 
[IRJ 
[IRH] 
[IeJ 
[I~] 
maxW), =N [9u(ClH)+u('IL)] + m(TL+TH)-(l+A.)c*N(qL+'lH) subject to: 
u(<h.)-TL~O 
9 u( em) - T H ~ 0 
u('lL) - TL ~ u(em) - TH 
9 u( em) - T H ~ 9 u( 'IL) - T L 
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As with the previous Loeb and Magat welfare function, the constraints [lCd 
and [IRH] are automatically satisfied by the solution of the problem when [IRd and 
[I~] are binding. Hence, even in this case, the only relevant constraints are: 
[IRd T L = uC'lL) 
[ICH] TH = 9 uC'lH) - C9 - 1) uC'lL) 
Therefore, in this second best setting, no surplus should be allowed to the L 
type. Welfare can be easily maximised only with respect to qII and qL once we 
substitute the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility constraints in the 
objective function: 
[LT.3] max Wi. = N[9u(ClH)+u('lL)]+A.N[C2·9)uC'lL)+9u(qI-l)]-(1 +A.)c*N('lL +ClH) 
Making use of the optimality conditions which hold for the customers we can 
easily write dov.n the first order conditions as: 
p~ = 9 u'C'lH) = c* 
pt = u'('lL) = c*Cl+A.)/[I+A.(2-9)] 
No distortion at the top 
Distortion at the bottom 
Clearly, we have some distortion at the bottom, as in the case of a private 
monopolist examined in the previous chapter; the two cases coincide only for A. 
which tends to infinite. The distortion here arises from the fact that profits are now 
given an additional weight A., being costly to get public revenues from taxes. From 
the previous first order conditions we obtain the optimal relationship between'lL and 
qH' similar to the one holding in the monopoly case: 
[LT.4] 9 u'C'h~) = [1+1..(1·9)/(1+1..)] u'C'lL) 
Notice how in this case it is always optimal that customers of type L enjoy no 
surplus at all, since the public (or regulated) firm's revenues have a weight equal to 
(1+1..), which is strictly greater than unity (as with Loeb and Magat's welfare 
function), which is the weight of the low demand customers' net surplus. 
We can now reformulate the basic Latfont and Tirole welfare maximisation 
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problem [L T.2] introducing competition following the same procedure as in the 
previous chapter (i.e. examining the public firm's problem with respect to the 
residual number of customers served by him). 
[LT.5] max W). = NH (I +A) eU('h-l) + [NL(1+A) - ANIle-I)] u(CIr.) + 
- (I+A)C*(NLCIr. +NHqH)-(1+A)tr +KHeu(qi-I) + KLU(qL) - Ce(QC) 
The first order conditions are: 
[q~] p~ = e U'('hl) = c* 
[ql] pt = u'(cfi) = c*/[l + (NulNL) (l-e)A./(1+A)] 
No distortion at the top 
Distortion at the bottom 
While the "no distortion at the top" result still holds, the socially optimal 
"distortion at the bottom" depends crucially on the scale of entry (as testified by the 
presence of the ratio NHtNL). This conclusion is opposite to the one reached in the 
previous subsection adopting Loeb and Magat's welfare function, where instead the 
marginal prices were invariant with respect to a change in the ratio NH'lNv 
In particular, it is interesting to notice how the socially optimal distortion turns 
out to be exactly the same as the optimal one derived for the first regime in Laffont 
and Tirole (1990b)'s cream skimming model, which holds only in the pure monopoly 
case. It should however be reminded that in their paper the ratio NHINL should be 
interpreted as the ratio between the total number of customers of different type. 
The optimal relationship benveen qL and 'hi is: 
[LT.6] e u'('hl) = [I + (NHlNd (l-e)A./(I+A)] u'(CIr.) = c* 
Let us examine the impact of competition on the socially optimal tariffs fixed 
by the public firm. A reduction in the number of high demand customers served by 
the public firm (due to cream skimming) leads him to reduce the efficient level of 
pricing distortion, as the ratio NIINL = (N-KI-l)tN becomes less than unitary, for any 
positive value ofKH. In the limiting case, in which KH tends towards N, there will be 
no distortion at the bottom, exactly as in Loeb and Magat's first best setting or in the 
bypass regime of Laffont and Tirole (1990b). On the other hand, a reduction in the 
number of low demand customers served by the public firm (due to skimmed milk 
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competition) leads instead to an increase in the pricing distortion, as the ratio NHINL 
= N/(N-Kt ) becomes greater than unity. 
From the previous considerations it follows that if the entrant is less efficient 
andlor serves the L type the direct consumers' net surplus U(Q, Q<) = N1f)u(crn) + 
NLu(CIr.) + KH9u(qH) + KLu(qD _Ri _Re is reduced, as the level of pricing distortion 
increases. Therefore, from the allocative point of view, the maximum level of total 
consumers' net surplus is reached with a more efficient entrant engaged in cream 
skimming competition. However, in what follows we will see that the decreased 
price distortion generated by cream skimming competition is a negative feature of 
entry (differently from we have seen in section 2.4.3 where we were dealing with a 
private monopolist maximising profits), as the public monopoly tariffs were socially 
optimal, due to the presence of a cost of public funds. Specifically, either the 
imposition of an entry tax or regulation of the entrant allow to maintain the public 
tariffs to their socially optimal public monopoly level. 
Let us now analyse the impact of different kind of competition on productive 
efficiency. The total producers' profits (I+A)fIi + ne = (1+A)R(Qi) +Re(Q<) -
(l+A)C*Qi _mQc in the absence of distortionary taxes -setting A = 0 as in the Loeb 
and Magat case- decrease if the entrant is less efficient (m > c*) and stay the same if 
the entrant is equally efficient (m=c*), as showed in the previous subsection. For A 
greater than zero, the incumbent's profits n i (that have attached a greater welfare 
weight) decrease in the presence of competition, reducing social welfare. However, 
what we are really interested is the overall effect on total profits (1 + A)fIi + TIe; in 
this regard, the reduction of the public firm's profits may be outweighed by the 
increase in the entrant's profit if she is sufficiently more efficient than him. Hence, 
when the entrant is strictly more efficient than the public firm (m<c*) social welfare 
is likely to increase, because cream skimming competition surely increases 
consumers' net surplus as in the Loeb and Magat setting. Skimmed milk competition 
not only decreases the consumers' net surplus but also producers' total profits in the 
case of an inefficient rival. 
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Consequently, as before, the regulator should not aI10w competition for the 
low-demand customers or by inefficient entrants, because they are socially 
undesirable forms of entry. In order to deter inefficient entrants, the policy maker 
may use a direct intervention. He may directly impose an entry tax equal to the 
foregone variable profits of the public firm (if KH customers of type Hand KL 
customers of type L were taken away by the competitor). In practice, the tax payment 
to any entrant should be set equal to ET = (KH 1t*H+ KL 1t*L) where 1t*t = (Tt-c*qt) 
is, in fact, the monopoly variable profit enjoyed by the public firm from a customer 
of type t (for NH=NL =N). In this way, government revenues (accrued by the entry 
taxes and the public firm's net profits) are kept unchanged independently of the scale 
of entry; this occurs since the public firm has no incentive to react to entry modifying 
his monopoly tariffs. In fact, once the public authority receives this entry tax, it 
becomes part of the public budget; consequently, the social value of the payment 
becomes (1+1..) ET = (1+1..) (KH 1t~+ KL 1tt) = (KH co~+ KL cot) and it 
compensated the public firm's for the foregone variable profits due to the presence 
of entry. This is so because cot = (l+A.)(Tt - c qt) represents just the value an 
additional customer of type t would bring to the public firm, if entry had not 
occurred. 
As in the previous case, a more efficient competitor (m < c*) will maximise 
her variable profits KH8u(qH)+ KLu(qj) - m(KH'li-I+ KLqj) - ET serving the H type 
and behaving as a surplus taker. The same graphical reasoning of the Loeb and 
Magat case applies, even if marginal prices are no longer equal to marginal costs. 
Furthermore, abstracting from fixed costs, social welfare would be additionally 
improved if also the entrant is regulated. In this case the social value of letting the 
entrant serving a customer of type H e u( qjI) - m qH would receive a higher weight 
(since her profits are now appropriated by the public authority) becoming e u(CJiJ) + 
A.(rl-f'mqH) - mqH. This value is clearly greater than the one the society would get 
with an entry tax e uC %) + A.(T I-f'C*qH) - mqH when the entrant is strictly more 
efficient compared with the public firm. 
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It should be reminded how, in these two specific cases (entry tax and regulated 
entrant), a reduction in the number of high demand customers served by the public 
incumbent will no longer lead to a reduction in the low customers' price distortion. 
In practice, the public firm's non-linear tariffs are kept the same as the public 
monopoly one, i.e. eU'(ClH)=[1+(2-e)JJ(1+A)]u'(ClL)=c*, since he does not find it 
optimal to respond to the scale of entry of a more efficient competitor by distorting 
his tariffs. This happens because in the presence of entry taxes, or if the entrant's 
profits are expropriated (representing a tax revenue for the public budget) the term 
(l+A)Kl/l-e)u(ClL) in the social welfare function [LT.5] replaces KH(l-e)u(ClL). 
Consequently, all the losses in the public firm's revenues, due to the net consumer 
surplus (l-e)u(ClL) to allow to the H type, are given a weight (1+A), as in the public 
monopoly case. In the modified first order conditions [LT.6] the ratio NHINL does 
not appear, being always equal to unity, for any positive KH scale of entry. 
It is important to notice how in the absence of an entry tax (or of the entrant's 
regulation), the competitor should be strictly more efficient than the public firm for 
entry to be optimal. In fact, even in the absence of fixed costs, the social welfare 
associated with a high demand customer being served by the public finn e u('lL) + 
A(TL-c*ClL) - c* ClL, is strictly greater than eu('lL) - c* 'lL the welfare associated with a 
high demand customer being served by an equally efficient entrant (m = c*). This 
happens because the public finn's profits are given a ,veight (1 + A) greater than unity 
and are consequently strictly preferable to the ones made by an equally efficient 
competitor, even if he pays corporate taxes on them (since the tax rate is nonnally 
less than unity). The decreased price distortion generated by cream skimming 
competition becomes a negative feature of entry, as the public monopoly tariffs were 
socially optimal. This is due to the presence of a trade-off between efficiency in 
production and decreased public revenues. 
3.2.4 Optimal non-linear pricing when the regulator cares of consumers' surplus 
Let us now briefly examine Baron and Myerson's (1982) case, in which the 
producer's surplus has a weight ~ less than unity. In this final setting, efficiency 
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issues are no longer the only ones the public finn deals with (in first or in second 
best). In fact, the public authority is more concerned with consumers' surplus in a 
sort of partial first best setting, where lump sum transfers are still available but only 
towards public or private regulated finns. This quite peculiar feature of this model 
differentiates it from the Laffont and Tirole's one and should be kept in mind when 
we examine it in a full information setting. 
Since the public firm's profits ni represent public revenues, being entirely 
redistributed to consumers, are given a unitary weight like consumers' surplus and 
differently from the entrant's profits ~ne Baron and Myerson's social welfare 
function W· can be written as: 
[B~f.l] W. = U(Qi, Qe) + n i _ tr + ~ne = S(Qi, Qe) _ C(Qi)-tr_ Ce(Qe) 
+(~_I)[Rc(Qe)_O\Qc)] = NH9u(q.n)+NLu(ClL)+ 
KH9u( qil)+ KL u( qt)-c"'(NHqH+ NL ClL)-m(KH'li-l+ KL qt) -( 1-$ )ne 
Maintaining Laffont and Tirole's accounting notation, social welfare can be 
expressed as the sum of consumers' surplus less the total cost of the project 
(including the transfers from the authority to the public firm). In fact, remembering 
that the consumers' net surplus is equal to the consumers' gross surplus minus firms' 
revenues, that is, U(Q, Qt) = S(Qi, QC) - R(Q) - RC(Qe), as in the Loeb Magat case, we 
see how in the formula the revenues drop out. 
In the public monopoly, neglecting the presence of fixed costs, the social 
welfare function collapses to the Loeb Magat one, so that we do not need to solve 
again the maximisation problem. 
[B~f.2] W· = U(Qi) - C*Qi -tr = N [9u(crn)+u(ClL)] - c"'N(crn+ClL) -tr 
Notice that we will assume, as we did in Loeb Magat's setting, that the low 
type's participation constraint [IRd is binding, even if this may not always be the 
case, due to the presence of lump sum transfers towards the public firm. In practice, 
we assume that the public firm can keep positive profits, appropriating customers' 
surplus (to keep our analysis as close as possible to Baron and Myerson, who deal 
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with a privately regulated firm), so that the two standard constraints are binding. 
Hence, with a public monopoly there is no distortion both at the top and at the 
bottom: 
lB~f.3] p~ = 9 u'(Ch-l) = Pi: = u'('lL) = c* 
Furthermore, the public firm finds it optimal to equate marginal prices to 
marginal costs, independently of the number of customers served 
Once we consider the entry problem, like with the LafTont and Tirole's welfare 
function, the public (or regulated) finn's objective function W· gives a lower weight, 
~ less than unity, to the per customer profits of the entrant. Hence, when the public 
(or regulated) firm's objective function is W·, i.e. Baron and Myerson's one, in this 
peculiar redistributive setting consumers' net surplus becomes U(Qi, QC)_(l_~)Re(Qe). 
In fact, as incumbent's profits It and consumers' surplus have a unit weight, 
differently from the entrant's ones $ne, allowing for entry the Baron and Myerson's 
social welfare function W. may be written as: 
[B1\f.4) max W. = U(Qi, QC) -C(Q;) _Cc(QC) +($-1) [Rc(Qe) _Cc(QC)]= 
NJ3u( Ch-l)+ NL u( 'lL)+ KJ)u( qj-r)+ KL u( qjJ-c* (NlflH+ NL'lL) 
- m(KHqi-l+KLqjJ-(l-~)n· 
The first order conditions remains unchanged compared to the public 
monopoly case: 
pt = 9 U'(qH) = c* 
pt = u'( 'lL) = c· 
No distortion at the top 
No distortion at the bottom 
This clearly shows that, even in the absence of fixed costs and access pricing, 
social welfare W. will increase only if the entrant is strictly more efficient than the 
incumbent. 
Consequently, in general, it is not necessary that a positive net surplus ~ > 0 
should be allowed to the L type, whereas the H type enjoys always a positive net 
surplus [given by (9 • l)u('lL)+ Sd. In fact, being the downward binding constraint 
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[I~] binding, any positive surplus SL> 0 given to the L type customer must also be 
given to the H type customer. This may happen if the incumbent has to prevent the 
entry of an inefficient competitor. 
As in Loeb and Magat's setting social welfare: (1) decreases if the entrant is 
less efficient (m > c*), and (2) increases only if the entrant is more efficient (m < 
c*). However, it decreases also if the entrant is equally efficient (m=c*) instead of 
staying the same, because the entrant's profits are valued less than the public firm's 
one. 
From an al10cative point of view, the consumers' net surplus specified below 
[B~f.4] 
is reduced when the relative efficiency of the entrant is lower. 
On the other hand, considerations of productive efficiency tell us that the 
social value of producers' profits n + ~ne surely decrease if the entrant is less or 
equally efficient (m ~ c*) and can increase only when the entrant is strictly more 
efficient (m < c*). 
Considering cream skimming competition, for each additional customer served 
by the entrant, social welfare varies by the amount {8u(qil) - mqi1 _(1_~)1te - [8u(crn) -
c"'qH]} which is positive only for a more efficient competitor (m < c*). 
Thus, in the absence of specific public interventions, competition for low 
demand customers or by inefficient or equally efficient rivals must be faced by the 
public firm, who can avoid them making those forms of entry unprofitable. This can 
be done, as in both of the previous settings, reducing, by a sufficient amount SL' the 
low type customers' tariff, so that the entrant's total variable profits K1tt = K[u(qt) -
SL -m qiJ are negative. But this means that also the high type customers' tariff is 
reduced by ~ and the public firm may not break even applying these lower tariffs, 
and may need lump sum transfers. 
Alternatively, we can make use of the same regulatory tools described in 
LafTont and Tirole's setting to enhance social welfare. In particular, the entI)' of less 
efficient competitors (m>c*) is prevented by a tax payment equal to the variable 
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profits enjoyed by the public finn if entry had not occurred; i.e. (KH 1t~+ KL 1tt). In 
this case, since the entry tax represents a component of the public budget its social 
weight is unitary and is not reduced to ~ as the entrant's profits are. Consequently, an 
equally efficient competitor may enter the market without reducing social welfare, as 
her variable profits are totally expropriated by the tax. 
It should at this point be clear how, even in this setting, a more efficient 
competitor (m<c*) finds it optimal to behave as a surplus taker and to serve the high 
type in order to maximise her own variable profits KH 'PH+ KLfi. - m(KH%+ KLqt). 
Hence, a socially optimal pricing is reached when the competitor pays an entry tax 
equal to (KH 1t~+ KL 1t() and the public finn equates marginal prices and marginal 
costs, causing no distortion for both type of customers. 
The other alternative which allow to further improve social welfare, as before 
in Laffont and Tirole's case, is to regulate the entrant. In fact, in this case the social 
value of letting the entrant serve a high demand customer e u( qil) - m qH would be 
attached an unitary weight. Moreover, this value is greater than the one obtained 
with an entry tax e u(qj-l) + (TH-c*qH) - Ti-l - (1-~X'PI1TH-mqi-l+c*'lJ-I)' when the 
entrant is strictly more efficient. 
In sum, similarly to Laffont and Tirole's setting, in the absence of entrant's 
regulation and/or an adequate entry tax, the rival should be strictly more efficient 
than the public finn for entry to be socially optimal. In fact, if a high customer is 
served by an equally efficient entrant (m = c*) instead of the public finn, social 
welfare would be reduced, because the profits of the entrant are given a lower weight 
(~< 1). 
3.2.5 Final remarks on regulatory issues in the hori=ontal game 
Let us now reconsider in general tenns the efficiency role played by 
competition with non-linear tariffs and in presence of a public firm who maximises 
social welfare. The previous results strengthened the initial reasoning according to 
which competition should complement rather than replace regulation. Furthermore, 
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it is better from a social point of view that competition is directly regulated by the 
authority or is subject to an entry tax. In particular, the public incumbent or the 
regulator should not allow competition for the low-demand type or by a less efficient 
entrant, and should impose socially optimal non linear tariffs. 
We have seen how in the horizontal game with purely profit maximising firms, 
the presence of cream skimming competition by a more efficient entrant increases 
social welfare, both from a productive and allocative point of view (since the 
distortion at the bottom tends to disappear). 
However, even under what might seem at first sight to be the most favourable 
conditions, the private tariffs (T Land T H) are far from optimal. This occurs since 
private firms, giving no weight to consumers' surplus, tend to distort prices by a 
greater amount than it would be socially optimal, even in the absence of lump sum 
transfers and of redistributive issues. 
Some of the considerations that have been previously made reminds us vaguely 
of the original Baumol's subtle pricing issues of 1983. Apparently, our analysis is not 
related to Baumol's one, because he was looking at ways to obtain efficiency 
improvements in vertically related market, showing that paradoxically a collusive 
result may be preferable to a Cournot-like competitive one and that access charges 
should be set equal to the marginal cost of access plus a term which reflects the 
opportunity cost of entry. We will deal with these issues in the section 3.3 in which 
we examine the welfare implications of the vertical game. 
However, even in the previous analysis of the horizontal game two points 
emerged and it is worthwhile to discuss them a little bit further, especially because 
they are closely related to the welfare analysis that we are going to develop dealing 
with access pricing. The points in which we are specifically interested are: (a) the 
necessity that competitors' entry may be allowed if they are able to pay an amount 
that reflects the opportunity cost of entry incurred by the public incumbent, (b) the 
idea to exploit the efficiency enhancing properties, implicit in a potential horizontal 
merger, or more precisely the more general idea of "intemalisation" (of which the 
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merger may represent a specific private application). 
The first point has already proved quite relevant with all the welfare function 
specifications. In particular, adopting the social welfare function of Laffont and 
Tirole and of Baron and Myerson in the absence of entrant's regulation and of an 
entry tax. entry is socially optimal if and only if the rival is strictly more efficient 
than the public or the private regulated firm (even in absence of fixed costs). This 
condition ensures that the competitor is able to pay an amount greater than the 
opportunity cost of entry, that is the foregone profits of the public firm. Only if we 
have an entry tax or the entrant is regulated, the entry of an equally efficient 
competitor is again optimal. 
Furthermore, the ability to pay a transfer equal to the opportunity cost may be 
seen as a sort of Hicks-Kaldor welfare improving criterion. Once the criterion is 
satisfied there would be no need for the transfers to take place, as with the Loeb and 
Magat social welfare function. Instead, with the welfare specifications of Laffont and 
Tirole and of Baron and Myerson, it is always optimal that the compensatory transfer 
towards the public firm or better toward the public budget takes effectively place. 
However, as the previous criterion of the "opportunity cost of entry payment" 
follows exactly from the efficiency properties of a horizontal merger, the fact that 
the entrant should be strictly more efficient shows that the merged monopolist's 
optimal pricing criteria are not always socially optimal with two distinct finns (a 
public and a private one) which behave following difTerent objectives (welfare and 
profit maximisation). 
. 
Nevertheless, the efficiency properties implicit in a more general criterion that 
we may call "internalisation principle" suggest regulatory mechanisms able to 
enhance social welfare. In fact, ceteris paribus, the use of a regulatory instrument 
such as the entry tax (that we devised in the previous sections) improves a previously 
socially optimal setting adopting the welfare function proposed by LafTont and Tirole 
and by Baron and Myerson (while social welfare would not change with Loeb and 
Magat's function). In these two cases, further improvements on this new socially 
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optimal setting (reached introducing the entry tax) can be achieved if we can also 
regulate the entrant. 
Finally, with all the social welfare functions previously examine~ we can 
make use of an additional instrument, able to better apply the "intemalisation 
principle", to increase further social welfare. In our model this mechanism is given 
by the purchasing solution (i.e. the solution in which the incumbent buys the output 
of the entrant to resell it to customers) as already envisaged in chapter 2. In fact, as 
in the case already examined of private market equilibrium, the purchasing solution 
is strictly socially preferable to allowing entry and direct selling of the competitor. 
We can easily show that social welfare increases when the competitor sells all 
the additional units K(qk'lJ~) to the public incumbent firm, so that the latter is able to 
resell it to consumers at the socially optimal monopoly tariffs (Tt and T~). 
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As shown in fig. 3.2 above, the presence of a competitor whose marginal price 
pi! (equal to his marginal cost m) is lower than the incumbent's one p~ implies a 
surplus loss for the collectivity, \vhich amounts to the integral of K[c*· 8u'(q)] for q 
that goes from 'h' to qj{. Hence, social welfare increases v,:hen the marginal units 
K( qk~) are purchased by the incumbent at their marginal cost m (or at their 
average price, always less than c*) and then sold at a higher price as inframarginal 
units (for instance to high-demand customers) as the surplus loss fully disappears. 
The consumer surplus will increase by an amount equal in practice to the area DHL 
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represented in fig. 3.2, and this will increase social welfare by (I+A) times the 
previous amount in Laffont and Tirole's case. 
Before introducing vertical issues in the following sectio~ let us now briefly 
reconsider the role of competition in the presence of access pricing in a private 
setting, as derived in section 2.5. It seems that the previous welfare implications are 
strengthened, even if some of the previous problems are no longer present. In 
particular, if he can fix access pricing the incumbent will not allow competition for 
the low-demand type or by an inefficient entrant, since it would not be profitable for 
him to set the per customer access charge less than the surplus he would get from the 
high type applying monopoly tariffs. Even under these most favourable conditions -
that is, in the presence of cream skimming competition by a more efficient entrant-
we will see that social welfare increases by a lower amount than it would do in the 
absence of vertical issues. Intuitively, this occurs since the pricing distortion is not 
reduced by entry, since the marginal price PL and the tariff T H remain unchanged, 
instead of decreasing. 
3.3 Access pricing regulation and the optimality of the Baumol-\VilIig rule 
The aim of this section is to consider in detail the implications of the presence 
of a regulated or of a public (vertically integrated) incumbent firm in vertically 
related markets. The following analysis will mainly focus on socially optimal non-
linear price regulation under full information, taking into consideration the three 
different social welfare specifications. 
A particular emphasis will be put on access pricing regulation, examining in 
detail the usefulness of the so called Baumol-Willig rule not only in the original 
linear access pricing framework devised by Baumol, but also in the cream skimming 
model previously analysed, restating its possible efficiency role in socially optimal 
pricing settings, in contrast with some recent interpretations. 
From the society point of view, in a first best setting without pnce 
discrimination and redistributional concerns, it is clear that the regulator should set 
, ! 
, 
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access pricing equal to the marginal cost of providing access. In fact, it is always 
possible to cover eventual budget deficits of the incumbent with lump sum transfers, 
ensuring that he will be able to continue to efficiently operate the network. 
Unfortunately, even with full information on the cost and effort of the network 
operator, such first best outcomes are not normally available, due, for instance, to the 
presence of a binding break even budget constraint when public subsidies are not 
feasible or because public funds are costly, given the impossibility to recur to lump 
sum taxes, as Laffont and Tirole and many other economists have forcefully argued. 
Therefore, much of the debate should explicitly involve the determination of optimal 
departures from marginal cost pricing. We will see how both the powers that the 
public regulatory authority can use and the possibility to allow transfers to the finn 
(possibility that may be endogenised in the model, explicitly allowing for regulatory 
capture, as done by Laffont and Tirole) are quite relevant issues to analyse in this 
case. 
3.3.1 The optimality of the Baumol-Willigpricing rule in the originalframework 
Once the original Baumol's model of 1983 is carefully examined, it is quite 
evident that the author implicitly considers a special case, where the budget 
constraint is binding, but transfers are not allowed, and proposes a rule, which is also 
known as the Baumol-Willig rule or the efficient component pricing rule, that can be 
used in order to attain some efficiency improvements. According to it, within non 
perfectly contestable industries, access charges should be set equal to the marginal 
cost of access plus a term which reflects the opportunity cost of entry. Moreover, he 
shows that, when dealing with linear pricing in a market characterised by vertical 
issues, the collusive result is normally preferable to the competitive one (leading to a 
Cournot-like equilibrium) as prices are closer to marginal costs. To fully understand 
the author's aims and the real relevance of his analysis, it is fundamental to realise 
that both of these results exploit the very same efficiency enhancing properties, 
implicit in a potential vertical merger. 
In the first case where there are two different firms operating two segments of 
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a given service (let say a rail service) and acting as profit maximisers, Baumol does 
not search for the optimal pricing (for each segment or the entire track) but simply 
considers "what price setting pro.cess will best serve the interests of consumers". His 
comparison between a complete collusion between the two firms with Cournot like 
competition shows the superiority of the first setting. Clearly, the same type of 
setting (within a profit maximisation model) should be preferable also in the second 
case in which there is a vertically integrated firm who is a monopolist of the first 
segment and the other firm still operates just in the competitive segment; in fact, 
Baumol does not even spend one more word in order to further specify matters. 
However, in the second case, differently from the first one, he seems to implicitly 
assume constant marginal costs of providing train space (iCe) in his reasoning. As we 
will see, in this particular case, his result will also hold with socially optimal 
regulation. 
In order to clarify matters, let us consider the original example due to Baumol 
(1983) in which he focuses on what we called the second case. A vertically 
integrated incumbent operates a rail service connecting R, Sand T. An entrant offers 
a perfect substitute on the competitive route connecting Rand S and has access to 
the incumbent's track ST. It should also be pointed out that, in this setting, he just 
deals with the efficiency issue (implicit in consumers' choice) of not distorting "the 
relative competitive advantages", even if the "optimal price" and "socially acceptable 
compensation" labels are used by Baumol himself.'Now a non-discriminatory access 
price cap should be set by an outside regulator to enforce the "principle of parity" of 
implicit prices. In practice, the cap should be low enough to let efficient competitors 
enter the market, eliminating the possibility that the access charge may result in a 
disadvantage for one of the two firms competing for customers. Baumol believes that 
a low access charge may be achieved even as the result of a private bargaining 
process. 
For simplicity's sake, by assumption we may consider, as in Cave (1994), the 
case where the incumbent's retail price p for the service over RST is equal to 
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average costs, so that the incumbent just breaks even. However, in dealing with this 
case, it should be made fully clear how Baumol does not believe that firms would 
adopt a Ramsey pricing policy voluntarily (as he stated in detail in his reply to Tye's 
comment). 
Let the incumbent's per unit incremental costs of providing track-space over 
ST be iCA- Let iCj and icc respectively denote the per unit incremental costs of . 
providing track-space over RS and train space on RT if the transportation service is 
performed by the incumbent or by the entrant (subscript i and e). In this case the 
equitable access charge F* that the incumbent should charge is: 
[B"l 
Let us show that F* is the only fixed charge that guarantees minimum costs of 
production. Assume that F (= E + P - iCj) be higher than p - iCj. Then, some entrants 
with an incremental cost less than the incumbent's one (icj > iCe> iCj - E) will find 
entry unprofitable. If entry occurred output would be produced at minimum costs, 
which would clearly improve efficiency and welfare. In practice, F* is "economically 
compensatory", since it is the implicit transfer price a merged monopolist would 
choose (for providing track-space over ST) when he faced the question of which 
production process should be used for the segment RS. From this it follows that the 
minimum costs of production property will hold immediately, as clearly the merged 
firm would always minimise costs. Thus, the rule just increases the industry'S 
efficiency, as in the case of a vertical merger. 
In sum this rule just "offers Pareto optimal criteria for pricing efficiency" 
related to the "intermediate input" (the track-space from S to T)~ the very same one 
that the merged monopolist would follow. However, not all the merged monopolist's 
optimal pricing criteria need to be followed and to be taken as socially optimal in 
this situation, as we continue to have two distinct firms, whose profits in general may 
be given different weights. Moreover, even in the presence of two profit maximising 
firms, probably this criterion may not necessarily hold if the two firms specialise on 
different types of customers having different demand elasticity. But this point is 
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already implicitly recognised by Baumol (see. p. 352). If we look at the second 
formulation of the Baumol-Wiilig rule [B\V], we notice how the optimal charge is 
set equal to the marginal cost of access (icA) plus the opportunity cost of access (p -
iCA - icj), i.e. the profits foregone by the incumbent by not serving the traffic. This 
clearly shows how the incumbent enjoys a fully compensatory pricing. 
Moreover, for practical purposes, Baumol refers to the price charged by the 
incumbent on his monopolised segment ST (PST) and to the incremental cost of 
providing train space service from S to T (icST). In this setting his efficiency 
improving rule can be refonnulated as: 
[B\V] , F* = PST - iCST = iCA + (PST - iCA - icST) 
and can be applied with any arbitrary pricing rule and not only as a part of a socially 
optimal pricing policy. According to Baumol, F* = PST - icST imposes "all of the 
contribution toward common costs of shipments from S to T upon the track space 
rental component". But, as the train space will be offered at its marginal cost only in 
perfectly contestable markets (see. n. 5 p. 355) nothing ensures us that the access 
charge PST - iCST (or p - icJ just covers effectively incurred costs (and not 
inefficiencies or monopoly returns, which can be included only in a quite broad 
definition of opportunity costs). 
In this regard, when the network is earning excessive returns, or is being 
operated inefficiently, the application of the Baumol-Willig rule may lead to a 
situation in which the incumbent keeps on earning super-normal profits or imposing 
the costs of his inefficiency to competitors. Instead, one of the regulatory purposes is 
to eliminate super-normal profits and inefficiency costs from the access charge; our 
analysis in setting the incumbent's price equal to average costs aims to point out this. 
In any case, later (see for instance Baumol and Sidak (1994» Baumol eliminates 
these potential problems, assuming that efficient regulation has already solved them, 
before dealing with access pricing regulation. 
Nevertheless, even in Baumol's original case, due to the presence of a positive 
externality or due to dynamic considerations (see Cave (1994), among others), the 
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regulator may wish to promote entry in the final services market, departing from the 
parity rule. 
In an extended framework Cave (1994) notices how the Baumol-Willig rule 
should explicitly incorporate components related to the variety of products (i.e. the 
demand for the services) provided over the network. However, this perhaps minor 
generalisation is already implicit in the definition of the marginal and the 
opportunity cost of access (the profits foregone by the incumbent). Moreover, it was 
also recognised by Baumol himself in the explicit assumption that parity holds only 
when the intermediate good "will face the same [final] demand conditions and incur 
the same marginal costs" (p. 352). 
Cave also points out that, with perfectly competitive entrants, social welfare 
may be enhanced by lowering p (the incumbent's retail price) and 
contemporaneously increasing F (the fixed access charge). This consideration leads 
him to conclude that the rule "is applicable only when the incumbent's retail prices 
are non-optimal". We will show that this is not always the case. 
In claiming this Cave refers to quite specific models, such as Armstrong and 
Doyle (1994) and Armstrong and Vickers (1995), in which transfers are not allowed 
and the only access pricing policy allowed for is the linear one. The question 
analysed by the previous authors within this framework is which type of access 
pricing policy is socially optimal (mainly considering welfare as the unweighted sum 
of the consumers' and the producer's surplus) in their partial equilibrium setting. 
Proposition 1 (closely related to Laffont and Tirole 1990a) simply states the 
optimality to set access charge in excess of the marginal cost of providing access, on 
the basis of a simplified Ramsey pricing formula: (p - F - iCi)/(p - F) = -kJllE. 
However, even in their particular setting, their proposition is easily falsified in the 
plausible case in which the elasticity of supply of the entrant (denoted in their model 
llE) is infinite because she has constant marginal costs. It should be also noticed how 
there is no reason which justifies the asymmetry between the incumbent and the 
entrant; in particular, their result may probably be modified, once one also considers 
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the elasticity of supply for the incumbent. Thus it is arguable that the Baumol-Willig 
rule can be socially optimal pricing in the original context assumed by Baumol, so 
that we can now focus on our cream skimming model. 
3.3.2 The social optimality of the Baumol-Willig pricing rule in the cream skimming 
model 
Before dealing with socially optimal access pricing rules, let us first examine 
the impact of regulating access directly (through the application of the Baumol-
Willig rule) starting from the purely private setting analysed in section 2.5. In 
vertically related markets we have seen how the incumbent will always enjoy 
monopoly profits, as if he were the only player, allowing the entry of an equally 
efficient competitor, while deterring less efficient rivals through high enough access 
charges. Moreover, in the presence of a more efficient rival the incumbent can enjoy 
an additional profit. In fact, the use of non-linear access charges allows him to 
control entry maximising at the same time productive efficiency. 
In what follows we show that in our cream skimming model the Baumol-
Willig rule allows entry to an equally efficient competitor who faces no entry costs 
(apart from the access charge) and serves either low or high-demand customers. The 
"no fixed costs assumption" is clear in what we called Baumol's second case, 
because for the entrant there are no additional fixed costs associated to offering train 
. 
space in the segment ST (which we assume to be the high-demand market). 
However, if we introduce non-linear pricing whenever the average retail price p is 
greater than average costs this parity rule atone would no longer attain global social 
optimality, though it would still represent the minimum charge that should be 
applied to avoid the entry of inefficient competitors. 
Let us then consider in detail the conditions under which in our model the 
Baumol-Willig rule is optimal for the incumbent and more generally for achieving 
productive efficiency. According to BaumoJ, in order to avoid inefficient entry, all 
potential competitors should pay one of the two charges specified below in order to 
enter the high or low demand market. 
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The per customer access charge which should be imposed according to the 
parity rule for the high-demand customers is 
[B\VnJ 
It allows an equally efficient competitor, who serves the H type (in the absence of 
fixed costs), to break even and to enter the market. Similarly, the per customer 
access charge for the low-demand customers 
[B\Vd 
allows the entry of an equally efficient competitor serving the L type (in the absence 
of fixed costs). 
Naturally, the competitor (in the absence of inframarginal costs) will always 
prefer to serve only high-demand customers, and is anyway obliged by the incumbent 
to cream skim, as our analysis has proved (cf. section 2.5). Nevertheless, in general 
there may exist particular specifications of the cost function for which the 
competitor will instead maximise her profits by serving the L type. 
As we are not yet dealing \\;th socially optimal regulation, one may put the 
usual objections on the use of this access pricing policy. However, in the previous 
setting, these prices are clearly the optimal ones for the incumbent (who faces an 
equally efficient competitor), as we have proved, and, given the presence of 
monopoly tariffs, they also represent the minimum fixed access charge which avoids 
the entry of inefficient competitors. In fact, in the case of an equally efficient rival, it 
is optimal for the incumbent to set the per customer access charge equal to the 
monopoly variable profits and to maintain his monopoly pricing strategy. In other 
words, the incumbent is indifferent to allow or deter entry (cf. proposition 1 of 
section 2.5). 
In the presence of a more efficient rival the incumbent finds it optimal to set 
the per customer access charge greater than the monopoly variable profits in order to 
expropriate all the entrant's profits. Hence, he is better off in the presence of entry 
and productive efficiency is guaranteed, since the incumbent can get all the relative 
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advantages. [AP], represents the per customer access charge fixed by the incumbent, 
which is clearly greater than [B\VH], the one derived from the parity rule: 
[AP] , F(KR) / KH = 'PH - m qH> f1I 
However, the application of the Baumol-Willig rule too, would still succeed in 
maximising productive efficiency, while leaving the entrant the additional profits 
(due to her greater efficiency), avoiding their complete appropriation by the 
incumbent. 
3.3.3 The optimality o/the Baumol-Willig rule in a Loeb and Magat 's setting 
So far we have seen how the Baumol Willig is optimal from the productive 
efficiency point of view. As a direct consequence, it might be expected its socially 
optimality if we stick to the very simple ultra-liberal social welfare function given by 
the unweighted sum of consumer surplus and profits a la Loeb and Magat (1979), 
focusing only on efficiency issues and ignoring any eventual distributional and 
excess burden considerations. However, our analysis will show that the tariffs 
induced by the Bawnol-Willig rule do not represent overall the unique socially 
optimal prices for the society, even in this naive setting. 
Let us then consider which access pricing rule would be the socially optimal 
one and in which direction we must move in order to achieve Pareto improvements. 
As in section 3.2.2, the collectivity will pay costs and transfers and get the public (or 
regulated) firm's revenues, including access charges. The entrant's individual 
rationality must be satisfied for entry to take place respectively in the high and low-
demand market. These conditions, specified below as [APH] and [APd, imply the 
entrant to break even after paying the access charges: 
[APR] fH KH ~ ('PH - mqj-l) KR 
[APd fL KL ~ (1l- mqL) KL 
All costs and transfers are attached weights equal to unity, so that the 
consumers' surplus can be simply expressed as S(qO, qk, crl., qH, qt, NH, NL• KH, KL). 
Adopting Loeb and Magat's social welfare function the public firm's general 
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problem is to maximise social welfare W (with respect to his tariffs) and can be 
written as: 
maxW= 
[MME] 
[IRd 
[IRH] 
[ICd 
[ICH] 
S -C(Q) -NC(2N, QO, Q) _Ce(QC) = 
NHeu(qH)+NLu(<lL)+KHeu(qj~)+KLu(qD+2Nv(qO)-c"'(NH'h-l+NLqL) 
- cO(2NqO) - NC(2N) - m(K~ii+KLqj) subject to: 
po ~ v'(qO) 
uC'lL) - TL ~ 0 
8 u( qH) - T H ~ 0 
u(~) - TL ~ U(qH) - Tu 
8 u('h!) - TH ~ 8 u(~) - TL 
To verify whether the Baumol-Willig rule is socially optimal in this setting we 
assume that the regulator imposes the parity rule for the high and low-demand 
customers, in order to avoid inefficient entry: 
fH = F(KH) / KH = TH - c*'h! 
fL = F(KL) / KL = TL - c"'~ 
Taking advantage of the previous analysis, all may be reduced to the 
maximisation of the follovving social welfare function, in which the entrant, being 
equally or more efficient than the public firm, \\ill cream skim the market: 
maxW= NHeU('h'l)+Nu(~)+KHeU(qH)-C*(NIAH+NL~)-m(K~-l)+2Nv(qO)-
cO(2NqO) - NC(2N) subject to: 
pO = v'(qO) 
u(~) - TL = 0 
e u(<ta) - TH = 8 u(<lL) - TL 
The welfare maximisation problem can be easily solved with respect to qO, <lL 
and 'hi' once we substitute the binding constraints [MME], [IRd and [ICH] into the 
objective function. Making use of consumers' optimality conditions for the non-
monopolised good, i.e. Pt=9tu'(qt) from the first order conditions we can see that an 
equality between the two marginal price must hold: 
p" = v'( qO) = CO 
PH = e U'(qH) = C· 
Pi: = U'( 'lL) = C· 
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Marginal cost pricing 
No distortion at the top 
No distortion at the bottom 
The public ftnn finds it optimal to equate price to marginal cost for the 
monopolised good 0 and to equate marginal prices (for both types of customers) to 
marginal costs in the market of good 1. 
Therefore, in this setting the answer to the socially optimal access pricing 
question seems relatively easy. In fact, starting from a monopoly price setting with 
the Baumol-Willig access charges, we can always reduce the access charge iJf and 
increase fL till we reach tariffs corresponding to the equality of marginal prices and 
marginal costs of the public finn~ that is, the couple T~ and T~' for which we have PH 
= pi = c*. Here, as usual the superscript W indicates a Loeb and Magat's socially 
optimal pricing, in contrast to the superscript B which would fol1ow from the 
application of the Baumol Willig rule. 
Once we consider non-linear pricing, differently from Cave's prescriptions, the 
retail average price is lowered, but simultaneously the access charge is decreased too 
(at least when we maximise an ultra-liberal welfare function and allow for lump sum 
transfers). 
Under a full information setting whenever PH = PI. = c* and c l = 0, if the 
regulator sets the unit access charges fi'I and t! following the Bawnol-WiIlig rule, he 
vvillleave the public firm's profits unchanged. 
~ = T~ - c*'il~ 
f!=Tt-c*~ 
These "parity" unit access charges are socially optimal being compatible with 
the previous first order conditions. Naturally, in this particular setting, differently 
from what implicitly assumed by Baumol and explicitly by Armstrong and Doyle 
(1994), lump sum transfers could be needed if the public firm will not break even 
when the regulator imposes the optimal tariffs T~ and TL' which equate marginal 
prices to marginal costs. Hence, differently from the original linear pricing setting, 
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under socially optimal non-linear pricing the presence of lump sum transfers is fully 
compatible with the original Baumol-Willig rule. 
Hence, in Loeb and Magat's setting, once the socially optimal tarifTs (T~ and 
T~) are reached we may impose the Baumol-Willig rule, as it represents the socially 
optimal access pricing policy for the whole society. In fact, in the previous model 
Pareto efficiency will be achieved (when the entrant behaves as a surplus taker, 
maximising her own profits) since the rule would not anow entry by an inefficient 
competitor and at the same time the marginal prices equate the marginal costs. 
However, from the society point of view, as in the welfare function the entrant 
and the public firm's profits are given the same weight, it doesn't matter if the 
incumbent would instead set a higher access charge, expropriating (partially or 
totally) the more efficient competitor's profits. In practice, denoting by the parameter 
1 > Y > 0 the proportion of entrant's per customer variable profits (net of the Baumol-
Willig charge) the public firm may take away from her- the family of unit access 
charges specified below will be socialIy optimal too: 
~ = ~ + y (TH - mqj1 - ffJ 
f'{ = ~ + y (Ti. - mqi. - ~) 
Notice that even if the competitor's profits under the Baumol-Willig pricing 
rule may be negative (for eventual less efficient entrants) it will remain in the 
competitor's interest not to enter when she is less efficient than the public firm. 
Consequently, the Baumol-Willig pricing rule is just one of the possible social1y 
optimal pricing rules. In any case, if we totally disregard redistributional concerns, 
the "parity principJe" is fully applicable with socially optimal retail prices, differently 
from what stated by Cave, even if lump sum transfers are available. 
3.3.4 Optimal access pricing regulation and the cost of public funds' approach 
We may instead consider the fact that taxes change the behaviour of economic 
agents creating unavoidable distortion costs, following for instance the cost of public 
funds' approach due to LafTont and Tirole, or alternatively imposing the presence of 
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a binding break even budget constraint and the impossibility to finance through 
subsidies. With this approach we still considers only efficiency issues (as welfare is 
the unweighted sum of consumers' and producer's surplus in the ambit of quasi 
linear utility functions) taking explicitly into consideration the cost of public funds. 
The collectivity will pay costs and transfers and get the public (or regulated) firm's 
revenues, including access charges. As in the previous subsection the entrant's 
individual rationality must be satisfied for entry to take place respectively in the high 
and low-demand market: 
[APH] FH:::; (rH - mqi-I) KH 
[APd FL :::; (,Pr. - mqiJ KL 
Allowing for costly public transfers and taking').. as given and adopting Laffont 
and Tirole's social welfare function, the consumers' surplus (now inclusive of public 
revenues) is S(qO, qiH• qiLt qi-I, qt, NL, NH, KL> KH,)+AR(Qo, Qi)+AF and the public 
finn maximises the new social welfare W'" (with respect to his tariffs), where the 
superscript A refers to Laffont and Tirole's formulation. 
maxW"'= 
[MME] 
[IRd 
[IRH] 
[led 
[ICH] 
S+AR(QO, Qi)-C(Qi)-NC(2N, QO+Q)+AF_Ce(QC) = 
NH9u(ClH)+ NLU(qd + A(NLTL+NHTH+FL+FH) +2Nv(qO)+A2NpOqO 
+KH9u(qi-I)+ KLU(qL)+ A(FL + FB)( 1 + '}..)[ c*CNH'll-l+ NLqd 
+cOC2NqO)+NCC2N)]-mCKH'li-l+KLQi.) subject to: 
v'(qO) - pO ~ 0 
u('lL) - TL ~ 0 
e u( qE) - T H ~ 0 
u(qd - TL ~ u('h-l) - TH 
e U('h-l) - TH ~ e u('lL) - TL 
In order to verify whether the Baumol-Willig rule can be socially optimal also 
in this setting we impose the parity rule for the high and low-demand customers, 
which avoids inefficient entry: 
fH = FH / KH = T H - c*ClH 
fL = FL / KL = T L - c*'lL 
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Taking advantage of the previous analysis, all may be reduced to the 
maximisation of the following social welfare function, in which the entrant, being 
equally or more efficient than the public firm, will cream skim the market: 
max w>-= NHeu(ClH)+Nu('lL)+2Nv(qO)+A.(NTL+NHTH+fHK~+A2NpOqO+K~u(qH) 
+AfHKH -(1+A)C*(N~H+NL'h.) -(1+A)[cO(2NqO) +NC(2N)] -m(KHqH) 
subject to: 
v'(qO) _ po = 0 
uC'lL) - T L = 0 . 
e U(CbI) - TH = e uC'lL) - TL 
Making use of the optimality conditions which hold for the customers we can 
easily write do\\-n the first order conditions as: 
pi. = v'(qO) = CO [1 + 1J(1 +A)T\O] 
Pi~ = e U'(qH) = c* 
pt = u'(qJ = c*(I+A)/[1+A(2-e)] 
Public Ramsey pricing 
No distortion at the top 
Distortion at the bottom 
The public firm finds it optimal to apply Ramsey pricing (above marginal cost) 
in the monopolised market of good 0 and to equate marginal prices (for high types of 
customers) to marginal costs while leaving some distortion at the bottom. The 
departures from marginal pricing in [q)'] and [CIt] arise because revenues are given an 
additional weight A., being costly to get public revenues from taxes. 
The distortion at the bottom is lower than in the unregulated setting of section 
3.3.1, apart from the case in which the shadow cost of public funds A goes to infinity. 
Hence, Pareto improvements would also be achieved by reducing the access charge 
f1'-I and increasing it till we reach the second best tariffs T~ and Tt corresponding to 
~=[1+A.(2-e)/ (l+A)]pt. 
However, in this setting, the Baumol-Willig rule cannot be socially optimal, 
apart from particular cases, since applying the parity rule for high and low-demand 
customers [B\V HI and [B\V d we impose stricter constraints than the access pricing 
condition. In fact, in this case, the access pricing conditions IAPH] and (APd are 
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now always binding (differently from Loeb and Magat's maximisation problem) 
being always socially optimal that the public firm expropriates all the entrant's 
profits, as his profits are now given an additional weight A (as FH and FL in the 
welfare function), due to the excess burden of the revenues coming from taxes. 
If we consider now an equally efficient competitor (and c l = 0) the Baumol 
Willig rule turns out again to be optimal. In fact, it will prescribe to set the unit 
access charges: 
fA = T~ - c*qf{ 
f! = Tt -c*q\ 
so that the public firm's profits remain the same as all the entrant's profits are 
appropriated. 
This result, stated in other words, says that the Baumol Willig rule is socially 
optimal when the rival is as efficient as the public firm and is in contrast Vtith the 
one derived in the absence of vertical relations, which requires the entrant to be 
strictly more efficient than the incumbent (see section 3.2.3). 
In sum, since the public (or private regulated) firm's profits are now given an 
additional weight 'A., being costly to get public revenue from taxes, the Baumol-
Wi11ig rule no longer represents the social1y optimal access pricing rule, apart from 
the case of an equally or less efficient entrant. In fact, the parity rule prevents the 
public firm from totally expropriating more efficient competitors' profits by setting a 
higher access charge. Hence a departure from the Baumol-Willig rule, increasing the 
access charge will be welfare improving. Specifically, total expropriation "ill be 
optimal as profits will be transferred from the competitor to the public firm. 
Consequently, with full information -while second best tariffs (corresponding 
to ~ = [1 +A(2-9)/(1 +A)] pt) will hold- socially optimal access pricjng turns out to be 
the one according to which the incumbent sets the following unit access charges: 
t1 = max {'J'eH - mqj{; T~ - c*qM 
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it = max{'Il - m'li.; Tt - c*qtJ 
so that the public firm's profits are always maximised (when transfers are available). 
We may rewrite the previous socially optimal unit access charges as follows, in 
order to show the differences with the one prescribed by the Baumol-Willig rule. 
it = m + max{('PH - T~) + (c*q~ - mqiI); O} 
it =-~ + max{('Il - Tt) + (c*qt - mqt); O} 
Here, the additional terms (T; - T~) + (c*q~ - mqD [with t = H, L] simply 
represent the additional profits that, under full information, the incumbent public 
finn can make, taking fun advantage of the efficiency of the entrant (\vhen c* > m). 
The case in which costly public transfers are available and the incumbent's 
budget is binding (in the absence of entry) and remains binding afterwards (in the 
presence of entry) is not substantially different from the previous one, apart from the 
fact that the value assumed by A. is in this case endogenously determined by the. 
maximisation problem and does not reflect the marginal excess burden of public 
funds (financed by an optimal tax system). 
3.3.5 Optimal access charges and pricing when the regulator cares about 
consumers' surplus 
Finally, we may also follow the approach due to Baron and Myerson (1982) 
which puts more weight on consumers' rather than on producer's surplus, obtaining 
similar results. Adopting this approach, apart from efficiency issues, we are more 
concerned of consumers' surplus and we assume that lump sum transfers are 
available only towards the public firm. The public or regulated firm's profits 
represent public revenues which have unit weight being redistributed to consumers. 
When the public (or regulated) firm's objective function is W., i.e. Baron and 
Myerson's one, his profits, as consumers' surplus, have a unit weight, differently 
from the entrant's ones ~1cc, consequently the consumers' surplus becomes S(qO, <lH, 
'lL, qH, 'li., NH• NL• KH, KL). Therefore, the social welfare maximisation problem can 
be written as: 
maxW+= 
[MME] 
[IRd 
[IRI-I] 
[rcd 
[ICH] 
[APH] 
[APd 
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U+(l_~)Re(Qe) _C(Qi) -NC(2N, QO+Q) +(l-~)F -4>C~.(Q.) = 
NHeu( 'h-l)+ NL u( 'lL)+ 2Nv( qO) + K~u( qH)+ KL u( CJi.)+( l-~ )(KH 'PH+ KL Tt) 
-NC(2N) -C*(N!-&I+NL'lL) -2NcOqo +(l-~)(FL + FH) -~m(KH<Ii1+KLCJi.) 
subject to: 
pO :$; v'( qO) 
u('lL) - Tt ~ 0 
a u( 'h-l) - T H ~ 0 
u(qd - TL ~ u('h-l) - TH 
a U(qH) - TH ~ a u('lL) - TL 
FH :$; ('PH - mqiI) KH 
FL :$; (11 -mqt) KL 
Let us proceed considering first the parity rule the regulator may impose for the 
high and low-demand customers, in order to avoid inefficient entry: 
fI1 = F(KH) / KH = T H - C*qH 
fL = F(KL) / KL = T L - C*CJL 
Taking advantage of the previous analysis, all may be reduced to the 
maximisation of the follo\\'ing social welfare function, in which the entrant, being 
equally or more efficient than the public firm, will cream skim the market: 
maxW+= NH8u( 'h-l)+ Nu( qL)+ 2Nv( qO) + KHau( qiI) +( 1-~ )KH 'PH -c*(N1!'hI+ NLCJL) 
-2NcOqO -NC(2N) +(1-~)FH - m~KHCJeH subject to: 
v'(qO) - pO = 0 
u(CIt) - TL = 0 
a u( 'h-l) - T H = a u( CIt) - T L 
Making use of the optimality conditions which hold for the customers we can 
easily write down the first order conditions as: 
Marginal pricing 
[CIt] 
[CIt] 
pt = e u'('lH) = c* 
pt = u'( 'lL) = c* 
179 
No distortion at the top 
No distortion at the bottom 
The public finn finds it optimal to apply marginal pricing in the monopolised 
market of good 0 and to equate marginal prices to marginal costs for both type of 
customers of good 1. 
Here, as in Laffont and Tirole's setting, the tenns [FHl (which represents the 
public or regulated firm's revenues) and [-THKHl (representing the consumers' costs 
paid to the entrant) do not disappear from the welfare function, because a lower 
weight $ (less than unity) is given to the corresponding costs and revenues of the 
entrant. Moreover, as in the previous case of the social welfare function with costly 
public transfers W\ but differently from Loeb and Magafs one W, the access pricing 
condition [AP] is binding, holding as an equality. In fact, it is always socially optimal 
that the incumbent expropriates all the entrant's profits, as the incumbent's profits 
are now given a lower weight $ (in the welfare function). 
However, as already seen in the section 3.2.4, follovv'ing Baron and Myerson's 
approach, like in the ultra-liberal case, there is no distortion at the bottom; hence, 
Pareto efficiency will be achieved \\!hen marginal prices equal marginal costs. But, 
similarly to Laffont and Tirole's welfare function, a lower weight $ (less than unity) 
is now given to the per customer profits of the entrant. Thus, social welfare will 
increase when the entrant's profits are transferred to the public firm (and to 
consumers through the public budget) and the Baumol-Willig rule will be no longer a 
socially optimal access pricing policy in this framework. 
Hence, under full information and following the optimal pricing pt-i = pt = c* 
(with cl = 0) the Baumol-Willig rule, that prescribes to set the unit access charges 
~=Tt- c*CIt 
tr. = 11 -c*qt 
which leave the public finn's profits unchanged is socially optimal with an equally 
(or less) efficient competitor. However, analogously to the previous case, the socially 
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optimal access pricing policy will set the unit access charges as: 
it = max {PH - mqH; Tt - c*qM 
tt = max{1l- mqi.; 11- c*crtJ 
As before, we may rewrite the optimal access charges in order to point out the 
additional terms (~ -11) + (c*qt - mq~), representing the profits of the efficiency of 
the entrant (under the Baumol Willig rule), the incumbent should expropriate. 
it = ~ + max{(PH -"It) + (C*qt1- mqj-I); O} 
tt = fl + max{(Ti. - Tt) + (c*qt - mqL); OJ 
However, if we consider a case in \vhich lump sum transfers from or to the 
public (or private regulated) firm are no longer allowed and the incumbent's budget 
constraint is not binding (and/or the entrants profits are directly ex1racted by the 
policy maker through lump sum transfers) the Baumol-Willig rule would be again a 
socially optimal access pricing policy. 
3.3.6 Some considerations on the Baumol-Willig rule and the OFTEL rule 
It should be noticed how in the previous analysis we have always assumed that 
there is no product differentiation and that (given full information) the public (or 
private regulated) firm is not operated inefficiemly. However, we have shown how, 
even within this context which is very close to Baumol's original one, the application 
of the Baumol-Willig rule may lead to sub-optimal results following Laffont and 
Tirole's approach or even adopting the Baron and Myerson social welfare function. 
This happens because, differently from what implicitly assumed by Baumol in his 
framework, not necessarily the access pricing fixed by the Baumol Willig rule is 
socially optimal, as there still remains two distinct firms (a public incumbent and a 
private competitor) which behave differently and whose profit are given a different 
social weight. 
Nevertheless, the parity principle is fully applicable and the Baumol-Willig 
pricing rule may be a socially optimal access pricing, when it is possible to avoid 
those particular redistributional concerns who lead to value less the entrant's profits, 
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differently from what found in Cave (1994) and in Armstrong and Doyle (1994). 
This proves that in reality, and even in quite simple models (with perfect 
regulation ofthe vertically integrated incumbent in a full information framework and 
without any product differentiation issue), the Baumol-Willig rule represent a quite 
useful efficiency reference point (as explicitly claimed by Baumol), even though it 
will not generally be the optimal access pricing policy for all institutional setting 
with different functional specifications of social welfare. 
Reconsidering, in a private setting, the twofold efficiency role played (in 
consumption and production) by competition allowing non-linear tariffs within 
vertically related markets, it clearly emerges how regulation would still be needed. 
Specifically, while in this setting the regulator should not bother with the problem 
posed by competition for the low-demand type or by a less efficient entrant (not 
allowed by the incumbent itself), he should regulate access and impose socially 
optimal non-linear pricing tariffs in the final good markets (otherwise monopoly 
pricing would dominate). In fact, cream skimming competition by more efficient 
entrants (the only type of competition allowed by the incumbent) increases social 
welfare by a lower amount than it would do in the absence of vertical issues, as the 
incumbent can keep monopoly tariffs (so that the only gain is in terms of productive 
efficiency). Basically, this occurs because, while the incumbent fully takes advantage 
of the greater efficiency of the competitor, through the use of non-linear access 
charge, he will not reduce the monopoly pricing distortion in the market for final 
goods. Consequently, both the low type marginal price PI. and the high type tariffTH 
remain unchanged notwithstanding competition. Both of them would instead 
decrease in the horizontal game, where, as the scale of entry increases welfare is 
enhanced and the distortion at the bottom is progressively reduced That is, the 
beneficial efficiency role played in terms of allocative efficiency by cream skimming 
competition of a more efficient entrant fully disappears with vertically related 
markets. 
Taking advantage of these results we have finally being able to test the 
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Baumol-Willig rule in the original Baurnol's setting and in our vertical game. 
Naturally, notwithstanding the similar basic hypotheses, there are many relevant 
differences between these two settings, due to the fact that in our vertical game firms 
adopt fully non-linear pricing tariffs and that we search for socially optimal non-
linear pricing in the final and intennediate goods (allowing for transfers). 
The Baurnol-Willig rule prescribes that access charges should be set equal to 
the marginal cost of access, plus a term which reflects the opportunity cost of entry, 
the idea being to exploit the efficiency enhancing properties of a vertical merger. 
Therefore it can be a useful point of reference in tenns of productive efficiency, 
deterring the entry of less efficient competition. In what follows we will show how 
the recently proposed OFTEL rule has the same aim and can be examined in our 
framework taking the particular case in which prices are linear and socially optimal 
price cap regulation applies. 
A relevant issue which should be consider in more detail is related to the 
presence of the incumbent's fixed costs. In our framework we already noticed how in 
many cases the imposition of socially optimal pricing or access rules may lead to 
problems of deficits, solved by appropriate transfers from the public budget to the 
firm. No additional distortion would follow from the deficit itself, but only from the 
additional cost of transfers needed to make the finn break even. 
The more appropriate setting in which examine these issues is LafTont and 
Tirole's one. In fact, the parameter A characterising their social welfare function is 
exogenous and can be interpreted as the shadow cost of public funds when transfers 
are pennitted. When transfers are not allowed this parameter is endogenised and 
represent the multiplier associated to the binding budget constraint of the incumbent. 
In this different framework the incumbent's deficit increases the value of A and 
relevant distortion of the marginal tariffs emerge in connection to higher fixed costs, 
even adopting non-linear tariffs. 
Our model is particularly appropriate to describe telecommunication 
industries, where these issues have been addressed, through the adoption of specific 
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rules designed to cover access deficit. According to our notation NC(2N) represent 
the access deficit, since we separated the incumbent's (British Telecom) costs due to 
the local network 
NC(2N, QO, QI) = NC(2N) + cOQO+CIQI 
from the ones due to long distance calls 
The entrant's variable costs, instead, are all related to long distance calls 
In the UK at the start of competition Mercury was allowed to interconnect with 
British Telecom's network \vithout making a contribution to his local costs. This 
helped Mercury to offset her disadvantage from the lack of economies of scale. Since 
British Telecom was practicaIIy constrained to charge uniform tariffs p, Mercury 
could concentrate her effort on the densest telephone traffic, without having to face 
aggressive responses. 
In Autumn 1993 OFTEL detennined of interconnection charges between 
British Telecom and Mercury and indicated how to deal with the Access Deficit 
Contribution (ADC) waivers. The ADC system aims to compensate British Telecom 
for the deficit it incurs (compared with fulJy allocated costs) in the provision of 
access. 
In the presence of linear prices p on long distance calls (regulated by a price 
cap) the OFTEL rule imposes on Mercury a tax ADC on a caU proportional to the 
profitability of that call for British Telecom (defined as the ratio between the 
variable profits in the local network and the total variable profits, including the ones 
derived from access charges, i.e.JQe): 
Hence the per call access charge can be recursively detennined as the sum of 
the network marginal cost and the access deficit contribution: 
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f=cl+ADC 
In the case in which the price cap is successful in keeping the budget in 
balance N~(2N) = AD = (pO - CO)Qo+(p - C*)Qi+ JQe this rule collapses to the Baumol 
Willig one, since: 
f= p - c l = c l + (p - c* -cl ) 
It is then clear how the main purpose of ADC IS indeed to discourage 
inefficient entry. 
Major changes occurred in the market itself. Since mid 1993 competition has 
come to all market segments. There has also been a series of price reduction by 
British Telecom and the settlement of new prices for new or existing mobile 
services. The OFTEL rule in fact equally applies in the presence of multiple 
compet~tive segments (and therefore access charges). Naturally also in this case if 
the budget is balanced the OFTEL rule is nothing else than the BaumoI-Willig rule 
examined in the previous sections. 
3.4 Final remarks 
From the previous analysis we have already noticed how competition can be 
even welfare reducing and this is clearly true even in the horizontal game without 
access pricing. In fact, when both firms maximise profits, the total collective surplus 
may be reduced because some consumers faces the competitor's higher costs and 
price distortion is increased by the incumbent in order to maximise his profits. A 
general implication that has emerged is that competition should complement rather 
than replace regulation. 
Let us reconsider now in general terms the role played by competition with non 
linear tariffs and in presence of a public firm who maximises social welfare. The 
public incumbent or the regulator should not allow competition for the low-demand 
type or by less efficient entrant, and should impose the adoption of optimal non-
linear tariffs. It is true that in the horizontal game with purely profit maximising 
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finns, the presence of cream skimming competition by more efficient entrants 
increases welfare, since the distortion at the bottom tends to disappear. 
However, even under the most favourable conditions, the private tariffs are not 
optimal, even adopting an approach that considers only efficiency issues and takes 
into account the cost of public funds, implicit in the use of public transfers. 
Basically, this occurs because profit maximising finns give no weight to consumers' 
surplus and distort prices too much, even in the absence of redistributive issues. 
In this chapter we have taken advantage of the Baumol-Willig rule and put it to 
the test in the original Baumol's setting and in the vertical game. Naturally, in the 
vertical game both the public incumbent finn and the entrant are allowed to adopt 
fully non-linear pricing tariffs and we deal with a nonnative approach, aiming to find 
socially optimal pricing for access and final goods. However, the Baumol-Willig . 
efficiency rule which prescribes that access charges should be set equal to the 
marginal cost of access plus a tenn which reflects the opportunity cost of entry and 
the idea to exploit the efficiency enhancing properties of a vertical merger, which 
may be seen as a narrow application of the more general idea of "internalisation". 
Notice how we already envisaged \\;thin the horizontal game the use of 
welfare enhancing instruments, such as the adoption of entry taxes, the regulation of 
the entrant, and finally the application of the purchasing solution (instead of allowing 
entry and direct selling by the more efficient competitor), which would increase 
social welfare to a greater extent. Specifically the use of the simplest instrument 
given by optimal entry taxes avoids socially undesirable entry. 
Within vertically related market the parity rule is nothing else than a way to 
impose entry taxes, while keeping the incumbent's position unchanged, as entry had 
not occurred. But clearly, adopting the social welfare function of Laffont and Tirole 
and of Baron and Myerson, it is socially optimal to set even higher access charge 
tariffs (compared with the ones implied by the parity rule) because the entrant' 
profits are given a lower weight than the public incumbent's ones. Hence, it is 
evident that the parity rule, which is built upon the efficiency properties of an 
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vertical merger, does not provide general socially optimal pricing criteria, as it is not 
always socially optimal under different functional specifications and when firms 
pursue different objectives. Nevertheless, the enhancing welfare properties implicit 
in the more general "intemalisation principle" may provide in all settings useful 
additional mechanisms available to the public authority. In fact, in general, ceteris 
paribus, the use of entrant regulation and of the purchasing solution (instead of 
allowing entry and direct selling by the more efficient competitor) can increase 
welfare even more. 
In sum, in our analysis we have always assumed a very simplified model in 
which there is no product differentiation and (given fun infonnation) the public (or 
private regulated) firm is 110t operated inefficiently. However, we have shovvn how, 
even '"ithin this context, the application of the Baumol-Willig rule may lead to sub-
optimal results following Laffont and Tirole's approach or even adopting Baron and 
Myerson's social welfare function. This happens because, differently from what 
implicitly assumed by Baumol in his framework, the merged monopolist's optimal 
pricing criteria are not necessarily always socially optimal in the situation where 
there are two distinct firms which behave differently and whose profits are given a 
different social weight. Further distortions will emerge ,,,hen we introduce vertically 
separated structures, as we will see in the next chapter. 
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NOS-L~EAR ACCESS PRICING AND COMPETITIOS 
IN VERTICALLY SEPARATED l\tARKETS· 
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-1.2.1 Vertical Separation 
4.2.2 Price discrimination and vertical separation 
-1.2.3 The dO~'11stream incumbent's maximisation problem: a reflection 
4.3 A more standard case of vertical separation with one type of customer 
4.3.1 First degree access charge discrimination 
4.3.2 Distortions when/he customers' bundle does not enter in the access 
charge 
4.3.3 The distortionary solution when customers' bundles influence access 
charge 
4.3.4 Access charge discrimination with one consumers' type: welfare 
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4.4 Vertical separation with two consumers' types in the standard 
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4.5 Final remarks . 
*.I am grateful to Michael Waterson for his most valuable advices and his 
patience. Section 4.2 is partly related to joint work with him (Vagliasindi and 
Waterson, 1995b). 
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Chapter 4 
NON-LINEAR ACCESS PRICING, COl\fPETITION AND OPTIl\fAL 
REGULATION: THE CASE OF VERTICAL SEPARATION 
4.1 Introduction 
There are several policy options that need to be analysed in a vertical setting, 
the most important of which are related to vertical structure and vertical conduct. 
Referring to the first question a network industry may be vertically integrated or 
vertically separated. If the incumbent starts off as a vertically integrated firm then a 
policy of vertical separation involves divestiture. Whether a network industry should 
be vertically integrated or vertically separated depends on the extent of vertical 
economies and on the cost of regulation. 
An intennediate approach may be to allow the incumbent to OVt'll the network 
but to oblige him to keep separate accounts for his network (setting the transfer price 
paid by his retail organisation equal to the access charge imposed on any potential 
entrant). This approach allows to combine the benefits of economies of scope \\lith 
the ban on discrimination by the network. 
As we have already dealt with the case of a vertically integrated monopoly in 
the previous chapter, here we will focus on vertically separated structures in which 
the network is owned by an upstream monopolist. We will not be concerned with any 
transition effect and \\lith the issue of the eventual welfare loss connected to the 
separation of the vertically integrated incumbent in two distinct firms (the upstream 
monopolist and the downstream incumbent) following the regulatory authority's 
decision. In fact here we \\ill just examine the implication of this new setting under 
different hypotheses on the cost function of downstream producers. 
There is a very little literature on the regulation of vertically separated 
structures. Yet for a long time that regulatory reforms have moved in the direction of 
divestitures and deregulated structures. Vickers (1995) offers some insights on 
vertical arrangements when there is regulation of monopoly pricing. Regulation is 
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imperfect, due to the presence of asymmetric information. Also downstream 
competition is imperfect, as firms behave a la Cournot. The main question analysed 
is how information and competition imperfections can balance. Some conclusions on 
the optimal setting of access pricing are derived In the case in which access price 
influences the number of the firm welfare losses associated with competition 
imperfections are greater than the ones associated with the other asymmetric 
information failure. Consequently access price is set above marginal cost basically to 
avoid duplication of fixed costs. Access price is instead set below marginal cost 
when it does not affect the number of firms in the industry. 
Our approach differs in several aspects. First, we completely ignore 
asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated finn. The reason of 
this choice should be clear at this point. Basically we believe that in this more 
complex framework a complete treatment of agency problems would require to 
introduce asymmetric information in tbe downstream sectors, not only between the 
regulator and the new agents, but also between the downstream producers'. Another 
difference is that we allow for price discrimination for the intermediate good as well 
as for final good, since ,ve believe that in practice the use of non-linear tariffs is an 
important feature in regulated industries. 
It seems quite natural to start the analysis from an initial setting in which there 
IS a natural monopoly in the network and the regulator adopted a divestiture 
approach. This seems to resemble the view taken by the US regulator in the 
telecommunication case, as well as the approach of the UK policy makers in the 
electricity and gas industries. Following at first a positive approach here we want to 
examine the private incentives of the economic players (basically an upstream 
incumbent and more firms producing the final good in the downstream sector) in the 
absence of regulatory constraints, apart from tbe initial divestiture. In dealing with 
private incentives of both parties we will follow the upstream incumbent's point of 
view in analysing the conditions under which he can maintain the same profits as a 
fully integrated firm while entry occurs at one vertical level. In doing this we' want 
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also to find out whether it is in his interest to oblige the downstream incumbent and 
the (eventual) competitor by the use of an appropriate access charge to modify their 
tariffs in order to maximise joint profits rather than to act myopically in their own 
interest. 
Our focus is still the determination of the range of circumstances in which 
access pricing regulation can be used to bring about a competitive solution to final 
goods supply, whilst a monopoly remains at one essential point in the chain of 
delivery. To develop this regulatory research topic, we will expand the model 
proposed in chapter 2, following the lines of chapter 3, tackling the problem of entry 
and price discrimination as crucial ones. We will limit the analysis within the simple 
framework in which both the incumbent and his competitors have the same technical 
requirements for the intermediate good, defined as the "common network case" as 
we did in the case of vertical integration examined in chapter 2. We have already 
shovvn how the access charge determined by the incumbent depends apart from the 
type of network cost, the game's structure, the strategy of competition chosen by the 
entrant, her cost and scale of entry. 
In particular, in this chapter we will show how, under complete information, in 
the absence of regulation and fonowing a11 the previous cost assumptions, the 
upstream monopolist, if allowed to price discriminate, will be able to expropriate all 
the downstream industry's profits. It is worth noticing how in this simplified setting, 
vertical separation will not introduce major changes in the vertical game proposed in 
chapter 2, so that the same results derived for a vertically integrated industry still 
hold. 
When perfect discrimination between dO\,~llstream producers is forbidden (and 
only non~linear pricing is allowed) by the regulatory authority, we are dealing with 
an incomplete information setting at the downstream level; however, as long as it is 
possible to resell access rights, or the access charge can be expressed as a function of 
the different consumption bundles that characterise each type of customers,. nothing 
changes with respect to the complete information benchmark. 
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Even in this setting, as under vertical integration, cream skimming will be the 
only strategy of competition allowed by the upstream incumbent, who obliges the 
competitor to act as a surplus taker, as long as he faces a fixed scale of entry. 
However, we will also show how the standard result of 'no distortion at the top' does 
no longer hold once we endogenise the scale of entry. In fact, in this case, because of 
the constraint imposed on the quantity produced, a new trade off arises between rent 
extraction and profit maximisation for the downstream incumbent, so that a tariff 
distortion at the top is introduced. 
The previous considerations seem to lead us to conclude that the vertical 
structure of a network industry may not matter a great deal adopting the previous 
cost assumptions, if a general non-linear pricing tariff is allowed and no other 
specific regulatory measures are taken. However, before deriving this strong 
conclusion, which holds for more general frameworks, we will analyse a more 
standard case of vertical separation, in which the marginal costs of the downstream 
producers do differ, as in the standard non-linear pricing models. 
SpecificaJIy, the dov.nstream incumbent (type "i") is strictly more efficient 
than the do"mstream entrant (type "e") for any equal number of customers served. 
Do"mstream producers face one or two types of consumers and the upstream 
monopolist can use non-linear access charge tariffs. In practice, the basic cream 
skimming model continues to hold, even if the two roles are interchanged: in fact, in 
the absence of any capacity constraint, it is likely that the dov.nstream entrant \\ill be 
obliged by the upstream monopolist's access charge tariffs to serve only low-demand 
customers, since she is less efficient and in this way the rent enjoyed by the 
downstream incumbent is reduced. 
Furthermore, the preVIOUS type of welfare analysis with socially optimal 
regulation under full information, will be pursued in this case. 
It will be shown how in general cream skimming turns out to be banned by the 
upstream monopolist (whether he is a private or a public firm) and going for the low 
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consumers is the most likely strategy of competition for the entrant, who, differently 
from before, will no longer act as a surplus taker towards the H customers. This may 
eventually imply that the upstream monopolist now faces a new incentive 
compatibility constraint. 
This is not the case for a public (or regulated) upstream monopolist, who 
maximises the Loeb Magat welfare function, as in first degree price discrimination, 
since there are not strong incentives to allow the downstream entrant to serve only 
low-demand customers. 
The main general conclusion that we can derive from this analysis is that there 
IS no distortion at the top for the downstream entrant's customers and some 
distortion at the bottom, for low customers' allocations and bundles. This means 
that, in practice, a modified monopoly result applies also in this framework, with 
quite relevant exceptions. In particular, when the upstream monopolist is allowed by 
the regulator to use the more general access charge tariff structure, the private 
monopoly solution implies a tridimensional distortion with respect to Loeb Magat's 
welfare maximising solution as: (a) on the number of customers served by the 
downstream entrant, (b) on the low customers' bundle, and (c) on the high 
customers' bundle offered by the downstream entrant. A similar result applies in 
Laffont and Tirole's case, as welfare maximisation distorts the marginal access 
charges, but to a lower extent. Instead, with Baron and Myerson's social welfare 
function there is a ty,lofold distortion only with respect to the downstream entrant, as 
only the number of customers and his customers' bundle are reduced 
The structure of this chapter is the follo\\1ng. We will first discuss the structure 
of the approach chosen to model vertical separation (section 4.2), specifying the 
main assumptions of the proposed game. In sections 4.3 we will provide a more 
standard case of vertical separation; i.e. when the downstream producers are 
characterised by different levels of efficiency in the presence of only one type of 
customers. The same vertical structures will be discussed in section 4.4, extended to 
192 
the presence of two types of customers. A final section (4.5) summarises the main 
results achieved by our analysis. 
4.2 :ModelIing approach to vertical separation 
Let us now consider the problem of vertical separation in the context of the 
vertical game, introduced in chapter 2 (section 2.5). To examine this case, we need 
to change assumption (v), as specified below, focusing on a specific example of 
vertical separation; that is, the separation between the production of good 0 and of 
the intennediate good from the production of good 1. Apart from that, we will 
maintain the same assumptions and the basic rules as in the vertical game. 
4.2.1 Vertical Separation 
(v') In practice, with vertical separation instead of dealing with a single incumbent 
we are in the presence of two new finns. The first, the upstream monopolist, 
produces only QO (good 0) and provides the intennediate good network's access. In 
fact, he owns and operates the network sustaining the related costs NC, which 
depend, as before, on the number of customers to be served (2N) and on the total 
quantity of commodities (Qo, Q') which flows through the network. To simplify 
matters we may assume (setting for simplicity's sake c' equal to zero): 
NC(2N, QO) = NC(2N) + CO QO 
The upstream monopolist will also set an access charge tariff pi 2:0 for the second 
finn, i.e. the downstream incumbent (as well as for any potential downstream entrant 
pc 2:0). 
The downstream incumbent is characterised by the same cost and revenue 
functions in the final goods market as the vertically integrated incumbent: 
C(Qi) = c* Qi = c* (NL ql + NH crl1) 
Ri = NLJiL + NH Tk 
where Nt = N -Kt denotes the residual number of customers of type t served by the 
downstream incumbent, c* is the downstream incumbent's constant marginal cost 
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and Qi = NLqL + NJAk denotes the total output. The downstream incumbent will 
produce a positive amount of good 1 (Qi) only if his participation constraint PC (with 
reservation net profits equal to zero, for simplicity's sake) is satisfied: 
The downstream entrant is defined by the same assumption as the entrant in our 
basic game (cf. section 2.3) and will produce a positive amount of good 1 (Qt) only if 
her participation constraint is satisfied: 
4.2.2 Price discrimination and vertical separation 
Allowing for perfect price discrimination, under complete information and in 
the absence of regulation, the upstream monopolist does not need to bother \\lith any 
incentive compatibility constraint in the downstream sector. In this setting, following 
the upstream monopolist's point of view it is evident that he can maintain the same 
profits as a fully integrated firm while entry occurs at the downstream level. 
In fact, in this case, the upstream incumbent can appropriate the entire gross 
profits of the downstream incumbent and of the downstream entrant 1J1 (with -01 = ~­
o for j = i, e) simply by setting the two access tariffs Fj = y.i. In this ,way, joint gross 
profits ~1J1 = ~[n(Qi)+P](for j = i, e) are maximised, so that the previous production 
levels (as in the absence of vertical separation) are reached. 
In practice, the upstream monopolist \\;11 pretend from the downstream 
incumbent a per customer access charge equal to his variable profits: that is, 1tl-I = 11-I 
- c*qk for each high-demand customer and 1tL = TL- c·qL to give access to each low-
demand customer. The downstream incumbent facing this access charge in order to 
break even must set his tariffs so as ifhe owned the network. In the case in which he 
does not set the same tariffs and quantities as an integrated monopolist, the perfectly 
discriminatory access charge he faces is greater than his gross profits. In this way the 
downstream incumbent is prevented from acting myopically in his own interest at the 
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expenses of joint profits, that is decreasing the marginal pnce of the L type 
increasing his own profits (but reducing the total profits). 
Given these premises, the upstream monopolist can enjoy the same profits as 
an integrated firm. Hence, he will set the same access price for the entrant as if he 
were a vertically integrated firm. More generally, we can take advantage of all the 
results of the analysis carried out in chapter 2 to describe his behaviour towards the 
entrant. Specifical1y, only the entry of a more efficient rival can take place. The 
downstream competitor's optimal response is to cream skim the market and behave 
as a surplus taker. All these results are summarised in the follovving proposition, 
whose proof can be immediately derived from the previous analysis (cf. the proof of 
proposition 3). 
Proposition 5 
Under assumptions (i) (iO (iii) (iv) and (v'), allowing the upstream monopolist 
to make use of any type of access price discrimination (between downstream 
producers), there is only cream skimming competition for good 1 and the upstream 
monopolist is able to reach the same result as he would without vertical separation. 
It is optimal for (he upstream incumbent to set the per customer access charge equal 
to the dovmstream firm's profits and ill particular to oblige the dOl1'11stream 
incumbent to maintain the same pricing strategy as in the vertical integration case, 
and the downstream entrant to cream skim and to behave as a surplus taker. 
In this way (i.e. allowing first degree access price discrimination) vertical 
separation does not introduce major changes in the model~ the only difference being 
the fact that it is now the upstream monopolist who gets the entire profits of the three 
firms, since the downstream incumbent and the entrant just break even. 
Allowing instead only for non-linear pricing, the upstream monopolist will 
need to take into account an incentive compatibility constraint and to deal with the 
two downstream producers as if he were under an incomplete information setting. 
Let as assume, as often happens in practice, that regulation simply forbids to 
195 
discriminate between different downstream producers of good 1. In order to examine 
a more interesting setting, we will now reintroduce assumption (iv') allowing for 
endogenous scale of entry of the downstream competitor. 
Proposition 6 
Under assumptions {i} {ii} {iii} {iv J and (v J, allowing for any finite number of 
customers as scale of entry but 110 first degree price discrimination between 
downstream producers (by the upstream monopolist), there is only cream skimming 
competition for good 1. Furthermore, the upstream monopolist is able to reach the 
same result as with perfect price discrimination only if it is possible to re-sell access 
rights, or the access charge is afunction of the consumption bundles of the different 
customers. In these cases, as before, the upstream incumbent will set the per 
customer access charge equal to the downstream firm's profits and will oblige the 
downstream incumbent to maintain the previous monopoly pricing strategy, and the 
competitor to behave as a surplus taker. 
Given our simplified assumptions about the cost functions, we will simply 
verify that at the end the dovmstream incumbent's and the entrant's incentive 
compatibility constraints are satisfied by the solution of the game. Moreover, in 
order to simplify matters and to allow for the comparison of the two cases with or 
without vertical separation, we will just proceed step by step, making use of the 
solution of the incumbent's problem, as derived from the proof of proposition 4. 
The best that the upstream incumbent can do (according to what stated in 
proposition 5 above) is to set the access charge tariff P equal to the entrant's total 
gross profits k[Tkm(k)qi-I] and the per customer access tariff for the dovmstream 
incumbent equal to his gross profits T{ -c*cd for each customer of type t. In fact, in 
this way the total profit of the industry is maximised and fully expropriated by the 
upstream incumbent. This is possible in two special settings: 
1) when it is possible for a downstream producer to resell access rights; 
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2) when the general access charge taritTF(NL Nk, ql, efH) -where N{ =~, Nt for j = i, 
e respectively- depends in a separate way upon the consumption bundles (i, qk) 
of the two customers' types and not just on the aggregate consumption Q!. 
In what follows, we will examine the two cases in a separate way. Let us start 
from the first one. Here, the upstream monopolist can sell all the access rights to one 
of the downstream producers in order to impose total price discrimination. In fact, 
denoting by -n-1 the dO\\TIstream producer's gross profits (as before) he can simply set 
the follo\\;ng taritT function: 
F(Nt, Nk, Qi) = max Lj~ 
=maXj (~+£) elsewhere for j = i, e and £>0 
Clearly, then neither downstream producer can break even if he picks up 
separately his own offer. In fact, one of the two downstream producers must buy the 
access rights for all the customers (2N), retaining the ones that it would have served 
in the vertically integrated setting, while selling the rest to the other player. 
Assuming that the downstream incumbent buys all the access rights, he can break 
even only if he produces the monopoly bundles qL and qj'j for the residual number of 
customers NL=N and NH=N-K and resells the remainder of the access rights (KH=K) 
to the downstream entrant fully appropriating her profits. In this way the do\\nstream 
entrant breaks even only if she cream skims the market (serving KH=K customers) 
and behaves as a surplus taker. 
Let us tum now to case (2) where we have a general access charge tariff F(NL 
Nk, ql, crl-l) expressed as a function of the consumption bundles in a separate way. In 
this case, the upstream monopolist will adopt the follo\'t'ing tariff function: 
F(Nt, ~H' efL, qk) = 1f1ll for Nt = N, Nk = N - K, efL = 'IL, efH = qH 
= ye for Nt = 0, ~H = K, efH = qH 
= ma~ (m + e) elsewhere, for j = i, e and e > 0 
Clearly, each one of the two downstream producers can break even if he (or 
she) picks up the offer designed in order to make him (her) maximise joint profits. 
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As before. the incumbent breaks even only if he produces the monopoly bundles q.L 
and 'lH for NL = Nand NH = N - K customers and the dOMlStream entrant breaks 
even only if she serves only high-demand customers (KH = K) behaving as a surplus-
taker. 
. 
4.2.3 The downstream incumbent's maximisation problem: a reflection 
It may be interesting to show that the downstream incumbent will not set the 
vertically integrated pricing when he faces the access tariff function specified below: 
FCNt, Nk. Qi) =-r 
=~ 
for Nt=N~ ~H=N-K and <t=NqL+ CN-K)qH 
for ~ =0. N, =K and QC=Kn!. L • H "lti 
= ma~ (-ni+£) elsewhere for j = i, e and 0-0 
Clearly, once he chooses the access charge F(Nt, NiH,Q)= -r (because 
otherwise he will incur in losses) he can always do strictly better than break even by 
modifying his pricing away from pricing which would be set in the vertically 
integrated case. In order to deal with this case, we may write do\\n the dov·mstream 
incumbent's maximisation problem, in the presence of entry with the additional 
quantity and participation constraint, respectively [Qm] and [PC], derived from the 
access pricing constraint: 
[DLt] max n i = NTt +(N-K)TH - -r - c*[Nqt + (N-K)qk] subject to: 
[IRd u(qU - TL ~ 0 
[ICH] a u(qk) - TH ~ a u(qt) - TL 
[Qm] (j S Q"'=NqL +(N-K)cu'{ 
[PCi] ni = R(Qi) - C*(j - -r = NTL + (N-K)TH- c*(NLqL + (N-K)qk) - r ~ 0 
It is easy to notice bow, substituting [IRd and [ICH] into the objective function, 
ignoring the other constraints, the problem [DI.t] becomes exactly the same as the 
incumbent's problem in the absence of the access price issue in the presence of 
cream skimming competition (cf. section 2.3.1). Hence, the output produced in this 
case will be greater than the one the upstream monopolist would like in order to 
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maximise joint profits (i.e. Q"'). In fact, following the results derived in chapter 2, 
while the per customer bundle offered to the high type 'll,z is the same, the one 
addressed to the low type ql is always higher in the presence of cream skimming 
(since NH=N-K and NL=N). 
In fact, solving the maximisation problem ignoring the additional constraints, 
we end up with: 
[qk] Pk = 9 u'(q1J = [1 - (9 - 1) N1INd u'(ql) = c* = PH 
['Ill Pl = u'(ql) = c*/[l - (9-1)NHlNd < PL = c*/(2-9) 
No distortion at the top 
Distortion at the bottom 
Thus, we would be back to the equations (2.3), (2.4) and [2.5) previously 
derived for the horizontal game in chapter 2 in the case of cream skimming, but this 
time the downstream incumbent's choice is constrained by the fact that he cannot 
produce a quantity greater than Qm = NqL + (N-K)qH and he must serve all low-
demand customers (Le. NL = N) and the residual high-demand customers [NH = (N-
K)< N]. Clearly, as sho\\TI by the first order conditions, since the marginal price Pl is 
strictly less than the one derived in the vertically integrated case PI: we have that the 
bundle qL is strictly greater than qL. Consequently, in the absence of [Q"'] the output 
Qi = NqL + (N-K)'ll-{ would be strictly great~r than Qm so that this constraint binds. 
On the other hand, since the dO\\TIstream incumbent breaks even applying the 
monopoly tariff, his participation constraint [PC] is automatically satisfied by the 
solution of the maximisation problem. 
Therefore, the solution of the maximisation problem IDI.t) becomes exactly 
the same as the revenue maximisation problem of the incumbent (for a given Q equal 
to Qm) in the absence of the access price issue. In fact, from equation [Qm] we know 
that the produced quantity is fixed, and so are all costs, so that the do\,nstream 
incumbent Will maximise profits simply by maximising his revenue subject to [Q"']: 
[DI.2] 
[IRJ 
[I~] 
[Q"] 
max Ri = NTt + (N-K)JiH 
u(ql)-Tt =0 
JiH = 9 [u(~) - u(ql)] - JiL 
Q = Qm = NCJL +(N-K)qH 
subject to: 
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Hence, in the presence of vertical separation the general equation eu'(qH)=(2-e) 
u'('lL) no longer holds as is shown by the solution of the previous maximisation 
problem [DI.2). In particular, from the first order conditions that characterise an 
interior solution we obtain the usual relationship between the two marginal prices: 
pi! = [1 - (e - 1) NHlNd pL 
and between qL and ctl!: 
e u'(qi-l) = [1 - (e - I) NHlNd u'(qU 
where the values NH = (N-K) < Nand N = NL are fixed. 
Furthermore, the usual 'no distortion at the top' condition pi! = c* no longer 
holds. In fact, as the production quantity is constrained, the relevant marginal cost 
for the downstream incumbent includes a positive shadow price and is greater than 
c*. Consequently, while the bundle of the high-demand customers qi-l is decreased, 
the bundle of the low-demand customers qL is increased. Hence, in this case the 
upstream monopolist can no longer impose the monopoly tariffs to the downstream 
incumbent, so that the maximisation solution of the latter creates a tariff distortion 
, ... hich affects (in the sense of reducing) the profits of the dO\\llstream entrant. In 
practice, the type of tariff previously proposed collapses, as the surplus taker 
dov-nstream entrant does no longer necessarily break even under the new tariffs 
fixed by the dov.nstream incumbent. This poses a major problem for the upstream 
monopolist, since there is a trade off not only between rent extraction and efficiency, 
but also between rent extraction and profit maximisation. The upstream monopolist 
anticipates these problems but has no longer the instrument to impose (through the 
access charge function) the monopoly tariffs to the dO\\llstream incumbent. 
4.3 A more standard case of vertical separation with one type of customers 
In the previous section we have followed the original hypotheses of chapter 2 
examining the case of more efficient (m < c*) entrant in the ambit of the vertical 
game. We have concluded that the results of the unregulated vertical game do hold 
even under the drastic regulatory measure that imposes complete vertical separation 
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if: a) the upstream monopolist cannot use complete discrimination; b) when it is 
possible to re-sell access rights; or c) the access charge can be expressed as a 
function of the consumption bundles of the different customer. 
For completeness' sake, let us examine a more standard framework of price 
discrimination, in which the downstream sector is portrayed quite similarly to the 
final demand market. This implies that the upstream monopolist cannot perfectly 
discriminate between downstream incumbent and entrant. In \"hat follows we will 
assume the dovmstream incumbent (type "i") to be strictly more efficient of the 
dO\\l1stream entrant (type "e") for any equal number of customers served. Natural1y 
the opposite case (in which the entrant is strictly more efficient than the incumbent) 
can be obtained simply by re-IabelIing the two types. In fact, notice how in this new 
setting the rival in determining the number of customers to be served is not 
constrained by a limited scale of entry, nor a fixed capacity (differently from the 
previous analysis). The reason why we consider the case of a less efficient entrant is 
to explore the benefits of entry, apart from the ones brought by productive efficiency. 
In order to examine this more standard case of vertical separation, we will 
modify the assumption regarding the cost function of the dO\\11stream producers. 
Furthermore, to examine carefully this new situation,' in this section we will just 
tackle the simplest case with only one type of customer (i.e. when the parameter e is 
equal to unity). Therefore we have the same total population (i.e. 2N), but composed 
only of low-demand customers. 
It may be useful to summarise the general structure of the vertical separation 
game which represents just a minor modification of the previous vertical game and 
will be maintained in the following sections where we deal within this framework. 
Vertical Separation Game 
(0) the authority sets up the regulatory system (e.g. the admissible terms of access); 
(1) the upstream monopolist proposes the general access charge tariff function F(.) 
which allows the downstream producers to gain access to a number of customers 
in each market, and to serve them a given total output already produced; 
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(2) on the basis of the public access charge tariff function F(.) the downstream 
entrant decides her scale of entry in terms of the number of customers {K} to be 
served in each market~ 
(3) the downstream incumbent chooses the pricing rule {T, q} to apply to the 
remaining customers, where T = T(q) is a funy non-linear tariff~ 
(4) the entrant chooses her strategy of competition and the non-linear tariff {r, 
qC}.41 
Furthermore, we need to modify the initial assumptions (iv) and (v) 
considering a specific case when the downstream producers' marginal costs are a 
function of the number of customers served (n and k), the per customer output (qi 
and qC) and an additional parameter (!3i and 13") which captures the efficiency of the 
firm. Naturally, apart from that, we will maintain the same assumptions and the basic 
rules of the vertical game. 
(iv*) The downstream producers (the incumbent and the entrant) can freely choose 
the number of customers to be served: 
n=NL :;;;2N 
k=KL :$;2N 
They pay, as before, a non-linear access charge tariffF(.) fixed by the upstream 
incumbent (a cost of entry) which may depend in general both on the number of 
customers served (Nj = n, k) and on the per customer output (qi = qi , qC) produced by 
a single firm: 
41 Naturally, with a single type of customers the most profitable strategy is ~lways to 
leave no surplus to the consumers. But, even in this simple framework, where the 
order of moves between the downstream incumbent and the downstream entrant 
loses all its meaning, we may have quite different versions of the game, depending 
on the nature of the network cost function and admissible access pricing strategies. 
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In substance, the upstream incumbent cannot discriminate between the two 
downstream producers, but may simply make use of non-linear pricing, since first 
and third degree price discrimination are no longer feasible. 
They have a production cost which depends on the number of customers 
served, on the per customer output ct produced by a single firm, and on a parameter 
f}i which captures the efficiency of the firm: 
0= C(Nj, ct, ~) 
In practice, in order to simplify notation, we set: 
W= 1 
w=p with 0 < p < 1 
considering a simple functional form such that for the same scale of entry the 
fraction of production cost which varies with the scale of entry of the dov.'TIstream 
competitor (i.e. the least efficient producer) is a fixed multiple liP of the 
downstream incumbent (i.e. the most efficient producer). In particular, we assume 
that costs are strictly increasing v.ith respect to the number of customers served and 
total output, convex in their first argument and linear in the second one (the cross 
derivative has a positive sign): 
CN > O~ CNN ~ O~ Cq > 0 ~ CNq ~ 0 and Cqq = 0 
Without loss of generality, in some parts of the analysis we will specify the function 
as: 
where c is the component of the cost function which is invariant with respect to the 
scale of entry (a constant which is often normalised to zero). An alternative way of 
representing this situation would be to assume d equal to the average cost Cj/O! 
(instead of a constant e), with c· greater than ci, the incumbent's fixed cost being 
already sunk. Notice also how using this specification, that we will keep on using in 
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the extension to the two customers' types, costs depend only on the total output and 
not on the bundle offered to each customer. 
The downstream producers are characterised by the following revenue and profit 
functions: 
Rj = Ri(N\ qi) = Ni Ti( qi) 
TIi = n(N j, qi, (}i) = Rj(Nj, qi) - C(Nj, qi, ~) - F(Ni, qi) 
The downstream producers will enter the market for good 1 only if their 
participation constraints 
[Pce] ne = k r(qe) _ C(k, qe, W) - F(k, qe) ~ 0 
[PC] ni = n Ti(qi) - C(n, qi, W) -F(n, qi) ~ 0 
(with reservation prices equal to zero) are satisfied 
(v*) Under vertical separation, as before, the upstream monopolist produces only QO 
(good 0) and provides the intermediate good network's access, sustaining the related 
costs NC, which depend, as before, both on the number of customers to be served 
(2N) and on the total quantity of commodities (Qo , Qi , Qe) which flows through the 
network. To simplify matters, we keep on assuming (setting c l equal to zero): 
The upstream monopolist -who also sets an access charge tariffs F(.) ~ 0 for the 1'.\10 
downstream producers- is characterised by the following revenue (net of the cost of 
the monopolised good 0) and profit functions: 
In what follows we will solve the vertical separation game by backward 
induction. Notice how, with one type of customer, since the order of moves between 
downstream producers in setting the tariffs will not affect the result we may solve 
their maximisation problems simultaneously. In fact, each of the two downstream 
producers will end up by proposing perfectly discriminatory tariffs, the ones that 
allow full surplus extraction. 
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The application of the revelation principle allows us to further simplify the 
game, restricting ourselves to the only two weakly separating access tariffs <k, F(k, 
qC» and <n, F(n, qi» optimally designed by the upstream monopolist for the two 
downstream players. In this way the game summarised above is equivalent to a static 
two stages game (apart from the preliminary regulatory decision). In the first stage 
the principal (the upstream monopolist) designs the contracts, and the second one in 
which the agents (the two downstream producers) reveal truthfully their types and 
choose their contracts, and act according to the game induced by the mechanism 
(that is, they produce respectively the quantities Q" and Qi serving k and n 
customers). 
In what follows we proceed step by step, starting from first degree access 
charge discrimination specifying later the access charges as a function of the number 
of customers served and also of the bundle sold to them . 
./.3. J First degree access charge discrimination 
Let us now examine the benchmark case of first degree access charge 
discrimination, in order to analyse later the ways in which the upstream incumbent 
creates distortions between the downstream producers, using the access charge tariff 
to maximise his total profit Ir(Qo, n, k. qi, q'). In such a situation (in the absence of 
high-demand customers) the upstream monopolist can detennine n and k and use 
Jump-sum access charges pi and P facing only the two participation constraints [PC] 
and [PCi] of the downstream producers (with reservation prices equal to zero), since 
we do not need to take into account the incentive compatibility constraints [IC] and 
[IC}. Hence, both the efficient type "i" (the downstream incumbent) and the 
inefficient type "e" (the downstream entrant) enjoy no net surplus. 
max Ir(Qo, n, k, qi, q')* = pOQo + pi + F - cOQo. NC(2N) subject to: 
po = v'(qO) 
1r = Re. C = k'P(q') - C(k, q', W) = F 
,r = Ri• C = nT(qi) - C(n, qi, (}i) = pi 
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and 2N=k+n 
As usual, [U*] can be solved with respect to qO, n, k, qi and qa, substituting the 
binding constraints into the objective function, obtaining: 
Ir'(QO, n, k, qi, qt)* = 2Nv'(qO)qO-2NcOqo+ Re(k, qe)_ce(k, qe)+Ri(n, q}C(n, qi)_ 
NC(2N) = 2Nv'(qO)qO - c02Nqo + k[u(qt) - m(k)qt] + 
n[u(qi) - ~m(n)qi] - NC(2N) 
2N=k+n 
subject to 
where we replace the value of the two tariffs 'fC(qe) and Ti(qi) with the consumers' 
surplus u(qe) and U(qi) fully expropriated by the downstream producers (allowed to 
make use of non-linear tariffs). 
Hence we can write down the Lagrangean function. 
Hereafter we denote by Rk = oRi(Ni, qi)/oNi and Ck = OC(Ni, qi, J)i)/oN the 
partial derivative of the revenue and cost function with respect to the number of 
customers served by each downstream producers and by Rt = oRi(Nj, qi)/oqi and ct 
=OC(Nj, qi, J)i)/aqi = [P.im(Ni)]Nj the partial derivative of the revenue and cost 
function with respect to the bundle qi hereafter setting for simplicity's sake c equal to 
zero. The first order conditions of the Lagrangean function are specified below: 
[qO] CO = v'( qO) + v"( qO)qO 
[*Ni] ~ - C~ = J.l = ,rn => U(qi) - (3 qi [m'(n)n + men)] = J.l = Fn 
[*Ne] Ri. - Ct = J.l = 11k => u(qt) - q' [m'(k)k + m(k)] = J.l = Fk 
[*qi] Ri =C L L => U'(qi) = J3m(n) 
[*qe] Rt=q => u'(qt) = m(k) 
Hence, considering the marginal access tariffs Fl = of(Ni, ci)/Oci with respect 
to the number of customers and the per customer bundle, as evident from [*qi] and 
[*qt], in a first degree price discrimination setting we have Fi. and Ft equal to zero. 
Hence, the relation between the consumer's marginal prices u'(ci) served by different 
206 
downstream producers is not distorted. Furthennore, the optimal per customer 
bundles qi can be expressed only as functions of the number of customers served Ni~ 
that is, qi = qi~). Specifically, they are both decreasing function of Ni; since 
dqi/dNi = O(CUNi)/oqi = pidm/dNi/d2u/( dqi)2 < O. This property which will be useful in 
our graphical representation hinges basically on the fact that cost are increasing in 
the number of customers served 
Moreover, the other two marginal access tariffs with respect to the number of 
customers Fki = of(Ni, ci)! oNi are equal to each others and represent the marginal 
gross profit of the downstream producers (i.e. the value of the Lagrangean multiplier) 
Pn = Fk = J.l, as from [*Ni] and [*Nt]. Since F~ and Fk are equal, the profit TIU(Qo, n, k, 
qL, qi.)* is maximised ",;thout any distortion between the marginal access prices. 
Hence, the Lagrangean multiplier J.l is equal to the variable profits on the marginal 
customer of both dovmstream producers (from [N] and [Nt]). 
As usual in a first degree price discrimination, the upstream monopolist takes 
away from downstream producers all variable profits P = ,r and F = 1T". That is no 
net positive rent is allowed to the downstream incumbent. 
The first order conditions referred to the final good can be summarised as: 
[4.1] U(qi) - u(qt) = C~ - Ct = qip men) (l+E(n»- qem(k)(l+E(k» 
[4.2] u'(qe) - U'(qi) = m(k) - p men) = Ct -Cl 
where E(n) and E(k) denote the elasticity of the cost function with respect to the 
number of customers, evaluated at the equilibrium points. 
The efficient customer bundles (I{ =0) offered by different dO\\-nstream 
producers (qe and qi), as well as downstream producers' marginal costs (Ct and CD 
are not generally equated However, for isoelastic cost function (when ten) equals 
E(k), for any nand k) equations [4.1] and [4.2] can be set equal to zero. Trivially, q' 
= qi = q* is an optimal solution of our problem. In this case also downstream 
producers' marginal costs per additional customer are equated (Cic = C~ = qn. In 
fact, from [4.2) the per customer bundles are equated (i.e. qe = qi = q*) if m(k) - (3 
men) = O. Replacing q* in equation [4.1] we find that it is satisfied for the same 
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optimal values of k and n, as derived from [4.2]: that is, u(q*) - u(q*) = q*~ men) 
(l+e)- q*m(k)(l+e) = O. 
We may easily give a representation of the flfSt degree discrimination in the 
vertical separation setting, assuming isoelastic cost function and drawing for 
simplicity's sake a linear functional form to represent the cost increase per marginal 
customer Cki. 
In fig. 4.1 we choose as the length of the horizontal axis the total number of 
customers and call respectively 0 and 2N the origin for the downstream entrant and 
for the downstream incumbent. The linear marginal costs q.:Ck, qC(k)) and C~(n, 
qi(n)) (as functions of the number of customers served by each downstream 
producer) are shown. as well as the optimal level of consumer gross surplus u(q*). 
The downstream entrant serves k* customers, whereas the downstream incumbent 
serves n* customers as the marginal costs q and C~ intersect in point C determining 
the efficient marginal cost level C~. 
Fig. 4.1 
A 
r-------------~~~------------------------------------------------_t u(qe) = u(cf) = u(q*) 
B I-----....;;;f~-----------__+- Ce= d = C* k n N 
E 
o k*=2N-n* 2N 
We can also represent on the same axes the two decreasing gross consumer 
surpluses uC(k) and ui(n) (as functions of the number of customers k and n served by 
each downstream producer) ct being a decreasing function of~ (as ct = ct~), with 
dct/~ < 0). In particular, gross consumer surpluses equate [ue(k) = ui(n)] for k* 
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(since marginal costs are equal, as evident from the first order conditions [.qC] and 
[.qi]) and hence intersect in point D determining the efficient gross consumer surplus 
level u(q·). The difference between u(q·) and ~ (given by the segment AB) 
represents the increase of variable profits for an additional customer (-rn = "Irk = u( q.) 
-C~) . 
. It should be noticed how the number of customers allocated to the less efficient 
downstream producers (i.e. the entrant) is less than the one served by the other 
producer. Specifically, in our isoelastic case, it directly follows from equation [4.2] 
the equality between m(k·) and ~ m(n·) which implies k* lower than n·, as stated 
above. 
An additional question to explore would be to endogenise the 'Iolal number of 
customers. We can ignore this issue, as we did so far, by assuming the level of 
customers 2N, fixed exogenously, to be the optimal one, in the sense that there is no 
reason to leave the market uncovered. Eventually, it could also be considered the 
alternative frameworks in which the number of customers (2N) is above the optimal 
level but there is a universal service obligation, or in which the upstream monopolist 
can endogenously determine the number of customers to be served (though 
maintaining the same population proportion between the 1'.VO types, i.e. an equal 
number of each type of customers). 
However, for completeness' sake let us briefly deal with the eventual 
determination of the optimal number of customers through the profit maximisation 
of the upstream monopolist specified below, the only difference with the usual one 
being the introduction of 2N as a choice variable: 
max nU(Qo, n, k, qi, qC, 2N)· = 2NqO(v'(qO)-cO)+RC(k, qC)-ee(k, qC)+Ri(n, qi)-C(n, q} 
NC(2N) subject to: 
2N=k+n 
We can then write down the modified Lagrangean function as: 
L = flU(Qo, k, n, 2N)* - J.l (k + n - 2N) 
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The first order condition derived in this section remain unchanged~ we need 
only to derive. an additional condition with respect to 2N, which can be stated as J.l 
= NC'. From the first order conditions relative to [*N] we know that the value of the 
Lagrangean multiplier is equal to the marginal access charges with respect to the 
number of customers [J.l = pin = Fk]; therefore, we immediately get: pin = Fk = NC'. It 
directly follows that the marginal access prices applied to the downstream producers 
equals the marginal cost, when the number of customer is optimally chosen, so that 
there is no distortion at the top and at the bottom in the pricing of the intermediate 
good (i.e. the access to the network). 
4.3.2 Distortions when the customers' bundle does not enter in the access charge 
In this more standard case of downstream incumbent's cost function we have 
assumed with (iv*) that the upstream monopolist's charge may depend, in general, 
both on the number of customers served (Ni = n, k) and on the per customer output 
qi. However, clearly as the upstream monopolist knows the number of customers 
served (k and n) he can also make use of the non-linear access charge tariffF(Ni, qi) 
which depends, instead, on the customers' bundles (qi = qi , qf) to be offered by each 
downstream producer to customers. 
Since in what follows we set c1 equal to zero, for simplicity's sake and without 
loss of generality, it may seem useful to first examine a setting in which the access 
charge can be expressed only as a function of the number of customers served (Ni = 
n, k), as a consequence of a regulatory ban to discriminate with respect to the output, 
that is: 
F=F(N) 
In this regulated case, differently from the more general case, the upstream. 
incumbent cannot discriminate between the two downstream producers using non-
linear pricing, with respect to total output, because the latter, by assumption, does 
not affect the subcost function. 
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4.3.2.A The downstream producers' problem with one type of customers 
Before tackling the upstream monopolist's problem we must explicitly solve 
the downstream producers' maximisation problem, proceeding by backward 
induction. In this case for good I first and second order price discrimination do 
coincide and the do\\nstream producers can simply extract all consumers' surplus. In 
practice, each downstream producer solves his maximisation problem with respect to 
ct and Ni. 
maxU= Ri(N, qi) - C(N, qi, (}i) - FeN) subject to: 
[IRd u( ct) -li( qi) ~ 0 
Hence, as the participation constraint is binding for the optimal solution, 
substituting the revenues and cost functions, we get the follo\\ing first order 
conditions: 
pi= u'( ct) = (}im(Ni), 
In practice, as shown by equation [tUJ, consumers' marginal prices Nju'(qi) = 
Rt = aRj(N, qi)/act (which equate marginal revenues) are set equal to marginal costs 
ct =OC(Ni, qi, (}i)/act = (}im(Ni)Ni by each do\\nstream producers and no surplus is 
ever left to consumers. Moreover, the access charge tariff F(Ni) does not directly 
influence consumers' marginal prices. In particular, from the first order condition we 
can derive the total output and the profit function specified below: 
From the previous solution we see how for the downstream entrant [as r = 
u( qe) and u'( qe) = m(Ne) the optimal per customer bundle qe and the optimal tariff Te 
can be expressed only as functions of the scale of entry Ne; that is, qe = qe(Ne) and 
Te = T"(qe(Ne». Specifically, they are both decreasing function ofNe; since dqe/dNe = 
O(Ci. lNe)/8et = dm/dNe/d2u!(dqe~ < 0 and r = d'P/dNe<O. Similarly, for the 
downstream incumbent we have that the quantity and tariff offered to each customer 
are a decreasing function of the number of customers served; that is, qi = qi(Ni) with 
dqi/dNi = O(CL /N)/8qi = (3dm/d,Ni/d2uJ(dqi)2 <0 and Ji= T(qi(Ni» with ti = dJi/dN <0. 
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These properties derive basically from the fact that cost are increasing in the number 
of customers served, due to the presence of diseconomies of scale. 
The previous analysis holds in a quite general framework where the upstream 
monopolist offers a menu of access charges Fi(Ni), summarised by a continuous 
function of the number of customers. Since we are dealing with the two type case we 
can further simplify the game, restricting ourselves to the only two weakly separating 
access tariffs <k, F(k» and <n, F(n» optimally designed by the upstream 
monopolist for the two downstream players. We are implicitly assuming that the 
upstream monopolist maximises his expected payoff by allowing entry, instead of 
offering a unique contract to the downstream incumbent. 
4.3.2.B The upstream monopolist's problem with one ope of customers 
Let us now tackle the upstream monopolist's optimisation problem in the 
absence of high-demand customers (i.e. when e =1 and second degree price 
discrimination coincides with perfect price discrimination). Regulation simply 
forbids to discriminate between the two downstream producers of good 1 using non-
linear access charges as functions of their total output. The upstream incumbent 
continues to act as a monopolist, but, since he is allowed only to use non-linear 
pricing, he must also satisfy their incentive compatibility constraints: 
[ICt] 1I""(k, qt) _ F(k) ~ 1I""(n, qi) - F(n) 
[IC] ,r(n, qi) - F(n) ~ ,r(k, qt) - F(k) 
In practice, he maximises his profit function nU(Qo, n, k) with respect to QO, n, 
k subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints: 
[U.I) 
[MME] 
[pCt] 
[PC] 
[ICt] 
max nU(Qo, n, k) = pOQo+F(n)+F(k) - NC(2N) - cOQo subject to: 
po = v' (qO) 
n e = kr - C(k, qe, W) - F(k) ~ 0 
ni = n'r - Ci(n, qi, (3) - F(n) ~ 0 
1I""(k, qt) _ F(k) ~ 1I""(n, qi) - F(n) 
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[IC] -n-i(n, qi) _ F(n) ~ -n-i(k, qe) - F(k) 
and 2N=k+n 
The frrst constraint [MME] is the usual one, which simply states the 
monopolised market equilibrium on the consumers' side, imposing the price of the 
monopolised good to be equal to the marginal utility enjoyed by its consumption. 
The two following constraints [PC] and [PCi ] are the usual participation constraints 
(with reservation prices equal to zero) of the downstream producers, whereas [IC] 
and [IC] represent the incentive compatibility constraints. 
As in section 2.3.1 with two types of customers, here the upward binding 
incentive constraint [ICt] and the participation constraint of the most efficient 
producer [PC] are automatically satisfied by the solution of the problem when [PC] 
and [IC] are binding (the proof follows the lines of the one given in section 2.3.1). 
[pce] TIe = k'r - C(k, qt, W) - F(k) = 0 
[IC] lri(n, qi) - F(n) = -n-i(k, qt) - F(k) 
In practice, no surplus is allowed for the downstream entrant (i.e. the 
inefficient type), whereas the downstream incumbent (i.e. the efficient type) enjoys a 
positive net surplus. 
The maximisation problem, keep on assuming for simplicity's sake c=c1 = 0, 
becomes: 
[U.tA] 
[MME] 
[PCt] 
[IC] 
and 
max TIU(Qo, n, k) = pOQo - cOQo +F(k)+F(n)- NC(2N) subject to: 
pO= v'(qO) 
F(k) = Re - CO = kT' - m(k)Qe 
F(n) = -n-i(n, qi(n»_ [,r(k, qi(k» _ r(k, qt(k»] = Ri(n, qi(n)_ Ci(n, qi(n)) 
- [Ri(k, qi(k) _ Ci(k, qi(k» - Re(k, qe(k»+ C(k, qC(k»] 
2N=n+k 
Before solving the problem let us introduce as before a simplified notation: 
[4.3] 
[4.4] 
1rk = or/ok = Rk -q 
,r. = o,r/iln = ~i - C. n "'''u D 
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where Rk = oRj!ONj and Ck = OCj!oNi respectively denote the marginal revenue and 
cost with respect with the number of customer served 
The previous problem [U.lA] can be solved only with respect to k and n, once 
we substitute the binding constraints [PCt], [ICi] and [MME] into the objective 
function: 
max nU(Qo, k, n) == 2Nv'(qO)qO -c02Nqo + Ri(n, qi(n))_ C(n, qi(n)) - [Ri(k, qi(k)) -
C(k, qi(k)) - 2ReCk, qeCk))+ 2C"Ck, qeCk))] - NCC2N) subject to: 
k+ n-2N=O 
We can then write down the Lagrangean function as: 
L = nUCQo, k, n) - J.l Ck + n - 2N) 
After few algebraic manipulations the first order conditions can be written as: 
[qO] CO = v'( qO) + v"( qO)qO 
[NO] 2Rk(k, qeCk)) - 2q.(k, qeCk)) - RkCk, qiCk)) + CL(k, qiCk)) = J.l 
[Ni] ~(n, qi(n)) - C~(n, qi(n)) = J.l 
Notice how the partial derivatives \vith respect to the per customer bundles qi 
cancel out from the two final first order condition, due to the equality between the 
marginal cost and revenue Vv1th respect to the relative per customer bundles Cas can 
be verified from ['lL] derived from the downstream producers' maximisation 
problem derived in subsection A). Substituting the value of the Lagrangean 
multiplier J.l = ~(n, qi(n)) - C~(n, qi(n))= 1f'n Ci.e. the shadow profits on the marginal 
customer or the marginal access price of the most efficient finn) into the first order 
condition with respect to n we obtain the optimal relationship between nand k: 
The optimal relationship between the two marginal prices is very easily 
obtained from [4.5], making use of the binding constraints which hold for the 
downstream producers, i.e. PNi = 1J1Ni = R!Ni - Ck: 
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The pre\ious relationslrip between the marginal access prices can be easily re-
expressed for our functional fonn specification and interpreted as follows: 
(4.6]' pin = Fl- [U(qi(k» - u(qC(k»] - [qC(k) -j3qi(k)][m(k)+m'(k)k] 
In practice, not only does the entrant (here the inefficient type) enjoy no 
surplus, but also we have a wedge between the marginal access prices, given by the 
net positive surplus the incumbent (that is the most efficient type) can enjoy, taking 
the access tariff of the entrant. This distortion of the marginal access charges (and 
consequently of the customers' marginal prices) is generated by the upstream 
incumbent, who cannot perfectly discriminate (through non-linear pricing) between 
the two downstream producers, in order to increase his profits. In fact, with a lower 
number of customers allocated to the "e" type (less efficient) do\\nstream producer, 
the rent of the "i" type (more efficient) downstream producer is reduced.. 
Let us now represent in fig. 4.2, assuming isoelastic cost functions, the result of 
this section when the access charges can be expressed only as a function of the 
number of customers and the customers' bundles offered by different downstream 
producers are not yet directly distorted In the same picture k* and n* represent the 
allocation derived in first degree price discrimination, the benchmark case analysed 
before. As the incentive compatibility constraint of the "i" type is now binding. the 
most efficient type (i.e. the downstream incumbent) should be allowed a net positive 
rent, which can be decomposed in 1'.vo main components. The first rent [qC(k*) -
j3qi(k*)]m(k*)k* (that is the area OCE) is attributed to the lower cost of the 
downstream incumbent due to his greater efficiency level; in our graphical 
representation we assume that this effect outweighs the cost increase associated \\ith 
the quantity increase. The other rent [u(qi(k*» - u(qC(k*»]k* (that is the area SUR) 
derives from the greater revenue obtained by the downstream incumbent due to the 
increase in the per customer bundle. Consequently, to enforce the perfectly 
discriminatory allocation of customers <k*, n*> the downstream incumbent's access 
charge must be reduced by the total rent. This situation would be no longer optimal 
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for the upstream monopolist, since the marginal profits of a customer allocated to the 
less efficient type "e" is now reduced by a loss given by the increase in the 
downstream incumbent's rent [u(qi(k*))-u(qe(k*))]+[qe(k*)-~qi(k*)][m(k*)+m'(k*)k*] 
(i.e. segments RU and CE). 
s Fig. 4.2 
A 
~------~~~------------~~~-------- u(qe) = u(~) = u(q*) 
B t---___ I--i'-------::=ti"'~---- Cc= d = C* 
k n N 
o k' k'" n"'n' 
In this case, there is no longer an efficient allocation of customers between 
dOVvTIstream producers, because both the dOVvTIstream incumbent's marginal access 
charge (F nand Fk) per additional customer are no longer equal. In order to get the 
dOVvTIstream incumbent's marginal access charge \ve must subtract from the segment 
ZF the two segments TZ and FG, as evident from equation [4.6). 
In general the sum of the marginal rents (TZ + FG) is strictly positive. In this 
way, a number of customers is transferred from the downstream entrant to the 
downstream incumbent; i.e. k* - k' = n' - n*. The net positive rent of the downstream 
incumbent (that is, the most efficient type) is consequently reduced to the area OFG 
+ SZT. With this new allocation of customers (k', n'), the downstream entrant's 
marginal cost (CD is reduced, whereas the downstream incumbent's marginal cost 
(C~) is increased and there is a positive wedge (Fk - F n) between them. Hence, ll"'n 
decreases from the level DV to MW and 111. increases from the level CU to FZ. 
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In graphical tenns the left hand side of equation [4.6] MW is equal to the right 
hand side ZF - TZ - FG. In this way, the gains from the marginal customer allocated 
to each downstream producer are equated; that is, -rrin = 1Tk - [u(qi(k')) - u(qe(k'))] -
[qe(k') - Pqi(k')][m(k')+m'(k')k'] (or in graphical tenns MW = FZ - OF - ZT). In fact, 
now the marginal customer al10cated to the less efficient type "e" brings a gain equal 
to the additional variable profit per marginal customer lTk (segment FZ) minus the 
increase in the rent (segment OF plus ZT) to be paid to the more efficient type "i". 
The upstream monopolist's profits are maximised when this gain (FZ - GF - ZT) is 
equated to the marginal loss due to the foregone profit of a customer no longer 
served by the more efficient type "i", i.e. his additional variable profit per marginal 
customer (segment MW). 
An interesting variant of the game would be to endogenise the total number of 
customers. We can ignore this issue, by assuming the level of customers 2N, fixed 
exogenously, to be the optimal one, in the sense that there is no reason to leave the 
market uncovered. Eventually, it could also be considered the alternative 
frameworks, in which the number of customers (2N) is above the optimal level but 
there is a universal service obligation, or in which the upstream monopolist can 
endogenously detennine the number of customers to be served (though maintaining 
the same population proportion between the two types, i.e. an equal number of each 
type of customers). However, let us briefly deal with the eventual detennination of 
the optimal nwnber of customers through the profit maximisation of the upstream 
monopolist specified below, the only difference with the usual one being the 
introduction of 2N as a choice variable: 
max rr(Qo, k, n, 2N) == 2Nv'(qO)qO -c02Nqo + Ri(n, qi(n))_ C(n, qi(n)) 
_[Ri(k, qi(k) - C(k, qi(k)) - 2Re(k, qe(k)+ 2C·(k, q«k»] 
- NC(2N) subject to: 
k+ n-2N=O 
We can then write down the modified Lagrangean function as: 
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L = nU(Qo, k, n, 2N) - J.l (k + n - 2N) 
The first order condition derived in section remain unchanged; we need only to 
derived an additional condition with respect to 2N, which can be stated as J.l = lYC'. 
Making use of [4.6) to express the value of the Lagrangean multiplier as a function 
of the marginal access charges [J.l = fin = R!t - C~], we immediately get: 
[4.7) F~ = Fl- [R~(k, qi(k)) - Rk(k, qe(k))] - [Ck(k. qe(k)) - Cl(k. qi(k))] = NC" 
It directly fol1ows from [4.7] that the marginal access price applied to the 
incumbent (the most efficient type) equals the marginal cost, when the number of 
customer is optimal, so that there is no distortion at the top. On the other side, there 
emerges some distortion at the bottom, even when the upstream monopolist can 
optimal1y choose the number of customers to serve through the network. 
The previous conclusion shows that the standard result on price discrimination 
for pure monopoly ,\lith no distortion at the top can be reinterpreted in this new 
vertical framework where there are two downstream producers characterised by 
different efficiency level (unknown to the upstream monopolist), alIo'wing for an 
endogenous scale of entry (k) of the downstream entrant. The strict equality of 
equation [4.7] will follow when the upstream monopolist can choose the parameter 
2N and consequently the total number of customers. 
4.3.3 The distortionary solution when customers' bundles influence access charges 
Let us now consider the more general assumption present in (iv') and let the 
upstream monopolist's non-linear access charge tariff F(Nj, qi) depend in general 
both on the number of customers served (~ = n, k) and on the customer bundles (qi = 
qi, qe) to be offered by each dO"vllstream producers to the customers: 
[4.8) F = F(~, qi) 
In this case, as before, the upstream incumbent, using only non-linear pricing, 
cannot perfectly discriminate, in theory, between the two downstream producers, but 
even if we have only a consumers' type he may influence, as it will be clearer later, 
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the customers' bundles (qi = qi, qC) through the access charge, to further reduce the 
rent of the "i" type (more efficient) downstream producer. 
In what follows, we will solve the previous game, with only one type of 
customers and considering non-linear access charge tariffs as F(N1, qi). The upstream 
monopolist (using second order price discrimination) maximises the following profit 
function nU(Qo, n, k, qi, qC) with respect to qO, n, k, qi and qO, subject to the individual 
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints: 
[U.2] 
[MME] 
[PCO] 
[PC] 
[Ice] 
[IC] 
and 
max TIU(Qo, n, k, qi, qO) = pOQo+F(n, qi)+F(k, qC) - NC(2N) _ cOQo 
subject to: 
po = v'(qO) 
n e = krc - C(k, QO, W) -F(k, qO) ~ 0 
n = nT~qi) - C(n, qi, Pi) - F(n, qi) ~ 0 
lJ""(k, rc) - F(k, qO) ~ lJ""(n, Ti) _ F(n, qi) 
-r(n, Ti) - F(n, qi) ~ -r(k, T) - F(k, qO) 
2N=k+ n 
where the constraints have their usual interpretation, with [ICC] and [PC] 
automatically satisfied by the solution and with [PCt] and [IC] binding as in [U.I]. 
Hence, while the efficient type "i" (the downstream incumbent) enjoys a positive net 
surplus, no surplus is allowed to the inefficient type "e" (the downstream entrant). 
We keep on assuming, just for simplicity's sake, c=c l = 0, and specify the 
maximisation problem taking only into account the binding constraints: 
[U.2A] 
[MME] 
[PCC] 
[IC] 
and 
max TIU(Qo, n, k, qi, qC) = pOQo-coQo + F(k, qC)+F(n, qi)-NC(2N) 
subject to: 
po = v'(qO) 
F(k, qO) = RC _ Co = k Te _ m(k)Qe 
F(n, qi) = 1r'(n, qi)_ [-r(k, qO) - T(k, qO)] = nti - pm(n)Ci- (1- p)m(k)Qc 
2N=n+k 
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As usual, [U.2A] can be solved with respect to qO, n, k, qi and qc, substituting the 
binding constraints [PCt], [IC] and [M11E] into the objective function, obtaining the 
new profit function: 
nU(QO, n, k, qi, qt) = 2NqO(v'(qO) -CO) +R(k, qt)_ 2Ct(k, qt) + C(k, qt)_ +R(n, qi) -C(n, qi) 
-NC(2N) 
= 2NqO(v'(qO) -CO) +kT«'-[(2-~)m(k)kqt] +n'r -~m(n)nqi - NC(2N) 
and solving the Lagrangean function, specified as below: 
Substituting the value ofTj, equal to the consumers' surplus u(qi), and following 
the usual procedure, we get the new first order conditions: 
[qO] CO = v'( qO) + v"( qO)qO 
[N] ~ - C~ = /-l = ,rn 
[Nt] ~ - 2C~ + C~ = /-l => 1Tk - (1-~)C~ = R~ - (2-~)C~ 
[qi] Rl- Cl = 0 => U'(qi) = ~ men) 
[q<] Rt - Ct = 0 => u'(q<) = (2-~)m(k)=m(k)+(1-~)m(k»m(k) 
This time, we find two additional first order conditions [qi] and [qt], while the 
first three are formally the same. Since from [N] the Lagrangean multiplier J.l = ~ -
C~ = ,rn is equal to the variable profits on the marginal customer of the efficient type 
(i.e. the marginal access price of the most efficient firm), using equation [Nt] we get 
the optimal relationship between nand k; that is, the optimal distortion which holds 
between the two marginal access prices for the two downstream producers which is 
exactly the same as [4.6]. 
[4.9] ,rn = ~ - C~ = Ric - (2-P)Q = lTj.- (l-P)Ck 
From [qi] and [qt] we obtain the new distortionary relation between the 
consumers' marginal prices u'(qi) served by different downstream producers, that the 
upstream monopolist sets, through the use of marginal access charges Il = 
of(N, ci)/oqi. 
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(4.10] AFL = Fl- Ft = (l-P) m(k) 
In practice, there is a positive wedge between the differential marginal access 
charges AFL = Fl- FL = of(k, qe)/ oq· - of(n, qi)/ oqi, which maximises the upstream 
monopolist's profits, reducing the net positive rent of the downstream incumbent (that 
is, the most efficient type), while the dO\VTIstream entrant is left with no surplus. In 
fact, while the downstream incumbent's marginal access charge ~L = c l is set equal to 
zero (as from [qi] U'(qi) = P men) = pm(n) + FL), the downstream entrant's optimal 
marginal access charge Fi. = (l-p)m(k) is strictly positive (as from [qt] u'(qe) = m(k) + 
(l-P) m(k) = m(k) + FiJ 
(4.11] u'(qe) - U'(qi) = [m(k) - P men)] + (l-P) m(k) = (Cic - C~) + (Fl- FD 
Hence, using his general access charge tariff, the upstream incumbent is able to 
maximise his profit function TIU(Qo, n, k, qi, qe) discriminating in two ways between 
the downstream producers. As we can see from [4.11] not only different marginal 
costs (Cic - C~ < 0) are imposed, through a distortionary allocation of the number of 
customers, but also the choice of customers' bundles (qi and qe) is distorted by 
charging different marginal access charges (&'L > 0). 
The previous relationship between the conswners' marginal prices U'(qi), set by 
different downstream producers, means that the inefficient type enjoys no surplus and 
that a bidimensional wedge is set between the two downstream producers' marginal 
access prices. This aims to reduce the net positive rent the dO\\TIstream incumbent 
could gain, taking the inefficient dO\VTIstream producer's contract. 
As before, when the number of customers is optimally chosen by the upstream 
monopolist the marginal revenue given by (4.11] must be greater or equal to marginal 
cost ]\'C'. In practice, the access charge per additional customer of the most efficient 
downstream producer is greater or equal to marginal cost NC' 
[4.12] -n-in= ~ - C~ = 1Ik- (l-P)Ct = Ric - Cit - (l-P)Cic ~ NC 
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Hence, the marginal access price applied to the incumbent (the most efficient 
type) equals the marginal cost and there is no distortion at the top. This conclusion is 
still quite close to the standard result on price discrimination for a pure monopoly. 
Let us finally consider the more general case in which the non-linear access 
charges F(n, qi) and F(k, q.) are allowed (as section 4.3.2) and the customer bundles 
offered by different downstream producers may be directly distorted setting positive 
marginal access charges (Ft > 0). In relation to the allocation of customers between 
the downstream producers the previous condition -rrfn = 11k - (l-P) q (and the relative 
graphical representation) still hold, but the new revenue function RD(qO, n, k, qi, q.) 
offers a new opportunity for reducing the rent of the downstream incumbent. 
As the upstream monopolist can also directly fix the bundles q. and qi offered by 
downstream producers, the previous situation (FL = 0) is no longer optimal. To show 
this, in fig. 4.3 we represent the linear marginal utility functions u'(q) of a quadratic 
utility function u(q)=q - (q)2/2. Consider now a non-distortionary marginal price pe= 
OC = Ct, the corresponding bundle qe and tariff T< (given by the integral from 0 to qe 
of the marginal utility function u'(q) the area AOqeE). 
A 
G 
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B 
o 
p 
q' q 
Fig. 4.3 
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D (l-p)m(k) 
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The variable profit per customer T/k, given by ACE, is derived by subtracting 
from the tariffT< the variable costs m(k)qe (represented by the area COq·E). With first 
degree access price discrimination this is optimal, as the upstream monopolist's 
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marginal gain (with respect to the quantity set by the less efficient type "e") equates 
the mar~nal variable profit already set equal to zero (dRu/dqe = lTi. = 0). 
However, now that only second degree access price discrimination is allowed, 
the upstream monopolist's marginal gain with respect to the quantity set by type "e" 
dRu/dqo (differently from ORU/oqi =,rL = 0, as from [qi] we have U'(qi) - ~ m(n) = 0) is 
negative since it is equal to the marginal variable profit (lTk=O) minus the loss given by 
the increase in the downstream incumbent's rent (l-(3)Ct = (l-(3)m(k) (segment DE). 
Hence, while it is optimal that the downstream incumbent's marginal access 
charge FL = c l remains set equal to zero, the dO\\nstream entrant's optimal marginal 
access charge is Fi. = (l-~) m(k) equal to segment DE. Adding CO (= DE) to the 
previous marginal cost OC the new distortionary marginal price is pO= 00 = Ct + Ft, 
and the corresponding tariff Te is given by the area AOqeE. The variable profit per 
customer lr"1k is reduced to ACHF, and oRu/oqe = 11k - (l-~)Ci. = 0 since now the 
marginal variable profit (HF) is equal to the marginal increase in the dO\\'Dstream 
incumbent's rent (DE). Thus, in this final case different marginal 'prices (pC and pi) are 
the result of a distortionary allocation of the number of customers and of a positive 
marginal access charges Fi. > 0 charged to the less efficient dO\\'Dstream producer. 
4.3.-1 Access charge discrimination wilh one consumers 'ope: welfare considerations 
In the present standard framework (\\ith one consumers' type) of the vertical 
separation. model the upstream monopolist allows the entry of a less efficient 
competitor, who faces no entry costs (or more generally no fixed costs, apart from the 
access charge). He leaves her no rent and charges her (with non-linear access pricing) 
also the increase in the rent to be paid to the more efficient type "incumbent" (in 
correspondence of the marginal increase in the number of customers and in the 
quantity supplied). With non-linear access pricing, these distortion are clearly optimal 
for the upstream monopolist, as we have proved, but they also represent a way to 
avoid the choice of inefficient entry scales by a less efficient competitor. In order to 
avoid an inefficiently large scale of entry, the potential competitor must pay these two 
marginal charges, in order to be allowed to enter the low demand market. This leads 
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leads us to examine what kind of access cparge tariff would be socially optimal. 
In order to start dealing with optimal regulation in this new vertical framework, 
let us consider the conditions under which the first degree discrimination access 
pricing policy is optimal. Ignoring any eventual distributional and excess burden 
considerations, adopting the ultra-liberal social welfare function a la Loeb and Magat 
(given by the unweighted sum of consumer surplus and profits) the lump sum tariffs pi 
and P (introduced in sub-section 4.3.3.A) represent overall the socially optimal access 
and final prices for the society. In this section, we will always assume that the 
upstream monopolist is a public (or regulated) firm i.e. the collectivity will pay costs 
and transfers and get the firm's revenues. But this is not strictly necessary adopting 
Loeb and Magat's social welfare function. 
Since the consumers' net surplus is equal to consumers' gross surplus minus 
firms' revenues, that is U(Qo, Qi, QC) = S(Qo, Qi, Qt) _ Ri(Qi) - Re(Qt) RU(Qo, Q\ Qt) the 
public upstream monopolist's general problem is no longer to maximise his revenue 
RU(Qo, n, k, qi, qe) but the social welfare W (with respect to qO, n, k). Taking advantage 
of the previous analysis and assuming transfers equal to zero for simplicity's sake the 
whole problem reduces to the constrained maximisation specified below: 
[U.Ll\I] 
2Nv( qO)+nu( qi)+ku( qe)-cO(2NqO)-NC(2N)-pm(n )nqi_m(k)kqe subject to: 
[PC] n = nr - C(n. qi, Pi) - F(n, qi) ~ 0 
[pCt] ne = kP - C(k, qe, pe) - F(k, qO) ~ 0 
[IC] ,r(n, Ti) - F(n. qi) ~ ,r(k, J<) - F(k, qC) 
[I CO] "Tr(k, P) - F(k, qO) ~ "Tr(n, Ti) - F (n, qi) 
and 2N= k + n 
Here, as usual the superscript W indicates optimal pricing a la Loeb and Magat. 
The problem [U.Ll\I] can be solved ,vith respect to qO, k, qi and qe, solving down Loeb 
. and Magat's social welfare function. rewritten (using [PCC] to substitute the value of 
Tj) as: 
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and getting the new first order conditions. 
[Ll\I.l]' 
[Ll\I.2)' 
[Ll'l.3]' 
[Ll\I.4)S 
CO = v'(qO) = pO 
,rn = U(qi) - c~ = U(qe) - q = 1Tk 
U'(qi) = ~ men) 
u'(qe) = m(k) 
Entry is optimal with F(kO, qO)=k°T'-m(kO)Qe and F(nO, qO)=n°-r-~m(nO)Qi-(l­
~)m(ko)Qe as constraints [PC] and [Ie] are binding, while the others are satisfied. In 
this case, the dO\\TIstream producer will automatically set the optimal tariffs 
Ti=T"=Tw, which equate marginal prices to marginal costs. From the previous 
equations it emerges that while first degree access price discrimination is socially 
optimal under Loeb and Magat's social welfare function, this is not true with other 
types of non-linear access charge tariff function. In fact, with the upstream 
monopolist's access charges which take away from dO\\TIstream producers all variable 
profits Fi=,r and F"=~ we have the same final price setting in the final market for 
good 1. Notice how equation [Ll\1.2]S is exactly equal to [4.1] while equations 
[L::\I.3)' and [Ll'l.4)' are equivalent to [4.2). Instead, in the monopolised final market 
for good 0 the price pO should be equal to marginal cost CO from [L::\I.t)', as it was 
without vertical separation. 
But first degree access price discrimination is just a special case in which no net 
positive rent is allowed to the dO\\nstream producers. In general, there are many non-
linear access charges which satisfy constraints [PCe] and [IC] (not necessarily 
binding), leaving some rent to do\\nstream producers, but do not produce any 
distortion, equating marginal access prices to zero (F~=Fl=Fl=FL =0) for k=ko, n=n° 
and qe=qi=qo. Hence, Pareto improvements would be achieved by reducing the value 
of the marginal access charge the entrant is facing (Fl, Ft), till they are zero. 
Let us now explicitly take into account, among the efficiency issues, the cost of 
public funds (following the approach of Laffont and Tirole) or let us, alternatively, 
impose the presence of a binding break even budget constraint in the absence of 
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subsidies. 
The public upstream monopolist maximises the LafTont and Tirole social . 
welfare function W'J... (with respect to N, qO, n, k, qi, qt), where for simplicity's sake we 
put the trasfer tr equal to zero. 
[U.LT] max W = S(Qo, Qi, Qt) +ARU(Qo,n,k,qi,qe)-(1+A.)NC(2N,Qo,Q) -C(n,qi)_ 
. Ce(k, qe) = 2Nv(qO)+A.2Npo+nu(qi) +ku(qr) +A[F(n,qi)+F(k,qr)]_ 
(1+A)[c02Nqo-NC(2N)] - pm(n)nqi -m(k)kqe subject to: 
[MME] pO = v'(qO) 
[PC] 
[PCO] 
[IC] 
[Icr] 
and 
n = nu(qi) - pm(n)nqi - F(n, qi) ~ 0 
TIC = ku(qe) - m(k)kqe - F(k, qr) ~ 0 
"!fen, Ti) - F(n, qi) ~ "!f(k, Tr) - F(k. qr) 
"Jr(k, r) - F(k, qt) ~ 11""(n, Ti) - F (n, qi) 
2N=k+n 
Taking advantage of the previous analysis, we can substitute the binding 
constraints [MME], [PCO] F(k, qr) = ku(qe) - m(k)kqe and [IC] F(n, qi) = nu(qi)_ 
pm(n)nqi-(l-p)m(k)kqe into the LafTont and Tirole social welfare function W'J... 
reducing the whole problem to the maximisation of the following function: 
W'J... = 2Nv(qO)+A2Nv'(qO)qO +(1 +A)[(2N-k)u(qi)+ku(qr)] -(1+A)[2NcOqo-iYC(2N)] 
-(l+A)C -[l+/,(2-P)]Ct 
In this case, we should have some distortion for the downstream entrant (the less 
efficient producer) but no distortion for the do\\nstream incumbent (the more efficient 
producer), analogously to the unregulated case. 
[LT.l]1 (pO _ C0)/pO = _ 1J(1 + A.) v"( qO) qO/po = + IJ( 1 + A )T)0 
[LT.2j' ,rn = U(qi)-C~ = u(qr)_{[1 +A.(2-P)]/(l +A.)}Ck = 1fk-[A(l-P)/(l +A)]Ct 
[LT.3]' ,rL = 0 => U'(qi) = pm(n) 
[LT.4]' 1Tf.. -[A(1-P)/(l+A)]Ct = 0 => u'(qr) = ([1+A(2-P)]/(1+A)}m(k) 
However, the unregulated regime can be derived when the shadow cost of public 
funds A. goes to infinity. In fact, as A goes to infinity, equation [LT.2]' is exactly equal 
to [4.9], while equations [LT .3]' and [LT.4]' combined are the analogues of [4.10] or 
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[4.11]. 
Hence, in this case, Pareto improvements would be also achieved by reducing 
the value of the downstream entrant's marginal access charges (11, FL) till they get to 
the socially optimal values {i.e. (J,,(l-P)/(l+A)]Ck and [A(l-P)/(l+A)]CiJ. 
In fact, in this way, we just reach the second best tariffs F"(n, qi) and F'{k, q") 
corresponding to the solution of the public upstream monopolist's problem [U.LT). 
The participation condition [pce] is always binding, since it is always socially optimal 
that the upstream monopolist expropriates all the do\mstream entrant's profits, as 
profits nu have an additional weight A, due to the excess burden of the revenues 
coming from taxes. Furthermore, there appears a trade-off between the expropriation 
of the dOVvnstream incumbent's rent and efficiency. Consequently, under full 
information, using the general access charge tariff F'{Nj, qi), the upstream incumbent 
is able to maximise total welfare W"- causing a twofold distortion. 
[LT.5]' 
Not only are different marginal costs (q - C~ < 0) imposed, through a 
distortionary allocation of the number of customers (k"- < kO), but also the choice of 
customers' bundles (qi and qe) is distorted by charging a positive marginal access 
charges {Fi;= [A(l-P)/(l+A)] mCk"-) > O} to the do\",nstream entrant. Stated in other 
words, since the upstream monopolist's profits are now given an additional weight A, 
the inefficient type enjoys no surplus and his choices are distorted by a bidimensional 
wedge in order to reduce the net Positive rent the efficient type could gain, taking the 
inefficient type's contract. 
To conclude, let us briefly follow the approach which puts more weight on 
consumers' surplus U(Qo, Qi, Qe) = SCQo, Qi, Q") _ Ri(Qi) - Re(Q") RU(Qo, Q\ Qe) and on 
the upstream monopolist's profits nu (which are redistributed to consumers as public 
revenues), rather than on the downstream producer's surplus ~n. Let then W· 
represent, as usual, the Baron and Myerson social welfare function, which is 
maximised by the upstream monopolist: 
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[U.B~ll max W. = S(Qo, Qi, Qe) -NC(2N, QO, Q) _(l_~)[Ri(Qi)+Re(Qe)] 
+(l-~)[F(n,qi)+F(k,qe)] -~[C(n, qi)+Ce(k, qe)] = 
2Nv(qO) +~nu(qi) +~ku(qe) +(1-<j»[F(n,qi)+F(k,qe)] -2NcOqo -NC(2N) 
- ~H3m(n)nqi+m(k)kqe] subject to: 
[PC] ni = nu(qi) - pm(n)nqi - F(n, qi) ~ 0 
[PCe] ne = ku(qe) _ m(k)kqe _ F(k, qe) ~ 0 
[IC] tr(n, 'r) - F(n, qi) ~ trek, 'P) - F(k, qe) 
[Ice] lJ""(k, 'P) - F(k, qe) ~ lJ""(n, Ti) - F (n, qi) 
and 2N=k+ n 
To solve the problem, the binding constraints [PC] F(k, qe) = ku(qe) - m(k)kqe 
and [IC] F(n, qi) = nu(qi) -pm(n)nqi-(l-p)m(k)kqe (since the others are satisfied by the 
solution) can be substituted into W+, obtaining: 
W. = 2Nv(qO) +(2N-k)u(qi) +ku(qe) - 2NcOqo -NC(2N) -C -[l+(l-P)(1-~)]C 
In this case, we should have no distortion for the monopolised good 0, and for 
the dO\vnstream incumbent, but in order to reduce the latter rent some distortion may 
emerge for the less efficient downstream producer, as in the Laffont and Tirole case. 
[B~I.lr 
[B~1.2r 
[B~I.31s 
[Bl\I.4]' 
CO = v'(qO) = po 
yin = U(qi) -C~ = u(qe) - [l+(l-P)(l-~)]Ck = 1Tk -(1-P)(l-<l»Ct 
yiL = nu'(qi) -CL = 0; 
11l- (1-P)(1-~)Ci. = 0 
U'(qi) = pm(n) 
u'(qe) = [l+(1-P)(1-~)]m(k) 
Analogously to Laffont and Tirole's case, the access charge tariffs are F(k+, +qe) 
= k+re -m(k+)Qe 'and F(n., qi) = n+r -pm(n+)Qi - <.1- p)m(~)Qe. The participation 
condition [PCt] is always binding and dO\\l1stream entrant has no rent, since profits nu 
have a greater weight; moreover the constraint [ICi] implies a trade-off between rent 
extraction (of the dO\\l1stream incumbent) and efficiency. 
While [Bl\I.l]' coincides with [Ll\I.l]' and Pareto efficiency is achieved in the 
monopolised market (where marginal prices equal marginal costs, like in the ultra-
liberal case), the scale of entry and customers' bundles are again distorted, as k+ < kO 
and +qe< QQ. 
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[B~I.5]' 
As in Laffont and Tirole's case, the maximisation of W+ causes a twofold 
distortion: through the allocation of the number of customers (k+ < kO) as +Fk = (l-fJ) 
(l-~)Ck > 0, and the customers' bundle +qe, as +Ft = (l-fJ)(l-~) m(k).) > O. In particular, 
the number of customers of the do\\nstream incumbent is relatively high, while the 
bundle offered to customers by the downstream entrant is relatively low, with respect 
to the optimal one with the Loeb and Magat social welfare function. However, the two 
regimes will clearly coincide as ~ tends to one. 
Access charges tend towards the ones holding under the private monopoly 
solution as the weight of profits ~ approaches zero, since the tariffs F+ become closer 
and closer to the monopoly ones F(Ni, qi). In fact, in the limiting case, equation 
[B~f.2]S is exactly equal to [4.9], while the combination of [B:\1.3]' and [B:\1.4)' is the 
analogue of [4.10] or [4.11]. 
Hence, also in the Baron and Myerson case, a reduction of the downstream 
entrant's monopoly marginal access charges (Ft, Ft) would enhance social welfare, till 
we reach the second best access charges +Fk and 'FL' 
4.4 Vertical separation with two consumers' types in the standard framework 
In order to deal with two consumers' types in the previous setting of vertical 
separation, we must modify some of the specific hypotheses contained in (iv*) and 
(v*) considering the more general assumptions specified below. 
In particular, now in (iv*) the downstream producers (the incumbent and the 
entrant) can freely choose the number of customers to be served in each market (the 
high and low demand customers' markets). In each market we will set 
N= t 
= ~ 
for j=i 
for j=e 
with N i = ~N~ = n = nL + nH :::; 2N and NC = ~N~ = k = kL + kH :::; 2N, requiring: 
nL +kL:::;N 
nH+kH:::;N 
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Moreover, the upstream incumbent has a new specification of the access charge 
tariffs F(NjH' Nt, 'liI' i) which are a function of the number of customers served N{ 
(withj = i, e and t = H, L) in each market, and of the customer bundles ('It = q~, q~ to 
be offered by each dO\vnstream producer to the different customers' types: 
[4.13] F = F(~H' Nt, qk, ql) 
In this way, the upstream incumbent is allowed to discriminate, through the non-
linear access charge tariff, between the two downstream producers choosing directly 
the customers' bundles (q~ and q~) and consequently the pricing strategies of the 
downstream producers, who can either accept or reject the offer. 
Downstream producers have the following revenue and cost junctions: 
Ri = Nt TiL + N{ .. TiH 
O(Nk, Nt, ql .. , ql) = C(Ni, Qi, (Y) 
In particular, we set as before (3c = 1 and (3i = (3 (with 0 < (3 < 1) and assume that 
costs C(Nj, Qi, (3-i) are strictly increasing with respect to the total number of customers 
served (Nj = N{-{ + ND and total output (Qi = Nkqh + NtqL), convex in their first 
argument and linear in the second (with positive cross derivatives). Consequently the 
above functional restrictions require: 
Cj = :¥"i/o"'Ni > O' Ci > O' Ci = OC)/eni > O' 0 = 0 and uCi/eNiD"; > 0 Nt v\,... t , NN -, t ~t' It • t 'it-
Without great loss of generality, in most of the analysis we \\ill consider the 
folIov ... ing simple functional form: Cj = !)i m(~) Qi. 
We may write downstream producers' profit junctions as: 
The two downstream producers enter the market for good 1 only if their 
participation constraints are satisfied 
[pce] IIe = kL Tt + kH rH - Ct(kH, kL, qi ... qiJ - F(kL• kH• qH. qt) ~ 0 
[PC] IIi = nL 1\ + nH 'PH - C(nH• nL• qk. CJi.) - F(nL• nH• qk. CJi.) ~ 0 
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Furthennore, with second degree price discrimination, the dO\\TIstream 
producers' incentive compatibility constraints should be satisfied to get true type 
. revelation: 
[Ice] . lr"(kL' kH' qt, qjJ-F(kL, kH' qiI' qD ~ lr"(nL' nH, <IL, qh) - F(nL• nIl' qi~. <IL) 
[IC] yi(nL' nH, qL, q;~) - F(nL, nH, q;~, 'IL) ~ vi(kL' kH' qt, 'Ill) - F(kL' kH' qH, qt) 
Moreover, in presence of two types, in (v*) the upstream monopolist IS 
characterised by the following profit nU(qO, nL, nH, kL' kH' qh, qL, qH' qt)function: 
Naturally, apart from these minor changes specified above, in what follows ,,,e 
will maintain the same assumptions and the basic rules of the vertical separation 
game. Moreover, as before, the order of moves between dO\\TIstream producers ,,,ill 
not affect the game's solution. In fact, the upstream monopolist directly chooses the 
customer bundles (crt = q\, q~) and consequently the tariffs that the dov-nstream 
producers offer to the different customers' types. 
-/..1.1 First degree access charge discrimination with two f}pes of customers 
Let us now analyse this more general setting starting from the benchmark case 
given by first degree access charge discrimination. This will show the ways in which 
the upstream incumbent can create distortions benveen the dO\\nstream producers, 
using the access charge tariff to maximise his total profit nU(qO, nL• nB• kL' kH' q\l' qL, 
qH, qiJ Under perfect discrimination both the efficient type "i" (the downstream 
incumbent) and the inefficient type "e" (the do\\nstream entrant) enjoy no net surplus 
as the upstream monopolist faces only the two participation constraints [PC] and 
[PC] (using lump-sum access charges Fi and P) and does not need to take into account 
their incentive compatibility constraints [Ice] and [IC]. 
[U*] 
[MME] 
max nU(qO, nL• nn, kL• kH' qii' qL, qH' qt). = 2N(pO-cO)qo+p+p - NC(2N) 
subject to: 
pO = v'(qO) 
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[PCO] lr'(kL' kH' qt, qH) = kL 11 + kH 1H -CO(kH' kL' qH' qt) = po 
[PC] ,r(nL, nH, qL, qk) = nLTt + nH 'rH - Ci(nH, nL• qk, qD = pi 
[NJL" ] nL +kL =N 
[Nk] nH+ kH=N 
and nL' kL' nH, kH ~ 0 
In order to solve his problem the upstream incumbent must consider the tariffs 
the dO\\nstream producers \\Till set after accepting the contract offered. In fact, the 
contract involves the determination of the variables(N{.b Nt, qiH' qiL) and the 
corresponding access charges Fj(Nk, Nt. cdI, ql) specifically designed for each 
downstream producer. Hence, in what follows we will define the downstream 
producers' tariffs for the relevant values of qH' qt. qiH and qiL. 
Considering the dO\\TIstream entrant's pricing problem, it is easy to verify how 
given kL• kH, qi. and qH the customers tariffs Ti. and T"H, which satisfy the rationality 
and incentive compatibility constraints of the customers, are the highest ones. 
In fact it is always optimal, that the "e" type producer always extracts ]ow type 
consumers' surplus, setting: 
[IRiJ Tt = u( qi.) 
If the downstream entrant enters the H type's market (kH > 0) her tarifTT"H must 
satisfy the following internal incentive compatibility constraint 
9 U(qi1) - T"H ~ 9 u(qt) - u(qt) 
She sets a tariffTi1 = 9 u(qj{) - (9 -1) u(qj) for the H type when qt ~ qL so that 
there are no external interference from the tariff ]iL and ]iH of the downstream 
incumbent and high demand customers have no incentive to buy from the downstream 
incumbent. 
More generally she must also consider an additional external incentive 
compatibility constraint in maximising the tariff 11. 
9 u(qH) -TH ~ 9 u(qL) -]iL 
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The solution of the problem depends on which of the two incentive 
compatibility constraints is binding. We do not need to consider the high demand 
tariff TH, since the dO\\TIstream incumbent's too maximises the customers tariffs TL 
and TH (given nH, nL, 'Il-I and CIL) Hence, the solution of the problem reduces to: 
[ICi-I] 'PH = 9 u(qi-I) - (9 - 1) max [u(qL), u(qiJ] 
In practice no surplus is left to the L consumers, while given the customers' 
bundles (qL and cu.) the rent of high-demand customers is minimised, since it is equal 
to (9 - 1) max [u(CIL), u(qiJ] the maximum rent a consumer of type H can get 
mimicking the low type. 
Let us now examine the downstream incumbent's tariffs problem, when he will 
serve both the Hand L customers. Like the entrant he should extract all the low type 
consumers' surplus, setting: 
[IRU TL = u(ql) 
Ifboth downstream producers enter the H type's market (kIl• nIl> 0) his tariffJiH 
must satisfy at the same time the internal and external incentive compatibility 
constraints specified below: 
9 u( qk) - TiH ~ 9 u( qL) - TL 
8 u(qi{) - Tk ~ 9 u(cu.) - Tt 
Also this time the producer just wants to minimise the rent left to the H 
customers who are able to mimic the low type. This is achieved applying the same 
procedure as before by equating the high demand customers' rent to the amount (9 - J) 
max [u(ql), u(qL)l 
[ICk] TiL = 9 u(qk) - (9 - 1) max [u(CIL), u(qt)] 
Knowing the downstream producers' tariffs 11{, TiL' 'fOH and Tt in 
correspondence of qi-I, qt, ctH and ctL we can reformulate the upstream monopolist's 
profit maximisation problem as: 
[U.I *] 
v,,;th 
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max IJU = 2N[v'(qO)-cO]qo+kLu(qjJ+kH{9u(qH)-(9-1)max[u(ql), u(CJi.)]}-
_Ce +(N-kdu(qL) + (N-kH){9u(qk)-(9 - l)max[u(qD, u(qi.)D-Ci-NC(2N) 
kL, kH ~ 0 
In this case, as usual, we assume that the customers served by the incumbent in 
both markets (i.e. nL and nH), are non-negative numbers in the optimal contract. First 
of all, assuming the downstream incumbent to be sufficiently more efficient than the 
downstream entrant (i.e. (3 significantly smaller than one), we can argue that the 
dO"ffistream entrant (Le. the less efficient producer) cannot pre-empt either of the two 
markets, since her average and marginal unit costs [m(k) and m'(k)] are both greater 
than the incumbent's ones [J3m(k) and (3m'(k)] when she serves N or more customers. 
In fact, in order to satisfy the upstream monopolist's profit maximisation problem one 
market is assigned to a downstream producer only if in that market his gross profits on 
the marginal customer are higher than the other do\\nstream player's one, which in 
tum is possible only when he has the lowest costs associated with serving the marginal 
customer (in that market). 
On the other han~ the upstream monopolist can find it optimal to oblige the 
do\\nstream entrant to serve just one type of customers; while the do\\nstream 
incumbent must always serve both types. Specifically, we \\ill show how the problem 
of market pre-emption emerges just when the upstream monopolist obliges her the to 
serve only low demand customers. Hence, this time a particular attention should be 
paid to the possibility that the downstream entrant (the less efficient producer) 
specialises in serving just one of the two markets (i.e. to the possibility of either kL or 
kH being equal to zero). Moreover, as seen before from the dO\\nstream producers' 
tariffs problem we do not know in advance whether qL is greater, equal or smaller than 
qt. 
Taking explicitly into account these problems the first order conditions can be 
specified as follows: 
=> 
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or: "lfkH - yinH < 0 forkH= 0 ~ Su( qk) -C~ > Su( qH) -Clli 
[*ktJ "lfkL - 11"01 = 0 forkL> 0 ~ u( qD -e:u. = u( qI) -Ck 
or: "lfkL - yinL < 0 forkL =0 ~ u( CIL) -C:u. > u( qI) -Ck 
[*qk] Ri =Ci H H ~ Su'(qk) = Ck!nH = pm(o) 
[*qH] Re =ce H H ~ Su'(qi-I) = Ci-likH = m(k) 
[*qU RL = CL -N~(S-l)U'(qiL) ~ u'(gL) = pm(n) -N~Ce-l)U'(gL)/nL 
[*qiJ Ri. = q -N(I-~)(S-l)u'(qiJ ~. u'(qiJ = mCk)-NCl-~)Ce-l)u'Cqi.)/kL 
where the parameter 0 ~ ~ ~ 1 is equal to zero when qL < qi. and equal to one for qL > 
qt, and determined endogenously for qL =. qi.. 
Let us explore first the case in which the downstream entrant serves both types 
(kL' kH> 0). In this case both equations [*kH] and [*kd should hold as an equality and 
we must have 
This equality in turn implies that the additional gains from serving a high 
customer is equal for both downstream producers: 
This equality is satisfied when the customers are distributed in a way such that 
average costs are equated CHfkH = Ci.ikL = qinH = CLlnL [i.e. pm(n) = mCk)] and the 
customers' bundles offered by the downstream producers are equated (i.e. 'lL = <Ii. and 
qk = qi-I). Naturally, condition [*kd [i.e. u(qL) -C:u. = u(qiJ -Ch] must also hold for kL• 
kH > O. This implies the equality between the two marginal costs C~ and cekL• Notice 
how, as we have already argued, the downstream entrant cannot serve a number of 
customers greater or equal to N. In fact, in these cases, her average cost would be 
greater than the incumbent's one, giving rise to a contradiction: mCk) ~ meN) > pm(N) 
~ pm(n). 
Isoelastic cost functions (for which £:(n) = n m'(n)/m(n) equals ~(k). for any n 
and k) meet all these requirements. In this case from the equality of unit costs [(3m(n) 
= m(k)] we have also [n pm'(n) = k m'(k)] and consequently the equality between C:u. 
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= (3[m'(n) n (Qi/n) + m(n)ql] and cekL = m'(k) k (Qe/k) + m(k)qt when downstream 
producers serve the same number of the two types. In fact, (since ql = qt and qk = qH) 
per capita output is equated (Qi/n = Qelk) when kL = kH = kl2. It easy to show how in 
this case the marginal prices of the high and low demand customers set by the 
dO\\l1stream producers are equal (i.e. 9u'(qk) = 9U'(qjf) and u'(ql) = u'(qt) ). In fact, 
from the equality of unit costs [(3m(n) = mCk)] and equations [*<tlf] and [*qj.I1 the 
equality of the high demand customers' marginal prices eu'(qk) = eU'(qH) follows. We 
can also get the optimal value of ~ (here given by nHIN) directly from equations [*qU 
and [*qiJ 
In practice, when the upstream monopolist perfectly discriminates behveen 
dO\\l1stream producers, in the final demand market there is no distortion at the top if 
the unit cost m(k) functions are isoelastic, since the marginal access tariffs for the high 
demand customers PH and PH are set equal to zero. In fact, marginal prices 9U'(qiH) 
equate the per customer marginal costs aC( ,p.i)/OQi, i.e. eu'(q11) = (3m(n) = mCk) = e 
U'(qH). On the other hand, we get distortion at the bottom, u'(qD = u'(qi.) < (3m(n) = 
mCk), even if in this particular case the marginal access tariffs (for the low demand 
customers' bundle Fl and FD are equal to zero. 
Let us briefly consider the other cases, in which the downstream entrant serve 
just one type of consumers, starting from the case in which the do"mstream entrant 
serves only the low-demand type (kH = 0). In this case only equations [*kd should 
hold as an equality and \ve must have: 
[*k'] -r kH - .,r nH < 1rk - .,r nL = 0 
This inequality implies that the additional gains from serving a high customer 
are smaller for the dO\\l1stream entrant. After some simplifications we get 
The previous inequality is satisfied for the relevant customers distributions 
(between dO\\11stream producers) when the dO\\l1stream entrant's unit marginal costs 
are higher ceHIkH = ctlkL > Ck/nH = ClInL [i.e. m(k) > (3m(n)], independently from the 
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fact that the customers and the bundles offered by the downstream producers are 
equated (i.e. qiL and qk are not necessarily equal to qL and qH). Naturally condition 
[*ktJ [i.e. u(qL) -C!u. = u(qi) -Ck] must hold also for kH = O. 
We can eventually also get condition [*ktJ holding as a strict inequality [i.e. 
u(GL) -C~ < u(qL) -Ck] in the case of low demand customers' market pre-emption by 
the downstream entrant, i.e. for nL = O. However, this case would not occur, provided 
that P is low enough. In fact, assuming u(ql) ~ u(qi) as we will show later, the 
inequality u(qL) -C!u. < u(CIi.) -Ck, for n = k =N, implies 
P [c(N) qi-I + qU > c(N) qi. + qi. 
a condition which can be never satisfied when p (> 0) is low enough. 
In this case condition [*qk] is of no interest as the downstream entrant is 
specialised in serving only customers of type L. Analysing the low demand customers' 
bundles it turns out (as claimed before) that the marginal price offered by the 
downstream incumbent [which from [*qiJ is greater or equal to marginal costs u'('lL) ~ 
pm(n)] should not be greater than the one offered by the downstream entrant, i.e. 
u'( qD ~ u'( qiJ 
In fact, otherwise (i.e. ifu'(Q}.) > u'(CIi.) were implied by the optimal solution) we 
incur in a contradiction. Since the dO\\TIstream entrant's unit costs are greater [pm(n) 
< m(k)], the upstream monopolist can make positive gains increasing downstream 
incumbent's low demand customers' marginal price (e.g. setting ql = qi.) while 
leaving ~ = o. 
This happens because, for Q}. ~ qi., the following statements hold: 
(a) the high demand customers' rent (8-I)u'(qD is determined by the level of qi. and 
does not decrease till ql is smaller or equal to qi. 
(b) the low demand customers' marginal price offered by the downstream entrant 
(from [*CIi.D is smaller or equal to his marginal costs (i.e. u'(qi.) ~ m(k)) and is clearly 
greater than the downstream incumbent's marginal cost [j.e. u'(qt) > pm(n)]. 
On the other hand, it is instead possible that the downstream entrant's marginal 
cost m(k) is greater than the Jow demand customers' marginal price offered by the 
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downstream incumbent [i.e. m(k) > ul('lL)] even for ~ = 1. Taking into account [*qiJ, 
this implies that the downstream entrant must apply marginal cost pricing so that the 
inequality ul( 'lL) < ul( q1) holds. 
In practice, when the upstream monopolist obliges the downstream entrant to 
serve only low-demand customers, there is, as usual, no distortion at the top (since 
the marginal access tariffs for high demand customers PH and fiH are set equal to zero) 
and distortion at the bottom, so that Fl may be positive for the dO\\TIstream entrant. 
In fact, when'lL = CJi. and ul('ll) > m(k), from the first order condition [*qiJ Fi. = (N-
kL)(l-~)(e-l)UI(qiJIkL is greater than zero as ~ must be less than unity. 
Let us tum now to the case in which the downstream entrant serves only the high 
type (kL = 0). In this case only equations [*kH] should hold as an equality and we must 
have: 
[*k"] lrk -IT'nL < -U-CkH -IT'nH = 0 
Th~ previous inequality implies that the additional gains from serving an high-
demand customer are greater for the downstream entrant. 
This inequality is satisfied when the downstream entrant's unit marginal costs 
are lower Cir'kH = CtlkL < Ck/nH = CLlnL [i.e. m(k) < ~m(n)], independently of the 
customers' bundles ('ll, qt, qk and qH). Naturally condition [*kH] [i.e. u(qk) -C~ = 
U(qH) -CkH] must hold for kL = O. 
In particular, in this case it is easy to show that the dO\\TIstream entrant can 
never serve a number of customers equal to N, pre-empting the high customer market. 
In fact, in these cases, her average cost would be greater than the incumbent's one, 
giving rise to a contradiction: meN) > ~m(N). Consequently, the equality between 
u( qk) -C~ and u( qjJ -celli is met only when the downstream entrant serves a smaller 
number of customers. 
As usual, we have no distortion at the top (the marginal access tariffs for the 
high demand customers PH and PH being equal to zero). In particular, high demand 
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customers' marginal price offered by the downstream incumbent [which from [*qk] is 
equal to marginal costs ut(qlel) = f3m(n)) is greater than the one offered by the 
downstream entrant, i.e. 8u'(qiJ> 8u'(qjel) = mCk). 
On the other hand, if the downstream entrant will not serve low demand 
customers' and consequently ~ = 1, from the first order condition [*qLJ we see how the 
marginal price offered by the downstream incumbent is increased by piL = (N-nH)(l-~X 
8-1)U'C'll)/nL, an amount which is greater than zero 
Having examined the only three admissible regimes CkL, kH > 0; kL > kH = 0; kH 
> kL = 0) let us re-consider more in depth the marginal access tariffs for the high and 
low demand customers in first degree price discrimination setting. First of all, we 
should remember how the first order conditions [*qH] and [*qiJ hold if and only if the 
downstream entrant is not specialised in serving either low-demand customers (kH = 0) 
or high-demand customers (kL = 0). 
From the first order conditions [*qii) and [*qj.d relative to the per customer 
bundle offered to high-demand conswners, the two marginal access tariffs PH and piH 
are always equal to zero. In practice, the relationship between the high demand 
consumer's marginal prices 8u'(qh) served by different downstream producers is not 
distorted, but it is equated to the per customer marginal costs q/nH = oC(Ni, Q, 
J)i)/OQ. Hence, equations ["'qk] and [*qH) simply state that there is no pricing 
distortion at tbe top when the upstream monopolist is able to perfectly discriminate 
between the two downstream producers. 
On the other hand, from the first order conditions [*'Il] and [*'liJ, we see that 
we have some pricing distortion at tbe bottom, even in the particular case in which 
the two marginal access tariffs (for the low demand customers' bundle) Fl and Fl are 
equal to zero. In any case, no surplus is left to the L consumers; but their marginal 
prices u'( 'Il) and ute qt) must be distorted at least by one downstream producers, in 
order to reduce the net surplus enjoyed by the customers of type H. Specifically, the 
value of the parameter 0 =:; ~ =:; 1 in equations [*qU and [*qt], shows how the distortion 
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at the bottom for each downstream producer depends on which of the two constraints 
[ICk] or [ICi,rl is binding. 
The most interesting case occurs in the non specialisation regime (kL, kH > 0), 
when the low demand customers' bundles -which equate the marginal rent of the high 
demand customers N(9.I)U'(ql)- is split between the downstream incumbent and 
entrant respectively in quotas ~ and (1-~) which do not need to be equal to the 
percentage of high customers served. Ft and piL will be equal to zero only if the quotas 
~ and (l-~) are equal to the percentage of high customers served, as in the case of 
isoelastic curves. When this is not the case, one downstream producer incurs in a 
positive marginal access tariff, while the other faces a negative one. 
Also when the downstream entrant is specialised in low demand customers, Fi. 
and FL can be equal to zero provided that qL is greater than qi. the bundle offered by 
the downstream entrant. In this situation there is no point in departing from the 
marginal pricing rule Pi. = u'(qiJ In fact, if it were Pi. = Ci/kH > pL high-demand 
customers would be worse off taking the entrant's contract and the upstream 
monopolist would have no incentive to rise the marginal price u'(qi) of the low-
demand consumers above that level. When this is not the case, the downstream entrant 
faces a positive marginal access tariff, while the dov.nstream incumbent faces a 
negative one. 
Finally, when the downstream entrant is specialised in high demand customers, 
Ft is always greater than zero, so that the dO\\TIstream incwnbent faces always a 
positive marginal access tariff. 
4..1.2 Second degree access charge discrimination '~vith two types of customers 
We now examine, keeping all the initial assumptions on the players, the more 
general setting of second degree access charge discrimination in which lump sum 
access charges are no longer available. Hence, differently from before, the access 
charges F(Nk, Nt, qk, ql) are no longer specifically designed for each dov.nstream 
producer and their incentive compatibility constraints should also be satisfied to get 
true type revelation. 
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At the same time, even if we depart from the perfect discrimination case, the 
previous analysis of section 4.4.1 of the downstream producers' pricing problem, 
given the values Nil, Nt, qiH and qiL, still holds. In fact as before, the customers tariffs 
TiL and Tk, must be the highest ones satisfying the rationality and incentive 
compatibility constraints of the customers. 
In practice, in order to maximise revenues, given the number of customers NiH' 
Nt served by each dovmstream producer and the related bundles qiH and qiL' no surplus 
is left to the L consumers, while the rent of the H customers (dependent on the low 
customers' bundles qL and qi) is minimised, being equated to (9 - 1) max [u(ql), 
u(qD] the maximum rent he can get mimicking the most profitable low type's 
contract. Specifically, we can still use equations [IRiJ, [ICi-I] , [IRU and [ICk] to 
determine the downstream producers' tariffs ~H' TL, Tii and 1l in correspondence of 
the customers' bundles qi-I, qi., qiH and qiL· 
Consequently, we can now analyse the ways in which the upstream incumbent 
creates additional distortions between the downstream producers, using the access 
charge tariff to maximise his total profit n u = nU(qo. nL• nil' kL• kH' qif' qL, qif' qi.) 
under second degree access charge discrimination. taking into account their incentive 
compatibility constraints [ICC] and [Ie]. 
[U2.1) 
[MME] 
[Pce] 
[PC] 
[ICC] 
[IC] 
[Nid 
[NjHl 
and 
max nu = 2N(p°-c°)qO + F(nL,nH,qii,ql) + F(kL.kH,qi!,qt) - A'C(2N) 
subject to: 
po = v'(qO) 
ne = kL Ti. + kH Til - CC(kH, kL• '11f' qi) - F(kL• kH• qjl' qiJ ~ 0 
ni = nLTL + nH TH - C(nH, nL' q;l' ql) - F(nt. nH• q;!, qD ~ 0 
lr'(kL>kH,qi-I,qt) - F(kL,kH,qji,qt) ~ lr'(nL,nH,q\i,qD - F(nL>nH,q\{,ql) 
tr(nL,nH,qk,qD - F(nL,nH,qi-I,qD ~ tr(kL,kH,qH,qi) - F(kL,kH,qif,qi) 
N - nL - kL ~ 0 
N -nH-kH~O 
nL• kL, nH, kH ~ 0 
241 
From the previous analysis we can derive the downstream producers' tariffs 
~H' ~L' reH and 11. (in correspondence of qi-I, qt, qk and ql) and, as usual, we can 
verify that ex post the solution does automatically satisfy: 
(i) non-negative value assumed by the constraints [NU, [Nkl and by the incumbent's 
customers (i.e. nL' nil ~ 0),. 
(ii) the incentive compatibility constraints [Ice] and [PC). 
In practice, it is profitable to serve all the customers in the two markets and, if 
the downstream incumbent is sufficiently efficient (i.e. j3 is significantly smaller than 
one), the upstream monopolist's profit maximisation implies that the do\\nstream 
entrant (i.e. the less efficient producer) cannot pre-empt either of the two market. 
This is quite plausible, her average and marginal unit costs being sufficiently greater 
than the incumbent's ones (when she serves N customers). Moreover, since only the 
[PCe] and [IC] are binding, the do\\nstream incumbent may enjoy a positive rent 
while the do\\nstream entrant enjoys no rent. 
The upstream monopolist objective function becomes: 
nU(qO, kL> kH' qi-I' qt, qk, qD = 2N[v'(qO)-cO]qO +2lr -~ + 1r' - A'C(2N) 
with: 
lr = lr(kL>kH,qi-I,qi,) = kLu(qD +kH{8u(qil)-C9-1)max[u(qL),u(qD]} -Ce(kH,kL,qi-l,qiJ 
~ = lJ"i(kL,kH,qj-I'qi,) = kLu(qi,)+kH{8u(qj-l)-(O-I)max[u(<!L), u(qi,)]} - C(kH, kL, qil' qi,) 
,r = lJ"i(N-kL,N-kH,qk,qL) = (N-kL)u(<!L) +(N-kHHOu(Qk)-(O-l)max[u(qL),u(qi.)]} 
-C(N-kH,N-kL,qll,qL) 
Hereafter the superscript denotes the values assumed by the do\\nstream 
incumbent's functions when he mimics the do\\nstream entrant. Therefore, the 
upstream monopolist profit maximisation problem can be reformulated as: 
[U.2.2] max n u = 2N[v'(qO)-cO]qo+kLu(qi.)+kH{8u(qi-l)-(O-1)max[u(ql), u(qiJ]} 
-2ce+Ci+(N-kL)u(<!L) +(N-kH){OU(~-I) - (O-l)max[u(qL),u(qi,)]} 
- Ci - NC(2N) subject to: 
kL• kH ~ 0 
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Notwithstanding the previous assumption we can take explicitly into account 
the most relevant issues. This time it is more likely that the upstream monopolist 
obliges the downstream entrant to serve just one type of customers (and specifically 
the low-demand type, i.e. the possibility of kH being equal to zero) while the 
dO\\TIstream incumbent serves both types. The intuition behind this is that the 
downstream entrant is less efficient and in this way the rent enjoyed by the 
downstream incumbent is reduced. Hence, we will examine this case \\ith a 
particular attention. As before, we cannot tell in advance whether qi. is greater, equal 
or smaller than qt. 
Using as before the superscript to denote the values assumed by the 
dO\\TIstream incumbent's functions when she mimics the dO\\TIstream entrant, the 
first order conditions can be specified as follows: 
[qO] CO = v'( qO) + v"( qO)qO 
[kHl 2lrklf" =rnH -,rnH = 0 for kH>O => 9u(qil) -C~i = 9U(qJi) -2CkH +C~I 
or: 2lrklf" =rnH -,rnH < 0 for kH=O => 9u( q\i)-C~ > 9u( qii)-2CkH +C~i 
[kd 2lrkL -if!u. -,rnL = 0 for kL>O => u(qD -C:u. = u(qt) -2Ck +C:u. 
or: 2lrkL -=rnL -,rnL < 0 forkL=O => u(qi.) -C:u. > u(qi) -2Ck +C:u. 
[qli] Ri =Ci H H => eU'(qiI) = Cilnll = ~m(n) 
[qH] RH=2CH- C~ => eu'( qH)=2( CkC~), KH=2m(k )-~m(k »m(k) 
[qU RL = CL -N~(e-l)U'(qD => u'(qL) = ~m(n) -N~(e-l)u'(qD/nL 
[qiJ Ri. = 2Ci.-CiL-N(I-~)(9-1)u'(qi,) => u'(qD=2m(k)-~m(k)-N(I-~)(e-l)u'(qi)/kL 
where, as in the previous section 4.4.1, the parameter 0 ~ ~ ~ 1 is equal to zero when 
qL < qi. and equal to one for qL > qi., and determined endogenously for qL = qt. 
Let us compare the previous conditions \,ith the benchmark case given by first 
degree access charge discrimination. This shows the ways in which, in absence of 
lump sum access prices, the upstream incumbent creates distortions benveen the 
downstream producers in order to maximise his total profit TI". 
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Equations [kHl and [kd express the optimal relationship between nL, nH, kH and 
kL; that is, the optimal distortion which holds between the two marginal access prices 
for the two downstream producers and are similar to [*kHl and [*kd. 
In particular, condition [kHl can be rewritten as lr ill - ,r nH = 1r nH - lr ill > 0 and 
tell us that, in order to serve the high-demand market, the downstream entrant's 
marginal profit on an additional customer of type H should be greater than the 
downstream incumbent's one. The additional profit -which is equal to zero in [*kHl-
is just given by (1r nH -lrkH) the marginal rent obtained by the do\\nstream incumbent 
ifhe takes the contract designed for the dov.nstream entrant. A similar reasoning can 
be made for condition [kd, which can be rewritten as lrkL ,rnL = 1rnL -lrkL > 0, where 
it is easy too see how the downstream incumbent enjoys a rent whose marginal value 
for an additional low-demand customer is given by (ifinH - TkH). 
Hence we have a positive differential marginal access price for the 
downstream entrant which reduces her scale of entry (in order to decrease the 
downstream incumbent's rent). 
While the downstream incumbent pricing conditions, given by [qi-il and [qU, 
stay the same the incentive compatibility constraint implies an additional distortion 
for the downstream entrant's pricing conditions [qj-il and [qiJ. In particular, equation 
[qkl ·shows how the high customers' bundle which is independently chosen by the 
downstream incumbent is not distorted, in practice marginal price ph equates 
marginal cost 9 u'(qk), and F~-l = O. As before, equation [qj.a tells us that no surplus is 
ever left to the low-demand consumers. The marginal prices u'( qt) may be distorted, 
in order to reduce the net surplus of high-demand customers. As in equations [*qU, 
the value of the parameter 0 ~ ~ ~ 1 shows how the distortion at the bottom for the 
downstream incumbent depends only on which of the constraints [IC~] or [ICH] is 
binding. 
On the other hand, condition [qj-ll can be rewritten as Ri-I - CH = ceH - Ck > 0 or 
equivalently 9u'(qj-l) - Ci-IlkH = (Cil -Ck)lkH = m(k)-J3m(k) > O. Thus, differently from 
[*qH], when the downstream entrant serves the high-demand market, her marginal 
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price must be greater than the marginal cost and we have some distortion at the top. 
The difference ceil -Ck) is equal to the marginal rent obtained by the downstream 
incumbent if he takes the contract designed for the downstream entrant. The same 
consideration can be made for condition [qL] since also in this case the dO\\TIstream 
incumbent enjoys a rent whose marginal value for an additional unit in the low 
customers' bundle is given by Ci. -CL > 0 or equivalently kL[m(k)-(3m(k)] > o. 
Hence, equations [qH] and [qiJ show how the upstream monopolist finds it 
optimal to distort the bundle of the customers served by the dO\\TIstream entrant. In 
particular, when the dO\\TIstream entrant's marginal prices PH and Pi. are always 
higher than the ones which hold in the benchmark case given by first degree access 
charge discrimination. That is, we always have a positive marginal access price for 
the additional customer's quantity served by the downstream entrant. 
In sum, we may notice how in the present framework C of non-linear access 
charges in vertical separation) the most relevant differences derive from the presence 
of this additional cost given by the marginal rent obtained by the do\\nstream 
incumbent if he takes the contract designed for the dovmstream entrant. This makes 
more likely that the upstream monopolist prefers the "e" type to specialise in low 
consumers' type. In fact, in this way, the marginal rent (related to the additional 
customer and quantity) of the more efficient type is automatically reduced. 
Furthermore, for (3 low enough, it is also optimal that she \\ill not serve all the 
customers of type L. 
A natural question which arises is whether, in terms of social welfare, this kind 
of non-linear access distortions represent a minor price to be paid (in efficiency 
term) in order to prevent a less efficient competitor from an inefficiently high scale 
of entry or from undesirable forms of tariff competition. This leads us to the next 
subsection where we examine in which way monopoly access charge tariffs should 
be modified to improve social welfare. 
4.4.3 Socially optimal access charge tariffs 
In what follows, we always assume that the upstream firm is a public (or 
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regulated) firm; i.e. his revenues represent public revenues, and also the firm's costs 
and transfers are components of the public budget. As usual, the superscript W, A, $, 
denote respectively Loeb and Magat's, Laffont and Tirole's and Baron and 
Myerson's optimal pricing. 
Let us start ignoring any eventual distributional and excess burden 
consideration, when the public upstream monopolist's general problem is to 
maximise the ultra-liberal social welfare W (with respect to qQ, nL, nH' kL' kH' qi-{, qt, 
qk and qD a la Loeb and Magat (i.e. the unweighted sum of sUrpluses and profits). 
Taking advantage of the previous analysis (setting constraints [Pce] and [Ie] as 
binding), we may write the following constrained maximisation: 
[U2.LM] max W = U( qO, qk, ql, qi-{, qi) -NC(2N, QQ, Q) _Ci -Ce subject to: 
[PC] F(kL' kH' qi~, qD = T(kL,kH,qH,qD = kL Ti. + kH TkC(kH, kL• qil' qD = 0 
[Ie] F(nL,nH,ql~,qD = If(nL,nH,qk,qD -If(kL,kH,qi-{,qD - T(kL,kH,qil,qj) 
[Nt] nL + kL = N 
[Nit] nH + kH = N 
and kL• kH ~ 0 
Using the constraints [NU and [Nil] and substituting the value of U( qQ, qll' qL, 
qH. qi) we can reformulate Loeb and Magat's social welfare maximisation problem 
as: 
subject to: 
getting the following first order conditions: 
["kd 
CO = v'(qO) = po 
8u(qk) -C~ = 8u(qiI) -Clli 
Su( qk) -C~ > Su( qH) -Clli 
u( ql) -C:u. = uC'lL) -Cll. 
uC ql) -C:u. > uC qj) -Cll. 
8u'(qk) = Ck/nH = (3m(n) 
for kH• nH> 0 
for kH = 0, nH> 0 
for kL' nL > 0 
for kL = 0, nL > 0 
fornH > 0 
[WqU 
[Wqi1] 
[wqe] L . 
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u'(ql) = CVnL = (3m(n) ~ m(k) 
eU'(qi1) = CHfkH = m(k) 
u'(qi) = Ci/kL = m(k) ~ (3m(n) 
fornL> 0 
forkH > 0 
forkL > 0 
From [WqO] we see how in the monopolised final market for good 0 price po 
should equate marginal cost co, as in the previous chapter (section 3.3.3) and 
differently from first degree access charge discrimination (section 4.4.1). 
Comparing the previous conditions ["kHl and [Yokd \\ith the benchmark case 
(cf. equations [*kHl and [*kd) we find out they are exactly the same. Hence, we can 
conclude that in order to maximise Loeb and Magat's social welfare, the upstream 
incumbent must not create distortions between the downstream producers. In 
practice, in order to serve either of the two markets, the do\\nstream entrant's 
marginal profit on an additional customer of a given type should be equal to the 
do\\nstream incumbent's one. The optimal relationship between nL, nH' kH and kL 
implies that no distortion should be created between the marginal access prices of 
dO\\nstream producers. 
Hence, improvements \vith respect to the unregulated non-linear access charge 
case (where instead conditions [kHl and [kd imply some distortion, since 
FkH(kL,kH,qi1,qi) > F~-r<N-kL,N-kH,qh,qD and FiJ.(kL,kH,qi{,qi) > fi nL(N-kL,N-
kH,qk,ql)) would be achieved by reducing the value of the marginal access charges 
the downstream entrant (the less efficient competitor) face till they reach the values 
of the do\\nstream incumbent's ones. 
Notice how, when the constraints [PC] and [IC] are binding we consider only 
the tariffs which do not allow positive rents to the do\\nstream entrant (as in the 
previous chapter, section 3.3.3). In general, other non-linear access charges, \vhich 
satisfy constraints [pCt] and [IC] (not necessarily binding), leaving to do\\nstream 
producers some rent, would also be optimal. 
We have explored the cases in which the do\\nstream entrant serves both types 
or she must specialise in serving one market in the first degree access price 
discrimination setting. This analysis will continue to hold in this regulated setting, 
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the only difference being that now the optimal customers' tariffs must equate 
marginal prices to marginal costs so that the downstream producers should be forced 
not to distort low consumers' bundles. In this regard, even the first degree access 
price discrimination would not be socially optimal adopting Loeb and Magat's social 
welfare function. 
Let us then consider the marginal access tariffs set for the high and low 
demand customers and compare them with the previous price discrimination setting. 
As before, the first order conditions [WqHl and [WqiJ hold only if the 
dov,nstream entrant is not specialised in serving respectively low demand customers 
(kH = 0) or high demand customers (kL = 0). From the first order conditions with 
respect to the low demand per customer bundle [\\'qkl and [Wqi-I] (exactly the same as 
[*qk] and [*qH]), we see how the marginal access tariffs PH and F~ are always equal 
to zero. Hence, differently from the second degree charge discrimination setting 
there is no pricing distortion at the top. The high demand consumer's marginal 
prices eu'( qk) set by the dovmstream producers are simply equated to the per 
customer marginal costs C{/nH = aC(N\ Qi, rY)/OQi. 
Referring to the low-demand per customer bundle the first order conditions 
[WqU and [Wqt], show that (differently, from the first and second degree price 
discrimination setting) there is no pricing distortion at the bottom. No surplus is 
left to low-demand consumers; but marginal prices [u'(ql) and u'(qt)l are not 
distorted by the downstream producers, as there is no interest in reducing the net 
surplus of the H customers. However, the value of the marginal prices in equations 
[\\'qU and r'qiJ should not be lower than the ones of the H customers, in order to 
prevent them from mimicking low demand customers. 
Explicitly taking into account the cost of public funds (following Laffont and 
Tirole) the public upstream monopolist would give more weight to his profits in 
maximising the Laffont and Tirole social welfare function Wi.: 
[U2.LT) max Wi. = U(qO, qk, CIl, CJi-{. qt) +i..RU -(l+i..)NC(2N, QO, Q) _Ci -Cc = 
2Nv( qO)+ i..2Npo+nHeu( qk)+nL u( CIl)+ kBeu( qk)+ kL u( qD+ 
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AF(nL>nH,qk,qD+AF(kL,kH,qji,qL) - (l+A)[cO(2NqO)-JYC(2N)] - C ~ C· 
subject to: 
[pce] F(kL, kH, qH, qi) = lr(kL,kH,qi-{,qL) = kL 1l + kH 'fCH - CC(kH, kL, qH, 'lL) = 0 
[IC] F(nL,nH,qii''lL) = yi(nL>nH,qk,qD - yi(kL.kH,qH,'lL) -lr(kLokH,qH,qL) 
[Nid nL + kL =N 
[NiH] nH + kH = N 
and kL, kH ~ 0 
Clearly, for A > 0 the constraint [Pce] is binding, since it is optimal to 
expropriate downstream producers' profits. In particular, [Ie] being binding, there is 
a trade-off between the expropriation of the downstream incumbent's rent and 
efficiency. 
We can substitute the binding constraints [PCC] and [ICi] into W). simplifying 
the problem which reduces to the maximisation of the following function (with NL = 
N-Kd: 
max W). = 2Nv(qO)+A2Nv'(q°)q°+(1+A)[(N-kH)8u(qk)+(N-kL)u(qD 
+kHSu( qH)+kLu( qL)]-j"N(8-1 )max[ u( CIi.),u( qt)]-
subject to: 
-(1 +A)[cO(2NqO)-lYC(2N)]-(l+A)C -(I +A)C· -A(CC _Ci) 
kL, kH ~ 0, 
In this case there is some distortion for type "e" (the less efficient producer) 
and also for low-demand customers but no distortion for type "i" (the more efficient 
one), as in the unregulated case. Specifically, as the first order conditions below 
show, this regime coincides with the unregulated second degree price discrimination 
setting when the shadow cost of public funds A is infinity and with the Loeb and 
Magat regime when A is zero. 
[AqO] (pO _ cO)/pO = _ AI( 1 + A) v"( qO) qO/pO = + AI( 1 + A )EO 
eokH] If' nH = Su( qk)-C~ = Su( qH)-Clli-A(Clli-CkI)/(1 + i.,) 
If' nH = Su(qk) -C~ > 8u(qjJ -CCkI-{-A(C"urCkl)/(1 +i..) 
['okd yi nL = u('lL) -C!u. = u('lL) -C"u-A(C"u-Ch)/(l+A) 
for kH, nH> 0 
for kH = 0, nH> 0 
for kL, nL > 0 
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yi nL = u(qL) -C!u. > u(qL) -cekL-A(Ck-ChJl(1 +A) 
eqiHl eu'(qk) = Ck/nH = pm(n) 
for kL = 0, nL > 0 
fornH> 0 
eqid u'(ql) = qjnL -AN~(e-1)u'(qL)/nL(1+A):S; pm(n) for nL > 0 
e"qeHl eU'(qH) = C}/kH +A(CkCk)lkJl +A):S; m(k) for kH > 0 
[,-qed u'('li.) =Ci/kL +A[(CH-Ck)+N(1-~)(e-l)u'(qDllkL(1 +A):s;m(k) for kL > 0 
where, as in the previous sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, the parameter 0 :s; ~ :s; 1 is equal to 
zero when qL < qi. and equal to one for qL > qi., and detennined endogenously for qL 
= 'li.. 
For intennediate values (A > 0 and kH > 0), welfare would be enhanced by 
reducing the value of the downstream entrant's marginal access charges (related to 
the additional high demand customer and bundle), till they differ from the 
dO\\TIstream incumbent's ones by the socially optimal values [i.e. respectively 1 ..(ceIJ1-
Ci-H)/(l +A) and A(CkCk)lkJI +A)]. The same type of reasoning applies to the low-
demand customers served by the do\'mstream entrant and their bundle (the additional 
issue in this case being the problem of reducing the high-demand customers' rent). 
To reach the second best tariffs F'"(nL,nH,qh,qL) and F(kL,kH,qi{,qi.) which solve 
the public upstream monopolist's problem [U2.LT) it is also needed to enforce less 
distortion behveen the dm\TIstream producer's marginal prices (for type II and L). 
Consequently, allo\\ing for non-linear access charges, to maximise welfare W'#. 
the public finn causes a hvofold distortion to the entrant imposing a distortionary 
allocation of the number of customers (k'#. < kW) and a distortionary choice of C"qL < 
wqD through positive marginal access charges. 
Hence, similarly to the second degree charge discrimination setting, the 
presence of an additional cost given by the marginal rent obtained by the 
downstream incumbent leads to some pricing distortion at the top. In fact, the high 
demand consumer's marginal prices eU'(qil) set by the downstream entrant are 
greater than the per customer marginal costs ceJnH. 
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With respect to the low demand per customer bundle the first order conditions 
e-qU and e-qiJ, show that there is also some pricing distortion at the bottom (even 
if less than in a second degree price discrimination setting). 
Finally, let us briefly follow the Baron and Myerson approach which puts more 
weight on consumers' surplus rather than on the do\\nstream producer's profits cj>lli 
and let W+ represent the welfare function maximised by the upstream public 
monopolist: 
[U2.B~I) max W. = U -NC(2N, QO) -(I-cj»(Ri +Re) +(I-cj»(fi +P) _~(Ci +C) = 
2Nv( qO)+cj> [ nHSu( qk)+nL u( qiL)+ kHSu( qH)+ kL u( CIL)]+ 
N( I-cj» max[ u( ql),u( qt)]+( 1-~ )[F(kL,kH,qi-l,qt)+F(nL,nH,qi-l,ql)] 
-cO(2NqO) -NC(2N) _cj>(c+ce) subject to: 
[Pce] F(kL• kH, <hI. qiJ = lr(kL,kH,qjI,qt) = kL Ti. + kH r I1ce(kH, kL, qil, qt) = 0 
[IC] F(nL>nH,qk,ql) = yi(nL>nB,qk,qD - yi(kL,kH,qil,qiJ -lr(kL,ku,qil,qiJ 
[Nt] nL +kL =N 
[Nkl nB + kH = N 
and kL, kH ~ 0 
This problem becomes easy to solve once the constraints are substituted into W+: 
max W+= 2N[v(qO)-cOqO] +[(N-kH)8u(qk)+(N-kL)u(qL)+kH8u(qil)+kLu(qiJ] -XC-
C _Ce -(1-cj>)(Ce-Ci) 
subject to: kL> kH ~ 0, 
Maximising the previous function we obtain the following first order 
conditions. 
[+qO] CO = v'( qO) = pO 
ekH] yi nH = 8u( qi-l) -C~ = Su( qj-l) -CkH -( I-~ )( CLrCk) 
yi nH = Su( qi-l) -C~H > Su( qj-l) -CL-l -( 1-~ )(CurCLi) 
['kd yi nL = u( ql) -C~ = u( CIL) -Ck -( I-cj> )( Ck -ClI.) 
yi nL = u( ql) -c~ > u( qD -Ck -( I-cj> X CkL -ClL) 
[+qi-l] SU'(qk) = Ck/nH = J3m(n) 
forkH, nH> 0 
for kH = 0, nH> 0 
for kL, nL > 0 
for kL = 0, nL > 0 
for nH > 0 
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[+'lLl UI('lL) = ClInL = ~m(n) 
[+qeHl 9ul(qH) = CHfkH +(I-~)(CirCk)/kH ~ m(k) 
[+qOd ul('lL) = CjjkL +(l-~)(q-cDIkL ~ m(k) 
fornL > 0 
forkH > 0 
forkL > 0 
Condition [+qO] coincides with rqO] and Pareto efficiency is achieved, since 
marginal price equates marginal cost in the monopolised market. There is also no 
distortion between the types served by the do\\nstream incumbent. Some distortion 
arises instead in the marginal access charges of the less efficient downstream 
producer, in order to reduce the' incumbent's rent, as in the Laffont and Tirole case. 
In fact, the participation condition [PC] is always binding so that the downstream 
entrant must have no rent; moreover [IC] creates two trade-offs between rent 
extraction (of the downstream incumbent) and efficiency (i,e. (1-~)(CkL-Ch) > 0 and 
(l-Cp)(CirCk)IkH> 0). 
As with one type of customers the entry's scale and the L customers' bundle 
are again distorted. In particular, the number of customers of the dO\\TIstream 
incumbent is relatively high, while the bundle offered to customers by the 
downstream entrant is relatively low, with respect to the optimal one with the Loeb 
and Magat social welfare function. 
Similarly to Laffont and Tirole's case, social welfare maximisation of W· 
causes this h\'ofold distortion both on the number of customers (k+ < kW) and on the 
customers' bundle (+qL < Wqt). However, the access charges are less distorted than 
they would be under the private monopoly solution, since they tend towards the 
monopoly ones as the weight of profits ~ approaches to zero. Differently from the 
Laffont and Tirole regime there is no distortion between high and Jow customers 
served by the downstream incumbent. In order to equate the incumbent marginal 
prices Pk and PL a negative marginal access charges is required. 
Also as far as the access charge tariffs are concerned, in Baron and Myerson's 
case, a reduction of the entrant's monopoly marginal access charges will enhance 
social welfare, till we reach the second best access charges. This, concludes our 
analysis of vertical separated markets and the design of social1y optimal non-linear 
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access charges. The next section summarised the results derived in this chapter. 
4.5 Final remarks 
In this chapter we first derived the modelling implications of introducing 
vertically separated structures where an upstream monopolist O\\,TIS the network, 
within the previous cost assumption, without major changes with respect to original 
the vertical game proposed in chapter 2. One may ask himself whether, abstracting 
from transition and welfare costs of separation, in this simplified common network 
case, the upstream monopolist is able to retain the same profit of the vertically 
integrated incumbent when he faces two dO\wstream producers. 
We have explored this question in detail, showing how a discriminating 
upstream monopolist \ .. ill continue to follow the monopoly pricing strateb'Y 
expropriating all the dO\\TIstream producers' profits, even when only non-linear 
pricing is allowed (provided that access rights can be resold, or the tariff is a 
function of the customers' bundles) and that cream skimming and surplus taking 
strategy tum out to be again the more profitable strategies of competition for the 
dO\\TIstream entrant. However, when the access charge tariffs can no longer be 
determined by the upstream monopolist on the basis of the customers' bundles (due 
for instance to an additional regulatory constraint), the standard result of 'no 
distortion at the top' does no longer hold, because a new trade off arises between 
rent extraction and profit maximisation for the dovoTIstream incumbent, so that a 
tariff distortion at the top is introduced, with an additional constraint on the 
produced quantity. 
In practice, in the context of our basic simplified common network case, the 
addition of vertical separation to competition seems to play the minor role of 
complicating the industrial framework without providing further efficiency gains. In 
order to verify if this result holds in a more standard set-up, we considered the case 
in which the downstream sector is portrayed (similarly to the two customer types' 
market) with one producer (type "i") strictly more efficient of the other (type "e") for 
any equal number of customers served. 
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Here, abstracting from many interesting variants and extensions, we focused 
mainly on the interactions between competition and regulation when the downstream 
producers face one or two types of consumers and the upstream monopolist can use 
non-linear access charge tariffs. Also in this generalised framework, we have shovtn 
how cream skimming may arise depending on the specification of the cost functions, 
given the vertical structure of the model. In fact, also in this framework we do not 
make any ad hoc hypothesis, such as excluding a priori the possibility for the entrant 
to serve low demand customers. 
In practice, referring to a non-linear price setting, the basic cream skimming 
model continues to hold, even if the two roles are interchanged: in fact, in the 
absence of any capacity constraint, it is likely that the dov\'TIstream entrant will be 
obliged by the upstream monopolist's access charge tariffs to serve only low-demand 
customers, since she is less efficient and in this way the rent enjoyed by the 
dO\\TIstream incumbent is reduced. This is not the case for a public (or regulated) 
upstream monopolist, who maximises the Loeb Magat welfare function, as in first 
degree price discrimination, since there are no. strong incentives to allow the 
downstream entrant to serve only low-demand customers. 
The main general conclusion that we can derive from this analysis is that there 
IS no distortion at the top for the dO\\TIstream entrant's customers and some 
distortion at the bottom, for low customers' allocations and bundles. This means 
that, in practice, a modified monopoly result applies also in this framework, vtith 
quite relevant exceptions. In particular, when the upstream monopolist is allowed by 
the regulator to use the more general access charge tariff structure, the private 
monopoly solution implies a tridimensional distortion with respect to Loeb Magat's 
welfare maximising solution as: (a) on the number of customers served by the 
dO\\TIstream entrant (which is reduced km < kW ), (b) on the low customers' bundle 
(which is decreased CIi.,qt < ~), and (c) on the high customers' bundle offered by the 
dO\\TIstream entrant (which is decreased since qH < q~). A similar result applies in 
Laffont and Tirole's case, as social welfare W" maximisation distorts the marginal 
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access charges, but to a lower extent. Instead, with Baron and Myerson's social 
welfare W+ function there is a twofold distortion only with respect to the downstream 
entrant, since only the number of customers (k+ < k\\') and his customers' bundle (.qt 
< ~ are reduced. 
In the next chapter we summarise the main results of our analysis, sketching 
the progress made in each chapter. To sum up the main policy implication of the 
case of vertical separation, analysed in this chapter, we can strongly argue that 
competition at the downstream level should be encouraged. In fact, in the alternative 
. "more standard" fTamework also competition by a less efficient dov~nstream entrant 
(compared to the dovmstream incumbent) turns out to be welfare enhancing in the 
presence of an upstream public firm. However, regulation is still needed to avoid 
inefficient scales of entry or distortions which are not socially optimal, but would 
emerge in the absence of any regulatory constraint. 
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Chapter 5 
SmlMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In broad terms what motivated this thesis was to gain a greater understanding 
of the particular features introduced in the standard regulatory set-up by competitive 
issues and vertically. related markets. Specifically, we intended to explore their 
impact on the profitability of the market and the possibility for the incumbent to 
maintain monopoly profits under different regulatory regimes. Our focus has been on 
the access pricing problem which is becoming the key issue to the regulators. 
Despite the presence of a growing literature in these area, nevertheless models fail to 
incorporate the use of non-linear pricing. Since price discrimination is common in 
practice this omission can lead to misleading results. 
In what follows we summarise the main results of our study, reconsidering in 
detail the whole structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the current state of the art of the literature 
on regulation (and related issues in procurement). We considered the recent 
developments of the literature on regulation, notably the substantial achievements of 
Laffont and Tirole, largely collected in their 1993 book. We explored in detail the 
relevance of the presence of asymmetric information between the regulator and the 
regulated firm. We showed that moral hazard as introduced in the standard way 
(referring for instance to Laffont and Tirole's canonical model) does not bring 
substantial changes in the outcomes relative to a pure adverse selection model. We 
then considered the ways in which competition and regulation interact in different 
scenarios. Namely, regarding regulation we took into account regulatory constraints 
on final goods, such as price caps, and on intermediate goods. Finally, competition 
\\ithin the market has been distinguished from competition for natural monopoly. 
These are the reasons why we adopted a simplified framework in which we 
ignored asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated firm, 
introducing the only type of asymmetric information on the consumers' side. 
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Technically, we dealt with a game of incomplete information, classified also as a 
game of mechanism design, sketched below. In the canonical framework a 
monopolist (the principal) has incomplete information about the agent's types, 
namely the consumers' willingness to pay for his goods. He has to design a tariff 
schedu1e, which determines the price to be paid as a function of the quantity 
purchased We extended this canonical setting to the presence of c'ompetition and 
vertically related markets. 
Making reference to the existing literature, the only model that introduces 
second degree price discrimination in a regulatory setting is Laffont and Tirole 
(1990b). Regarding competitive issues, however, this model is quite restrictive, since 
it ignores the most interesting problems of strategic competition. In fact, as in the 
original (1986) model competitors are assumed to have an unlimited capacity, and 
they don't really undertake any type of economic decisions (competitors do not even 
choose which type of customer is more profitable to serve, or the optimal pricing 
strategy to apply). Basically, this occurs because their technology is exogenously 
given and, due to their hypothesis of two part tariffs (where the fixed part is simply 
given by the fixed per capita cost of access) \\ith perfect competition, it 
automatically determines the surplus competitors ofTer to the most profitable 
customers. In practice, the problem of which type of customers \\ill be served in 
equilibrium is already settled in advance by the authors, by appropriately choosing a 
relatively high fixed per capita cost in order to avoid competition for the low 
customers (the skimmed milk). 
However, in a more general situation, it is not clear at all that high-demand 
consumers should always be seen as the most profitable part of the market by the 
entrant. In other words, the entrant's choice of the type of customers to serve should 
in general depend also on the relative efficiency of the competitor and needs to be 
endogenised in a sequential multistage game. 
In reality we usually do not see a perfectly regulated incumbent or a perfectly 
competitive fringe, since the typical initial situation entails a "big" incumbent who 
257 
faces a "small" entrant not able to undertake a complete market invasion. We 
decided to consider a small output constrained entrant, the idea being that 
competition should start somewhere. Another basic difference between our approach 
and the one proposed by Laffont and Tirole is that here the incumbent is the first 
mover \\ith respect to pricing policies, i.e. the first player who chooses the tariff for 
which he is committed to serve the customers. We think that this resembles more 
closely the typical situation in utilities industries, where the incumbent is more 
powerful and enjoys the first mover advantage in many respects. 
When the competitor does not behave as a purely competitive fringe things 
become more complicated, and in this case what is the most lucrative part of the 
market for the entrant and for the incumbent remain open questions. The answer to 
them depends crucially on the respective marginal costs, the game's structure, the 
strategy of competition chosen by the entrant. her cost and scale of entry. Here, what 
is more lucrative for the entrant will determine which type of customer she will 
choose to serve. if she is able to attack both part of the market. 
Chapter 2 examined the private incentives of the economic players (basically 
an incumbent and a' potential entrant) in the absence of regulatory constraints in 
horizontal and vertical settings (where the rival enters the do\\nstream level). 
Specifically, we explored the conditions under which the incumbent can maintain 
monopoly profits while entry occurs at one vertical level and act as if he were the 
only player. 
This approach (in which first we leave aside regulation) allowed us to 
detennine what behaviour the regulator could expect from the economic agents in 
the case in which they operated \\ith no constraints. In this way we identified the 
persistence of natural monopoly in network and the presence of cream-skimming 
competition. We have shown that in the absence of vertically related markets cream 
skimming is not necessarily the most profitable strategy for a potential entrant except 
for very particular cases. We also examine the question regarding the desirability of 
cream skimming, sho\\ing that this type of competition. contrary to the general 
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wisdom, is not necessarily as "harmful" as skimmed milk competition. Basical1y, 
productive efficiency benefits from the entry of a more efficient rival and from an 
allocative point of view we go towards socially optimal pricing since the distortion at 
the bottom is reduced. 
Introducing vertically related markets we analysed a simple framework in 
which both the incumbent and his competitors have the same technical requirements 
for the intermediate good (i.e. there is no need to create new infrastructure or 
facilities to connect the competitors with the existing network). We referred to this 
situation as the "common network case", following the definition by Laffont and 
Tirole. 
What we discovered is that, when the incumbent remains the monopolist of an 
intermediate good which is consumed both internally and by any potential 
competitors, cream skimming is the only strategy of competition allowed by the 
incumbent. Specifically we showed how the entry of an equally efficient competitor 
in the market of the non monopolised good 1, represents a limiting case as the 
incumbent is indifferent about entry. In fact, setting the per customer access charge 
equal to the monopoly variable profits, he maintains the monopoly pricing strategy 
and the related profits, independently of the entry scale. It is optimal for the 
incumbent to allow entry, if, maintaining the previous monopoly pricing, he can set a 
per customer access charge equal to the variable profits of the entrant and they are 
equal or greater than his. own. This happens only with an equally or more efficient 
competitor. Moreover, the incumbent finds it optimal to oblige the competitor to 
behave as a surplus taker and to allow only cream skimming competition. However, 
it would be preferable for the incumbent (and for the maximisation of social welfare) 
that the competitor sells all the produced good I to the incumbent (reaching only 
break-even profits), so that the latter is able to resell it to the consumers, applying the 
monopoly tariffs. Further refinements of our vertical game including the 
endogenisation of the scale of entry (previously exogenously given) and the 
consideration of more general cost functional forms for the entrant are considered 
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The" outcomes of the models proved to be robust with respect to these extensions. 
In chapter 3 we analysed" further the market outcomes described above and the 
ways in which the regulator can intervene to improve social welfare. The regulator 
can intervene by directly setting the terms of interconnection between the incumbent 
and potential rivals, or more generally by imposing some constraints on firms' 
conduct. 
Clearly, the aims and objectives of regulation are several and can be partly 
contradictory. They include not only allocative and productive efficiency, but also 
the promotion of competition and the respect of universal service obligations (or 
more generally of a criterion of fairness). Moreover, information and incentives 
issues complicate the intervention of regulators. However, the amount of private 
information on the regulatory side built into the standard models seems too limited 
by comparison with the problems actual regulators face. There is no reason why the 
regulator should be merely uncertain about the level of the cost function, as in 
Laffont and Tirole (1994a) and Vickers (1995), and not about its shape, or the 
demand condition of the industry. Furthermore, as Vickers (1995) says "It would be 
nice to examine a model in which the regulator was uncertain about both upstream 
and dO\\TIstream cost levels" (p. 4), but till now no model assumes that the entrants' 
costs are private information. As already explained, we decide to leave aside 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection on the regulatory side to make the 
problem more manageable and to reveal its fundamental structure. These 
assumptions are quite usual in the case of a public firm which directly maximises 
social welfare, as well as in the large part of the debate on access pricing and vertical 
Issues. 
Within the models of access pricing proposed by the recent economic literature 
both competitors and the regulated firm make use only of a linear access pricing 
policy. Hence, the results are somewhat special in their nature; that is, the proposed 
regulatory rules are optimal only in a framework in which non-linear tariffs are 
prevented on "a priori" grounds, or because of an exogenous political constraint. 
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Since this pricing strategy is a more general one. always superior to the linear pricing 
strategy, it is not clear why it should be rejected a priori by the firms (and in 
. particular the incumbent) and by the regulatory authority. Hence, we introduced the 
possibility of making use of non-linear access charges. 
The general conc1usion we drawn are that the regulator should not allow 
competition for the low demand type or by a less efficient entrant and should impose 
the adoption of optimal non-linear pricing. In our horizontal setting the presence of 
cream skimming competition as shown in Chapter 2 is welfare enhancing since it 
reduces the distortion at the bottom. However, even in such a favourable case private 
tariffs are far from optimal; basically because profit maximising firms putting no 
weight to consumers' surplus distort tariffs too much (compared to a public finn. 
even if redistributive issues are ignored and we deal with a first best setting). 
Welfare enhancing instruments, such as the imposition of appropriate entry taxes or 
the regulation of the entrant have been considered in detail. 
Introducing a vertically related market we examined optimal pricing both for 
access and final goods. We took advantage of the Baumol-Willig rule and tested its 
optimality both in Baumol (1983)'s original setting and in our vertical game where 
fully non-linear tariffs are allowed for. We have sho\\n how the Baumol-Willig rule 
can also be interpreted as a way of imposing an entry tax, in order to avoid socially 
undesirable entry, while keeping the incumbent's position unchanged (as if entry had 
not occurred). Under this perspective this rule turned out not to be provide socially 
optimal pricing criteria, unless we confine ourselves to the Loeb and Magat setting, 
that is, ignoring redistributive considerations. The other welfare instruments 
envisaged before are instead still valuable, as they employ the welfare properties 
implicit in a (horizontal or vertical) merger. 
In chapter 4 we introduced vertically separated markets. For a long time 
regulatory reforms have moved in the direction of divestitures and deregulated 
structures. Yet the theoretical and applied literature on this intriguing area is very 
little. We first expanded the model set out in Chapter 2 to see under which 
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circumstances we can get the same outcomes where the regulatory stage involves 
divestiture. It turned out that if it is possible to resell access rights or if access 
charges can be expressed as a function of the consumption bundles that characterise 
each type of consumers nothing changes compared to the complete information 
benchmark. Basically the upstream incumbent through the use of an appropriate 
access charge tariff obliges the downstream entrant to cream skim the market and to 
act as a surplus taker. Doing so he can retain the same profit as entry had not 
occurred. Hence in such cases vertically separated structures do not introduce any 
major changes in our setting. 
We then model vertical separation in an alternative framework that portrays 
access price discrimination by an upstream monopoly towards do\\nstream 
producers of different types (that is, level of efficiency). \Ve extended the model by 
introducing price discrimination also in the final demand market. 
As should be expected, there are no clear cut results in terms of the optimal 
pricing strategy to be applied in the intennediate and final demand markets. \Ve 
discover a variety of different combinations of cases that can arise depending on the 
specification of the functional form of dO\\nstream producers' costs and final 
customers' demand. In this setting do\\nstream producers differ only in their 
efficiency level, their cost functions having the same functional form and being 
decreasing in the scale of entry, so that differently from before the entrant is not 
output constrained. 
Nevertheless the basic cream skimming model continues to hold, even if the 
two roles are interchanged. In fact, in the absence of capacity constraints it is very 
likely (even if it not always the case) that the dO\\nstream entrant \\ill be obliged by 
the upstream incumbent to serve only low-demand customers, the reason being that 
in this way the rent enjoyed by the downstream incumbent is reduced 
Another generalles'son to be dra\\n is that distortion can arise not only in the 
tariff schedule offered to fmal customers but also in the customers' allocations 
between the do\\nstream producers. Nevertheless, a modified monopoly result 
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applies also in this framework, \\ith quite relevant exceptions. This shows how 
pervasive is the standard no distortion at the top result. 
To conclude, let us sketch some directions for further research. We believe it is 
important, building up on what has been already done, to set up a quite general 
framework which allows a comparison between what optimal regulation would 
suggest and the results achievable through the most common regulatory constraints 
on the price level and/or structure. In practice, in the UK supporters of the "price 
cap" or "RPI-X" argue that significant benefits have been achieved Yet its architect 
(Littlechild, 1983) only claimed it to be a short to medium-term instrument, and 
there have been strident calls for its replacement. Nor was it designed for access 
pricing. Hence it is worth exploring whether price cap regulation (or other possible 
candidates) appropriate in a setting where there are vertically related markets and 
also for the purpose of regulating access pricing. 
The advantage of the approach proposed in this thesis is in its simplicity, 
whilst capturing some of the flavour of Laffont and Tirole's (1990) and (199';a) 
papers. Yet clearly it is important to consider in some detail \\ithin our framework 
the theoretical implications of the introduction of agency problems between the 
regulator and the regulated firm. Following this perspective, "ith a particular 
emphasis on non-linear pricing in final and intermediate markets, it is possible to 
develop a model which fits better the needs of the regulatory authorities. Within this 
we can embed rules, such as RPI-X in order to examine their properties. An 
additional d}namic issue concerns the analysis of what elements in conjunction with 
RPI-X can lead the regulator to a closer understanding of the firm's cost structure. In 
this context, we would like to explore if RPI-X can be considered an appropriate 
instrument for the longer-term or are there superior alternatives a regulator might 
employ. Finally, we feel it is relevant to address specific questions related to vertical 
separation and divestitures. In a more general framework the downstream competitor 
can be selected through an auction and the optimal number of firms in the 
downstream sector can be endogenised depending on the industry's cos.t structure. 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the regimes in the LT game 
In what follows we will derive all the possible regimes of the LT game (an 
intuitive account of which has been given in section 1.3) maintaining the same 
notation and the same simplifying hypotheses sketched in section 1.3. 
The incumbent maximises his profit with respect to T L' 'lL. T H and <hI subject 
to the follovving constraints: 
maxTI <XL TL + <XH TH - C(<XL qL + <XH 'h~) subject to: 
[IRtl u('lL) ~ TL 
[IR'H] 9 u(~) - T H ~ SH 
[ICd u('lL) - TL ~ u(~) - TH 
[ICH] 9 u(~) - T H ~ 9 u( 'lL) - T L 
No comments are needed for [IRd [ICd and [ICH], since they have the 
standard meaning. The modified individual rationality constraint [IR'Hl instead tells 
that a H consumer will not buy from the incumbent, unless he is allowed to enjoy a 
rent greater or equal to the exogenous surplus offered by the entrant SII' 
When both types are served by the incumbent, LafTont and Tirole (1993) 
demonstrate (Appendix A6.3) that there are five different possible no-bypass regimes 
with the following binding constraints: (1) IRL and ICII, (2) IRL, ICu and IRii , (3) IRL 
and IRH, (4) IRb IRk and rCb (5) IRH and ICL. 
Here, we will derive all these regimes in a stylised version of the model (L T 
game), with no asymmetric infonnation and no 'optimal' regulation. 
In the LT game we obtain regime (1) when the value of SII is Jess than the level 
(9-I)u('lL). Once we substitute IRL and ICH into n, the profit function can be easily 
maximised only with respect to 'lL and 'h1: 
max n l 
Setting Pi = 9i u'(~), we can verify that the first order conditions are: 
264 
In particular when the net surplus ~ is increased but is still less than the le\'el 
(9 - l)u(qL) (where qL corresponds to the values which occurs for u(<h:) is equal to c) 
we are in regime (2), with P=PI and IRk binding, Thus, taking also into account IRk 
we get that in equilibrium: 
u('lL) = SI!(9 - 1) = TL; Pi. < PI. < C 
PH = c; TH = 9 U(qH) - (9 - l)u('lL) 
Hence. as SH increases. PL decreases reaching c (and'lL increase till qI) when 
finally SH is equal to (a - 1 )u( qi). In practice, while 'hI remains constant, the 
distortion at the bottom is reduced till marginal price PI. becomes equal to marginal 
cost c, 
Then we move to regime (3) when (a - l)u(qi) < SH < (9 - I)U(q~l) and (due to 
a greater SH) ICH is no longer binding. Consequently, from IRL and IRi1 we get: Til = 
9 uC 'h-I) - SI-I and the profit function becomes: 
We can easily verify that in equilibrium marginal prices equal to marginal 
costs: 
Later. as SH increases it becomes equal to (a - I )uC'hI) and we are in regime (~), 
where ICL becomes binding. Consequently taking into account this additional 
constraint we can easily get: 
Pi: = c; TL = u(qL) 
UC<hI) = SH/(a - 1) < c; PH < C 
Hence, as SH increases till SH is equal to (9 - 1 )u( cht), PH decreases below c 
(and 'lH increases to qH). In practice, the marginal price PH is now below marginal 
cost c in order to retain the H customers and to prevent pooling. 
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Finally we get into regime (5) when ~ is greater than (8 - l)u(qH) and IRL is 
no longer binding. Consequently from ICL and IRk we get the new profit function: 
and we obtain the following first order conditions: 
Pi: = c; TL = u(qL) + (9 - 1) u(qii) - SH < u(qiJ 
PH = c/[l + (a,iaL)(9-1)/8] < c; T H = 8 u(qii) - SH 
Hence, as the individual rationality constraint of type L is no longer binding. 
the low-demand customers enjoy a positive net surplus [TL < u(th.)]. 
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Appendix 2: The surplus taker pricing strategy of the ent~ant 
Here we will prove that to act as a surplus taker represents the optimal pricing 
strategy for the entrant. That is, marginal tariffs must be set equal to her marginal 
cost and customers must be allowed the same rent determined by the incumbent. 
We are naturally dealing with the the sequential game in which the incumbent 
accomodates entry. From the formulation of our game the choice of the entrant is 
binary, in the sense that she can decide either to serve a fixed number of customers, 
or not to enter the market. In the case entry takes place, the rival must commit 
herself to serve a given number of customers of type high or low, after obserying the 
incumbent's tariffs fixed for each type. 
We have already determined the solution of the game for a tarifTtaker entrant. 
It is easy to show how the entrant may improve upon it, leaving unchanged the 
number of customers of each type served, if she acts instead as a surplus taker. In 
fact, in this way she will increase profits setting prices equal to her marginal cost and 
alIo'h1ng to each type the same rent implied by the incumbent's tariffs. In practice, if 
she serves only the low type, no rent is left to the consumers and no marginal losses 
are incurred. However, the entrant must also respect the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the high type consumers if she chooses to serve them. The relevant 
incentive compatibility constraint is naturally the same one considered in the 
incumbent's problem, as the entrant allows the same surplus. 
Notice how this constraint was triviaIIy fulfilled in the case of a tariff taker 
competitor. In the surplus taker case the entrant proposes a new tariff the solution of 
her optimisation problem implies the equality between marginal prices and marginal 
costs. Specifically, in the cream skimming case by setting marginal price equal to 
marginal cost marginal profits will be equal to zero, so that profits cannot be 
increased any further. 
Intuitively, on one hand if the entrant allows a lower level of surplus than the 
incumbent the consumer would rather buy the good from the incumbent. On the 
other hand, offering a higher surplus would entail a net loss of profit 
267 
A similar reasoning carries over to the case of skimmed milk competition and 
for intermediate cases. The reasoning is also true changing the number of customers 
of each type served by the entrant, since (for given values of KL and KH) it is not 
possible to improve upon surplus taker pricing. Generally, apart from the case of an 
equally efficient competitor, the optimal values of the entry scale in each market (KL 
and KH) would be different. In fact, we have already seen (in section 2.4.3 
considering the surplus taker case) that for quadratic utility functions we have me> 
iff and me > m for any value ofK. 
Therefore, the optimal pricing strategy for the entrant is to behave as a surplus 
taker. 
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Appendix 3: Endogenising the entrant's choice of customers 
The optimisation problem for a tariff-taker entrant, in the general case, can be 
stated as: 
maxne 
The marginal profitability per unit of customer is: 
Let us examine all the terms that enter in dne I dKH: 
1) T = (T ~mcrn) - (T L -m<lL) represents the di fference behveen the two net revenues 
enjoyed by serving a customer of type H and a customer of type L. 
2) n = KH d(T~m~-I)/dKH + (K-KH) d(TL-m'lL)/dKH represents the lola/ net gain (or 
loss) on the inframarginal customers of type Hand L. Let us examine the single 
components of this term: 
The sign of nH is negative (as 9>1, U'(ClL»O and d'lL/dKH~O). In fact, Wu 
represents the loss incurred by the entrant for each customer of type II. Intuitively, as 
KH rises the entrant must be willing to leave for each additional high demand 
customer a net marginal surplus (9-1)u'('b.) times the increase in the quantity sold to 
the L type (d'b./dKH)' 
n L = d(TL-m'lL)/dKH = [u'(qd - m] dqIldKH ~ 0 
The sign of n L is positive (as long as m < u'('lL), since d'lL/dKII ~ 0). In fact. 
WL represents the gain enjoyed by the entrant for each customer of type L. As Kit 
rises the entrant for each additional high demand customer obtains a gain equal to 
the marginal revenue [u'('b.)-m] times the increase in the quantity sold to the L type 
(d'lL/dKH)' 
3) fe = (feH - feL) represents the effect brought by a different cost of entry per unit 
and type of customer, where feH=dF/dKH and feL =dF/d(K-KH)' Its sign is determined 
by the values assumed by feH and feL' For simplicity's sake in what follows we will 
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assume that fe=O, a condition is clearly fulfilled whenever the cost of entry depends 
only on the total scale of entry K. 
The entrant will serve both type of customers if and only if d1tE/dKH=O, which 
occurs whenever: 
Proposition: m is a decreasing function of KH. 
Here we will prove that m is a decreasing function ofKII. First, let us deal with 
the case in which there are no infra-marginal effects (0=0). This \,ill surely hold 
whenever dqr/dKH=O, as both the expressions 011 and ilL vanish. Let us then expand 
this term, applying the chain rule: 
where PL=c/[I-(9-I);Rl; R=NHINL=[N-KH]/[N-K+KH]' The values of the single 
components are given by: 
oqJOPL = 1 / utI 
~/oR = c(9 - 1) / [1 - (9 - 1)/R]2 
dR/dKH= - [2N-K] I [N - K+ KHF 
It is self-evident that as N assumes very high values compared to KL the last 
component vanish. The same is true when the percentage scale of entry (KIN) is 
small. Ignoring infra-marginal effects: 
The denominator of m represents the additional tariff of the II type, which is 
the integral from 'h. to 'lH of the area which lies below the H type marginal utility 
function. This area can be decomposed in the integral from 'lL to qn of the area 
which lies between the H type marginal utility function and the marginal cost c and 
the total cost incurred by selling the quantity ('hr<1L). Dividing the additional tariffby 
('lH-'lL) the first component will vary only according to the relative height (9Pt.) 
whereas the latter component is clearly independent of KH. Since PI. is a decreasing 
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function ofKH the same is true ofm. Therefore, m is lower than m. 
Consider now the case in which n is not equal to O. We will prove that the 
lower bound of m m(O*O) is less than m(O=O), where the upper bound m (0*0) is 
greater than m (0=0), so that also in this case m is a decreasing function of KH. 
Substituting the value ofm(O*O) into TIe, we get: 
To bring back dTIe / dKH to zero, since the coefficient of m in the expression is 
negative, m must decrease, so that m is lower in the presence of infra-marginal 
effects. 
Applying the same reasoning, we substitute the value of m (0*0) into TIe: 
dTIe / dKI~ m) = -KOL = - K[U'(qL) - m] dqddKH > ° 
To bring back dTIc/dKH to zero m must decrease, since its coefficient in the 
expression is negative, so that m assumes a greater value in the presence of infra-
marginal effects. 
Let us provide a counterexample in which the entrant finds it more profitable 
to substitute one H type customer \\ith one L type. Let us consider, for quadratic 
utility functions the extreme case in ,\'hich the entrant in the initial setting serves all 
high-demand customers (K=N=KH) and PH=PL =p. Compare this situation with the 
one in which the entrant is serving (N-l) customers of H type and only one customer 
of type L. Clearly, in the latter case PH=P, whereas p~ > P (since ~ is a decreasing 
function ofKH we can also conclude that qi. < 'h.). 
We need to prove that the gains obtained on the (N-I) customers of II type 
(hereafter denoted by 0H) are greater than the losses due to the forgone additional 
tariff on one customer of type H (hereafter 0L)' 
GH = (N - 1) (9 - 1) u'('hJ (~-qD 
0L = (% - 'h. ) (9 - 1) 13/2 
To prove that 0H is greater thart 0L, since u'(~) > P, it suffices to show that: 
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Dividing both sides by (e-l) 13 we get: 
For quadratic utility function we know that: 
(ClL - qiJ = (1-13) - {l- 13 / [1- (8 -1)1 (N-I)] = (e - l)/(N - 8)(3 
('lJr 'IL) = (1 - pIe) ~ (1 - 13 ) = (1 - lie) 13 
By substituting the values ('lL - qiJ and (qH - 'lL) in the previous expression, for 
GH to be greater than GL we just need to verify that: 
(N-l)(e-l)1 (N-e) 13 > (8-1) p/2e 
which reduces to: 
(N-I) > (N-e)/2e 
a condition which always holds, since e is greater than unity. 
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Chapter 1 's notation 
Laffont and Tirole's model: 
C = cQ + E is the general specification of the cost function for the 
regulated finn where: 
c= 13-e 
P 
e 
Q 
E 
W 
\V(e) 
v 
11 ... 0+1 
is the marginal (and average) cost 
is the adverse selection parameter (a technological 
parameter in the two type case P = PL, PH) 
is the moral hazard parameter (the effort level) 
is the output 
is a noise parameter 
is Laffont and Tirole's social welfare function in the 
basic (1986) monopoly model where: 
is the consumers' gross surplus 
is the shadow cost of public funds 
is the managerial utility function where: 
represents the transfers from the regulator to the 
regulated finn 
is the disutility of effort, where '4">0, '41">0 and '4''''>0 
is the probability the regulated finn being efficient 
(i.e. P=PL) 
is the differential rent of the more efficient finn 
denote the proportion of low and high-demand 
consumers 
is the surplus offered by the competitive fringe 
is the Lerner index 
is the elasticity of demand 
is the cross elasticity of demand between n and n+ 1 
is the fringe's price reaction 
". 
The simplified model: 
v = c+\jJ(e) 
n=tr-vQ 
uH = 9U(qH) 
uL= u('IL) 
9>1 
(T H, 'lJ1) (T L, 'IL) 
PI. =l-'IL 
7tL and 7tH 
R(Q) = [TL + TI-I] N 
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is our newly defined cost function inclusive of 
managerial disutility 
is the incumbent's profit 
is the surplus of the high-demand consumer 
is the surplus of the low-demand type consumer 
is the taste parameter 
are the incumbent's non-linear tariffs chosen for each 
type of consumer t = H, L (T is the maximum 
willingness to pay for buying the bundle q) 
is the per customer inverse demand function for the H 
type (specified for a quadratic utility function) 
is the per customer inverse demand function for the L 
type (specified for a quadratic utility function) 
are the per customer profits of the incumbent 
is the revenue function of the incumbent, where N is 
the number of customers of each type. 
n 
NC(2N, QO, QI) 
K=l:l~ 
F (KH• KL> QC) 
CV=mQc 
s=K/N 
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Chapters 2'5 notation 
is the number of consumers of each type 
is the surplus of the consumer of type t for good 1 
is the taste parameter. 
is the bundle of consumer t 
is the incumbent's non-linear tariff chosen for each 
type of consumer t = H, L (T is the maxImum 
willingness to pay for buying the bundle q) 
represents the per customer inverse demand function 
for type t for the final good (good 1) 
represents the per customer inverse demand function 
for the monopolised good (good 0) 
is the consumer surplus for good 0 
is the total output of good 0 
is the total output of good 1, where Q and QC are the 
output of the incumbent and the entrant respectively 
denotes the profit function of the incumbent 
is the network subcost function of the incumbent 
is a fixed limited scale of entry, in terms of number of 
customers served of type t 
is the residual number of customer of type t served by 
the incumbent 
is the access tariff set by the incumbent 
is the variable cost of the entran 
is the marginal cost of the entrant 
is the unit production cost of the incumbent for good 1 
is the marginal cost of access for good 1 
is the marginal cost of the incumbent for good 0 
is the proportional scale of entry 
Te and qe t l 
T 
n 
fe 
me 
Land~ 
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are respectively the tariff and the bundle offered to 
each customer of type t by the entrant 
is the additional net revenue enjoyed by the incumbent 
serving a customer of type H in the place of a L type . 
is the inframarginal gain enjoyed by the incumbent 
serving a customer of type H in the place of a L type 
is the marginal fixed cost incurred by the incumbent in 
serving a customer of type H in the place of a L type 
is the limiting value of the marginal cost for which 
entry is profitable 
are the per customer profits of the incumbent for each 
type t 
are the Lagrangean function and the relative multiplier 
w 
IC 
f 
ADC 
f 
.. 
Weight on S 
Weight on rri 
Weight on rre 
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Chapters 3's notation 
as a superscript refers to Loeb and Magat's social 
welfare function 
denotes the weight attached to consumers surplus and 
to the entrant's profit (and as a superscript characterises 
Baron and Myerson social welfare function) 
denotes the shadow cost of public funds and as a 
superscript characterises Laffont and Tirole's social 
welfare function 
is the incremental cost of providing track space 
is the per customer access charge 
is the access deficit contribution 
represents the per unit profit on the access charges 
Social \Velfare functions 
Loeb-Magat Laffont-Tirole Baron-Myerson 
1 I 1 
1 >1 1 
I 1 <1 
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Chapters 4's notation 
Vertical separation model (section 4.2): 
Fi 
TL and q{ 
denotes the profit function of the upstream monopolist 
is the network subcost function of the upstream 
monopolist 
is the revenue function of the dov.nstream producer j 
is the access tariff for the dO\\nstream producer j 
is the number of customer of type t served by the 
downstream incumbent 
is the number of customer of type t served by the 
dO\\nstream entrant 
are respectively the tariff and the bundle offered to 
each customer of type t by the dO\\TIstream producer j 
is the gross profit of the dO\\nstream producer j 
(inclusive of access charges) 
is the per customer gross profit of the dO\\TIstream 
producer j 
is the net profit of the dov.nstream producer j 
are the gross profit, the price and the output level in the 
vertically integrated case 
Vertical separation model (section 4.3 and 4.4.): 
R! = R(Ni, qi) is the revenue function of the do\\nstream producer j 
0= C(Ni, qi, p-i) is the access tariff for the dovYnstream producer j, 
where: 
is the number of customer served by the dO\\nstream 
producer j (Ni = n, k for j=i, e) 
is the efficiency of the downstream producer j 
Ri . andCi . NJ NJ 
Rtandct 
E(k) and E(n) 
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is the component of the cost function independent of 
the scale of entry 
is the per customer output of the dovmstream producer 
J 
are the partial derivatives of the revenue and cost 
function \\ith respect to the number of customers 
served by each downstream producers 
are the partial derivatives of the revenue and cost 
function \ ... ith respect to the bundle qiL 
are the elasticity of the cost function \\ith respect to the 
number of customers (k and n respectively) 
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